WINDS OF DOCTRINE

STUDIES IN

CONTEMPORARY OPINION

BY

G. SANTAYANA

LATE PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY



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教义之风

研究

当代思想

作者

乔治·桑塔亚那

哈佛大学已故哲学教授



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WINDS OF DOCTRINE

I

THE INTELLECTUAL TEMPER OF THE AGE

The present age is a critical one and interesting to live in. The civilisation characteristic of Christendom has not disappeared, yet another civilisation has begun to take its place. We still understand the value of religious faith; we still appreciate the pompous arts of our forefathers; we are brought up on academic architecture, sculpture, painting, poetry, and music. We still love monarchy and aristocracy, together with that picturesque and dutiful order which rested on local institutions, class privileges, and the authority of the family. We may even feel an organic need for all these things, cling to them tenaciously, and dream of rejuvenating them. On the other hand the shell of Christendom is broken. The unconquerable mind of the East, the pagan past, the industrial socialistic future confront it with their equal authority. Our whole life and mind is saturated with the slow upward filtration of a new spirit—that of an emancipated, atheistic, international democracy.

These epithets may make us shudder; but what they describe is something positive and self-justified, something deeply rooted in our animal nature and inspiring to our hearts, something which, like every vital impulse, is pregnant with a morality of its own. In vain do we deprecate it; it has possession of us already through our propensities, fashions, and language. Our very plutocrats and

教义之风

I

时代的思想气质

当前时代是一个批判的时代，也是一个值得生活的有趣时代。基督教世界的文明特征尚未消失，然而另一种文明已开始取而代之。我们仍然理解宗教信仰的价值；我们仍然欣赏我们先祖那些浮华的艺术；我们是在学院式的建筑、雕塑、绘画、诗歌和音乐中成长起来的。我们仍然热爱君主制和贵族制，连同那幅如画般且尽职尽责的秩序--它建立在地方制度、阶级特权和家庭权威之上。我们甚至可能对这一切感到一种有机的需要，执着地依附于它们，并梦想着使它们复兴。另一方面，基督教世界的外壳已经破裂。东方那不可征服的心灵、异教的过去、工业社会主义的未来，以其同等的权威与之对峙。我们的全部生活和心灵都浸透了一种新精神的缓慢向上渗透--那是一种解放了的、无神论的、国际性的民主精神。

这些称谓或许令我们不寒而栗；但它们所描述的东西是积极的、自证的，深深植根于我们的动物本性之中并激励着我们的心灵，它如同每一种生命冲动一样，孕育着一种属于自身的道德。我们贬斥它亦是徒劳；它已经通过我们的癖性、风尚和语言占有了我们。我们那些财阀和

monarchs are at ease only when they are vulgar. Even prelates and missionaries are hardly sincere or conscious of an honest function, save as they devote themselves to social work; for willy-nilly the new spirit has hold of our consciences as well. This spirit is amiable as well as disquieting, liberating as well as barbaric; and a philosopher in our day, conscious both of the old life and of the new, might repeat what Goethe said of his successive love affairs—that it is sweet to see the moon rise while the sun is still mildly shining.

君主们只有在粗俗时才能安适。甚至高级教士和传教士也几乎不真诚，或不意识到一种诚实的职能，除非他们献身于社会工作；因为不管愿意与否，新精神也同样抓住了我们的良心。这种精神既可亲又令人不安，既解放又野蛮；我们时代的一位哲学家，同时意识到旧生活和新生活，可能会重复歌德关于他接连不断的恋情所说的话--那就是，当太阳仍温和地照耀时，看着月亮升起是甜蜜的。

Meantime our bodies in this generation are generally safe, and often comfortable; and for those who can suspend their irrational labours long enough to look about them, the spectacle of the world, if not particularly beautiful or touching, presents a rapid and crowded drama and (what here concerns me most) one unusually intelligible. The nations, parties, and movements that divide the scene have a known history. We are not condemned, as most generations have been, to fight and believe without an inkling of the cause. The past lies before us; the history of everything is published. Every one records his opinion, and loudly proclaims what he wants. In this Babel of ideals few demands are ever literally satisfied; but many evaporate, merge together, and reach an unintended issue, with which they are content. The whole drift of things presents a huge, good-natured comedy to the observer. It stirs not unpleasantly a certain sturdy animality and hearty self-trust which lie at the base of human nature.

与此同时，我们这一代人的身体通常是安全的，往往也是舒适的；而对于那些能够暂时搁置其非理性劳作足够长久以环顾四周的人来说，世界的景象，即使不是特别美丽或动人，也呈现出一场迅速而拥挤的戏剧，而且(此处最令我关切的是)一场异常可理解的戏剧。划分这一场景的各个民族、党派和运动都有着已知的历史。我们不像大多数世代那样，注定要在对原因毫无所知的情况下战斗和信仰。过去就展现在我们面前；一切事物的历史都已出版。每个人都记录自己的意见，并大声宣告自己想要什么。在这理想的巴别塔中，很少有要求被真正满足；但许多要求蒸发、融合，并达到一个意想不到的结果，而他们对此感到满意。事物的整个趋势向观察者呈现出一场巨大而善意的喜剧。它并非不愉快地激起了某种坚实的动物性和由衷的自信--这些正位于人性的基底。

A chief characteristic of the situation is that moral confusion is not limited to the world at large, always the scene of profound conflicts, but that it has penetrated to the mind and heart of the average individual. Never perhaps were men so like one another

这一处境的一个主要特征是，道德混乱并不局限于那个始终是深刻冲突之舞台的广大世界，而是已经渗透到普通个体的心灵与心中。也许从未有过人们如此彼此相像

and so divided within themselves. In other ages, even more than at present, different classes of men have stood at different levels of culture, with a magnificent readiness to persecute and to be martyred for their respective principles. These militant believers have been keenly conscious that they had enemies; but their enemies were strangers to them, whom they could think of merely as such, regarding them as blank negative forces, hateful black devils, whose existence might make life difficult but could not confuse the ideal of life. No one sought to understand these enemies of his, nor even to conciliate them, unless under compulsion or out of insidious policy, to convert them against their will; he merely pelted them with blind refutations and clumsy blows. Every one sincerely felt that the right was entirely on his side, a proof that such intelligence as he had moved freely and exclusively within the lines of his faith. The result of this was that his faith was intelligent, I mean, that he understood it, and had a clear, almost instinctive perception of what was compatible or incompatible with it. He defended his walls and he cultivated his garden. His position and his possessions were unmistakable.

因而在自身内部如此分裂。在其他时代，甚至比现在更甚，不同阶层的人站在不同的文化层次上，怀着一种宏大的准备，为各自的原则去迫害和殉道。这些好战的信徒敏锐地意识到他们有敌人；但他们的敌人对他们来说是陌生人，他们只能把敌人设想为敌人，将其视为空洞的否定力量、可恨的黑色魔鬼，其存在可能使生活艰难，却不能混淆生活的理想。没有人试图理解自己的这些敌人，甚至不去安抚他们，除非在强迫之下或出于阴险的策略，去违背他们的意愿使他们皈依；他仅仅用盲目的反驳和笨拙的打击向他们投掷。每个人都真诚地感到正义完全在自己一边，这证明他所具有的智力自由地且专一地在他的信仰界限内活动。这样做的结果是他的信仰是明智的，我的意思是，他理解它，并且对什么与它相容或不相容有一种清晰的、几乎是本能的知觉。他保卫自己的城墙，耕耘自己的花园。他的立场和他的财产都是明确无误的。

When men and minds were so distinct it was possible to describe and to count them. During the Reformation, when external confusion was at its height, you might have ascertained almost statistically what persons and what regions each side snatched from the other; it was not doubtful which was which. The history of their respective victories and defeats could consequently be written. So in the eighteenth century it was easy to perceive how many people Voltaire and Rousseau might be alienating from Bossuet and Fénelon. But how shall we satisfy ourselves now whether, for instance, Christianity is holding its own? Who can

当人和心灵如此分明时，就有可能描述和计数它们。在宗教改革时期，当外部混乱达到顶点时，你几乎可以用统计方法查明每一方从另一方夺取了哪些人和哪些地区；何者为何者并非可疑。因此，他们各自胜利和失败的历史可以被书写。同样，在十八世纪，很容易看出伏尔泰和卢梭可能使多少人背离博絮埃和费奈隆。但如今我们如何使自己确信，例如，基督教是否在坚守阵地?谁能

tell what vagary or what compromise may not be calling itself Christianity? A bishop may be a modernist, a chemist may be a mystical theologian, a psychologist may be a believer in ghosts. For science, too, which had promised to supply a new and solid foundation for philosophy, has allowed philosophy rather to undermine its foundation, and is seen eating its own words, through the mouths of some of its accredited spokesmen, and reducing itself to something utterly conventional and insecure. It is characteristic of human nature to be as impatient of ignorance regarding what is not known as lazy in acquiring such knowledge as is at hand; and even those who have not been lazy sometimes take it into their heads to disparage their science and to outdo the professional philosophers in psychological scepticism, in order to plunge with them into the most vapid speculation. Nor is this insecurity about first principles limited to abstract subjects. It reigns in politics as well. Liberalism had been supposed to advocate liberty; but what the advanced parties that still call themselves liberal now advocate is control, control over property, trade, wages, hours of work, meat and drink, amusements, and in a truly advanced country like France control over education and religion; and it is only on the subject of marriage (if we ignore eugenics) that liberalism is growing more and more liberal. Those who speak most of progress measure it by quantity and not by quality; how many people read and write, or how many people there are, or what is the annual value of their trade; whereas true progress would rather lie in reading or writing fewer and better things, and being fewer and better men, and enjoying life more. But the philanthropists are now preparing an absolute subjection of the individual, in soul and body, to the instincts of the majority

什么样的怪想或什么样的妥协不可以自称基督教呢?一位主教可以是现代主义者，一位化学家可以是神秘的神学家，一位心理学家可以是相信鬼魂的人。因为科学也曾许诺为哲学提供一个崭新而坚实的基础，如今却容许哲学反而去瓦解它的基础，并且通过它一些公认的代言人之口，被人看到它自食其言，把自己化约为某种全然因袭而不可靠的东西。人性的一种特征便是：对于未知之事，它既不耐烦于自己的无知，又懒于获取手边已有的知识；甚至那些并不懒惰的人，有时也会心血来潮，贬低自己的科学，并在心理学的怀疑论上超过专业哲学家，以便同他们一起沉入最乏味的思辨。这种关于第一原则的不可靠性并不限于抽象主题。它在政治中同样盛行。自由主义本被认为倡导自由；但那些仍自称自由派的先进党派如今所倡导的却是控制，对财产、贸易、工资、工时、肉与酒、娱乐的控制，而在像法国这样真正先进的国家里，还有对教育和宗教的控制；只有在婚姻问题上(如果我们忽略优生学)，自由主义才变得越来越自由。那些大谈进步的人以数量而非质量来衡量进步：有多少人识字写字，或者有多少人口，或者他们的贸易年值多少；而真正的进步倒更应在于读写得少些而好些，人少些而好些，并且更多地享受生活。但慈善家们如今正在准备让个人在灵魂与身体上绝对服从于多数人的本能

—the most cruel and unprogressive of masters; and I am not sure that the liberal maxim, "the greatest happiness of the greatest number," has not lost whatever was just or generous in its intent and come to mean the greatest idleness of the largest possible population.

Nationality offers another occasion for strange moral confusion. It had seemed that an age that was levelling and connecting all nations, an age whose real achievements were of international application, was destined to establish the solidarity of mankind as a sort of axiom. The idea of solidarity is indeed often invoked in speeches, and there is an extreme socialistic party that—when a wave of national passion does not carry it the other way—believes in international brotherhood. But even here, black men and yellow men are generally excluded; and in higher circles, where history, literature, and political ambition dominate men's minds, nationalism has become of late an omnivorous all-permeating passion. Local parliaments must be everywhere established, extinct or provincial dialects must be galvanised into national languages, philosophy must be made racial, religion must be fostered where it emphasises nationality and denounced where it transcends it. Man is certainly an animal that, when he lives at all, lives for ideals. Something must be found to occupy his imagination, to raise pleasure and pain into love and hatred, and change the prosaic alternative between comfort and discomfort into the tragic one between happiness and sorrow. Now that the hue of daily adventure is so dull, when religion for the most part is so vague and accommodating, when even war is a vast impersonal business, nationality seems to have slipped into the place of honour. It has become the one eloquent, public, intrepid

--最残酷且最不进步的主人；而我不确定那条自由主义格言“最大多数人的最大幸福”是否已经丧失了其意图中一切公正或宽厚之处，转而意味着尽可能多的人口的最大闲散。

民族性为另一种奇怪的道德混乱提供了场合。人们似乎曾以为，一个正在拉平并连接所有民族的时代，一个其真正成就是具有国际应用性的时代，注定要确立人类的团结，作为一种公理。团结的观念确实常在演说中被援引，并且有一个极端社会主义的党派--当一阵民族激情的浪潮没有把它带向相反方向时--相信国际兄弟情谊。但即便在这里，黑人和黄种人通常也被排除在外；而在更高的圈子里，历史、文学和政治野心支配着人们的心灵，民族主义近来已成为一种无所不食、无孔不入的激情。地方议会必须在各地建立，已消亡的或地方性的方言必须被通电激活为民族语言，哲学必须被种族化，宗教必须在强调民族性之处受到扶植，而在超越民族性之处受到谴责。人确实是一种动物，只要他活着，就为理想而活。必须找到某种东西来占据他的想象，把快乐和痛苦提升为爱与恨，并把舒适与不适之间平淡无奇的取舍变成幸福与悲伤之间悲剧性的取舍。既然日常冒险的色彩如此沉闷，既然宗教多半如此模糊而随和，既然连战争也是一桩庞大的非个人事务，民族性似乎就溜进了荣誉的位置。它已成为唯一雄辩的、公共的、无畏的

illusion. Illusion, I mean, when it is taken for an ultimate good or a mystical essence, for of course nationality is a fact. People speak some particular language and are very uncomfortable where another is spoken or where their own is spoken differently. They have habits, judgments, assumptions to which they are wedded, and a society where all this is unheard of shocks them and puts them at a galling disadvantage. To ignorant people the foreigner as such is ridiculous, unless he is superior to them in numbers or prestige, when he becomes hateful. It is natural for a man to like to live at home, and to live long elsewhere without a sense of exile is not good for his moral integrity. It is right to feel a greater kinship and affection for what lies nearest to oneself. But this necessary fact and even duty of nationality is accidental; like age or sex it is a physical fatality which can be made the basis of specific and comely virtues; but it is not an end to pursue or a flag to flaunt or a privilege not balanced by a thousand incapacities. Yet of this distinction our contemporaries tend to make an idol, perhaps because it is the only distinction they feel they have left.

幻象。我的意思是幻象，当它被当作一种终极的善或一种神秘的本质上时，因为民族性当然是一个事实。人们说某种特定的语言，而在说另一种语言的地方，或在他们自己的语言被说得不同的地方，他们便很不自在。他们有一些习惯、判断、预设，他们与之结为连理，而一个对这一切闻所未闻的社会会令他们震惊，并使他们处于令人恼火的劣势。对无知的人来说，外国人本身便是可笑的，除非他在人数或威望上优于他们，那时他便变得可恨。人喜欢在家乡生活是自然的，而在别处长久生活却没有流放之感，对他的道德操守并不好。对最贴近自身的东西感到更深的亲缘和情感，是正确的。但这种民族性的必要事实乃至义务是偶然的；像年龄或性别一样，它是一种身体上的命定，可以被当作特定而合宜的德性的基础；但它不是要追求的目的，不是要炫耀的旗帜，也不是一种没有千百种无能来平衡的特权。然而我们的同时代人却倾向于把这种区别做成一个偶像，也许是因为这是他们觉得自己仅剩的唯一区别。

Anomalies of this sort will never be properly understood until people accustom themselves to a theory to which they have always turned a deaf ear, because, though simple and true, it is materialistic: namely, that mind is not the cause of our actions but an effect, collateral with our actions, of bodily growth and organisation. It may therefore easily come about that the thoughts of men, tested by the principles that seem to rule their conduct, may be belated, or irrelevant, or premonitory; for the living organism has many strata, on any of which, at a given moment, activities may exist perfect enough to involve consciousness, yet too weak and isolated to control the organs of outer expression; so

这类反常现象永远不会被真正理解，除非人们使自己习惯于一种他们一向充耳不闻的理论，因为，尽管简单而真实，它却是唯物主义的：即心灵不是我们行动的原因，而是一种结果，与我们的行动并行，是身体生长和组织的产物。因此很容易出现这样的情况：人的思想，用似乎支配其行为的原则来检验，可能是滞后的，或不相干的，或预兆性的；因为活的有机体有许多层次，在任一层次上，在某一时刻，活动都可能存在得足够完善以牵涉意识，却又太弱且孤立而无法控制外部表现的器官；所以

that (to speak geologically) our practice may be historic, our manners glacial, and our religion palæozoic. The ideals of the nineteenth century may be said to have been all belated; the age still yearned with Rousseau or speculated with Kant, while it moved with Darwin, Bismarck, and Nietzsche: and to-day, in the half-educated classes, among the religious or revolutionary sects, we may observe quite modern methods of work allied with a somewhat antiquated mentality. The whole nineteenth century might well cry with Faust: "Two souls, alas, dwell in my bosom!" The revolutions it witnessed filled it with horror and made it fall in love romantically with the past and dote on ruins, because they were ruins; and the best learning and fiction of the time were historical, inspired by an unprecedented effort to understand remote forms of life and feeling, to appreciate exotic arts and religions, and to rethink the blameless thoughts of savages and criminals. This sympathetic labour and retrospect, however, was far from being merely sentimental; for the other half of this divided soul was looking ahead. Those same revolutions, often so destructive, stupid, and bloody, filled it with pride, and prompted it to invent several incompatible theories concerning a steady and inevitable progress in the world. In the study of the past, side by side with romantic sympathy, there was a sort of realistic, scholarly intelligence and an adventurous love of truth; kindness too was often mingled with dramatic curiosity. The pathologists were usually healers, the philosophers of evolution were inventors or humanitarians or at least idealists: the historians of art (though optimism was impossible here) were also guides to taste, quickeners of moral sensibility, like Ruskin, or enthusiasts for the irresponsibly beautiful, like Pater and Oscar Wilde. Everywhere in

(用地质学的话说)我们的实践可能是历史性的，我们的风俗可能是冰川期的，我们的宗教可能是古生代的。十九世纪的理想可以说全都是滞后的；那个时代仍与卢梭一起向往，或与康德一起思辨，而它却与达尔文、俾斯麦和尼采一起行进；而今天，在半受教育的阶层中，在宗教或革命的派别中，我们可能观察到相当现代的工作方法与某种颇为陈旧的心态相结合。整个十九世纪大可随浮士德一起呼喊：“唉，两个灵魂栖居在我的胸中!”它目睹的革命使它充满恐惧，并使它浪漫地爱上过去，痴迷于废墟，因为它们是废墟；而当时最好的学问和小说都是历史性的，受一种前所未有的努力所激发，去理解遥远的生活与情感形式，去欣赏异域的艺术和宗教，去重新思考野蛮人和罪犯那无可指责的思想。然而这种同情的劳作和回顾远非仅仅是感伤的；因为这分裂的灵魂的另一半在向前看。那些同样的革命，往往如此具有破坏性、愚蠢而血腥，却使它充满自豪，并促使它发明好几种互不相容的理论，关于世界上一种稳定而不可避免的进步。在对过去的研究中，与浪漫的同情并肩而立的，有一种现实主义的、学者式的智识和一种冒险的求真之爱；仁慈也常与戏剧性的好奇相混合。病理学家通常是治疗者，进化哲学家是发明家或人道主义者，或至少是理想主义者：艺术史家(尽管在这里乐观主义是不可能的)也是趣味的向导、道德感受性的激发者，如罗斯金，或对不负责任之美热衷的人，如佩特和王尔德。在

the nineteenth century we find a double preoccupation with the past and with the future, a longing to know what all experience might have been hitherto, and on the other hand to hasten to some wholly different experience, to be contrived immediately with a beating heart and with flying banners. The imagination of the age was intent on history; its conscience was intent on reform.

在十九世纪，我们发现一种对过去与未来的双重专注，一种渴望知道迄今为止一切经验可能曾是什么，另一方面又渴望加速走向某种全然不同的经验，以跳动的心和飘扬的旗帜即刻筹划之。那个时代的想象专注于历史；它的良心专注于改革。

Reform! This magic word itself covers a great equivocation. To reform means to shatter one form and to create another; but the two sides of the act are not always equally intended nor equally successful. Usually the movement starts from the mere sense of oppression, and people break down some established form, without any qualms about the capacity of their freed instincts to generate the new forms that may be needed. So the Reformation, in destroying the traditional order, intended to secure truth, spontaneity, and profuseness of religious forms; the danger of course being that each form might become meagre and the sum of them chaotic. If the accent, however, could only be laid on the second phase of the transformation, reform might mean the creation of order where it did not sufficiently appear, so that diffuse life should be concentrated into a congenial form that should render it strong and self-conscious. In this sense, if we may trust Mr. Gilbert Murray, it was a great wave of reform that created Greece, or at least all that was characteristic and admirable in it—an effort to organise, train, simplify, purify, and make beautiful the chaos of barbaric customs and passions that had preceded. The clanger here, a danger to which Greece actually succumbed, is that so refined an organism may be too fragile, not inclusive enough within, and not buttressed strongly enough without against the flux of the uncivilised world.

改革!这个神奇的词本身就包含着极大的歧义。改革意味着打碎一种形式并创造另一种形式；但这一行动的两个方面并不总是被同等意欲，也不总是同等成功。通常，运动始于单纯的压迫感，人们打破某种既定的形式，而对他们被解放的本能能否产生可能需要的新形式毫无顾虑。因此，宗教改革在摧毁传统秩序时，意在确保真理、自发性和宗教形式的丰富性；当然，危险在于每种形式都可能变得贫乏，而它们的总和则混乱无序。然而，如果重心只能放在转变的第二阶段，改革就可能意味着在秩序尚未充分显现之处创造秩序，使分散的生命集中于一种相宜的形式，从而使其强大而具有自我意识。在这个意义上，如果我们能相信吉尔伯特·默里先生，正是一场伟大的改革浪潮创造了希腊，或者至少创造了希腊一切独特而令人钦佩的东西--一种努力，去组织、训练、简化、净化并美化先于它的野蛮习俗与激情的混沌。这里的危险，也是希腊实际屈服于其中的危险，在于如此精致的有机体可能过于脆弱，对内包容不足，对外又未能足够有力地抵御未开化世界的流变。

Christianity also, in the first formative centuries of its existence, was an integrating reform of the same sort, on a different scale and in a different sphere; but here too an enslaved rabble within the soul claiming the suffrage, and better equipped intellectual empires rising round about, seem to prove that the harmony which the Christian system made for a moment out of nature and life was partial and insecure. It is a terrible dilemma in the life of reason whether it will sacrifice natural abundance to moral order, or moral order to natural abundance. Whatever compromise we choose proves unstable, and forces us to a new experiment.

基督教在其存在的最初形成世纪中，也是一种同一类型的整合性改革，只是规模不同、领域不同；但在这里同样，灵魂内部一群要求选举权的被奴役的乌合之众，以及周围崛起的装备更好的知识帝国，似乎证明基督教体系一度从自然和生命中造就的和谐是局部的、不稳固的。在理性的生活中，这是一个可怕的困境：究竟是为道德秩序牺牲自然的丰盛，还是为自然的丰盛牺牲道德秩序。无论我们选择何种妥协，都证明是不稳定的，并迫使我们进行新的实验。

Perhaps in the century that has elapsed since the French Revolution the pendulum has had time to swing as far as it will in the direction of negative reform, and may now begin to move towards that sort of reform which is integrating and creative. The veering of the advanced political parties from liberalism to socialism would seem to be a clear indication of this new tendency. It is manifest also in the love of nature, in athletics, in the new woman, and in a friendly medical attitude towards all the passions.

也许在法国大革命以来的一个世纪里，钟摆已有时间在消极改革的方向上摆到它所能摆到的最远处，现在可能开始朝着那种整合性和创造性的改革移动。先进政党从自由主义转向社会主义，似乎清楚地表明了这种新倾向。这种倾向也表现在对自然的热爱、体育运动、新女性以及对一切激情的友好医学态度中。

In the fine arts, however, and in religion and philosophy, we are still in full career towards disintegration. It might have been thought that a germ of rational order would by this time have penetrated into fine art and speculation from the prosperous constructive arts that touch the one, and the prosperous natural and mathematical sciences that touch the other. But as yet there is little sign of it. Since the beginning of the nineteenth century painting and sculpture have passed through several phases, representatives of each naturally surviving after the next had appeared. Romanticism, half lurid, half effeminate, yielded to a

然而，在美术中，以及在宗教和哲学中，我们仍然全速奔向解体。人们或许会以为，到这时，理性的秩序胚芽本应从那触及美术的繁荣的建设性艺术，以及那触及思辨的繁荣的自然科学和数学科学，渗入美术和思辨之中。但迄今几乎没有这种迹象。自十九世纪初以来，绘画和雕塑已经历了几个阶段，每个阶段的代表在下一阶段出现之后自然仍然存续。浪漫主义，一半阴郁炽烈，一半柔弱娇媚，让位于一种

brutal pursuit of material truth, and a pious preference for modern and humble sentiment. This realism had a romantic vein in it, and studied vice and crime, tedium and despair, with a very genuine horrified sympathy. Some went in for a display of archaeological lore or for exotic *motifs*; others gave all their attention to rediscovering and emphasising abstract problems of execution, the highway of technical tradition having long been abandoned. Beginners are still supposed to study their art, but they have no masters from whom to learn it. Thus, when there seemed to be some danger that art should be drowned in science and history, the artists deftly eluded it by becoming amateurs. One gave himself to religious archaism, another to Japanese composition, a third to barbaric symphonies of colour; sculptors tried to express dramatic climaxes, or inarticulate lyrical passion, such as music might better convey; and the latest whims are apparently to abandon painful observation altogether, to be merely decorative or frankly mystical, and to be satisfied with the childishness of hieroglyphics or the crudity of caricature. The arts are like truant children who think their life will be glorious if they only run away and play for ever; no need is felt of a dominant ideal passion and theme, nor of any moral interest in the interpretation of nature. Artists have no less talent than ever; their taste, their vision, their sentiment are often interesting; they are mighty in their independence and feeble only in their works.

对物质真理的粗暴追求，以及对现代而谦卑的情感的虔诚偏好。这种实在论其中带有一种浪漫气质，以非常真诚的惊骇同情研究罪恶与犯罪、沉闷与绝望。有些人热衷于展示考古学识或异域母题；另一些人则全神贯注于重新发现并强调抽象的表现问题，因为技术传统的通衢早已被抛弃。初学者仍被假定要学习他们的艺术，但他们没有可以师从的大师。因此，当似乎存在某种危险，即艺术可能被科学和历史淹没时，艺术家们巧妙地通过变成业余爱好者来回避它。一个人献身于宗教的复古，另一个人献身于日本的构图，第三个人献身于野蛮的色彩交响；雕塑家试图表达戏剧性的高潮，或不可言说的抒情激情，而这些或许音乐能更好地传达；最新的奇想显然是彻底放弃痛苦的观察，仅仅成为装饰性的或坦率地神秘主义的，并满足于象形文字的幼稚或漫画的粗糙。艺术就像逃学的孩子，以为只要永远跑出去玩耍，他们的生活就会辉煌灿烂；人们感觉不到需要一种主导的理想激情和主题，也感觉不到在解释自然时需要任何道德兴趣。艺术家的才能并不比以往少；他们的品味、他们的眼光、他们的情感往往有趣；他们在独立性上强大，仅在作品上软弱。

In philosophy there are always the professors, as in art there are always the portrait painters and the makers of official sculpture; and both sorts of academicians are often very expert and well-educated. Yet in philosophy, besides the survival of all the official and endowed systems, there has been of late a very interesting

在哲学中总有教授，正如在艺术中总有肖像画家和官方雕塑的制作者；而这两类学院中人往往非常内行且受过良好教育。然而在哲学中，除了所有官方和受资助体系的存续之外，近来还出现了一种非常有趣的

fresh movement, largely among the professors themselves, which in its various hues may be called irrationalism, vitalism, pragmatism, or pure empiricism. But this movement, far from being a reawakening of any organising instinct, is simply an extreme expression of romantic anarchy. It is in essence but a franker confession of the principle upon which modern philosophy has been building—or unbuilding—for these three hundred years, I mean the principle of subjectivity. Berkeley and Hume, the first prophets of the school, taught that experience is not a partial discovery of other things but is itself the only possible object of experience. Therefore, said Kant and the second generation of prophets, any world we may seem to live in, even those worlds of theology or of history which Berkeley or Hume had inadvertently left standing, must be an idea which our present experience suggests to us and which we frame as the principles of our mind allow and dictate that we should. But then, say the latest prophets —Avenarius, William James, M. Bergson—these mental principles are no antecedent necessities or duties imposed on our imagination; they are simply parts of flying experience itself, and the ideas—say of God or of matter—which they lead us to frame have nothing compulsory or fixed about them. Their sole authority lies in the fact that they may be more or less congenial or convenient, by enriching the flying moment æsthetically, or helping it to slip prosperously into the next moment. Immediate feeling, pure experience, is the only reality, the only *fact*: if notions which do not reproduce it fully as it flows are still called true (and they evidently ought not to be) it is only in a pragmatic sense of the word, in that while they present a false and heterogeneous image of reality they are not practically

一场新的运动，主要发生在教授们自己中间，按其各种色调可被称为非理性主义、活力论、实用主义或纯粹经验主义。但这场运动远非任何组织性本能的重新觉醒，而不过是浪漫无政府主义的一种极端表达。它本质上只是对现代哲学三百年来一直在建立--或一直在拆毁--所依据的那条原则更为坦率的供认，我指的是主体性原则。贝克莱和休谟，这一学派最早的先知，教导说经验并非对其他事物的部分发现，而本身就是经验唯一可能的对象。因此，康德和第二代先知们说，我们似乎生活于其中的任何世界，甚至贝克莱或休谟不经意间留存下来的那些神学或历史的世界，都必定是我们的当下经验向我们暗示的观念，是我们按照我们心灵的原则所允许并规定的方式构造出来的。但接着，最新的先知们--阿芬那留斯、威廉·詹姆斯、柏格森先生--说，这些心灵原则并非先于经验强加于我们想象之上的必然性或义务；它们不过是流动经验本身的部分，而它们引导我们构造的观念--比如上帝或物质的观念--并无任何强制或固定之处。它们唯一的权威在于这样一个事实：它们可能或多或少令人惬意或方便，或以审美方式丰富那飞逝的瞬间，或帮助它顺利地滑入下一个瞬间。直接的感觉、纯粹的经验，是唯一的实在，唯一的事实：如果那些不能完整再现流动中的经验的观念仍被称为真的(它们显然不应如此)，那只是在“真”一词的实用主义意义上，即当它们呈现出一幅虚假而异质的实在图像时，它们在实践上并不

misleading; as, for instance, the letters on this page are no true image of the sounds they call up, nor the sounds of the thoughts, yet both may be correct enough if they lead the reader in the end to the things they symbolise. It is M. Bergson, the most circumspect and best equipped thinker of this often scatter-brained school, who has put this view in a frank and tenable form, avoiding the bungling it has sometimes led to about the "meaning of truth." Truth, according to M. Bergson, is given only in intuitions which prolong experience just as it occurs, in its full immediacy; on the other hand, all representation, thought, theory, calculation, or discourse is so much mutilation of the truth, excusable only because imposed upon us by practical exigences. The world, being a feeling, must be felt to be known, and then the world and the knowledge of it are identical; but if it is talked about or thought about it is denaturalised, although convention and utility may compel the poor human being to talk and to think, exiled as he is from reality in his Babylon of abstractions. Life, like the porcupine when not ruffled by practical alarms, can let its fretful quills subside. The mystic can live happy in the droning consciousness of his own heart-beats and those of the universe.

With this we seem to have reached the extreme of self-concentration and self-expansion, the perfect identity and involution of everything in oneself. And such indeed is the inevitable goal of the malicious theory of knowledge, to which this school is committed, remote as that goal may be from the boyish naturalism and innocent intent of many of its pupils. If all knowledge is of experience and experience cannot be knowledge of anything else, knowledge proper is evidently impossible. There can be only feeling; and the least self-transcendence, even in

误导；例如，本页上的字母并非它们所唤起的 sound 的真实图像，sound 也非思想的真实图像，然而只要它们最终引导读者抵达它们所象征的事物，两者都可能足够正确。正是柏格森先生，这个常常头脑散乱的学派中最审慎、装备最好的思想家，将这一观点置于坦率而站得住脚的形式中，避免了它有时导致的关于“真理的意义”的笨拙处理。按照柏格森先生，真理只在直觉中给出，直觉延展经验恰如其发生的样子，在其充分的直接性中；另一方面，一切表象、思想、理论、计算或话语都是对真理的肢解，其可原谅仅因为实践 exigences 强加于我们。世界既然是一种情感，就必须被感受到才能被认识，于是世界与对它的认识是同一的；但如果它被谈论或被思考，它就被去自然化了，尽管习俗与效用可能迫使可怜的人类去谈论和思考，因为他被放逐于抽象之巴比伦，远离实在。生命，如同未被实践警报惊扰的豪猪，可以让它烦躁的刺平息下来。神秘主义者可以在他自己心跳和宇宙心跳的嗡嗡意识中幸福地生活。

至此我们似乎已到达自我集中与自我扩张的极端，一切在自身中的完美同一与内卷。而这确实就是这个学派所承诺的恶意的知识论的不可避免的目标，尽管该目标可能远离其许多学生稚气的自然主义和无邪意图。如果一切知识都是关于经验的，而经验不可能是关于其他任何事物的知识，那么严格意义上的知识显然是不可能的。只可能有情感；而哪怕最微小的自我超越，即使在

memory, must be an illusion. You may have the most complex images you will; but nothing pictured there can exist outside, not even past or alien experience, if you picture it.[1] Solipsism has always been the evident implication of idealism; but the idealists, when confronted with this consequence, which is dialectically inconvenient, have never been troubled at heart by it, for at heart they accept it. To the uninitiated they have merely murmured, with a pitying smile and a wave of the hand: What! are you still troubled by that? Or if compelled to be so scholastic as to labour the point they have explained, as usual, that oneself cannot be the absolute because the *idea* of oneself, to arise, must be contrasted with other ideas. Therefore, you cannot well have the idea of a world in which nothing appears but the *idea* of yourself.

记忆，必定是一种幻觉。你尽可以拥有最复杂的意象；但凡是你在心中描绘出来的东西，都不可能在外部存在，哪怕是过去的或异己的经验，只要你把它描绘出来。[1]唯我论向来是唯心论显而易见的蕴含；然而唯心论者面对这一在辩证上颇为不便的后果时，内心从未为此困扰，因为他们心底里是接受它的。对未入门者，他们只是带着怜悯的微笑、挥一挥手，低声说道：怎么!你还为那个困扰吗?或者，倘若被迫如此经院气地细究这一点，他们便照例解释说，自我不可能是绝对者，因为自我的观念若要产生，就必须与其他观念相对照。因此，你无法很好地拥有这样一个世界的观念：在其中显现的除了你自己的观念之外别无他物。

This explanation, in pretending to refute solipsism, of course assumes and confirms it; for all these *cans* and *musts* touch only your idea of yourself, not your actual being, and there is no thinkable world that is not within you, as you exist really. Thus idealists are wedded to solipsism irrevocably; and it is a happy marriage, only the name of the lady has to be changed.

这一解释在假装反驳唯我论时，当然预设并确认了它；因为所有这些能够和必须只触及你对自己的观念，而非你的实际存在，并且不存在任何可思的世界不在你之内，正如你真实地存在那样。因此，唯心主义者不可撤销地与唯我论结为连理；这是一桩幸福的婚姻，只是这位女士的名字必须被更换。

Nevertheless, lest peace should come (and peace nowadays is neither possible nor desired), a counter-current at once overtakes the philosophy of the immediate and carries it violently to the opposite pole of speculation—from mystic intuition to a commercial cult of action and a materialisation of the mind such as no materialist had ever dreamt of. The tenderness which the pragmatists feel for life in general, and especially for an accelerated modern life, has doubtless contributed to this

然而，唯恐和平降临(而和平如今既不可能也不被渴望)，一股逆流立刻赶上了直接性的哲学，并猛烈地将其带向思辨的对极--从神秘直觉转向一种商业性的行动崇拜和一种心灵的物质化，那是任何唯物主义者都从未梦想过的。实用主义者对一般生命、尤其是对加速的现代生活所怀的温情，无疑促成了这一点

revulsion, but the speculative consideration of the immediate might have led to it independently. For in the immediate there is marked expectancy, craving, prayer; nothing absorbs consciousness so much as what is not quite given. Therefore it is a good reading of the immediate, as well as a congenial thing to say to the contemporary world, that reality is change, growth, action, creation. Similarly the sudden materialisation of mind, the unlooked-for assertion that consciousness does not exist, has its justification in the same quarter. In the immediate what appears is the thing, not the mind to which the thing appears. Even in the passions, when closely scanned introspectively, you will find a new sensitiveness or ebullition of the body, or a rush of images and words; you will hardly find a separate object called anger or love. The passions, therefore, when their moral essence is forgotten, may be said to be literally nothing but a movement of their organs and their objects, just as ideas may be said to be nothing but fragments or cross-threads of the material world. Thus the mind and the object are rolled into one moving mass; motions are identified with passions, things are perceptions extended, perceptions are things cut down. And, by a curious revolution in sentiment, it is things and motions that are reputed to have the fuller and the nobler reality. Under cover of a fusion or neutrality between idealism and realism, moral materialism, the reverence for mere existence and power, takes possession of the heart, and ethics becomes idolatrous. Idolatry, however, is hardly possible if you have a cold and clear idea of blocks and stones, attributing to them only the motions they are capable of; and accordingly idealism, by way of compensation, has to take possession of physics. The idol begins to wink and drop tears under the wistful

反感，但对当下的思辨考察本可以独立地导致它。因为在当下中有明显的期待、渴望、祈祷；没有什么比尚未完全给出的东西更能占据意识。因此，说实在是变化、生长、行动、创造，既是对当下的良好解读，也是对当代世界说的一件惬意之事。同样，心灵的突然物质化，即意识不存在这一意外断言，也在同一处有其正当理由。在当下中，显现的是事物，而非事物向其显现的心灵。即使在激情中，当内省地仔细审视时，你会发现身体的一种新的敏感性或沸腾，或图像和词语的涌流；你几乎找不到一个被称为愤怒或爱的独立对象。因此，激情，当其道德本质被遗忘时，可以说字面上不过是其器官及其对象的运动，正如观念可以说不过是物质世界的碎片或交叉线。于是心灵与对象被卷入一个运动的质量中；运动与激情同一，事物是延展的知觉，知觉是被削减的事物。而且，通过情感上的一种奇特革命，正是事物和运动被认为具有更充实、更高贵的实在。在唯心论与实在论之间融合或中立的外衣下，道德唯物论，对单纯存在和力量的崇敬，占据了心灵，伦理学变成偶像崇拜。然而，如果你对块状物和石头有冷静清晰的概念，只赋予它们它们所能有的运动，偶像崇拜几乎不可能；因此，唯心论作为补偿，必须占据物理学。偶像开始在渴望的

gaze of the worshipper. Matter is felt to yearn, and evolution is held to be more divinely inspired than policy or reason could ever be.

Extremes meet, and the tendency to practical materialism was never wholly absent from the idealism of the moderns. Certainly, the tumid respectability of Anglo-German philosophy had somehow to be left behind; and Darwinian England and Bismarckian Germany had another inspiration as well to guide them, if it could only come to consciousness in the professors. The worship of power is an old religion, and Hegel, to go no farther back, is full of it; but like traditional religion his system qualified its veneration for success by attributing success, in the future at least, to what could really inspire veneration; and such a master in equivocation could have no difficulty in convincing himself that the good must conquer in the end if whatever conquers in the end is the good. Among the pragmatists the worship of power is also optimistic, but it is not to logic that power is attributed. Science, they say, is good as a help to industry, and philosophy is good for correcting whatever in science might disturb religious faith, which in turn is helpful in living. What industry or life are good for it would be unsympathetic to inquire: the stream is mighty, and we must swim with the stream. Concern for survival, however, which seems to be the pragmatic principle in morals, does not afford a remedy for moral anarchy. To take firm hold on life, according to Nietzsche, we should be imperious, poetical, atheistic; but according to William James we should be democratic, concrete, and credulous. It is hard to say whether pragmatism is come to emancipate the individual spirit and make it lord over things, or on the contrary to declare the spirit a mere instrument for the

崇拜者的凝视。物质被感受为有所渴求，而进化被认为比政策或理性所能做到的更具神圣的灵感。

是。

两极相通，而实践唯物论的倾向从未完全从近代人的唯心论中消失。诚然，盎格鲁-德意志哲学那肿胀的体面总得被抛在身后；而达尔文式的英国与俾斯麦式的德国也有另一种灵感可供指引它们，只要这灵感能在教授们那里达到意识。对权力的崇拜是一种古老的宗教，黑格尔--不必追溯更远--就充满了这种崇拜；但如同传统宗教一样，他的体系通过把成功--至少在将来--归因于真正能激发崇敬的东西，来限定其对成功的尊崇；而这样一位歧义大师不难说服自己：善必在最终获胜，因为凡在最终获胜者即是善。在实用主义者中间，对权力的崇拜同样是乐观主义的，但权力并不被归因于逻辑。他们说，科学作为工业的助力是好的，哲学则好在于纠正科学中可能扰乱宗教信仰的一切，而宗教信仰又有助于生活。工业或生活究竟为了什么才是好的，去追问这一点将是不合同情的：洪流浩大，我们必须随流而泳。然而，对生存的关切--这似乎是道德中的实用主义原则--并不能为道德的无政府状态提供补救。按照尼采，要牢牢把握生命，我们应当专横、诗性、无神；但按照威廉·詹姆斯，我们应当民主、具体、轻信。很难说实用主义究竟是来解放个体精神并使之成为万物的主宰，还是相反，来宣称精神不过是

survival of the flesh. In Italy, the mind seems to be raised deliriously into an absolute creator, evoking at will, at each moment, a new past, a new future, a new earth, and a new God. In America, however, the mind is recommended rather as an unpatented device for oiling the engine of the body and making it do double work.

Trustful faith in evolution and a longing for intense life are characteristic of contemporary sentiment; but they do not appear to be consistent with that contempt for the intellect which is no less characteristic of it. Human intelligence is certainly a product, and a late and highly organised product, of evolution; it ought apparently to be as much admired as the eyes of molluscs or the antennae of ants. And if life is better the more intense and concentrated it is, intelligence would seem to be the best form of life. But the degree of intelligence which this age possesses makes it so very uncomfortable that, in this instance, it asks for something less vital, and sighs for what evolution has left behind. In the presence of such cruelly distinct things as astronomy or such cruelly confused things as theology it feels *la nostalgie de la boue*. It was only, M. Bergson tells us, where dead matter oppressed life that life was forced to become intelligence; for this reason intelligence kills whatever it touches; it is the tribute that life pays to death. Life would find it sweet to throw off that painful subjection to circumstance and bloom in some more congenial direction. M. Bergson's own philosophy is an effort to realise this revulsion, to disintegrate intelligence and stimulate sympathetic experience. Its charm lies in the relief which it brings to a stale imagination, an imagination from which religion has vanished and which is kept stretched on the machinery of business

肉体的存续。在意大利，心灵似乎被狂喜地提升为一位绝对的创造者，随心所欲地在每一时刻唤起一个新的过去、一个新的未来、一个新的大地和一个新的上帝。然而在美国，心灵则更多地被推荐为一种未获专利的装置，用来为身体的引擎上油，使其做双倍的工作。

对进化的信赖与对强烈生命的渴望是当代情感的特征；但它们似乎与同样作为其特征的、对智力的蔑视并不一致。人类智力无疑是进化的产物，而且是晚近的、高度组织化的产物；它显然应当像软体动物的眼睛或蚂蚁的触角一样受到赞赏。而如果生命越是强烈和集中就越好，那么智力似乎就是生命的最佳形式。但这个时代所拥有的智力程度使它如此不适，以至于在此情形下它要求某种不那么有生命力的东西，并为进化所遗弃的东西而叹息。面对诸如天文学这样残酷清晰的事物，或诸如神学这样残酷混乱的事物，它感到*la nostalgie de la boue*。柏格森先生告诉我们，只有在死物质压迫生命之处，生命才被迫成为智力；因此之故，智力杀死它所触及的一切；它是生命向死亡缴纳的贡赋。生命若能摆脱对环境的痛苦屈从，在某个更相宜的方向上绽放，那将是甜美的。柏格森先生自己的哲学正是实现这种反转、瓦解智力并激发同感经验的一种努力。它的魅力在于它给一种陈腐的想象带来的解脱，这种想象已无宗教存留，被维系在商业的机器

and society, or on small half-borrowed passions which we clothe in a mean rhetoric and dot with vulgar pleasures. Finding their intelligence enslaved, our contemporaries suppose that intelligence is essentially servile; instead of freeing it, they try to elude it. Not free enough themselves morally, but bound to the world partly by piety and partly by industrialism, they cannot think of rising to a detached contemplation of earthly things, and of life itself and evolution; they revert rather to sensibility, and seek some by-path of instinct or dramatic sympathy in which to wander. Having no stomach for the ultimate, they burrow downwards towards the primitive. But the longing to be primitive is a disease of culture; it is archaism in morals. To be so preoccupied with vitality is a symptom of anaemia. When life was really vigorous and young, in Homeric times for instance, no one seemed to fear that it might be squeezed out of existence either by the incubus of matter or by the petrifying blight of intelligence. Life was like the light of day, something to use, or to waste, or to enjoy. It was not a thing to worship; and often the chief luxury of living consisted in dealing death about vigorously. Life indeed was loved, and the beauty and pathos of it were felt exquisitely; but its beauty and pathos lay in the divineness of its model and in its own fragility. No one paid it the equivocal compliment of thinking it a substance or a material force. Nobility was not then impossible in sentiment, because there were ideals in life higher and more indestructible than life itself, which life might illustrate and to which it might fitly be sacrificed. Nothing can be meaner than the anxiety to live on, to live on anyhow and in any shape; a spirit with any honour is not willing to live except in its own way, and a spirit with any wisdom is not over-eager to live at all. In

与社会之上，或维系在些许半借来的激情之上，我们以卑劣的修辞为这些激情披上外衣，并以粗俗的快乐点缀它们。我们的同代人发现自己的智力被奴役，便以为智力本质上是奴性的；他们不去解放它，反而试图回避它。他们自己在道德上不够自由，却部分地因虔敬、部分地因工业主义而被束缚于世界，他们无法设想上升到对尘世事物、对生命本身与进化的超然沉思；他们宁可回退到感性，寻找本能的或戏剧性同感的某条小径去漫游。既然对终极之物没有胃口，他们便向下钻探，趋向原始。但对原始的渴望是文化的一种疾病；它是道德上的复古主义。如此专注于生命力，是贫血的一种症状。当生命真正强健而年轻时，例如在荷马时代，似乎没有人担心它会被物质的梦魇或智力的石化枯萎挤出存在。生命就像白昼之光，是可供使用、可供挥霍、可供享受的东西。它不是崇拜的对象；而生活的最大奢侈往往在于有力地四处散播死亡。生命确实被爱，其美与悲怆被精微地感受到；但其美与悲怆在于其范型的 divine 性以及自身的脆弱。没有人以把它视为一种实体或一种物质力量这种模棱两可的恭维来对待它。那时，高贵在情感中并非不可能，因为生活中有比生命本身更高、更不可摧毁的理想，生命可以例示这些理想，也可以合宜地为之牺牲。没有什么比渴望活下去、以任何方式任何形态活下去更卑劣的了；任何有荣誉的精神都不愿不以自己的方式活着，而任何有智慧的精神都不至于过分急于活着。在

those days men recognised immortal gods and resigned themselves to being mortal. Yet those were the truly vital and instinctive days of the human spirit. Only when vitality is low do people find material things oppressive and ideal things unsubstantial. Now there is more motion than life, and more haste than force; we are driven to distraction by the ticking of the tiresome clocks, material and social, by which we are obliged to regulate our existence. We need ministering angels to fly to us from somewhere, even if it be from the depths of protoplasm. We must bathe in the currents of some non-human vital flood, like consumptives in their last extremity who must bask in the sunshine and breathe the mountain air; and our disease is not without its sophistry to convince us that we were never so well before, or so mightily conscious of being alive.

那些日子里，人们承认不朽的诸神，并安于自己是会死的。然而那才是人类精神真正有生命力而本能的时代。只有当生命力低落时，人们才觉得物质事物压抑、理想事物虚幻。如今运动多于生命，匆忙多于力量；我们被那些烦人的时钟--物质的与社会的--的滴答声逼得发狂，我们不得不依照它们来调节自己的存在。我们需要有侍奉的天使从某处飞向我们，哪怕是从原生质的深处。我们必须沐浴于某种非人的生命洪流之中，就像垂死的肺痨患者必须晒太阳、呼吸山间空气；而我们的疾病也不乏诡辩，使我们相信我们从未如此健康，或如此强烈地意识到自己活着。

When chaos has penetrated so far into the moral being of nations they can hardly be expected to produce great men. A great man need not be virtuous, nor his opinions right, but he must have a firm mind, a distinctive, luminous character; if he is to dominate things, something must be dominant in him. We feel him to be great in that he clarifies and brings to expression something which was potential in the rest of us, but which with our burden of flesh and circumstance we were too torpid to utter. The great man is a spontaneous variation in humanity; but not in any direction. A spontaneous variation might be a mere madness or mutilation or monstrosity; in finding the variation admirable we evidently invoke some principle of order to which it conforms. Perhaps it makes explicit what was preformed in us also; as when a poet finds the absolutely right phrase for a feeling, or when nature suddenly astonishes us with a form of absolute beauty. Or perhaps

当混乱已如此深入地渗透到各民族的道德存在之中，便很难指望他们产生伟人。伟人不必有德，其见解也不必正确，但他必须有坚定的心灵，一种独特而光辉的性格；如果他要主宰事物，他身上就必须有某种主宰性的东西。我们觉得他伟大，是因为他澄清并表达出了我们其余人身上潜在的东西，而我们因肉体和环境的负担过于迟钝，未能说出它。伟人是人类中的一种自发变异；但不是任何方向上的。一种自发变异可能只是疯狂、残损或畸形；在发现这种变异值得赞赏时，我们显然诉诸某种它所遵从的秩序原则。也许它使我们身上预先形成的东西变得明确；正如诗人找到一个感觉的绝对恰当的措辞，或自然突然以一种绝对美的形式使我们惊异。又或许

it makes an unprecedented harmony out of things existing before, but jangled and detached. The first man was a great man for this latter reason; having been an ape perplexed and corrupted by his multiplying instincts, he suddenly found a new way of being decent, by harnessing all those instincts together, through memory and imagination, and giving each in turn a measure of its due; which is what we call being rational. It is a new road to happiness, if you have strength enough to castigate a little the various impulses that sway you in turn. Why then is the martyr, who sacrifices everything to one attraction, distinguished from the criminal or the fool, who do the same thing? Evidently because the spirit that in the martyr destroys the body is the very spirit which the body is stifling in the rest of us; and although his private inspiration may be irrational, the tendency of it is not, but reduces the public conscience to act before any one else has had the courage to do so. Greatness is spontaneous; simplicity, trust in some one clear instinct, are essential to it; but the spontaneous variation must be in the direction of some possible sort of order; it must exclude and leave behind what is incapable of being moralised. How, then, should there be any great heroes, saints, artists, philosophers, or legislators in an age when nobody trusts himself, or feels any confidence in reason, in an age when the word *dogmatic* is a term of reproach? Greatness has character and severity, it is deep and sane, it is distinct and perfect. For this reason there is none of it to-day.

它从先前存在、但杂乱无章且彼此分离的事物中创造出一种前所未有的和谐。第一个人之所以是伟人，正是由于后一个原因；他是一只被其不断增多的本能所困扰和败坏的猿猴，却突然找到了一种体面存在的新方式，即通过记忆和想象将所有这些本能驾驭在一起，并依次给予每一种本能应有的尺度；这就是我们所谓的合乎理性。这是一条通往幸福的新路，前提是你有足够的力量稍稍惩戒那些轮流支配你的各种冲动。那么，为什么殉道者为了一个吸引力而牺牲一切，却与做同样事情的罪犯或傻瓜区别开来?显然是因为在殉道者身上摧毁肉体的那种精神，正是肉体在我们其余人身上所窒息的那种精神；尽管他私人的灵感可能是不理性的，但其倾向却不是，而是使公共良心在任何其他人有勇气行动之前就行动起来。伟大是自发的；单纯、对某种清晰本能的信任，对伟大而言是本质性的；但自发的变异必须朝向某种可能的秩序方向；它必须排除并留下那些无法被道德化的东西。那么，在一个没有人信任自己、或对理性毫无信心的时代，在一个教条的一词成为责难之辞的时代，怎么会有任何伟大的英雄、圣徒、艺术家、哲学家或立法者呢?伟大具有品格和严苛，它深沉而健全，它独特而完美。由于这个原因，今天没有伟大可言。

There is indeed another kind of greatness, or rather largeness of mind, which consists in being a synthesis of humanity in its current phases, even if without prophetic emphasis or direction: the breadth of a Goethe, rather than the fineness of a Shelley or a

确实还有另一种伟大，或者更确切地说是心灵的宽广，它在于成为人性在其当前各阶段的综合，即使没有预言式的强调或方向：这是歌德式的广度，而非雪莱或某人的精细。

Leopardi. But such largeness of mind, not to be vulgar, must be impartial, comprehensive, Olympian; it would not be greatness if its miscellany were not dominated by a clear genius and if before the confusion of things the poet or philosopher were not himself delighted, exalted, and by no means confused. Nor does this presume omniscience on his part. It is not necessary to fathom the ground or the structure of everything in order to know what to make of it. Stones do not disconcert a builder because he may not happen to know what they are chemically; and so the unsolved problems of life and nature, and the Babel of society, need not disturb the genial observer, though he may be incapable of unravelling them. He may set these dark spots down in their places, like so many caves or wells in a landscape, without feeling bound to scrutinise their depths simply because their depths are obscure. Unexplored they may have a sort of lustre, explored they might merely make him blind, and it may be a sufficient understanding of them to know that they are not worth investigating. In this way the most chaotic age and the most motley horrors might be mirrored limpidly in a great mind, as the Renaissance was mirrored in the works of Raphael and Shakespeare; but the master's eye itself must be single, his style unmistakable, his visionary interest in what he depicts frank and supreme. Hence this comprehensive sort of greatness too is impossible in an age when moral confusion is pervasive, when characters are complex, undecided, troubled by the mere existence of what is not congenial to them, eager to be not themselves; when, in a word, thought is weak and the flux of things overwhelms it.

Without great men and without clear convictions this age is

莱奥帕尔迪。但这种心胸的宽广，若要不流于庸俗，就必须公正、全面、奥林匹斯式；如果其杂糅不为一清晰的才具所主宰，如果诗人和哲学家面对事物的混乱本身不感到欣喜、昂扬，而绝非困惑，那它就不是伟大。这也不预设他拥有全知。没有必要为了知道如何对待事物而探究其根基或结构。石头不会使建筑师感到不安，因为他可能碰巧不知道它们在化学上是什么；同样，生命与自然的未解问题，以及社会的巴别塔，也不必打扰这位和善的观察者，尽管他可能无力解开它们。他可以将这些暗点安置在它们的位置上，就像风景中的许多洞穴或水井，而不觉得仅仅因为其深处晦暗就有义务去审视它们。未被探索时它们可能有一种光泽，被探索时它们也许只会使他失明，而知道它们不值得探究，或许就是对它们的充分知性。以这种方式，最混乱的时代和最杂多的恐怖可以在一个伟大的心灵中被清澈地映照出来，正如文艺复兴在拉斐尔和莎士比亚的作品中被映照出来一样；但大师的眼睛本身必须单一，他的风格必须无可混淆，他对他所描绘之物的幻想式兴趣必须坦率而至上。因此，这种包罗万象的伟大在一个道德混乱弥漫的时代同样不可能，那时性格复杂、犹豫不决，因与己不合之物的单纯存在而困扰，渴望不成为自己；一言以蔽之，那时思想软弱，事物的流变将其淹没。

没有伟人，也没有明确信念，这个时代是

nevertheless very active intellectually; it is studious, empirical, inventive, sympathetic. Its wisdom consists in a certain contrite openness of mind; it flounders, but at least in floundering it has gained a sense of possible depths in all directions. Under these circumstances, some triviality and great confusion in its positive achievements are not unpromising things, nor even unamiable. These are the *Wanderjahre* of faith; it looks smilingly at every new face, which might perhaps be that of a predestined friend; it chases after any engaging stranger; it even turns up again from time to time at home, full of a new tenderness for all it had abandoned there. But to settle down would be impossible now. The intellect, the judgment are in abeyance. Life is running turbid and full; and it is no marvel that reason, after vainly supposing that it ruled the world, should abdicate as gracefully as possible, when the world is so obviously the sport of cruder powers—vested interests, tribal passions, stock sentiments, and chance majorities. Having no responsibility laid upon it, reason has become irresponsible. Many critics and philosophers seem to conceive that thinking aloud is itself literature. Sometimes reason tries to lend some moral authority to its present masters, by proving how superior they are to itself; it worships evolution, instinct, novelty, action, as it does in modernism, pragmatism, and the philosophy of M. Bergson. At other times it retires into the freehold of those temperaments whom this world has ostracised, the region of the non-existent, and comforts itself with its indubitable conquests there. This happened earlier to the romanticists (in a way which I have tried to describe in the subjoined paper on Shelley) although their poetic and political illusions did not suffer them to perceive it. It is happening now, after disillusion, to some radicals and

然而在智性上非常活跃；它好学、经验主义、富于发明、富有同情。它的智慧在于某种悔悟式的思想开放；它跌跌撞撞，但至少在跌撞中它获得了一种对各个方向可能深度的感觉。在这种情况下，它实证成就中的某些琐碎和巨大混乱并非不祥之事，甚至并非不可爱。这些是信仰的漫游岁月；它微笑着看待每一张新面孔，那也许是一位命中注定的朋友的面孔；它追逐任何迷人的陌生人；它甚至不时重新出现在家中，对它曾在那里抛弃的一切充满新的柔情。但如今安定下来将是不可能的。知性和判断处于悬置状态。生活浑浊而充盈地奔流；理性在徒劳地设想自己统治世界之后，当世界如此明显地是更粗野力量的玩物--既得利益、部落激情、库存情感和偶然多数--它尽可能优雅地退位，这并不奇怪。由于没有责任加于它，理性已变得不负责任。许多批评家和哲学家似乎认为，大声思考本身就是文学。有时理性试图通过证明其当下主人如何优于自己，来赋予他们某种道德权威；它崇拜进化、本能、新奇、行动，正如它在现代主义、实用主义和柏格森先生的哲学中所做的那样。另一些时候，它退隐到那些被这个世界放逐的性情者的自由领地，即非存在之域，并以它在那里无可置疑的征服来安慰自己。这更早发生在浪漫主义者身上(以一种我试图在附于后面的论雪莱一文中描述的方式)，尽管他们的诗性和政治幻象使他们未能察觉这一点。如今，在幻灭之后，这正发生在某些激进分子和

mathematicians like Mr. Bertrand Russell, and to others of us who, perhaps without being mathematicians or even radicals, feel that the sphere of what happens to exist is too alien and accidental to absorb all the play of a free mind, whose function, after it has come to clearness and made its peace with things, is to touch them with its own moral and intellectual light, and to exist for its own sake.

These are but gusts of doctrine; yet they prove that the spirit is not dead in the lull between its seasons of steady blowing. Who knows which of them may not gather force presently and carry the mind of the coming age steadily before it?

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Perhaps some unsophisticated reader may wonder if I am not trying to mislead him, or if any mortal ever really maintained anything so absurd. Strictly the idealistic principle does not justify a denial that independent things, by chance resembling my ideas, may actually exist; but it justifies the denial that these things, if they existed, could be those I know. My past would not be my past if I did not appropriate it; my ideas would not refer to their objects unless both were ideas identified in my mind. In practice, therefore, idealists feel free to ignore the gratuitous possibility of existences lying outside the circle of objects knowable to the thinker, which, according to them, is the circle of his ideas. In this way they turn a human method of approach into a charter for existence and non-existence, and their point of view becomes the creative power. When the idealist studies astronomy, does he learn anything about the stars that God made? Far from him so naive a thought! His astronomy consists of two activities of his

像伯特兰·罗素先生这样的数学家，以及我们中另一些人--他们或许并非数学家，甚至并非激进分子--感到实际存在之物的领域过于异己和偶然，不足以吸纳一颗自由心灵的全部活动，这颗心灵的功能，在它达到清晰并与事物达成和解之后，是以自身的道德与智性之光照亮它们，并为自身而存在。

这些不过是学说的阵风；然而它们证明，在稳定吹拂的季节之间的间歇里，精神并未死去。谁知道其中哪一阵不会很快积聚力量，稳稳地承载起即将到来的时代的心灵呢？

脚注：

[1] 也许某些天真的读者会想知道，我是否在试图误导他，或者是否有任何凡人真的主张过如此荒谬的东西。严格说来，唯心主义原则并不为否认以下一点提供理由：独立的事物，偶然类似于我的观念，可能实际存在；但它为否认以下一点提供理由：这些事物，如果存在，能够是那些我所知道的东西。如果我不将我的过去据为己有，它就不会是我的过去；如果我的观念与其对象不是在我心中被同一化的观念，它们就不会指涉其对象。因此，在实践中，唯心主义者感到可以自由地忽略一种无端的可能性，即存在物处于思想者可认识对象圈之外--按照他们的说法，这个圈就是他的观念圈。以这种方式，他们把一种人类接近方法转变为存在与非存在的特许状，而他们的观点成为创造力。当唯心主义者研究天文学时，他是否学到了任何关于上帝所造星辰的东西?如此天真的想法离他甚远!他的天文学由他自己的两种活动构成

own (and he is very fond of activity): star-gazing and calculation. When he has become quite proficient he knows all about star-gazing and calculation; but he knows nothing of any stars that God made; for there are no stars except his visual images of stars, and there is no God but himself. It is true that to soften this hard saying a little he would correct me and say his *higher* self; but as his lower self is only the idea of himself which he may have framed, it is his higher self that is himself simply: although whether he or his idea of himself is really the higher might seem doubtful to an outsider.

(而他非常喜爱活动)：观星和计算。当他变得相当精通时，他就完全了解观星和计算；但他对上帝所造的任何星辰一无所知；因为除了他对星辰的视觉图像之外没有星辰，除了他自己之外没有上帝。诚然，为了稍微缓和这一严苛说法，他会纠正我，说那是他的更高自我；但既然他的较低自我只是他可能已构想的关于自身的观念，那么正是他的更高自我才是他自己本身：尽管他本人还是他关于自身的观念才真正是更高的，在外人看来也许可疑。

II

MODERNISM AND CHRISTIANITY

Prevalent winds of doctrine must needs penetrate at last into the cloister. Social instability and moral confusion, reconstructions of history and efforts after reform, are things characteristic of the present age; and under the name of modernism they have made their appearance even in that institution which is constitutionally the most stable, of most explicit mind, least inclined to revise its collective memory or established usages—I mean the Catholic church. Even after this church was constituted by the fusion of many influences and by the gradual exclusion of those heresies—some of them older than explicit orthodoxy—which seemed to misrepresent its implications or spirit, there still remained an inevitable propensity among Catholics to share the moods of their respective ages and countries, and to reconcile them if possible

II

现代主义与基督教

流行的教义之风最终必然吹进修道院。社会的不稳定与道德的混乱、历史的重新建构与改革后的种种努力，都是当今时代的特征；它们以现代主义之名，甚至出现在那个在体制上最为稳固、头脑最为明确、最不倾向于修改其集体记忆或既定习俗的制度之中--我指的是天主教会。即便在这个教会通过融合诸多影响、并逐渐排除那些异端(其中一些比明确的正统更为古老)而得以确立之后--这些异端似乎曲解了它的意涵或精神--天主教徒中间仍然不可避免地存在一种倾向：分享各自时代与国家的情绪，并尽可能使之

with their professed faith. Often these cross influences were so strong that the profession of faith was changed frankly to suit them, and Catholicism was openly abandoned; but even where this did not occur we may detect in the Catholic minds of each age some strange conjunctions and compromises with the *Zeitgeist*. Thus the morality of chivalry and war, the ideals of foppishness and honour, have been long maintained side by side with the maxims of the gospel, which they entirely contradict. Later the system of Copernicus, incompatible at heart with the anthropocentric and moralistic view of the world which Christianity implies, was accepted by the church with some lame attempt to render it innocuous; but it remains an alien and hostile element, like a spent bullet lodged in the flesh. In more recent times we have heard of liberal Catholicism, the attitude assumed by some generous but divided minds, too much attached to their traditional religion to abandon it, but too weak and too hopeful not to glow also with enthusiasm for modern liberty and progress. Had those minds been, I will not say intelligently Catholic but radically Christian, they would have felt that this liberty was simply liberty to be damned, and this progress not an advance towards the true good of man, but a lapse into endless and heathen wanderings. For Christianity, in its essence and origin, was an urgent summons to repent and come out of just such a worldly life as modern liberty and progress hold up as an ideal to the nations. In the Roman empire, as in the promised land of liberalism, each man sought to get and to enjoy as much as he could, and supported a ponderous government neutral as to religion and moral traditions, but favourable to the accumulation of riches; so that a certain enlightenment and cosmopolitanism

与他们所宣称的信仰相调和。这些交叉影响往往如此强大，以至于信仰的宣称被坦率地改变以迎合它们，天主教被公开抛弃；但即便在此并未发生之处，我们也能在每一时代的天主教心灵中察觉到一些奇特的结合与对*Zeitgeist*的妥协。因此，骑士精神与战争的道德、纨绔作风与荣誉的理想，长期与福音的箴言并立共存，而后者与它们完全矛盾。后来，哥白尼的体系--其核心与基督教所隐含的人类中心论和道德主义的世界观不相容--被教会接受，并作出一些拙劣的尝试使之无害；但它仍然是一个异己且敌对的元素，如同嵌入肉体中的一颗已射出的子弹。在更近的时代，我们听说了自由派天主教，这是一些慷慨却分裂的心灵所采取的态度，他们过于依恋其传统宗教而不愿抛弃它，却又过于软弱、过于满怀希望，以至于不能不为现代自由与进步而热情燃烧。倘若这些心灵--我不说他们是明智的天主教徒，而是说他们是彻底的基督徒--他们就会感到，这种自由不过是受诅咒的自由，这种进步并非迈向人类真正善的进步，而是陷入无尽异教式漂泊的堕落。因为基督教在其本质与起源上，乃是一个急迫的召唤，要人悔改并脱离正是现代自由与进步向各民族树立为理想的那种世俗生活。在罗马帝国，正如在自由主义的应许之地，每个人都竭力获取并享受尽可能多的东西，并支持一个在宗教与道德传统上保持中立、却有利于财富积累的沉重政府；从而某种启蒙与世界主义

were made possible, and private passions and tastes could be gratified without encountering persecution or public obloquy, though not without a general relaxation of society and a vulgarising of arts and manners. That something so self-indulgent and worldly as this ideal of liberalism could have been thought compatible with Christianity, the first initiation into which, in baptism, involves renouncing the world, might well astonish us, had we not been rendered deaf to moral discords by the very din which from our birth they have been making in our ears.

得以成为可能，私人的激情与品味可以得到满足而不遭遇迫害或公众谴责，尽管并非没有社会普遍的松弛与艺术和风尚的庸俗化。自由主义这一如此自我放纵且世俗的理想竟能被认作与基督教相容--而基督教的最初入门，即在洗礼中，便涉及弃绝世界--这很可能会令我们惊讶，若非我们自出生起便被那在我们耳中喧响的嘈杂之声弄得对道德的不谐充耳不闻。

But this is not all. Primitive Christianity was not only a summons to turn one's heart and mind away from a corrupt world; it was a summons to do so under pain of instant and terrible punishment. It was the conviction of pious Jews since the days of the Prophets that mercilessness, avarice, and disobedience to revealed law were the direct path to ruin; a world so wicked as the liberal world against which St. John the Baptist thundered was necessarily on the verge of destruction. Sin, although we moderns may not think so, seemed to the ancient Jews a fearful imprudence. The hand of the Lord would descend on it heavily, and very soon. The whole Roman civilisation was to be overthrown in the twinkling of an eye. Those who hoped to be of the remnant and to be saved, so as to lead a clarified and heavenly life in the New Jerusalem, must hasten to put on sackcloth and ashes, to fast and to pray, to watch with girded loins for the coming of the kingdom; it was superfluous for them to study the dead past or to take thought for the morrow. The cataclysm was at hand; a new heaven and a new earth—far more worthy of study—would be unrolled before that very generation.

但这还不是全部。原始基督教不仅是一个召唤，要人将心灵与头脑从腐败的世界转离；它还是一个召唤，要人在即刻而可怕的惩罚之威胁下如此行。自先知时代以来，虔诚的犹太人便确信，冷酷无情、贪婪、以及对启示律法的不顺从是通往毁灭的直接道路；一个如此邪恶的世界--即施洗圣约翰对其发出雷霆之声的自由主义世界--必然濒临毁灭。罪，尽管我们现代人或许不这么认为，在古代犹太人看来却是一种可怕的愚妄。主的手将沉重地降于其上，且为时不远。整个罗马文明将在眨眼之间被推翻。那些希望成为余民而得救、从而在新耶路撒冷过一种净化而属天之生活的人，必须赶紧披上麻衣与灰烬，禁食祈祷，束腰守望天国的到来；对他们而言，研究死去的过去或为明日忧虑都是多余的。大灾变近在眼前；一个新天新地--远更值得研究--将在那一代人面前展开。

There was indeed something terribly levelling, revolutionary,

确实存在某种极具拉平作用、革命性的东西，

serious, and expectant about that primitive gospel; and in so far as liberalism possessed similar qualities, in so far as it was moved by indignation, pity, and fervent hope, it could well preach on early Christian texts. But the liberal Catholics were liberals of the polite and governmental sort; they were shocked at suffering rather than at sin, and they feared not the Lord but the movement of public opinion. Some of them were vaguely pious men, whose conservativism in social and moral matters forbade them to acquiesce in the disappearance of the church altogether, and they thought it might be preserved, as the English church is, by making opportune concessions. Others were simply aristocrats, desirous that the pacifying influence of religion should remain strong over the masses. The clergy was not, in any considerable measure, tossed by these opposing currents; the few priests who were liberals were themselves men of the world, patriots, and orators. Such persons could not look forward to a fierce sifting of the wheat from the tares, or to any burning of whole bundles of nations, for they were nothing if not romantic nationalists, and the idea of faggots of any sort was most painful to their minds. They longed rather for a sweet cohabitation with everybody, and a mild tolerance of almost everything. A war for religion seemed to them a crime, but a war for nationality glorious and holy. No wonder that their work in nation-building has endured, while their sentiments in religion are scattered to the winds. The liberalism for the sake of which they were willing to eviscerate their Christianity has already lost its vitality; it survives as a pale parliamentary tradition, impotent before the tide of socialism rising behind its back. The Catholicism which they wished to see gently lingering is being driven out of national life by official

对那原始福音认真而满怀期待；而就自由主义具有类似品质而言，就它被义愤、怜悯与热切的希望所驱动而言，它完全可以依据早期基督教的文本进行宣讲。但自由派天主教徒是那种彬彬有礼、政府式的自由主义者；他们震惊于苦难而非罪，他们畏惧的不是主，而是公众舆论的动向。他们中有些人是含糊其辞的虔诚者，其社会与道德事务上的保守主义禁止他们默许教会完全消失，他们认为教会或可通过作出适时的让步而得以保存，如同英国教会那样。另一些人则纯粹是贵族，渴望宗教的安抚性影响仍能强有力地支配大众。神职人员并未在多大程度上被这些对立的潮流所摇动；少数身为自由主义者的神父本身便是世俗之人、爱国者与演说家。这样的人不可能期待一场将麦子与稗子猛烈筛分的时刻，也不可能期待任何整捆民族的焚烧，因为他们若非浪漫的民族主义者便什么也不是，而任何一捆柴薪的念头对他们心灵而言都极为痛苦。他们毋宁渴望与所有人甜蜜共处，以及对几乎一切事物的温和宽容。为宗教而战在他们看来是罪行，而为民族性而战则是光荣而神圣的。难怪他们在建国方面的工作得以延续，而他们在宗教上的情感则被风吹散。他们为了它而愿意掏空其基督教的那种自由主义，已经失去了生命力；它作为一种苍白无力的议会传统而残存，在从其背后升起的社会主义浪潮面前无能为力。他们希望看到温和延续的天主教，正被官方的

spoliations and popular mockeries. It is fast becoming what it was in the beginning, a sect with more or less power to alienate the few who genuinely adhere to it from the pagan society in which they are forced to live.

The question what is true or essential Christianity is a thorny one, because each party gives the name of genuine Christianity to what it happens to believe. Thus Professor Harnack, not to mention less distinguished historians, makes the original essence of Christianity coincide—what a miracle!—with his own Lutheran and Kantian sentiments. But the essence of Christianity, as of everything else, is the whole of it; and the genuine nature of a seed is at least as well expressed by what it becomes in contact with the earth and air as by what it seems in its primitive minuteness. It is quite true, as the modernists tell us, that in the beginning Christian faith was not a matter of scholastic definitions, nor even of intellectual dogmas. Religions seldom begin in that form, and paganism was even less intellectual and less dogmatic than early Christianity. The most primitive Christian faith consisted in a conversion of the whole man—intellect, habits, and affections—from the life of the world to a new mystical life, in answer to a moral summons and a prophecy about destiny. The moral summons was to renounce home, kindred, possessions, the respect of men, the hypocrisies of the synagogue, and to devote oneself to a wandering and begging life, healing, praying, and preaching. And preaching what? Preaching the prophecy about destiny which justified that conversion and renunciation; preaching that the world, in its present constitution, was about to be destroyed on account of its wickedness, and that the ignorant, the poor, and the down-trodden, if they trusted this prophecy, and turned their backs at

掠夺与大众的嘲弄。它正迅速变回它起初的样子，一个或多或少有能力将真正依附于它的少数人从他们被迫生活于其中的异教社会里疏离出去的教派。

什么是真实或本质的基督教，这是一个棘手的问题，因为每一派别都把自己碰巧相信的东西称为真正的基督教。因此，哈纳克教授--更不用说那些不太著名的历史学家了--使基督教的原始本质与他自己的路德宗和康德式情感相吻合--多么奇妙啊!--。但基督教的本质，如同其他一切事物的本质一样，是它的整体；而一颗种子的真正本性，至少同样通过它在与土壤和空气接触后所变成的东西来表达，正如通过它在原始微小状态下的样子来表达一样。现代主义者告诉我们，起初基督教信仰不是经院式定义的问题，甚至不是理智教义的问题，这完全正确。宗教很少以那种形式开始，而异教甚至比早期基督教更少理智、更少教条。最原始的基督教信仰在于整个人--理智、习惯和情感--从世俗生活向一种新的神秘生活的转变，这是对一种道德召唤和一种关于命运的预言的回应。道德召唤是放弃家园、亲属、财产、他人的尊重、会堂的虚伪，献身于一种流浪和乞讨的生活，治病、祈祷和布道。布道什么?布道那关于命运的预言，这预言为那种转变和放弃提供了正当理由；布道说，世界在其目前的构造下，因其邪恶即将被毁灭，而那些无知者、穷人和受践踏者，如果他们相信这预言，并立刻背弃

once on all the world pursues, would be saved in the new deluge, and would form a new society, of a more or less supernatural kind, to be raised on the ruins of all present institutions. The poor were called, but the rich were called also, and perhaps even the heathen; for there was in all men, even in all nature (this is the one touch of speculative feeling in the gospel), a precious potentiality of goodness. All were essentially amiable, though accidentally wretched and depraved; and by the magic of a new faith and hope this soul of goodness in all living things might be freed from the hideous incubus of circumstance that now oppresses it, and might come to bloom openly as the penetrating eye of the lover, even now, sees that it could bloom. Love, then, and sympathy, particularly towards the sinful and diseased, a love relieved of sentimentality by the deliberate practice of healing, warning, and comforting; a complete aversion from all the interests of political society, and a confident expectation of a cataclysm that should suddenly transfigure the world—such was Christian religion in its origin. The primitive Christian was filled with the sense of a special election and responsibility, and of a special hope. He was serene, abstracted, incorruptible, his inward eye fixed on a wonderful revelation. He was as incapable of attacking as of serving the state; he despised or ignored everything for which the state exists, labour, wealth, power, felicity, splendour, and learning. With Christ the natural man in him had been crucified, and in Christ he had risen again a spiritual man, to walk the earth, as a messenger from heaven, for a few more years. His whole life was an experience of perpetual graces and miracles.

The prophecy about the speedy end of this wicked world was not

一切世人追求的东西，将在新的洪水中得救，并将形成一个新社会，一种或多或少超自然的社会，建立于一切现存制度的废墟之上。穷人被召唤，但富人也同样被召唤，或许甚至异教徒也被召唤；因为在所有人身上，甚至在一切自然之中(这是福音中唯一一丝思辨情感的痕迹)，都有一种宝贵的善的潜能。所有人本质上都是可爱的，尽管偶然地悲惨和堕落；通过一种新信仰和新希望的魔力，一切生物中这种善的灵魂可能从目前压迫它的环境的可怕梦魇中解放出来，并可能公开绽放，正如爱人的穿透性眼睛甚至在现在就看到它能够绽放。因此，爱和同情，特别是对罪人和病人的爱和同情，一种通过刻意实践治病、警告和安慰而摆脱了感伤主义的爱；对政治社会一切利益的完全厌恶，以及对一场将突然改变世界面貌的灾难的自信期待--这就是基督教宗教在其起源时的样子。原始基督徒充满了特殊拣选和责任感，以及一种特殊的希望。他宁静、超脱、不可腐蚀，他的内在眼睛固定在一个奇妙的启示上。他既不能攻击国家，也不能服务于国家；他鄙视或无视国家所赖以存在的一切：劳动、财富、权力、幸福、辉煌和学问。随着基督，他身上的自然人已被钉死在十字架上，而在基督里他又复活为一个属灵的人，作为来自天堂的使者，在地上再行走几年。他的一生是持续恩典和奇迹的经验。

关于这个邪恶世界迅速终结的预言并非

fulfilled as the early Christians expected; but this fact is less disconcerting to the Christian than one would suppose. The spontaneous or instinctive Christian—and there is such a type of mind, quite apart from any affiliation to historic Christianity—takes a personal and dramatic view of the world; its values and even its reality are the values and reality which it may have for him. It would profit him nothing to win it, if he lost his own soul. That prophecy about the destruction of nature springs from this attitude; nature must be subservient to the human conscience; it must satisfy the hopes of the prophet and vindicate the saints. That the years should pass and nothing should seem to happen need not shatter the force of this prophecy for those whose imagination it excites. This world must actually vanish very soon for each of us; and this is the point of view that counts with the Christian mind. Even if we consider posterity, the kingdoms and arts and philosophies of this world are short lived; they shift their aims continually and shift their substance. The prophecy of their destruction is therefore being fulfilled continually; the need of repentance, if one would be saved, is truly urgent; and the means of that salvation cannot be an operation upon this world, but faith in another world that, in the experience of each soul, is to follow upon it. Thus the summons to repent and the prophecy about destiny which were the root of Christianity, can fully retain their spirit when for "this wicked world" we read "this transitory life" and for "the coming of the Kingdom" we read "life everlasting." The change is important, but it affects the application rather than the nature of the gospel. Morally there is a loss, because men will never take so hotly what concerns another life as what affects this one; speculatively, on the other hand, there is a gain, for the

正如早期基督徒所期待的那样实现了；但这个事实对基督徒来说并不像人们想象的那样令人不安。自发的或本能的基督徒--存在这样一种心灵类型，完全独立于与历史基督教的任何关联--对世界持一种个人的和戏剧性的看法；世界的价值，甚至其现实性，就是它对他可能具有的价值和现实性。如果他失去了自己的灵魂，赢得世界对他毫无益处。关于自然毁灭的预言源于这种态度；自然必须服从于人的良心；它必须满足先知的希望并为圣徒辩护。岁月流逝而似乎什么也没有发生，这不必粉碎这个预言的力量，对于那些被它激发想象的人来说。这个世界对我们每个人来说实际上必须很快消失；这正是对基督徒心灵来说重要的观点。即使我们考虑后代，这个世界的王国、艺术和哲学都是短暂的；它们不断改变目标，也改变实质。因此，关于它们毁灭的预言在不断实现；如果一个人想得救，悔改的需要确实紧迫；而那种拯救的手段不能是对这个世界的操作，而是对另一个世界的信仰，那个世界在每个灵魂的经验中将随之而来。因此，悔改的召唤和关于命运的预言--它们是基督教的根源--可以完全保留其精神，当我们把“这个邪恶的世界”读作“这个短暂的生命”，把“天国的到来”读作“永生”。这个变化很重要，但它影响的是福音的应用而非其本质。在道德上有所损失，因为人们永远不会像对待涉及今生的事情那样热切地对待涉及来生的事情；另一方面，在思辨上有所收获，因为

expectation of total transformations and millenniums on earth is a very crude illusion, while the relation of the soul to nature is an open question in philosophy, and there will always be a great loftiness and poetic sincerity in the feeling that the soul is a stranger in this world and has other destinies in store.

What would make the preaching of the gospel utterly impossible would be the admission that it had no authority to proclaim what has happened or what is going to happen, either in this world or in another. A prophecy about destiny is an account, however vague, of events to be actually experienced, and of their causes. The whole inspiration of Hebraic religion lies in that. It was not metaphorically that Sodom and Gomorrah were destroyed. The promised land was a piece of earth. The kingdom was an historical fact. It was not symbolically that Israel was led into captivity, or that it returned and restored the Temple. It was not ideally that a Messiah was to come. Memory of such events is in the same field as history; prophecy is in the same field as natural science. Natural science too is an account of what will happen, and under what conditions. It too is a prophecy about destiny. Accordingly, while it is quite true that speculations about nature and history are not contained explicitly in the religion of the gospel, yet the message of this religion is one which speculations about nature and reconstructions of history may extend congruously, or may contradict and totally annul. If physical science should remove those threats of destruction to follow upon sin which Christian prophecy contains, or if it should prove that what brings destruction is just that unworldly, prayerful, all-forgiving, idle, and revolutionary attitude which the gospel enjoins, then physical science would be incompatible with

对彻底转变和人间千禧年的期待是一种非常粗糙的幻象，而灵魂与自然的关系在哲学中是一个悬而未决的问题，并且，那种认为灵魂是这世界上的异乡人、另有别的命运在等待的感觉，将永远具有一种伟大的崇高与诗意的真诚。

使福音的宣讲完全不可能的是承认它没有权威去宣告在这个世界或另一个世界中已经发生或将要发生的事情。关于命运的预言是对实际将要经历的事件及其原因的记述，无论多么模糊。希伯来宗教的全部灵感就在于此。所多玛和蛾摩拉被毁灭不是隐喻性的。应许之地是一块土地。王国是一个历史事实。以色列被掳，或回归并重建圣殿，不是象征性的。弥赛亚将要到来不是理想性的。对这些事件的记忆与历史处于同一领域；预言与自然科学处于同一领域。自然科学也是对将要发生什么以及在什么条件下发生的记述。它也是关于命运的预言。因此，虽然关于自然和历史的思辨并未明确包含在福音的宗教中，这完全正确，但这种宗教的信息是一种关于自然的思辨和历史的 reconstruction 可以一致地扩展，或者可以矛盾并完全取消的信息。如果物理科学消除了基督教预言中包含的随罪而来的毁灭威胁，或者如果它证明带来毁灭的正是福音所 enjoined 的那种出世的、祈祷的、全然宽恕的、闲散的、革命的态度，那么物理科学将与

Christianity; not with this or that text of the Bible merely, about the sun standing still or the dead rising again, but with the whole foundation of what Christ himself, with John the Baptist, St. Paul, St. James, and St. John, preached to the world.

基督教；并非仅仅针对《圣经》中某段文本，关于太阳静止或死者复活，而是针对基督本人与施洗约翰、圣保罗、圣雅各和圣约翰向世界所宣讲的全部根基。

Even the pagan poets, when they devised a myth, half believed in it for a fact. What really lent some truth—moral truth only—to their imaginations was indeed the beauty of nature, the comedy of life, or the groans of mankind, crushed between the upper and the nether millstones; but being scientifically ignorant they allowed their pictorial wisdom to pass for a revealed science, for a physics of the unseen. If even among the pagans the poetic expression of human experience could be mistaken in this way for knowledge of occult existences, how much more must this have been the case among a more ignorant and a more intense nation like the Jews? Indeed, *events* are what the Jews have always remembered and hoped for; if their religion was not a guide to events, an assured means towards a positive and experimental salvation, it was nothing. Their theology was meagre in the description of the Lord's nature, but rich in the description of his ways. Indeed, their belief in the existence and power of the Lord, if we take it pragmatically and not imaginatively, was simply the belief in certain moral harmonies in destiny, in the sufficiency of conduct of a certain sort to secure success and good fortune, both national and personal. This faith was partly an experience and partly a demand; it turned on history and prophecy. History was interpreted by a prophetic insight into the moral principle, believed to govern it; and prophecy was a passionate demonstration of the same principles, at work in the catastrophes of the day or of the morrow.

即便是异教诗人，在编造神话时，也半信以为真。真正赋予他们想象以某种真理--仅仅是道德真理--的，确实是自然之美、生活之喜剧，或被上下磨石碾碎的人类之呻吟；但由于对科学一无所知，他们便让自己图画式的智慧冒充为一种启示的科学，一种关于不可见之物的物理学。倘若即便在异教徒中间，人类经验的诗意表达也能以这种方式被误认为关于隐秘存在的知识，那么在像犹太人这样一个更为无知、更为激烈的民族中间，这种情况必定更甚多少呢?的确，事件正是犹太人始终铭记并寄予希望的东西；倘若他们的宗教不是对事件的指引，不是通向一种积极的、实验性的救赎的可靠手段，那它就什么也不是。他们的神学在描述主的本性方面是贫乏的，但在描述主的作为方面却是丰富的。的确，他们对主的存在与权能的信仰，倘若我们以实用主义而非想象的方式去理解，就不过是对命运中某些道德和谐的信仰，对某种品行足以确保民族与个人的成功与好运的充足性的信仰。这种信仰部分是经验，部分是要求；它取决于历史与预言。历史被一种对道德原则的预言式洞见所解释，人们相信该原则支配着历史；而预言则是对同一原则的热情展示，展示其在当日或翌日的灾难中发挥作用。

There is no doubt a Platonic sort of religion, a worship of the ideal apart from its power to realise itself, which has entered largely into the life of Christians; and the more mystical and disinterested they were, the more it has tended to take the place of Hebraism. But the Platonists, too, when left to their instincts, follow their master in attributing power and existence, by a sort of cumulative worship and imaginative hyperbole, to what in the first place they worship because it is good. To divorce, then, as the modernists do, the history of the world from the story of salvation, and God's government and the sanctions of religion from the operation of matter, is a *fundamental apostasy* from Christianity. Christianity, being a practical and living faith in a possible eventual redemption from sin, from the punishment for sin, from the thousand circumstances that make the most brilliant worldly life a sham and a failure, essentially involves a faith in a supernatural physics, in such an economy of forces, behind, within, and around the discoverable forces of nature, that the destiny which nature seems to prepare for us may be reversed, that failures may be turned into successes, ignominy into glory, and humble faith into triumphant vision: and this not merely by a change in our point of view or estimation of things, but by an actual historical, physical transformation in the things themselves. To believe this in our day may require courage, even a certain childish simplicity; but were not courage and a certain childish simplicity always requisite for Christian faith? It never was a religion for the rationalist and the worldling; it was based on alienation from the world, from the intellectual world no less than from the economic and political. It flourished in the Oriental imagination that is able to treat all existence with disdain and to hold it superbly at arm's length, and

无疑存在一种柏拉图式的宗教，一种对理想的崇拜，撇开其实现自身的力量，这种宗教已大量进入基督徒的生活；他们越是神秘、越是无私，它就越倾向于取代希伯来主义。但柏拉图主义者亦然，当其听任本能时，便追随其宗师，通过一种累积的崇拜与想象的夸张，将权能与存在归于他们最初因其善而崇拜的东西。因此，如现代主义者所做的那样，将世界的历史与救赎的故事割裂开来，将上帝的治理与宗教的制裁同物质的作用割裂开来，乃是对基督教的根本背教。基督教既然是一种实践的、活的信仰，信仰一种可能的、终将实现的从罪中、从对罪的惩罚中、从千百种使最辉煌的世俗生活成为虚假与失败的情境中的救赎，就本质上包含一种对超自然物理学的信仰，对这样一种力量经济的信仰--它位于可发现的自然力量之后、之内与周围，以致自然似乎为我们预备的命运可以被逆转，失败可以变为成功，耻辱可以变为荣耀，谦卑的信仰可以变为胜利的异象：而这并非仅仅通过我们观点或对事物评价的改变，而是通过事物本身中一种实际的历史的、物理的转变。在我们这个时代相信这一点或许需要勇气，甚至需要某种孩童般的单纯；但勇气与某种孩童般的单纯难道不一直是基督教信仰所必需的吗?它从来不是为理性主义者和世俗之人而设的宗教；它建立在与世界的疏离之上，与理智世界的疏离不亚于与经济和政治世界的疏离。它兴盛于东方人的想象之中，这种想象能够蔑视一切存在，并高傲地将其拒于臂长之外，并且

at the same time is subject to visions and false memories, is swayed by the eloquence of private passion, and raises confidently to heaven the cry of the poor, the bereaved, and the distressed. Its daily bread, from the beginning, was hope for a miraculous change of scene, for prison-walls falling to the ground about it, for a heart inwardly comforted, and a shower of good things from the sky.

同时又易受异象与虚假记忆的影响，被私人激情的雄辩所左右，并自信地将穷人、丧亲者和困苦者的呼喊升向天堂。从一开始，它的日用饮食便是希望：希望场景发生奇迹般的改变，希望监狱的墙壁在它周围倒塌于地，希望内心得到慰藉，希望天上降下美好之物。

It is clear that a supernaturalistic faith of this sort, which might wholly inspire some revolutionary sect, can never wholly inspire human society. Whenever a nation is converted to Christianity, its Christianity, in practice, must be largely converted into paganism. The true Christian is in all countries a pilgrim and a stranger; not his kinsmen, but whoever does the will of his Father who is in heaven is his brother and sister and mother and his real compatriot. In a nation that calls itself Christian every child may be pledged, at baptism, to renounce the world, the flesh, and the devil; but the flesh will assert itself notwithstanding, the devil will have his due, and the nominal Christian, become a man of business and the head of a family, will form an integral part of that very world which he will pledge his children to renounce in turn as he holds them over the font. The lips, even the intellect, may continue to profess the Christian ideal; but public and social life will be guided by quite another. The ages of faith, the ages of Christian unity, were such only superficially. When all men are Christians only a small element can be Christian in the average man. The thirteenth century, for instance, is supposed to be the golden age of Catholicism; but what seems to have filled it, if we may judge by the witness of Dante? Little but bitter conflicts, racial and religious; faithless rebellions, both in states and in

显然，这种超自然主义的信仰，尽管可能完全激励某个革命的教派，却永远不能完全激励人类社会。每当一个民族皈依基督教，其实践中的基督教就必定在很大程度上被转化为异教。真正的基督徒在所有国家都是朝圣者和异乡人；不是他的亲属，而是凡遵行他在天之父旨意的人，才是他的兄弟、姐妹、母亲和他真正的同胞。在一个自称基督教的民族中，每个孩子都可能在受洗时被要求弃绝世界、肉体与魔鬼；但肉体仍会自行其是，魔鬼会得到其应得之物，而名义上的基督徒，一旦成为商人和一家之主，就会成为那个他抱着孩子立于洗礼池上、让孩子依次弃绝的世界的不可分割的一部分。口舌，甚至理智，可以继续宣称基督教理想；但公共与社会生活将由完全另一套东西来引导。信仰的时代，基督教统一的时代，只是表面上如此。当所有人都是基督徒时，在普通人身上只有一小部分能是基督教的。例如，十三世纪被认为是天主教会的黄金时代；但倘若我们可以根据但丁的见证来判断，充斥那个时代的又是什么呢?除了激烈的冲突--种族的与宗教的；不忠的叛乱，无论在国中还是在

individuals, against the Christian regimen; worldliness in the church, barbarism in the people, and a dawning of all sorts of scientific and æsthetic passions, in themselves quite pagan and contrary to the spirit of the gospel. Christendom at that time was by no means a kingdom of God on earth; it was a conglomeration of incorrigible rascals, intellectually more or less Christian. We may see the same thing under different circumstances in the Spain of Philip II. Here was a government consciously labouring in the service of the church, to resist Turks, convert pagans, banish Moslems, and crush Protestants. Yet the very forces engaged in defending the church, the army and the Inquisition, were alien to the Christian life; they were fit embodiments rather of chivalry and greed, or of policy and jealous dominion. The ecclesiastical forces also, theology, ritual, and hierarchy, employed in spreading the gospel were themselves alien to the gospel. An anti-worldly religion finds itself in fact in this dilemma: if it remains merely spiritual, developing no material organs, it cannot affect the world; while if it develops organs with which to operate on the world, these organs become a part of the world from which it is trying to wean the individual spirit, so that the moment it is armed for conflict such a religion has two enemies on its hands. It is stifled by its necessary armour, and adds treason in its members to hostility in its foes. The passions and arts it uses against its opponents are as fatal to itself as those which its opponents array against it.

In every age in which a supernaturalistic system is preached we must accordingly expect to find the world standing up stubbornly against it, essentially unconverted and hostile, whatever name it may have been christened with; and we may expect the spirit of

个人身上，反对基督教体制；教会中的世俗化，民众中的野蛮，以及各种科学与审美激情的曙光，这些激情本身完全是异教的，与福音精神相悖。那时的基督教世界绝非地上的上帝之国；它是一群不可救药的恶棍的集合体，在理智上或多或少是基督教的。我们可以在腓力二世时代的西班牙，在不同的境况下看到同样的事情。这是一个自觉为教会服务而劳作的政府，抵抗土耳其人，皈依异教徒，驱逐穆斯林，镇压新教徒。然而，参与保卫教会的那些力量本身，即军队与宗教裁判所，却与基督徒生活格格不入；它们毋宁是骑士精神与贪婪，或权术与嫉妒的统治的恰当体现。同样，用于传播福音的教会力量，即神学、仪式与教阶制度，本身也与福音格格不入。一种反世俗的宗教事实上发现自己处于这样的困境：倘若它仅仅保持精神性，不发展任何物质器官，它就不能影响世界；而倘若它发展出用以作用于世界的器官，这些器官就成为它试图使个体精神脱离的那个世界的一部分，以致这种宗教一旦武装起来投入战斗，手中便有两个敌人。它被自己必需的盔甲所窒息，在其成员中增添的背叛，更甚于其敌人中的敌意。它用以对抗对手的激情与手段，对自身的致命程度，不亚于对手用以对付它的那些。

因此，在每一个宣讲超自然主义体系的时代，我们都必须预料到世界会顽固地与之对抗，本质上未皈依且充满敌意，无论它被冠以何种名称；我们也可以预料到那种精神

the world to find expression, not only in overt opposition to the supernaturalistic system, but also in the surviving or supervening worldliness of the faithful. Such an insidious revulsion of the natural man against a religion he does not openly discard is what, in modern Christendom, we call the Renaissance. No less than the Revolution (which is the later open rebellion against the same traditions) the Renaissance is radically inimical to Christianity. To say that Christianity survives, even if weakened or disestablished, is to say that the Renaissance and the Revolution are still incomplete, Far from being past events they are living programmes. The ideal of the Renaissance is to restore pagan standards in polite learning, in philosophy, in sentiment, and in morals. It is to abandon and exactly reverse one's baptismal vows. Instead of forsaking this wicked world, the men of the Renaissance accept, love, and cultivate the world, with all its pomp and vanities; they believe in the blamelessness of natural life and in its perfectibility; or they cling at least to a noble ambition to perfect it and a glorious ability to enjoy it. Instead of renouncing the flesh, they feed, refine, and adorn it; their arts glorify its beauty and its passions. And far from renouncing the devil—if we understand by the devil the proud assertion on the part of the finite of its autonomy, autonomy of the intellect in science, autonomy of the heart and will in morals—the men of the Renaissance are possessed by the devil altogether. They worship nothing and acknowledge authority in nothing save in their own spirit. No opposition could be more radical and complete than that between the Renaissance and the anti-worldly religion of the gospel.

"I see a vision," Nietzsche says somewhere, "so full of meaning, yet

世界得以表达，不仅在于对超自然主义体系的公开反对，也在于信徒中残存的或随之而来的世俗化。这种自然人对一种他并未公开抛弃的宗教的阴险反叛，正是我们在现代基督教世界中所称的文艺复兴。文艺复兴与宗教改革(后者是后来对同一传统的公开反叛)一样，从根本上敌视基督教。说基督教幸存下来，即便已被削弱或废黜，就等于说文艺复兴与宗教改革仍未完成；它们远非过去的事件，而是活生生的纲领。文艺复兴的理想是在文雅学问、哲学、情感与道德中恢复异教的标准。它是放弃并恰好颠倒一个人的洗礼誓言。文艺复兴之人不是弃绝这个邪恶的世界，而是接受、热爱并培育这个世界，连同其一切浮华与虚荣；他们相信自然生活的无咎及其可完善性；或者他们至少执着于一种完善它的高贵抱负和一种享受它的光荣能力。他们不是弃绝肉体，而是滋养、精炼并装饰它；他们的艺术颂扬其美与其激情。而远非弃绝魔鬼--倘若我们以魔鬼指有限者对其自主性的骄傲主张，即理智在科学中的自主性、心灵与意志在道德中的自主性--文艺复兴之人完全被魔鬼附身。他们不崇拜任何东西，不承认任何东西中的权威，除了他们自己的精神。没有任何对立能比文艺复兴与福音的反世俗宗教之间的对立更为根本和彻底。

“我看见一个幻象，”尼采在某处说道，“如此充满意义，然而

so wonderfully strange—Cæsar Borgia become pope! Do you understand? Ah, that would verily have been the triumph for which I am longing to-day. Then Christianity would have been done for." And Nietzsche goes on to accuse Luther of having spoiled this lovely possibility, which was about to be realised, by frightening the papacy out of its mellow paganism into something like a restoration of the old acrid Christianity. A dream of this sort, even if less melodramatic than Nietzsche's, has visited the mind of many a neo-Catholic or neo-pagan. If the humanistic tendencies of the Renaissance could have worked on unimpeded, might not a revolution from above, a gradual rationalisation, have transformed the church? Its dogma might have been insensibly understood to be nothing but myth, its miracles nothing but legend, its sacraments mere symbols, its Bible pure literature, its liturgy just poetry, its hierarchy an administrative convenience, its ethics an historical accident, and its whole function simply to lend a warm mystical aureole to human culture and ignorance. The Reformation prevented this euthanasia of Christianity. It re-expressed the unenlightened absolutism of the old religion; it insisted that dogma was scientifically true, that salvation was urgent and fearfully doubtful, that the world, and the worldly paganised church, were as Sodom and Gomorrah, and that sin, though natural to man, was to God an abomination. In fighting this movement, which soon became heretical, the Catholic church had to fight it with its own weapons, and thereby reawakened in its own bosom the same sinister convictions. It did not have to dig deep to find them. Even without Luther, convinced Catholics would have appeared in plenty to prevent Cæsar Borgia, had he secured the tiara, from being pope in any novel fashion or with

如此奇妙地奇怪--凯撒·博尔吉亚成为教皇!你明白吗?啊，那确实会是我今天所渴望的胜利。那么基督教就完蛋了。”尼采接着指责路德破坏了这一可爱的可能性，这一可能性即将实现，却因恐吓教廷脱离其成熟的异教主义，使之转向某种旧日辛辣基督教的复辟。这类梦想，即便不如尼采那般情节夸张，也曾造访许多新天主教徒或新异教徒的心灵。如果文艺复兴的人文主义倾向能够不受阻碍地发挥作用，一场自上而下的革命、一种渐进的理性化，难道不可能改造教会吗?其教义或许会被不知不觉地理解为不过是神话，其奇迹不过是传说，其圣礼仅是象征，其圣经纯为文学，其礼仪只是诗歌，其教阶制度是行政上的便利，其伦理学是历史的偶然，而其全部功能不过是为人类文化与无知披上一层温暖的神秘光环。宗教改革阻止了基督教的这种安乐死。它重新表达了旧宗教未经启蒙的绝对论；它坚持教义在科学上是真实的，得救是紧迫的且可怕地可疑的，世界以及世俗化的异教教会如同所多玛和蛾摩拉，而罪虽对人而言是自然的，对上帝却是可憎的。在与这一不久便成为异端的运动作斗争时，天主教会不得不以自身的武器与之战斗，从而在自己怀抱中重新唤醒了同样阴森的信念。它无需深挖便可找到它们。即便没有路德，坚信的天主教徒也会大量出现，以阻止凯撒·博尔吉亚--倘若他获得了三重冠--以任何新奇的方式或带着

any revolutionary result. The supernaturalism, the literal realism, the other-worldliness of the Catholic church are too much the soul of it to depart without causing its dissolution. While the church lives at all, it must live on the strength which these principles can lend it. And they are not altogether weak. Persons who feel themselves to be exiles in this world—and what noble mind, from Empedocles down, has not had that feeling?—are mightily inclined to believe themselves citizens of another. There will always be spontaneous, instinctive Christians; and when, under the oppression of sin, salvation is looked for and miracles are expected, the supernatural scheme of salvation which historical Christianity offers will not always be despised. The modernists think the church is doomed if it turns a deaf ear to the higher criticism or ignores the philosophy of M. Bergson. But it has outlived greater storms. A moment when any exotic superstition can find excitable minds to welcome it, when new and grotesque forms of faith can spread among the people, when the ultimate impotence of science is the theme of every cheap philosopher, when constructive philology is reefing its sails, when the judicious grieve at the portentous metaphysical shams of yesterday and smile at those of to-day—such a moment is rather ill chosen for prophesying the extinction of a deep-rooted system of religion because your own studies make it seem to you incredible; especially if you hold a theory of knowledge that regards all opinions as arbitrary postulates, which it may become convenient to abandon at any moment.

Modernism is the infiltration into minds that begin by being Catholic and wish to remain so of two contemporary influences: one the rationalistic study of the Bible and of church history, the

任何革命性的结果成为教皇。天主教会的超自然主义、字面实在论和来世性太是其灵魂所在，若离去而不导致其解体是不可能的。只要教会还存在，它就必须依靠这些原则所能赋予它的力量而存在。而这些原则并非全然软弱。那些感到自己是此世流放者的人--自恩培多克勒以降，哪个高贵的心灵没有过这种感觉?--极倾向于相信自己乃是另一世界的公民。总会有自发的、本能的基督徒；而当在罪的压迫下寻求得救、期待奇迹时，历史基督教所提供的超自然得救方案并不会总被轻视。现代主义者认为，如果教会对高级批评充耳不闻或无视柏格森先生的哲学，它就注定灭亡。但它已熬过了更大的风暴。在一个任何异域迷信都能找到易激动的头脑来欢迎它的时刻，在信仰的新奇怪诞形式能在民众中传播的时刻，在科学的终极无能成为每个廉价哲学家的主题的时刻，在建构性语文学正在收帆的时刻，在明智之士为昨日那些不祥的形而上学骗局而悲叹、对今日的骗局微笑的时刻--这样的时刻颇不适合预言一个根深蒂固的宗教体系的灭绝，仅仅因为你自己的研究使你觉得它不可信；尤其是如果你持有一種知识理论，认为一切意见都是任意的设定，随时都可能变得便于抛弃。

现代主义是两种当代影响渗入那些起初是天主教徒并希望保持如此的心灵：其一是对《圣经》和教会史的理性主义研究，

other modern philosophy, especially in its mystical and idealistic forms. The sensitiveness of the modernists to these two influences is creditable to them as men, however perturbing it may be to them as Catholics; for what makes them adopt the views of rationalistic historians is simply the fact that those views seem, in substance, convincingly true; and what makes them wander into transcendental speculations is the warmth of their souls, needing to express their faith anew, and to follow their inmost inspiration, wherever it may lead them. A scrupulous honesty in admitting the probable facts of history, and a fresh upwelling of mystical experience, these are the motives, creditable to any spiritual man, that have made modernists of so many. But these excellent things appear in the modernists under rather unfortunate circumstances. For the modernists to begin with are Catholics, and usually priests; they are pledged to a fixed creed, touching matters both of history and of philosophy; and it would be a marvel if rationalistic criticism of the Bible and rationalistic church history confirmed that creed on its historical side, or if irresponsible personal speculations, in the manner of Ritschl or of M. Bergson, confirmed its metaphysics.

其他现代哲学，尤其是其神秘主义和唯心主义形式。现代主义者对这两种影响的敏感，作为人值得称赞，尽管作为天主教徒可能令他们不安；因为使他们采纳理性主义历史学家观点的，仅仅是那些观点在实质上似乎令人信服地真实这一事实；而使他们游荡进先验思辨的，是他们灵魂的温暖，需要重新表达其信仰，并追随其最内在的灵感，无论它引领他们到何处。一丝不苟的诚实，承认历史可能的事实，以及神秘经验的新涌流，这些是任何属灵之人都值得称赞的动机，它们使如此多的人成为现代主义者。但这些优秀之物在现代主义者身上出现于相当不幸的境况中。因为现代主义者首先是天主教徒，通常是神父；他们受誓约约束于固定的信条，涉及历史与哲学两方面的事务；如果对圣经的理性主义批评和理性主义教会史在其历史方面证实了该信条，或者如果里奇尔或柏格森先生那种不负责任的个人思辨证实了其形而上学，那倒会是奇事。

I am far from wishing to suggest that an orthodox Christian cannot be scrupulously honest in admitting the probable facts, or cannot have a fresh spiritual experience, or frame an original philosophy. But what we think probable hangs on our standard of probability and of evidence; the spiritual experiences that come to us are according to our disposition and affections; and any new philosophy we frame will be an answer to the particular problems that beset us, and an expression of the solutions we hope for. Now this standard of probability, this disposition, and these problems

我远非想暗示一个正统基督徒不能一丝不苟地诚实承认可能的事实，或不能有新鲜的精神经验，或不能构建原创的哲学。但我们认为可能的东西取决于我们的或然性与证据标准；降临于我们的精神经验依我们的性情与情感而定；我们所构建的任何新哲学都将是对困扰我们的特定问题的回答，是对我们所希望之解决方案的表达。如今，这种或然性标准、这种性情、这些问题

and hopes may be those of a Christian or they may not. The true Christian, for instance, will begin by regarding miracles as probable; he will either believe he has experienced them in his own person, or hope for them earnestly; nothing will seem to him more natural, more in consonance with the actual texture of life, than that they should have occurred abundantly and continuously in the past. When he finds the record of one he will not inquire, like the rationalist, how that false record could have been concocted; but rather he will ask how the rationalist, in spite of so many witnesses to the contrary, has acquired his fixed assurance of the universality of the commonplace. An answer perhaps could be offered of which the rationalist need not be ashamed. We might say that faith in the universality of the commonplace (in its origin, no doubt, simply an imaginative presumption) is justified by our systematic mastery of matter in the arts. The rejection of miracles *a priori* expresses a conviction that the laws by which we can always control or predict the movement of matter govern that movement universally; and evidently, if the material course of history is fixed mechanically, the mental and moral course of it is thereby fixed on the same plan; for a mind not expressed somehow in matter cannot be revealed to the historian. This may be good philosophy, but we could not think so if we were good Christians. We should then expect to move matter by prayer. Rationalistic history and criticism are therefore based, as Pius X. most accurately observed in his Encyclical on modernism, on rationalistic philosophy; and we might add that rationalistic philosophy is based on practical art, and that practical art, by which we help ourselves, like Prometheus, and make instruments of what religion worships, when this art is carried beyond the

与希望，可能是基督徒的，也可能不是。例如，真正的基督徒会首先将奇迹视为可能的；他要么相信自己亲身经历过奇迹，要么热切地盼望奇迹；在他看来，没有什么比奇迹在过去大量而持续地发生更自然、更符合生活的实际纹理了。当他发现一则奇迹记载时，他不会像理性主义者那样追问那虚假记载是如何编造出来的；相反，他会问，尽管理性主义者有如此多的相反见证，他是如何获得对平凡事物之普遍性的固定确信的。或许可以给出一个理性主义者无需为之羞愧的回答。我们可以说，对平凡事物之普遍性的信仰(在其起源上，无疑只是一种想象性的假定)由我们在技艺中对物质的系统掌控所证明。对奇迹的先验拒斥表达了一种确信：我们总能借以控制或预测物质运动的那些定律普遍地支配着那种运动；而且显然，如果历史的物质进程是机械地固定的，那么其精神与道德进程便按同一方案被固定；因为一种未以某种方式在物质中表达的心灵不可能向历史学家显现。这或许是好的哲学，但如果我们是好基督徒，我们就不会这样认为。我们那时会期望通过祈祷来移动物质。因此，理性主义的历史与批评，正如庇护十世在其关于现代主义的通谕中最准确地指出的，建立在理性主义哲学之上；我们还可以补充说，理性主义哲学建立在实践技艺之上，而实践技艺--我们借此像普罗米修斯一样自助，把宗教所崇拜的东西制成工具--当这种技艺被推至

narrowest bounds, is the essence of pride and irreligion. Miners, machinists, and artisans are irreligious by trade. Religion is the love of life in the consciousness of impotence.

最狭隘的界限，是骄傲与不宗教的本质。矿工、机械师和工匠因其职业而不宗教。宗教是在无力意识中对生命的热爱。

Similarly, the spontaneous insight of Christians and their new philosophies will express a Christian disposition. The chief problems in them will be sin and redemption; the conclusion will be some fresh intuition of divine love and heavenly beatitude. It would be no sign of originality in a Christian to begin discoursing on love like Ovid or on heaven like Mohammed, or stop discoursing on them at all; it would be a sign of apostasy.

同样，基督徒的自发直觉及其新哲学将表达一种基督教倾向。其中的主要问题将是罪与救赎；结论将是对神圣之爱与天上至福的某种新鲜直觉。一个基督徒若像奥维德那样谈论爱，或像穆罕默德那样谈论天堂，或干脆停止谈论它们，并不会显示其独创性；那将是一种背教的标志。

Now the modernists' criterion of probability in history or of worthiness in philosophy is not the Christian criterion. It is that of their contemporaries outside the church, who are rationalists in history and egotists or voluntarists in philosophy. The biblical criticism and mystical speculations of the modernists call for no special remark; they are such as any studious or spiritual person, with no inherited religion, might compose in our day. But what is remarkable and well-nigh incredible is that even for a moment they should have supposed this non-Christian criterion in history and this non-Christian direction in metaphysics compatible with adherence to the Catholic church. That seems to presuppose, in men who in fact are particularly thoughtful and learned, an inexplicable ignorance of history, of theology, and of the world.

然而，现代主义者在历史中的或然性标准或在哲学中的价值标准，并不是基督教的标准。它是他们那些教会之外的同時代人的标准，这些人在历史中是理性主义者，在哲学中是利己主义者或唯意志论者。现代主义者的圣经批评和神秘思辨无需特别评论；它们不过是任何好学或属灵的人，在没有继承宗教的情况下，在我们这个时代可能写出的东西。但令人瞩目且几乎难以置信的是，他们竟会哪怕片刻以为这种非基督教的历史标准和这种非基督教的形而上学方向与坚持天主教会相容。这似乎 presupposes，在事实上特别深思熟虑和博学的人身上，一种对历史、神学和世界的不可解释的无知。

Everything, however, has its explanation. In a Catholic seminary, as the modernists bitterly complain, very little is heard of the views held in the learned world outside. It is not taught there that the Christian religion is only one of many, some of them older and superior to it in certain respects; that it itself is eclectic and

然而，一切都有其解释。在一所天主教神学院里，正如现代主义者所痛切抱怨的，很少听到外部学术世界所持的观点。那里不教导说基督教只是众多宗教之一，其中一些在某些方面更古老且优于它；不教导说它本身是折衷的

contains inward contradictions; that it is and always has been divided into rancorous sects; that its position in the world is precarious and its future hopeless. On the contrary, everything is so presented as to persuade the innocent student that all that is good or true anywhere is founded on the faith he is preparing to preach, that the historical evidences of its truth are irrefragable, that it is logically perfect and spiritually all-sufficing. These convictions, which no breath from the outside is allowed to ruffle, are deepened in the case of pensive and studious minds, like those of the leading modernists, by their own religious experience. They understand in what they are taught more, perhaps, than their teachers intend. They understand how those ideas originated, they can trace a similar revelation in their own lives. This (which a cynic might expect would be the beginning of disillusion) only deepens their religious faith and gives it a wider basis; report and experience seem to conspire. But trouble is brewing here; for a report that can be confirmed by experience can also be enlarged by it, and it is easy to see in traditional revelation itself many diverse sources; different temperaments and different types of thought have left their impress upon it. Yet other temperaments and other types of thought might continue the task. Revelation seems to be progressive; a part may fall to us also to furnish.

包含内在矛盾；它现在和一直分裂为充满敌意的派别；它在世界上的地位岌岌可危，其未来毫无希望。相反，一切都如此呈现，以说服天真的学生相信，任何地方一切善的或真的东西都建立在他准备宣讲的信仰之上，其真理的历史证据是不可反驳的，它在逻辑上是完美的，在精神上是完全充足的。这些信念，不允许外界一丝气息吹皱，在沉思和好学的心灵中，如那些主要现代主义者的心灵，被他们自己的宗教经验所加深。他们在所教的东西中理解得更多，也许超过他们的教师所意图的。他们理解那些观念如何起源，他们能在自己的生活中追溯类似的启示。这(一个玩世不恭者可能期望这将是幻灭的开始)只是加深了他们的宗教信仰，并给它一个更广阔的基础；传闻和经验似乎 conspire。但麻烦正在这里酝酿；因为一个能被经验证实的传闻也能被它扩大，而且容易在传统启示本身中看到许多不同的来源；不同的气质和不同的思想类型在它上面留下了印记。然而其他气质和其他思想类型可能继续这项任务。启示似乎是进步的；一部分也可能落到我们身上来提供。

This insight, for a Christian, has its dangers. No doubt it gives him a key to the understanding and therefore, in one sense, to the acceptance of many a dogma. Christian dogmas were not pieces of wanton information fallen from heaven; they were imaginative views, expressing now some primordial instinct in all men, now the national hopes and struggles of Israel, now the moral or dialectical philosophy of the later Jews and Greeks. Such a

这种洞见，对一个基督徒而言，有其危险。无疑，它给了他一把理解之钥，因此，在某种意义上，也给了他接受许多教义之钥。基督教教义并非从天上落下的任意信息碎片；它们是想象性的观点，时而表达所有人身上的某种原始本能，时而表达以色列的民族希望与斗争，时而表达后期犹太人和希腊人的道德或辩证哲学。这样一种

derivation does not, of itself, render these dogmas necessarily mythical. They might be ideal expressions of human experience and yet be literally true as well, provided we assume (what is assumed throughout in Christianity) that the world is made for man, and that even God is just such a God as man would have wished him to be, the existent ideal of human nature and the foregone solution to all human problems. Nevertheless, Christian dogmas are definite,[2] while human inspirations are potentially limitless; and if the object of the two is identical either the dogmas must be stretched and ultimately abandoned, or inspiration which does not conform to them must be denounced as illusory or diabolical.

推导本身并不使这些教义必然成为神话。它们可以是人类经验的理想表达，同时也可以是字面真实的，只要我们假定(基督教中始终假定的)世界是为人类而造的，甚至上帝正是人类所希望的那种上帝，即人性的现存理想和一切人类问题的预先解决。然而，基督教教义是确定的，[2]而人类的灵感则是潜在地无限的；如果二者的对象是同一的，那么要么教义必须被扩展并最终被放弃，要么不符合教义的灵感必须被谴责为虚幻的或魔鬼的。

At this point the modernist first chooses the path which must lead him away, steadily and for ever, from the church which he did not think to desert. He chooses a personal, psychological, variable standard of inspiration; he becomes, in principle, a Protestant. Why does he not become one in name also? Because, as one of the most distinguished modernists has said, the age of partial heresy is past. It is suicidal to make one part of an organic system the instrument for attacking another part; and it is also comic. What you appeal to and stand firmly rooted in is no more credible, no more authoritative, than what you challenge in its name. In vain will you pit the church against the pope; at once you will have to pit the Bible against the church, and then the New Testament against the Old, or the genuine Jesus against the New Testament, or God revealed in nature against God revealed in the Bible, or God revealed in your own conscience or transcendental self against God revealed in nature; and you will be lucky if your

在这一点上，现代主义者首先选择了那条必定引导他稳步且永远离开他未曾想过要抛弃的教会的道路。他选择了一个个人的、心理的、可变的灵感标准；他在原则上变成了一个新教徒。为什么他不也在名义上成为一个呢?因为，正如一位最杰出的现代主义者所说，部分异端的时代已经过去。使一个有机系统的一部分成为攻击另一部分的工具是自杀性的；也是滑稽的。你所诉诸并坚定扎根的东西，并不比你所挑战的东西更可信、更有权威。你徒劳地让教会对抗教皇；立刻你将不得不让圣经对抗教会，然后让新约对抗旧约，或真正的耶稣对抗新约，或自然中启示的上帝对抗圣经中启示的上帝，或你自己的良心或先验自我中启示的上帝对抗自然中启示的上帝；而你将幸运，如果你的

conscience and transcendental self can long hold their own against the flux of immediate experience. Religion, the modernists feel, must be taken broadly and sympathetically, as a great human historical symbol for the truth. At least in Christianity you should aspire to embrace and express the whole; to seize it in its deep inward sources and follow it on all sides in its vital development. But if the age of partial heresy is past, has not the age of total heresy succeeded? What is this whole phenomenon of religion but human experience interpreted by human imagination? And what is the modernist, who would embrace it all, but a freethinker, with a sympathetic interest in religious illusions? Of course, that is just what he is; but it takes him a strangely long time to discover it. He fondly supposes (such is the prejudice imbibed by him in the cradle and in the seminary) that all human inspirations are necessarily similar and concurrent, that by trusting an inward light he cannot be led away from his particular religion, but on the contrary can only find confirmation for it, together with fresh spiritual energies. He has been reared in profound ignorance of other religions, which were presented to him, if at all, only in grotesque caricature; or if anything good had to be admitted in them, it was set down to a premonition of his own system or a derivation from it—a curious conceit, which seems somehow not to have wholly disappeared from the minds of Protestants, or even of professors of philosophy. I need not observe how completely the secret of each alien religion is thereby missed and its native accent outraged: the most serious consequence, for the modernist, of this unconsciousness of whatever is not Christian is an unconsciousness of what, in contrast to other religions, Christianity itself is. He feels himself full of love—except for the

良心和先验自我能长期抵挡直接经验的流变。现代主义者觉得，宗教必须被广泛而同情地看待，作为真理的伟大人类历史象征。至少在基督教中，你应当渴望拥抱和表达整体；抓住其深层的内在源泉，并在其生命发展的各个方面追随它。但如果部分异端的时代已经过去，难道不是整体异端的时代已经接替了吗?宗教的整个现象，除了是人类想象所解释的人类经验，还能是什么?而现代主义者，那个想要拥抱这一切的人，除了是一个对宗教幻觉抱有同情兴趣的自由思想家，还能是什么?当然，他正是如此；但他花了奇怪地长的时间才发现这一点。他天真地以为(这是他在摇篮和神学院中吸收的偏见)，所有人类灵感必然相似且一致，通过信任内在之光，他不可能被带离他的特定宗教，相反只能找到对它的确认，连同新鲜的精神能量。他在对其他宗教的深刻无知中长大，这些宗教如果被呈现给他，也只是以怪诞的漫画形式；或者如果必须承认其中任何好的东西，那被归因于对他自己体系的预感或源自它--一个奇怪的幻想，似乎不知何故并未完全从新教徒、甚至哲学教授的心中消失。我无需指出，每个异己宗教的秘密由此被多么完全地错过，其本土口音被多么严重地冒犯：对现代主义者来说，这种对任何非基督教事物的无意识的最严重后果，是对基督教本身与其他宗教相比是什么的无意识。他感到自己充满爱--除了对那

pope—of mysticism, and of a sort of archaeological piety. He is learned and eloquent and wistful. Why should he not remain in the church? Why should he not bring all its cold and recalcitrant members up to his own level of insight?

The modernist, like the Protestants before him, is certainly justified in contrasting a certain essence or true life of religion with the formulas and practices, not all equally well-chosen, which have crystallised round it. In the routine of Catholic teaching and worship there is notoriously a deal of mummery: phrases and ceremonies abound that have lost their meaning, and that people run through without even that general devout attitude and unction which, after all, is all that can be asked for in the presence of mysteries. Not only is all sense of the historical or moral basis of dogma wanting, but the dogma itself is hardly conceived explicitly; all is despatched with a stock phrase, or a quotation from some theological compendium. Ecclesiastical authority acts as if it felt that more profundity would be confusing and that more play of mind might be dangerous. This is that "Scholasticism" and "Mediævalism" against which the modernists inveigh or under which they groan; and to this intellectual barrenness may be added the offences against taste, verisimilitude, and justice which their more critical minds may discern in many an act and pronouncement of their official superiors. Thus both their sense for historical truth and their spontaneous mysticism drive the modernists to contrast with the official religion what was pure and vital in the religion of their fathers. Like the early Protestants, they wish to revert to a more genuine Christianity; but while their historical imagination is much more accurate and well-fed than that of any one in the

神秘主义教皇，以及一种考古式虔诚。他博学、雄辩而怅惘。他为何不应留在教会中?他为何不应将教会中所有冷漠而抗拒的成员提升到他自己洞见的水平?

现代主义者，如同他之前的新教徒一样，当然有理由将宗教的某种本质或真实生命与围绕它结晶化的公式和做法--并非所有都同样恰当--进行对比。在天主教教学和崇拜的常规中，众所周知有大量繁文缛节：充斥着的短语和仪式已失去其意义，人们只是走过场，甚至没有那种普遍的虔诚态度和油膏，毕竟在神秘面前所能要求的仅此而已。不仅教义的历史或道德基础感缺失，而且教义本身也几乎未被明确构想；一切都用陈词滥调或引用神学汇编来打发。教会权威行事仿佛觉得更深的深度会令人困惑，更多的心灵活动可能危险。这就是现代主义者所抨击或在其下呻吟的“经院哲学”和“中世纪主义”；除了这种智识贫瘠，还可以加上他们在许多官方上级的行为和声明中可能 discern 的冒犯品味、逼真性和正义之处。因此，他们的历史真理感和自发神秘主义都驱使现代主义者将官方宗教与他们父辈宗教中纯洁和充满活力的部分进行对比。像早期新教徒一样，他们希望回归更真正的基督教；但尽管他们的历史想象比十六世纪任何人都更准确和丰富，他们并不坚持新教徒的信仰原则。新教徒将圣经视为神谕，由个人灵感来解释，可以根据理性或情感随意改革传统，无论程度如何。但只要他们的基督教是积极信仰，当所有杂质被批评和烧尽后，残余物就具有神圣权威。圣经对他们从未仅仅成为一本古老的犹太百科全书，常常雄辩、常常奇特、常常野蛮。上帝从未成为文学象征，涵盖某种有问题的宇宙力量或良心的理想。但对现代主义者来说，这种彻底转变立即发生。他保留整个天主教体系，但不相信其中任何部分如其要求被相信的那样。他理解并分享它所蕴含的道德经验；但泡沫已被刺破，彩绘世界被发现只是彩绘。他已不再是基督徒，而成为基督教的业余爱好者，或如你所愿，鉴赏家。他相信--这是毫无疑问的，因为他是他时代的产物--历史、语言学、进化，也许还有德国唯心论；他不相信罪、救赎或启示。他对历史的研究向他揭示了基督教在其进化和神话特性中；他希望完整保留它，正是因为他将其视为一种约定，如语言或艺术流派；而新教徒相反，希望将其还原到原始实质，因为他们天真地以为那个原始实质是大量字面真理。因此，现代主义是一种模棱两可和不稳定的东西。它是对所有基督教的爱，在那些感知到它全是寓言的人中。它是一个天主教徒对其教会的历史依恋

sixteenth century could be, they have no hold on the Protestant principle of faith. The Protestants, taking the Bible as an oracle which personal inspiration was to interpret, could reform tradition in any way and to any extent which their reason or feeling happened to prompt. But so long as their Christianity was a positive faith, the residue, when all the dross had been criticised and burned away, was of divine authority. The Bible never became for them merely an ancient Jewish encyclopædia, often eloquent, often curious, and often barbarous. God never became a literary symbol, covering some problematical cosmic force, or some ideal of the conscience. But for the modernist this total transformation takes place at once. He keeps the whole Catholic system, but he believes in no part of it as it demands to be believed. He understands and shares the moral experience that it enshrines; but the bubble has been pricked, the painted world has been discovered to be but painted. He has ceased to be a Christian to become an amateur, or if you will a connoisseur, of Christianity. He believes—and this unquestioningly, for he is a child of his age—in history, in philology, in evolution, perhaps in German idealism; he does not believe in sin, nor in salvation, nor in revelation. His study of history has disclosed Christianity to him in its evolution and in its character of a myth; he wishes to keep it in its entirety precisely because he regards it as a convention, like a language or a school of art; whereas the Protestants wished, on the contrary, to reduce it to its original substance, because they fondly supposed that that original substance was so much literal truth. Modernism is accordingly an ambiguous and unstable thing. It is the love of all Christianity in those who perceive that it is all a fable. It is the historic attachment to his church of a Catholic

十六世纪任何人都更准确和丰富，他们并不坚持新教徒的信仰原则。新教徒将圣经视为神谕，由个人灵感来解释，可以根据理性或情感随意改革传统，无论程度如何。但只要他们的基督教是积极信仰，当所有杂质被批评和烧尽后，残余物就具有神圣权威。圣经对他们从未仅仅成为一本古老的犹太百科全书，常常雄辩、常常奇特、常常野蛮。上帝从未成为文学象征，涵盖某种有问题的宇宙力量或良心的理想。但对现代主义者来说，这种彻底转变立即发生。他保留整个天主教体系，但不相信其中任何部分如其要求被相信的那样。他理解并分享它所蕴含的道德经验；但泡沫已被刺破，彩绘世界被发现只是彩绘。他已不再是基督徒，而成为基督教的业余爱好者，或如你所愿，鉴赏家。他相信--这是毫无疑问的，因为他是他时代的产物--历史、语言学、进化，也许还有德国唯心论；他不相信罪、救赎或启示。他对历史的研究向他揭示了基督教在其进化和神话特性中；他希望完整保留它，正是因为他将其视为一种约定，如语言或艺术流派；而新教徒相反，希望将其还原到原始实质，因为他们天真地以为那个原始实质是大量字面真理。因此，现代主义是一种模棱两可和不稳定的东西。它是对所有基督教的爱，在那些感知到它全是寓言的人中。它是一个天主教徒对其教会的历史依恋

who has discovered that he is a pagan.

When the modernists are pressed to explain their apparently double allegiance, they end by saying that what historical and philological criticism conjectures to be the facts must be accepted as such; while the Christian dogmas touching these things—the incarnation and resurrection of Christ, for instance—must be taken in a purely symbolic or moral sense. In saying this they may be entirely right; it seems to many of us that Christianity is indeed a fable, yet full of meaning if you take it as such; for what scraps of historical truth there may be in the Bible or of metaphysical truth in theology are of little importance; whilst the true greatness and beauty of this, as of all religions, is to be found in its *moral idealism*, I mean, in the expression it gives, under cover of legends, prophecies, or mysteries, of the effort, the tragedy, and the consolations of human life. Such a moral fable is what Christianity is in fact; but it is far from what it is in intention. The modernist view, the view of a sympathetic rationalism, revokes the whole Jewish tradition on which Christianity is grafted; it takes the seriousness out of religion; it sweetens the pang of sin, which becomes misfortune; it removes the urgency of salvation; it steals empirical reality away from the last judgment, from hell, and from heaven; it steals historical reality away from the Christ of religious tradition and personal devotion. The moral summons and the prophecy about destiny which were the soul of the gospel have lost all force for it and become fables.

The modernist, then, starts with the orthodox but untenable persuasion that Catholicism comprehends all that is good; he adds the heterodox though amiable sentiment that any well-meaning ambition of the mind, any hope, any illumination, any science,

他发现自己是个异教徒。

当现代主义者被要求解释他们表面上的双重忠诚时，他们最终说，历史和语言批评推测为事实的东西必须被接受为如此；而涉及这些事情的基督教教义--例如基督的道成肉身和复活--必须从纯粹象征或道德意义来理解。这样说他们可能完全正确；对我们许多人来说，基督教确实是一个寓言，但如果你这样看待它，却充满意义；因为圣经中可能有的历史真理碎片或神学中的形而上学真理都无关紧要；而这一切，如同所有宗教，其真正伟大和美丽在于其道德理想主义，我的意思是，在传说、预言或神秘的掩护下，表达人类生活的努力、悲剧和慰藉。这样的道德寓言实际上是基督教；但远非其意图。现代主义观点，即同情理性主义的观点，撤销了基督教所嫁接的整个犹太传统；它去除了宗教的严肃性；它甜化了罪的痛苦，使之成为不幸；它移除了救赎的紧迫性；它从最后审判、地狱和天堂中偷走了经验现实；它从宗教传统和个人奉献的基督中偷走了历史现实。道德召唤和关于命运的预言，曾是福音的灵魂，对它已失去所有力量，成为寓言。

因此，现代主义者始于正统但站不住脚的信念，即天主教包容一切善；他加上异端却友善的情感，即任何善意的思想抱负、任何希望、任何启示、任何科学，

must be good, and therefore compatible with Catholicism. He bathes himself in idealistic philosophy, he dabbles in liberal politics, he accepts and emulates rationalistic exegesis and anti-clerical church history. Soon he finds himself, on every particular point, out of sympathy with the acts and tendencies of the church to which he belongs; and then he yields to the most pathetic of his many illusions—he sets about to purge this church, so as not to be compelled to abandon it; to purge it of its first principles, of its whole history, and of its sublime if chimerical ideal.

必须是善的，因而与天主教相容。他沐浴于唯心主义哲学之中，涉猎自由派政治，接受并效仿理性主义的释经学与反教权的教会史。很快他便发现，自己在每一个具体问题上，都与所属教会的行为和倾向格格不入；于是他屈服于他众多幻想中最可悲的一个--着手净化这个教会，以免被迫抛弃它；净化它的首要原则，净化它的全部历史，净化它那崇高而虚幻的理想。

The modernist wishes to reconcile the church and the world. Therein he forgets what Christianity came into the world to announce and why its message was believed. It came to announce salvation from the world; there should be no more need of just those things which the modernist so deeply loves and respects and blushes that his church should not be adorned with—emancipated science, free poetic religion, optimistic politics, and dissolute art. These things, according to the Christian conscience, were all vanity and vexation of spirit, and the pagan world itself almost confessed as much. They were vexatious and vain because they were bred out of sin, out of ignoring the inward and the revealed law of God; and they would lead surely and quickly to destruction. The needful salvation from these follies, Christianity went on to announce, had come through the cross of Christ; whose grace, together with admission to his future heavenly kingdom, was offered freely to such as believed in him, separated themselves from the world, and lived in charity, humility, and innocence, waiting lamp in hand for the celestial bridegroom. These abstracted and elected spirits were the true disciples of Christ and the church itself.

现代主义者希望调和教会与世界。在此之中，他忘记了基督教来到世上所要宣告的是什么，以及它的信息为何被人相信。它来宣告的是从世界中的拯救；本不应再需要那些现代主义者如此深爱、如此尊重、并因他的教会未能以之装点而脸红的东西--解放了的科学、自由的诗性宗教、乐观的政治、放荡的艺术。依照基督教良心，这些东西全是虚空，都是精神的烦恼，异教世界本身也几乎承认了这一点。它们令人烦恼且虚空，因为它们滋生自罪，滋生自对内在的与启示的上帝律法的忽视；它们必将迅速导致毁灭。基督教继而宣告，从这些愚妄中所需的拯救，已通过基督的十字架而来；他的恩典，连同准入他未来天国的资格，白白赐给那些信他的人，那些使自己与世界分离、生活在仁爱、谦卑与纯真之中、手持灯盏等候天上新郎的人。这些超脱而被拣选的精神，才是基督真正的门徒，也是教会本身。

Having no ears for this essential message of Christianity, the modernist also has no eyes for its history. The church converted the world only partially and inessentially; yet Christianity was outwardly established as the traditional religion of many nations. And why? Because, although the prophecies it relied on were strained and its miracles dubious, it furnished a needful sanctuary from the shames, sorrows, injustices, violence, and gathering darkness of earth; and not only a sanctuary one might fly to, but a holy precinct where one might live, where there was sacred learning, based on revelation and tradition, to occupy the inquisitive, and sacred philosophy to occupy the speculative; where there might be religious art, ministering to the faith, and a new life in the family or in the cloister, transformed by a permeating spirit of charity, sacrifice, soberness, and prayer. These principles by their very nature could not become those of the world, but they could remain in it as a leaven and an ideal. As such they remain to this day, and very efficaciously, in the Catholic church. The modernists talk a great deal of development, and they do not see that what they detest in the church is a perfect development of its original essence; that monachism, scholasticism, Jesuitism, ultramontanism, and Vaticanism are all thoroughly apostolic; beneath the overtones imposed by a series of ages they give out the full and exact note of the New Testament. Much has been added, but nothing has been lost. Development (though those who talk most of it seem to forget it) is not the same as flux and dissolution. It is not a continuity through changes of any sort, but the evolution of something latent and preformed, or else the creation of new instruments of defence for the same original life. In this sense there was an immense

由于对基督教这一本质信息充耳不闻，现代主义者对其历史也视而不见。教会只是部分地、非本质地归化了世界；然而基督教在外表上已确立为许多民族的传统宗教。为何如此?因为，尽管它所倚靠的预言牵强、奇迹可疑，它却提供了一个必要的避难所，使人逃离世上的耻辱、悲伤、不义、暴力与日增的黑暗；不仅是一个可以逃往的避难所，更是一个可以居住的神圣境地，那里有基于启示与传统的圣学，供好探究者研习，有神圣哲学，供思辨者钻研；那里可以有服务于信仰的宗教艺术，以及在家庭或修道院中、被渗透一切的仁爱、牺牲、节制与祈祷之精神所转化的新生活。这些原则依其本性不可能成为世界的原则，但它们可以作为酵与理想留存于世界之中。如此，它们至今仍留在天主教会中，且极为有效。现代主义者大谈发展，却看不到他们在教会中所憎恶的，正是其原初本质的完美发展；修道制度、经院哲学、耶稣会主义、越山主义与梵蒂冈主义，全都彻底是使徒性的；在一系列时代所叠加的泛音之下，它们发出的是新约完整而准确的音调。增添了许多，但什么也没有失去。发展(尽管那些谈论它最多的人似乎忘记了这一点)并不等同于流变与解体。它不是经由任何变化而保持的连续，而是某种潜在且预成之物的进化，或是为同一原初生命创造新的防御工具。在这个意义上，最初三个世纪里基督教有过巨大的

development of Christianity during the first three centuries, and this development has continued, more slowly, ever since, but only in the Roman church; for the Eastern churches have refused themselves all new expressions, while the Protestant churches have eaten more and more into the core. It is a striking proof of the preservative power of readjustment that the Roman church, in the midst of so many external transformations as it has undergone, still demands the same kind of faith that John the Baptist demanded, I mean faith in another world. The *mise-en-scène* has changed immensely. The gospel has been encased in theology, in ritual, in ecclesiastical authority, in conventional forms of charity, like some small bone of a saint in a gilded reliquary; but the relic for once is genuine, and the gospel has been preserved by those thick incrustations. Many an isolated fanatic or evangelical missionary in the slums shows a greater resemblance to the apostles in his outer situation than the pope does; but what mind-healer or revivalist nowadays preaches the doom of the natural world and its vanity, or the reversal of animal values, or the blessedness of poverty and chastity, or the inferiority of natural human bonds, or a contempt for lay philosophy? Yet in his palace full of pagan marbles the pope actually preaches all this. It is here, and certainly not among the modernists, that the gospel is still believed.

发展，此后这一发展一直以更缓慢的速度继续，但只在天主教会中继续；因为东方诸教会拒绝了一切新的表达，而新教诸教会则越来越多地侵蚀到核心。罗马教会历经如此之多的外在变形，却仍然要求施洗约翰所要求的那种信仰--我指的是对另一个世界的信仰--这是对其重新调适之保存力的一个显著证明。舞台布景已发生了巨大变化。福音被包裹在神学、礼仪、教会权威、常规的慈善形式之中，就像圣徒的一小块骨头被装进镀金的圣物匣；但这一次圣物是真的，福音正是被那些厚厚的硬壳保存了下来。贫民窟中许多孤立的狂热分子或福音派传教士，在外在处境上比教皇更肖似使徒；但如今有哪个心灵疗愈者或复兴布道家宣讲自然世界的厄运及其虚空，或动物价值的颠倒，或贫穷与贞洁的福分，或自然人伦纽带的低劣，或对世俗哲学的蔑视?然而，在满是异教大理石雕像的宫殿里，教皇实际上宣讲的正是这一切。正是在这里，而肯定不是在现代主义者中间，福音仍然被人相信。

Of course, it is open to any one to say that there is a nobler religion possible without these trammels and this officialdom, that there is a deeper philosophy than this supernaturalistic rationalism, that there is a sweeter life than this legal piety. Perhaps: I think the pagan Greeks, the Buddhists, the

当然，任何人都可以这样说：可能存在一种更高贵的宗教，没有这些束缚和这种官僚体制；可能存在一种比这种超自然理性主义更深刻的哲学；可能存在一种比这种律法式虔诚更甜美的生活。也许吧：我认为异教的希腊人、佛教徒、

Mohammedans would have much to say for themselves before the impartial tribunal of human nature and reason. But they are not Christians and do not wish to be. No more, in their hearts, are the modernists, and they should feel it beneath their dignity to pose as such; indeed the more sensitive of them already feel it. To say they are not Christians at heart, but diametrically opposed to the fundamental faith and purpose of Christianity, is not to say they may not be profound mystics (as many Hindus, Jews, and pagan Greeks have been), or excellent scholars, or generous philanthropists. But the very motive that attaches them to Christianity is worldly and un-Christian. They wish to preserve the continuity of moral traditions; they wish the poetry of life to flow down to them uninterruptedly and copiously from all the ages. It is an amiable and wise desire; but it shows that they are men of the Renaissance, pagan and pantheistic in their profounder sentiment, to whom the hard and narrow realism of official Christianity is offensive just because it presupposes that Christianity is true.

穆罕默德信徒在人性与理性的公正法庭面前，会有许多话为自己申辩。但他们不是基督徒，也不愿成为基督徒。现代主义者在内心深处同样不是，而且他们应当觉得冒充基督徒有失尊严；事实上，他们中较敏感的人已经感觉到了这一点。说他们内心不是基督徒，而是与基督教的基本信仰和宗旨截然相反，并不是说他们不可能是深刻的神秘主义者(正如许多印度教徒、犹太人和异教希腊人那样)，或杰出的学者，或慷慨的慈善家。但使他们依附于基督教的动机本身却是世俗的、非基督教的。他们希望保持道德传统的连续性；他们希望生活的诗意从所有时代不间断地、丰沛地流向他们。这是一个可亲而明智的愿望；但它表明他们是文艺复兴式的人物，在其更深的情感中是异教的、泛神论的，官方基督教那僵硬而狭窄的实在论之所以冒犯他们，恰恰因为它预设基督教是真的。

Yet even in this historical and poetical allegiance to Christianity I suspect the modernists suffer from a serious illusion. They think the weakness of the church lies in its not following the inspirations of the age. But when this age is past, might not that weakness be a source of strength again? For an idea ever to be fashionable is ominous, since it must afterwards be always old-fashioned. No doubt it would be dishonest in any of us now, who see clearly that Noah surely did not lead all the animals two by two into the Ark, to say that we believe he did so, on the ground that stories of that kind are rather favourable to the spread of religion. No doubt such a story, and even the fables essential to

然而，即便是在这种对基督教的历史与诗意的忠诚中，我也怀疑现代主义者们陷入了一种严重的幻觉。他们认为教会的弱点在于它没有追随时代的灵感。但当这个时代过去之后，那种弱点难道不可能再次成为力量的源泉吗?一种观念若永远时髦，那是不祥的，因为它此后必然永远过时。毫无疑问，我们当中任何现在清楚地看到挪亚肯定没有把所有动物一对一对地领进方舟的人，若以那类故事颇为有利于宗教传播为理由，说我们相信他确实这么做了，那都是不诚实的。毫无疑问，这样一个故事，甚至包括那些对

Christian theology, are now incredible to most of us. But on the other hand it would be stupid to assume that what is incredible to you or me now must always be incredible to mankind. What was foolishness to the Greeks of St. Paul's day spread mightily among them one or two hundred years later; and what is foolishness to the modernist of to-day may edify future generations. The imagination is suggestible and there is nothing men will not believe in matters of religion. These rational persuasions by which we are swayed, the conventions of unbelieving science and unbelieving history, are superficial growths; yesterday they did not exist, to-morrow they may have disappeared. This is a doctrine which the modernist philosophers themselves emphasise, as does M. Bergson, whom some of them follow, and say the Catholic church itself ought to follow in order to be saved—for prophets are constitutionally without a sense of humour. These philosophers maintain that intelligence is merely a convenient method of picking one's way through the world of matter, that it is a falsification of life, and wholly unfit to grasp the roots of it. We may well be of another opinion, if we think the roots of life are not in consciousness but in nature, which intelligence alone can reveal; but we must agree that in life itself intelligence is a superficial growth, and easily blighted, and that the experience of the vanity of the world, of sin, of salvation, of miracles, of strange revelations, and of mystic loves is a far deeper, more primitive, and therefore probably more lasting human possession than is that of clear historical or scientific ideas.

基督教神学至关重要的寓言，如今对我们大多数人来说都是不可信的。但另一方面，如果假定现在对你我不可信的东西必定永远对人类不可信，那就是愚蠢的。在圣保罗时代的希腊人看来是愚拙的东西，一两百年后却在他们中间广泛传播；而今天对现代主义者来说是愚拙的东西，或许能启迪后代。想象是易受暗示的，在宗教事务上人们没有什么不会相信。那些左右我们的理性说服，那些不信的科学和不信的历史的惯例，都是浅表的生长物；昨天它们还不存在，明天它们可能已经消失。这是现代主义哲学家们自己强调的一种学说，正如亨利·柏格森先生所做的那样--他们中有些人追随他--并且说天主教会本身也应当追随它才能得救--因为先知们天生缺乏幽默感。这些哲学家坚持认为，理智不过是一种在物质世界中择路而行的便利方法，是对生命的伪造，完全不适合把握生命的根基。我们完全可以持另一种意见，如果我们认为生命的根基不在意识中而在自然中，唯有理智才能揭示自然；但我们必须同意，在生命本身中，理智是一种浅表的生长物，容易枯萎，而对世界之虚妄、对罪、对得救、对奇迹、对奇异的启示、对神秘之爱的经验，是一种远比清晰的历史观念或科学观念更为深刻、更为原始、因而可能更为持久的人类财富。

Now religious experience, as I have said, may take other forms than the Christian, and within Christianity it may take other forms than the Catholic; but the Catholic form is as good as any

现在，如我所说，宗教经验可以采取基督教以外的其他形式，而在基督教内部，它也可以采取天主教以外的其他形式；但天主教的形式与任何形式一样好

intrinsically for the devotee himself, and it has immense advantages over its probable rivals in charm, in comprehensiveness, in maturity, in internal rationality, in external adaptability; so much so that a strong anti-clerical government, like the French, cannot safely leave the church to be overwhelmed by the forces of science, good sense, ridicule, frivolity, and avarice (all strong forces in France), but must use violence as well to do it. In the English church, too, it is not those who accept the deluge, the resurrection, and the sacraments only as symbols that are the vital party, but those who accept them literally; for only these have anything to say to the poor, or to the rich, that can refresh them. In a frank supernaturalism, in a tight clericalism, not in a pleasant secularisation, lies the sole hope of the church. Its sole dignity also lies there. It will not convert the world; it never did and it never could. It will remain a voice crying in the wilderness; but it will believe what it cries, and there will be some to listen to it in the future, as there have been many in the past. As to modernism, it is suicide. It is the last of those concessions to the spirit of the world which half-believers and double-minded prophets have always been found making; but it is a mortal concession. It concedes everything; for it concedes that everything in Christianity, as Christians hold it, is an illusion.

FOOTNOTES:

[2] At least in their devotional and moral import. I suggest this qualification in deference to M. Le Roy's interesting theory of dogma, *viz.*, that the verbal or intellectual definition of a dogma may be changed without changing the dogma itself (as a sentence might be translated into a new language without altering the

对虔信者本人而言是内在的，而且它在魅力、在包容性、在成熟性、在内在合理性、在外部适应性上，较之其可能的竞争对手具有巨大优势；以至于一个强大的反教权政府，如法国，不能安全地任由教会被科学、健全常识、嘲笑、轻浮和贪婪(这些都是法国的强大力量)的力量所淹没，而必须同时使用暴力来做到这一点。在英国教会中也是如此，真正有活力的党派并不是那些只把洪水、复活和圣礼当作象征来接受的人，而是那些字面接受它们的人；因为只有这些人对穷人或富人有话可说，能使他们振作。在坦率的超自然主义中，在紧密的教权主义中，而非在愉快的世俗化中，蕴藏着教会唯一的希望。它唯一的尊严也在于此。它不会使世界皈依；它从未做到，也永远不可能做到。它将仍然是旷野中呼喊的声音；但它将相信自己呼喊的内容，未来会有一些人听它，正如过去曾有许多人听它一样。至于现代主义，那是自杀。它是那些半信半疑者和三心二意的先知们一向对世俗精神所作让步中的最后一次；但这是一次致命的让步。它让出了一切；因为它承认基督教中基督徒所信奉的一切都是幻觉。

脚注：

[2] 至少在它们的虔敬和道德意涵上。我提出这一限定是出于对勒鲁瓦先生关于教义的有趣理论的尊重，即，一个教义的口头或智性定义可以被改变而不改变教义本身(正如一个句子可以被翻译成一种新语言而不改变其

meaning) provided the suggested conduct and feeling in the presence of the mystery remained the same. Thus the definition of transubstantiation might be modified to suit an idealistic philosophy, but the new definition would be no less orthodox than the old if it did not discourage the worship of the consecrated elements or the sense of mystical union with Christ in the sacrament.

意义)，只要在面对神秘时所建议的行为和感受保持不变。因此，变体论的定义可以被修改以适应一种唯心主义哲学，但新定义将不会比旧定义更不正统，只要它不阻碍对祝圣元素的崇拜或在圣礼中与基督神秘结合的感受。

III

THE PHILOSOPHY OF M. HENRI BERGSON

The most representative and remarkable of living philosophers is M. Henri Bergson. Both the form and the substance of his works attract universal attention. His ideas are pleasing and bold, and at least in form wonderfully original; he is persuasive without argument and mystical without conventionality; he moves in the atmosphere of science and free thought, yet seems to transcend them and to be secretly religious. An undercurrent of zeal and even of prophecy seems to animate his subtle analyses and his surprising fancies. He is eloquent, and to a public rather sick of the half-education it has received and eager for some inspiriting novelty he seems more eloquent than he is. He uses the French language (and little else is French about him) in the manner of the more recent artists in words, retaining the precision of phrase and the measured judgments which are traditional in French literature, yet managing to envelop everything in a penumbra of emotional suggestion. Each expression of an idea is complete in

III

亨利·柏格森先生的哲学

在世哲学家当中最具代表性、最杰出的是亨利·柏格森先生。他作品的形式与实质都引起了普遍关注。他的观念令人愉悦而大胆，至少形式上奇妙地富有原创性；他无需论证而能说服人，不落俗套而具神秘色彩；他活动于科学与自由思想的氛围中，却又似乎超越了它们，暗中带有宗教性。一股热忱乃至预言式的潜流似乎赋予他精微的分析和惊人的想象以生命。他雄辩滔滔，而对于一个已相当厌倦自己所受的半吊子教育、渴望某种振奋人心的新奇之物的公众来说，他显得比实际上更为雄辩。他使用法语(除此之外他身上很少有法国的东西)，其方式一如晚近的文字艺术家，既保留了法国文学传统的措辞精确与审慎判断，又设法将一切笼罩在情感暗示的半影之中。每一个观念的表达都完整地

itself; yet these expressions are often varied and constantly metaphorical, so that we are led to feel that much in that idea has remained unexpressed and is indeed inexpressible.

Studied and insinuating as M. Bergson is in his style, he is no less elaborate in his learning. In the history of philosophy, in mathematics and physics, and especially in natural history he has taken great pains to survey the ground and to assimilate the views and spirit of the most recent scholars. He might be called outright an expert in all these subjects, were it not for a certain externality and want of radical sympathy in his way of conceiving them. A genuine historian of philosophy, for instance, would love to rehearse the views of great thinkers, would feel their eternal plausibility, and in interpreting them would think of himself as little as they ever thought of him. But M. Bergson evidently regards Plato or Kant as persons who did or did not prepare the way for some Bergsonian insight. The theory of evolution, taken enthusiastically, is apt to exercise an evil influence on the moral estimation of things. First the evolutionist asserts that later things grow out of earlier, which is true of things in their causes and basis, but not in their values; as modern Greece proceeds out of ancient Greece materially but does not exactly crown it. The evolutionist, however, proceeds to assume that later things are necessarily better than what they have grown out of: and this is false altogether. This fallacy reinforces very unfortunately that inevitable esteem which people have for their own opinions, and which must always vitiate the history of philosophy when it is a philosopher that writes it. A false subordination comes to be established among systems, as if they moved in single file and all had the last, the author's system, for their secret goal. In Hegel,

本身；然而这些表达往往变化多端且不断使用隐喻，以至于我们被引导去感受那个观念中有许多东西仍未得到表达，而且确实是不可表达的。

亨利·柏格森先生在文风上既精雕细琢又善于暗示，在学识上也同样煞费苦心。在哲学史、数学和物理学，尤其是博物学方面，他不遗余力地勘察地形，吸收最新学者的观点与精神。若不是他在构想这些学科时带有某种外在性和缺乏根本的同情，他简直可以被称为所有这些领域的专家。例如，一位真正的哲学史家会乐于复述伟大思想家的观点，会感受到它们永恒的合理性，并且在解释它们时，会尽量少想到自己，正如他们从未想到过他一样。但亨利·柏格森先生显然把柏拉图或康德视为这样一些人：他们为某种柏格森式的洞见铺平了道路，或者没有铺平道路。进化论若被热情地接受，容易对事物的道德评价产生不良影响。首先，进化论者断言较晚的事物从较早的事物中生长出来，这在事物的原因和基础方面是真实的，但在其价值方面则不然；正如现代希腊在物质上从古希腊发展而来，却并不完全是它的顶峰。然而，进化论者接着假定较晚的事物必然比它们所由生长出来的事物更好：这完全是错误的。这一谬误非常不幸地强化了人们对自己意见的那种不可避免的尊重，而这种尊重在哲学家撰写哲学史时必定总是败坏哲学史。一种虚假的从属关系便在诸体系之间建立起来，仿佛它们排成单行前进，而全都以最后那个体系、即作者自己的体系，为秘密目标。在黑格尔那里，

for instance, this conceit is conspicuous, in spite of his mastery in the dramatic presentation of points of view, for his way of reconstructing history was, on the surface, very sympathetic. He too, like M. Bergson, proceeded from learning to intuition, and feigned at every turn to identify himself with what he was describing, especially if this was a philosophical attitude or temper. Yet in reality his historical judgments were forced and brutal: Greece was but a stepping-stone to Prussia, Plato and Spinoza found their higher synthesis in himself, and (though he may not say so frankly) Jesus Christ and St. Francis realised their better selves in Luther. Actual spiritual life, the thoughts, affections, and pleasures of individuals, passed with Hegel for so much moonshine; the true spirit was "objective," it was simply the movement of those circumstances in which actual spirit arose. He was accordingly contemptuous of everything intrinsically good, and his idealism consisted in forcing the natural world into a formula of evolution and then worshipping it as the embodiment of the living God. But under the guise of optimism and belief in a cosmic reason this is mere idolatry of success—a malign superstition, by which all moral independence is crushed out and conscience enslaved to chronology; and it is no marvel if, somewhat to relieve this subjection, history in turn was expurgated, marshalled, and distorted, that it might pass muster for the work of the Holy Ghost.

例如，尽管他在戏剧性地呈现各种观点方面技艺娴熟，这种自负却格外显眼，因为他重构历史的方式表面上非常富有同情心。他也像柏格森先生一样，从学问走向直觉，并时时假装与自己所描述的对象融为一体，尤其当这对象是一种哲学态度或气质时。然而实际上，他的历史判断是强横而粗暴的：希腊不过是通往普鲁士的垫脚石，柏拉图与斯宾诺莎在他自己身上找到了更高的综合，而(尽管他或许不会坦率地这样说)耶稣基督与圣方济各在路德身上实现了他们更好的自我。实际的精神生活，即个人的思想、情感与快乐，在黑格尔看来不过是虚幻的光影；真正的精神是"客观的"，它仅仅是实际精神由以产生的那些环境的运动。因此他蔑视一切本身善的东西，而他的唯心论就在于把自然世界强行纳入一个进化的公式，然后将其作为活上帝的化身加以崇拜。但在乐观主义和对宇宙理性的信仰的伪装之下，这不过是对成功的赤裸裸的偶像崇拜--一种恶性的迷信，它碾碎了一切道德独立性，使良心沦为编年史的奴隶；而历史反过来被删改、编排和扭曲，以便冒充圣灵的作品，从而多少缓解这种屈从，这也就不足为奇了。

In truth the value of spiritual life is intrinsic and centred at every point. It is never wholly recoverable. To recover it at all, an historian must have a certain detachment and ingenuousness; knowing the dignity and simplicity of his own mind, he must courteously attribute the same dignity and simplicity to others,

事实上，精神生活的价值是内在的，并且在每一点上都是以自身为中心的。它从来不是完全可以复原的。要完全复原它，历史学家必须具有某种超然和天真；知道自己心灵的高贵与单纯，他必须礼貌地将同样的高贵与单纯归于他人，

unless their avowed attitude prevents; this is to be an intelligent critic and to write history like a gentleman. The truth, which all philosophers alike are seeking, is eternal. It lies as near to one age as to another; the means of discovery alone change, and not always for the better. The course of evolution is no test of what is true or good; else nothing could be good intrinsically nor true simply and ultimately; on the contrary, it is the approach to truth and excellence anywhere, like the approach of tree tops to the sky, that tests the value of evolution, and determines whether it is moving upward or downward or in a circle.

除非他们公开宣称的态度有所妨碍；这就是做一个明智的批评家，像绅士一样书写历史。一切哲学家同样在寻求的真理是永恒的。它离一个时代与离另一个时代同样近；只有发现的手段在变化，而且并不总是变得更好。进化的进程不是检验何为真或何为善的标准；否则就没有任何东西可以是本身善的，也没有任何东西可以是单纯而终极地真的；相反，正是在任何地方对真理与卓越的接近，如同树梢接近天空，才检验进化的价值，并决定它是在上升、下降还是循环。

M. Bergson accordingly misses fire when, for instance, in order utterly to damn a view which he has been criticising, and which may be open to objection on other grounds, he cries that those who hold it "*retardent sur Kant;*" as if a clock were the compass of the mind, and he who was one minute late was one point off the course. Kant was a hard honest thinker, more sinned against than sinning, from whom a great many people in the nineteenth century have taken their point of departure, departing as far as they chose; but if a straight line of progress could be traced at all through the labyrinth of philosophy, Kant would not lie in that line. His thought is essentially excentric and sophisticated, being largely based on two inherited blunders, which a truly progressive philosophy would have to begin by avoiding, thus leaving Kant on one side, and weathering his philosophy, as one might Scylla or Charybdis. The one blunder was that of the English malicious psychology which had maintained since the time of Locke that the ideas in the mind are the only objects of knowledge, instead of being the knowledge of objects. The other blunder was that of Protestantism that, in groping after that moral freedom which is

因此，柏格森先生在此处失手了，例如，当他为了彻底诅咒一个他一直在批评、且可能因其他理由而受到质疑的观点时，他大声疾呼说持有该观点的人"*retardent sur Kant;*"，仿佛时钟是心灵的罗盘，而迟到一分钟的人就偏离了航线一个方位。康德是一位坚韧诚实的思想家，遭受的误解多于他犯下的过错，十九世纪有许多人从他那里出发，随心所欲地走得尽可能远；但如果在哲学的迷宫中终究能描出一条进步的直线，康德不会位于那条线上。他的思想本质上是偏心的和矫揉造作的，很大程度上基于两个继承而来的谬误，一个真正进步的哲学必须从避免它们开始，从而把康德搁在一边，绕过他的哲学，如同绕过斯库拉或卡律布狄斯。一个谬误是英国那种恶意的心理学，它自洛克时代以来一直主张心灵中的观念是知识的唯一对象，而不是关于对象的知识。另一个谬误是新教主义的谬误，它在摸索那种道德自由--那是纯粹精神不可根除的需要--时，以为可以在对启示、传统和偏见的修订中找到它，以便能够再依附它们稍久一些。一个如此地方性、如此偶然、如此不稳定的体系，如康德的体系，怎么可以被规定为全人类的一种教理问答呢?知识之树有许多枝条，它的果实并非注定永远悬挂在那一条扭曲盘结的枝干上。柏格森先生本人在那些他更好的洞见要求如此的要点上"落后于"康德，例如在时间的实在性上；但关于他自己的哲学，我恐怕他认为所有以前的体系都汇入其中，这未必属实，而所有未来的体系都必须从中流出，这未必必要。

so ineradicable a need of a pure spirit, thought to find it in a revision of revelation, tradition, and prejudice, so as to be able to cling to these a little longer. How should a system so local, so accidental, and so unstable as Kant's be prescribed as a sort of catechism for all humanity? The tree of knowledge has many branches, and all its fruits are not condemned to hang for ever from that one gnarled and contorted bough. M. Bergson himself "lags behind" Kant on those points on which his better insight requires it, as, for instance, on the reality of time; but with regard to his own philosophy I am afraid he thinks that all previous systems empty into it, which is hardly true, and that all future systems must flow out of it, which is hardly necessary.

The embarrassment that qualifies M. Bergson's attainments in mathematics and physics has another and more personal source. He understands, but he trembles. Non-human immensities frighten him, as they did Pascal. He suffers from cosmic agoraphobia. We might think empty space an innocent harmless thing, a mere opportunity to move, which ought to be highly prized by all devotees of motion. But M. Bergson is instinctively a mystic, and his philosophy deliberately discredits the existence of anything except in immediacy, that is, as an experience of the heart. What he dreads in space is that the heart should be possessed by it, and transformed into it. He dreads that the imagination should be fascinated by the homogeneous and static, hypnotised by geometry, and actually lost in *Auseinandersein*. This would be a real death and petrifaction of consciousness, frozen into contemplation of a monotonous infinite void. What is warm and desirable is rather the sense of variety and succession, as if all visions radiated from the occupied focus or hearth of the self. The

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more concentration at this habitable point, with the more mental perspectives opening backwards and forwards through time, in a word, the more personal and historical the apparition, the better it would be. Things must be reduced again to what they seem; it is vain and terrible to take them for what we find they are. M. Bergson is at bottom an apologist for very old human prejudices, an apologist for animal illusion. His whole labour is a plea for some vague but comfortable faith which he dreads to have stolen from him by the progress of art and knowledge. There is a certain trepidation, a certain suppressed instinct to snap at and sting the hated oppressor, as if some desperate small being were at bay before a horrible monster. M. Bergson is afraid of space, of mathematics, of necessity, and of eternity; he is afraid of the intellect and the possible discoveries of science; he is afraid of nothingness and death. These fears may prevent him from being a philosopher in the old and noble sense of the word; but they sharpen his sense for many a psychological problem, and make him the spokesman of many an inarticulate soul. Animal timidity and animal illusion are deep in the heart of all of us. Practice may compel us to bow to the conventions of the intellect, as to those of polite society; but secretly, in our moments of immersion in ourselves, we may find them a great nuisance, even a vain nightmare. Could we only listen undisturbed to the beat of protoplasm in our hearts, would not that oracle solve all the riddles of the universe, or at least avoid them?

更多的集中在这个可居住的点上，随着更多的心灵视角在时间中向前和向后展开，一言以蔽之，这个显象越是个人化和历史化，就越好。事物必须再次被还原为它们所显现的样子；把它们当作我们发现它们实际所是的样子，是徒劳而可怕的。柏格森先生归根结底是一位非常古老的人类偏见的辩护者，是一位动物幻象的辩护者。他的全部工作是为某种模糊而舒适的信仰辩护，他害怕这种信仰被艺术和知识的进步从他那里偷走。有一种战栗，有一种被压抑的本能，想要咬住并刺伤那可恨的压迫者，仿佛某个绝望的小生命正被一个可怕的怪物逼入绝境。柏格森先生害怕空间、害怕数学、害怕必然性、害怕永恒；他害怕知性和科学可能的发现；他害怕虚无和死亡。这些恐惧可能阻止他成为这个词古老而高贵意义上的哲学家；但它们磨砺了他对许多心理学问题的感觉，并使他成为许多无法言说的灵魂的代言人。动物的怯懦和动物的幻象深藏在我们所有人的心中。实践可能迫使我们服从知性的惯例，如同服从礼貌社会的惯例一样；但秘密地，在我们沉浸于自身的时刻，我们可能发现它们是一个极大的麻烦，甚至是一场徒劳的噩梦。如果我们能不受干扰地倾听我们心中原生质的跳动，那个神谕难道不会解开宇宙的所有谜题，或者至少避开它们吗?

To protect this inner conviction, however, it is necessary for the mystic to sally forth and attack the enemy on his own ground. If he refuted physics and mathematics simply out of his own faith, he might be accused of ignorance of the subject. He will therefore

然而，为了保护这种内在的确信，神秘主义者必须出击，在敌人自己的地盘上攻击敌人。如果他仅仅出于自己的信仰来反驳物理学和数学，他可能会被指责对该学科无知。因此他将

study it conscientiously, yet with a certain irritation and haste to be done with it, somewhat as a Jesuit might study Protestant theology. Such a student, however, is apt to lose his pains; for in retracing a free inquiry in his servile spirit, he remains deeply ignorant, not indeed of its form, but of its nature and value. Why, for instance, has M. Bergson such a horror of mechanical physics? He seems to think it a black art, dealing in unholy abstractions, and rather dangerous to salvation, and he keeps his metaphysical exorcisms and antidotes always at hand, to render it innocuous, at least to his own soul. But physical science never solicited of anybody that he should be wholly absorbed in the contemplation of atoms, and worship them; that we must worship and lose ourselves in reality, whatever reality may be, is a mystic aberration, which physical science does nothing to foster. Nor does any critical physicist suppose that what he describes is the whole of the object; he merely notes the occasions on which its sensible qualities appear, and calculates events. Because the calculable side of nature is his province, he does not deny that events have other aspects—the psychic and the moral, for instance—no less real in their way, in terms of which calculation would indeed be impossible. If he chances to call the calculable elements of nature her substance, as it is proper to do, that name is given without passion; he may perfectly well proclaim with Goethe that it is in the accidents, in the *farbiger Abglanz*, that we have our life. And if it be for his freedom that the mystic trembles, I imagine any man of science would be content with M. Bergson's assertion that true freedom is the sense of freedom, and that in any intelligible statement of the situation, even the most indeterministic, this freedom disappears; for it is an immediate

认真地研究它，却带着某种恼怒和急于了结的心情，颇像一位耶稣会士研究新教神学那样。然而，这样的学生往往白费力气；因为当他以奴性的精神追溯一项自由探究时，他仍然深深地无知，不是对其形式无知，而是对其本性和价值无知。例如，为什么柏格森先生如此憎恶机械论物理学?他似乎认为它是一种黑魔法，从事不神圣的抽象，对得救相当危险，他总是把形而上学的驱魔和解毒剂放在手边，使它变得无害，至少对他自己的灵魂无害。但物理科学从未要求任何人完全沉浸于对原子的沉思并崇拜它们；我们必须崇拜并在实在中失去自身，无论实在可能是什么，这是一种神秘主义的偏差，物理科学丝毫不助长它。任何有批判精神的物理学家也不认为他所描述的就是对象的全部；他只是记录其可感性质出现的场合，并计算事件。因为自然的可计算方面是他的领域，他并不否认事件还有其他方面--例如心理的和道德的方面--就其自身方式而言同样真实，尽管用这些方面进行计算确实是不可能的。如果他碰巧把自然的可计算要素称为她的实体，正如恰当的做法那样，这个名称的给予是不带激情的；他完全可以和歌德一起宣称，我们正是在偶性中，在*farbiger Abglanz*中，拥有我们的生命。而如果神秘主义者为之颤抖的是他的自由，我想任何科学家都会满足于柏格森先生的断言：真正的自由是自由的感觉，而在对处境的任何可理解的陈述中，即使是最非决定论的陈述，这种自由都消失了；因为它是直接的

experience, not any scheme of relation between events.

经验，而非事件之间任何关系的图式。

The horror of mechanical physics arises, then, from attributing to that science pretensions and extensions which it does not have; it arises from the habits of theology and metaphysics being imported inopportunely into science. Similarly when M. Bergson mentions mathematics, he seems to be thinking of the supposed authority it exercises—one of Kant's confusions—over the empirical world, and trying to limit and subordinate that authority, lest movement should somehow be removed from nature, and vagueness from human thought. But nature and human thought are what they are; they have enough affinity to mathematics, as it happens, to suggest that study to our minds, and to give those who go deep into it a great, though partial, mastery over things. Nevertheless a true mathematician is satisfied with the hypothetical and ideal cogency of his science, and puts its dignity in that. Moreover, M. Bergson has the too pragmatic notion that the use of mathematics is to keep our accounts straight in this business world; whereas its inherent use is emancipating and Platonic, in that it shows us the possibility of other worlds, less contingent and perturbed than this one. If he allows himself any excursus from his beloved immediacy, it is only in the interests of practice; he little knows the pleasures of a liberal mind, ranging over the congenial realm of internal accuracy and ideal truth, where it can possess itself of what treasures it likes in perfect security and freedom. An artist in his workmanship, M. Bergson is not an artist in his allegiance; he has no respect for what is merely ideal.

那么，对机械论物理学的恐惧，源于把该科学并不具有的僭越和延伸归给它；源于神学和形而上学的习惯被不合时宜地引入科学。同样，当柏格森先生提到数学时，他似乎想到的是数学对经验世界所行使的所谓权威--这是康德的混淆之一--并试图限制和贬低这种权威，唯恐运动以某种方式从自然中被移除，模糊性从人类思想中被移除。但自然和人类思想就是它们所是的样子；它们碰巧与数学有足够的亲缘关系，向我们心灵提示这项研究，并给予那些深入其中的人一种伟大而部分的对事物的掌握。然而，真正的数学家满足于他的科学的假设性和理念性的说服力，并把它的尊严置于其中。此外，柏格森先生有一个过于实用主义的观念，认为数学的用途是在这个商业世界中把我们的账目算清；而它内在的用途是解放性的和柏拉图式的，因为它向我们展示了其他世界的可能性，那些世界比这个世界更少偶然性和扰动。如果他允许自己从他钟爱的直接性中有所偏离，那也只是为了实践的利益；他几乎不知道一个自由心灵的快乐，它漫游在内在精确性和理念真理的相宜领域，在那里它可以完全安全和自由地占有它喜欢的任何珍宝。柏格森先生在其技艺上是一位艺术家，在其效忠上却不是艺术家；他不尊重仅仅理念性的东西。

For this very reason, perhaps, he is more at home in natural history than in the exact sciences. He has the gift of observation, and can suggest vividly the actual appearance of natural

也许正因如此，他在博物学中比在精确科学中更为自在。他具有观察的天赋，能够生动地暗示自然物的实际外观

processes, in contrast to the verbal paraphrase of these processes which is sometimes taken to explain them. He is content to stop at habit without formulating laws; he refuses to assume that the large obvious cycles of change in things can be reduced to mechanism, that is, to minute included cycles repeated *ad libitum*. He may sometimes defend this refusal by sophistical arguments, as when he says that mechanism would require the last stage of the universe to be simultaneous with the first, forgetting that the unit of mechanism is not a mathematical equation but some observed typical event. The refusal itself, however, would be honest scepticism enough were it made with no *arrière pensée*, but simply in view of the immense complexity of the facts and the extreme simplicity of the mechanical hypothesis. In such a situation, to halt at appearances might seem the mark of a true naturalist and a true empiricist not misled by speculative haste and the human passion for system and simplification. At the first reading, M. Bergson's *Evolution Créatrice* may well dazzle the professional naturalist and seem to him an illuminating confession of the nature and limits of his science; yet a second reading, I have good authority for saying, may as easily reverse that impression. M. Bergson never reviews his facts in order to understand them, but only if possible to discredit others who may have fancied they understood. He raises difficulties, he marks the problems that confront the naturalist, and the inadequacy of explanations that may have been suggested. Such criticism would be a valuable beginning if it were followed by the suggestion of some new solution; but the suggestion only is that no solution is possible, that the phenomena of life are simply miraculous, and that it is in the tendency or vocation of the animal, not in its body or its past,

过程，与对这些过程的口头复述相对照--后者有时被用来解释前者。他满足于停留在习惯层面而不去制定规律；他拒绝假定事物中那些显而易见的巨大变化循环可以还原为机械论，也就是说，还原为微小的、可随意重复的内在循环。他有时会以诡辩的论据来为这一拒绝辩护，例如他说机械论会要求宇宙的最后阶段与最初阶段同时并存，却忘了机械论的单位并非数学方程式，而是某种被观察到的典型事件。然而，这一拒绝本身，若不带任何「隐念」而仅仅鉴于事实的极度复杂与机械假说的极端简单，便已是足够诚实的怀疑论了。在这样一种情境下，止步于现象或许正是真正的自然主义者与真正的经验主义者的标志--他们不被思辨的仓促以及人类对体系与简化的热情所误导。初读柏格森先生的「创造的进化」，它很可能令职业自然主义者目眩，并在他眼中显得是对其科学的性质与界限的一份启发性自白；然而再读一遍，据可靠消息，同样可能轻易地推翻那一印象。柏格森先生从不为了理解他的事实而重新审视它们，而只是--如果可能的话--为了使那些或许自以为已经理解了的人失去信誉。他提出困难，他指出自然主义者所面对的问题，以及那些可能已被提出的解释之不充分。这样的批评若继之以某种新解决方案的提示，本会是一个有价值的开端；然而所提示的只是：没有任何解决方案是可能的，生命现象纯然是奇迹般的，而关键在于动物的倾向或使命，而非其身体或其过去，

that we must see the ground of what goes on before us.

With such a philosophy of science, it is evident that all progress in the understanding of nature would cease, as it ceased after Aristotle. The attempt would again be abandoned to reduce gross and obvious cycles of change, such as generation, growth, and death, to minute latent cycles, so that natural history should offer a picturesque approach to universal physics. If for the magic power of types, invoked by Aristotle, we substituted with M. Bergson the magic power of the *élan vital*, that is, of evolution in general, we should be referring events not to finer, more familiar, more pervasive processes, but to one all-embracing process, unique and always incomplete. Our understanding would end in something far vaguer and looser than what our observation began with. Aristotle at least could refer particulars to their specific types, as medicine and social science are still glad enough to do, to help them in guessing and in making a learned show before the public. But if divination and eloquence—for science is out of the question—were to invoke nothing but a fluid tendency to grow, we should be left with a flat history of phenomena and no means of prediction or even classification. All knowledge would be reduced to gossip, infinitely diffuse, perhaps enlisting our dramatic feelings, but yielding no intellectual mastery of experience, no practical competence, and no moral lesson. The world would be a serial novel, to be continued for ever, and all men mere novel-readers.

Nothing is more familiar to philosophers nowadays than that criticism of knowledge by which we are thrown back upon the appearances from which science starts, upon what is known to children and savages, whilst all that which long experience and

我们必须看到眼前所发生之事的基础。

有了这样一种科学哲学，显然，理解自然的一切进步都将停止，正如它在亚里士多德之后停止了一样。将粗略而明显的变化循环--如生成、生长和死亡--还原为微小的潜在循环，从而使自然史为普遍物理学提供一条 picturesque 的进路，这一尝试将再次被放弃。如果我们用柏格森先生的生命冲力的魔力，即一般进化的魔力，来取代亚里士多德所援引的类型的魔力，我们就将把事件不是归因于更精细、更熟悉、更普遍的过程，而是归因于一个包罗万象的过程，独一无二且永远不完整。我们的知性将终结于某种远比我们观察开始时所面对的东西更模糊、更松散的东西。亚里士多德至少可以把特殊事物归因于它们的特定类型，正如医学和社会科学仍然乐于做的那样，以帮助它们猜测并在公众面前做一番博学的展示。但如果占卜和雄辩--科学是谈不上的--只援引一种流动的生长倾向，我们就只剩下现象的平淡历史，没有预测甚至分类的手段。一切知识都将被还原为闲谈，无限地弥散，也许能唤起我们的戏剧性情感，却不产生对经验的智性掌握，不产生实践能力，也不产生道德教训。世界将是一部连载小说，永远待续，而所有人不过是小说读者。

如今对哲学家来说，没有什么比那种知识批评更为熟悉了，通过它我们被抛回到科学出发所依据的现象，抛回到儿童和野蛮人所知道的东西，而所有那些长期经验和

reason may infer from those appearances is set down as so much hypothesis; and indeed it is through hypothesis that latent being, if such there be, comes before the mind at all. Now such criticism of knowledge might have been straightforward and ingenuous. It might have simply disclosed the fact, very salutary to meditate upon, that the whole frame of nature, with the minds that animate it, is disclosed to us by intelligence; that if we were not intelligent our sensations would exist for us without meaning anything, as they exist for idiots. The criticism of knowledge, however, has usually been taken maliciously, in the sense that it is the idiots only that are not deceived; for any interpretation of sensation is a mental figment, and while experience may have any extent it will it cannot possibly, they say, have expressive value; it cannot reveal anything going on beneath. Intelligence and science are accordingly declared to have no penetration, no power to disclose what is latent, for nothing latent exists; they can at best furnish symbols for past or future sensations and the order in which they arise; they can be seven-league boots for striding over the surface of sentience.

理性从这些现象中推演出来的东西，被当作诸多假设记录下来；而事实上，正是通过假设，潜在的存在--如果有这种存在的话--才得以呈现在心灵面前。然而，这种对知识的批评本可以是直截了当而坦诚的。它本可以仅仅揭示这样一个事实--沉思此事大有裨益--即自然的整个框架，连同赋予其生命的诸心灵，都是通过理智向我们揭示的；如果我们没有理智，我们的感觉就会像在白痴那里一样，对我们存在却毫无意义。然而，对知识的批评通常被恶意地理解，其意是说唯有白痴才不受欺骗；因为对感觉的任何解释都是一种心理虚构，而经验无论具有多大的范围，他们说，它都不可能具有表达的价值；它不能揭示底下发生的任何事情。于是，理智与科学被宣称没有穿透力，没有能力揭示潜在之物，因为没有任何潜在之物存在；它们至多只能为过去或未来的感觉及其产生的秩序提供符号；它们只能是七里格靴，用来跨越感觉的表面。

This negative dogmatism as to knowledge was rendered harmless and futile by the English philosophers, in that they maintained at the same time that everything happens exactly *as if* the intellect were a true instrument of discovery, and *as if* a material world underlay our experience and furnished all its occasions. Hume, Mill, and Huxley were scientific at heart, and full of the intelligence they dissected; they seemed to cry to nature: Though thou dost not exist, yet will I trust in thee. Their idealism was a theoretical scruple rather than a passionate superstition. Not so M. Bergson; he is not so simple as to invoke the malicious criticism of

这种关于知识的消极教义主义被英国哲学家们弄得无害而无效，因为他们同时坚持认为，一切事情的发生恰恰就好像理智是发现的真正工具一样，并且就好像一个物质世界构成了我们经验的基础并提供了它的一切场合一样。休谟、密尔和赫胥黎骨子里是科学性的，充满了他们所剖析的那种理智；他们似乎在向自然呼喊：尽管你并不存在，我仍要信赖你。他们的唯心论是一种理论上的顾虑，而非一种狂热的迷信。柏格森先生则不然；他没有那么天真，不会去诉诸那种恶意的批评--

knowledge in order to go on thinking rationalistically. Reason and science make him deeply uncomfortable. His point accordingly is not merely that mechanism is a hypothesis, but that it is a wrong hypothesis. Events do not come as if mechanism brought them about; they come, at least in the organic world, as if a magic destiny, and inscrutable ungovernable effort, were driving them on.

Thus M. Bergson introduces metaphysics into natural history; he invokes, in what is supposed to be science, the agency of a power, called the *élan vital,* on a level with the "Will" of Schopenhauer or the "Unknowable Force" of Herbert Spencer. But there is a scientific vitalism also, which it is well to distinguish from the metaphysical sort. The point at issue between vitalism and mechanism in biology is whether the living processes in nature can be resolved into a combination of the material. The material processes will always remain vital, if we take this word in a descriptive and poetic sense; for they will contain a movement having a certain idiosyncrasy and taking a certain time, like the fall of an apple. The movement of nature is never dialectical; the first part of any event does not logically imply the last part of it. Physics is descriptive, historical, reporting after the fact what are found to be the habits of matter. But if these habits are constant and calculable we call the vitality of them mechanical. Thus the larger processes of nature, no matter how vital they may be and whatever consciousness may accompany them, will always be mechanical if they can be calculated and predicted, being a combination of the more minute and widespread processes which they contain. The only question therefore is: Do processes such as nutrition and reproduction arise by a combination of such events

知识以便继续理性主义地思考。理性与科学令他深感不安。因此，他的观点不仅仅是机械论是一种假设，而是它是一种错误的假设。事件的发生并不像是机械论所导致的那样；至少在有机世界中，事件的发生仿佛有一种神奇的命运，以及一种不可测度、无法驾驭的努力在驱动着它们

开
启。

于是柏格森先生将形而上学引入自然史；他在所谓的科学中诉诸一种力量的作用，称之为生命冲力，与叔本华的“意志”或赫伯特·斯宾塞的“不可知的力量”处于同一层次。但也存在一种科学的活力论，将其与形而上学的那种区分开来是有益的。在生物学中，活力论与机械论之间争论的焦点在于：自然中的生命过程能否被分解为物质的组合。物质过程将永远是活力的，如果我们从描述性和诗意的意义上使用这个词；因为它们将包含一种具有某种独特性质并占据一定时间的运动，就像苹果的下落一样。自然的运动从来不是辩证的；任何事件的前一部分并不在逻辑上蕴含它的后一部分。物理学是描述性的、历史性的，事后报告所发现的物质的习惯。但如果这些习惯是恒定的且可计算的，我们就称它们的活力为机械的。因此，自然中较大的过程，无论它们可能多么具有活力，无论伴随它们的是什么意识，如果它们可以被计算和预测，就将永远是机械的，因为它们是其所包含的更微小、更普遍的过程的组合。因此唯一的问题是：诸如营养和生殖这样的过程，是否由诸如苹果下落这样的事件的组合而产生？

as the fall of apples? Or are they irreducible events, and units of mechanism by themselves? That is the dilemma as it appears in science. Both possibilities will always remain open, because however far mechanical analysis may go, many phenomena, as human apprehension presents them, will always remain irreducible to any common denominator with the rest; and on the other hand, wherever the actual reduction of the habits of animals to those of matter may have stopped, we can never know that a further reduction is impossible.

还是说它们是不可还原的事件，其本身即是机械论的单位?这就是科学中所呈现的困境。两种可能性将永远保持开放，因为无论机械论分析可能走得多远，许多现象，正如人类理解所呈现的那样，将永远无法还原为与其余现象的任何共同标准；另一方面，无论将动物的习惯实际还原为物质的习惯的工作可能在何处停止，我们永远无法知道进一步的还原是不可能的。

The balance of reasonable presumption, however, is not even. The most inclusive movements known to us in nature, the astronomical, are calculable, and so are the most minute and pervasive processes, the chemical. These are also, if evolution is to be accepted, the earliest processes upon which all others have supervened and out of which, as it were, they have grown. Apart from miraculous intervention, therefore, the assumption seems to be inevitable that the intermediate processes are calculable too, and compounded out of the others. The appearance to the contrary presented in animal and social life is easily explicable on psychological grounds. We read inevitably in terms of our passions those things which affect them or are analogous to what involves passion in ourselves; and when the mechanism of them is hidden from us, as is that of our bodies, we suppose that these passions which we find on the surface in ourselves, or read into other creatures, are the substantial and only forces that carry on our part of the world. Penetrating this illusion, dispassionate observers in all ages have received the general impression that nature is one and mechanical. This was, and still remains, a general impression only; but I suspect no one who walks the earth

然而，合理推定的天平并不均衡。我们在自然中所知的最宏大的运动，即天文学的运动，是可计算的，最微小且最普遍的过程，即化学过程，也是如此。如果进化论要被接受的话，这些也是最早的过程，所有其他过程都叠加于其上，并且可以说，是从中生长出来的。因此，撇开奇迹般的干预不谈，这一假设似乎是不可避免的：中间过程也是可计算的，并且是由其他过程复合而成的。动物生活和社会生活中所呈现的相反表象，在心理学上很容易解释。我们不可避免地以我们自身的激情来解读那些影响它们或与我们自身中涉及激情的东西相类似的事物；而当这些事物的机制对我们隐藏起来时--正如我们身体的机制那样--我们便以为这些我们在自身表面发现的、或读入其他造物之中的激情，是支撑我们这部分世界的实体性的、唯一的力量。穿透这一幻象，各个时代冷静的观察者都获得了这样一个总体印象：自然是统一的且机械的。这曾经是，并且仍然只是一个总体印象；但我怀疑没有任何一个行走于大地之上的人

with his eyes open would be concerned to resist it, were it not for certain fond human conceits which such a view would rebuke and, if accepted, would tend to obliterate. The psychological illusion that our ideas and purposes are original facts and forces (instead of expressions in consciousness of facts and forces which are material) and the practical and optical illusion that everything wheels about us in this world—these are the primitive persuasions which the enemies of naturalism have always been concerned to protect.

睁着眼睛的人，若非某些人类自恋的幻想--这种观点会驳斥它们，而一旦被接受，便会倾向于抹去它们--否则便会关切地抵制它。心理学上的幻觉，即我们的观念和目的是原创的事实和力量(而非物质性事实和力量在意识中的表达)，以及实践和视觉上的幻觉，即世上万物都围绕我们旋转--这些正是自然主义的敌人一直关切保护的原始信念。

One might indeed be a vitalist in biology, out of pure caution and conscientiousness, without sharing those prejudices; and many a speculative philosopher has been free from them who has been a vitalist in metaphysics. Schopenhauer, for instance, observed that the cannon-ball which, if self-conscious, would think it moved freely, would be quite right in thinking so. The "Will" was as evident to him in mechanism as in animal life. M. Bergson, in the more hidden reaches of his thought, seems to be a universal vitalist; apparently an *élan vital* must have existed once to deposit in inorganic matter the energy stored there, and to set mechanism going. But he relies on biology alone to prove the present existence of an independent effort to live; this is needed to do what mechanism, as he thinks, could never do; it is not needed to do, as in Schopenhauer, what mechanism does. M. Bergson thus introduces his metaphysical force as a peculiar requirement of biology; he breaks the continuity of nature; he loses the poetic justification of a metaphysical vitalism; he asks us to believe that life is not a natural expression of material being, but an alien and ghostly madness descending into it—I say a ghostly madness, for why should disembodied life wish that the body should live? This

一个人确实可以出于纯粹的谨慎和良知而在生物学上成为活力论者，而不分享那些偏见；许多思辨哲学家在形而上学上是活力论者，却免于这些偏见。例如，叔本华观察到，如果炮弹有自我意识，它会认为自己自由运动，那么它这样想是完全正确的。「意志」在他那里在机械论中如同在动物生命中一样明显。柏格森先生在其思想更隐秘的深处，似乎是一个普遍的活力论者；显然，一种生命冲力必定曾经存在，以在无机物质中储存能量，并启动机械论。但他仅依靠生物学来证明当下存在一种独立的生存努力；这被需要去做他認為机械论永远无法做到的事；它不被需要去做，如叔本华那里，机械论所做的事。柏格森先生因此将他的形而上学力量作为生物学的一种特殊要求引入；他打破了自然的连续性；他失去了形而上学活力论的诗歌辩护；他要求我们相信生命不是物质存在的自然表达，而是一种异己的、幽灵般的疯狂降临其中--我说幽灵般的疯狂，因为为何无躯体的生命会希望躯体存活?这种

vitalism is not a kind of biology more prudent and literal than the mechanical kind (as a scientific vitalism would be), but far less legitimately speculative. Nor is it a frank and thorough mythology, such as the total spectacle of the universe might suggest to an imaginative genius. It is rather a popular animism, insisting on a sympathetic interpretation of nature where human sympathy is quick and easy, and turning this sympathy into a revelation of the absolute, but leaving the rest of nature cold, because to sympathise with its movement there is harder for anxious, self-centred mortals, and requires a disinterested mind. M. Bergson would have us believe that mankind is what nature has set her heart on and the best she can do, for whose sake she has been long making very special efforts. We are fortunate that at least her darling is all mankind and not merely Israel.

活力论不是一种比机械论更谨慎和字面化的生物学(如科学活力论那样)，而是远不那么合法的思辨。它也不是一种坦率而彻底的的神话，如宇宙的整体景象可能向富有想象力的天才所暗示的那样。它更像是一种流行的万物有灵论，坚持在人类同情迅速而容易的地方对自然进行同情的解释，并将这种同情转变为对绝对的启示，但让自然的其余部分保持冷漠，因为对其运动产生同情对焦虑、自我中心的凡人来说更难，需要一颗无私的心灵。柏格森先生想让我们相信，人类是自然倾心所在和她所能做的最好，为了人类她长期做出了非常特殊的努力。我们很幸运，至少她的宠儿是全人类，而不仅仅是以色列。

In spite, then, of M. Bergson's learning as a naturalist and his eye for the facts—things Aristotle also possessed—he is like Aristotle profoundly out of sympathy with nature. Aristotle was alienated from nature and any penetrating study of it by the fact that he was a disciple of Socrates, and therefore essentially a moralist and a logician. M. Bergson is alienated from nature by something quite different; he is the adept of a very modern, very subtle, and very arbitrary art, that of literary psychology. In this art the imagination is invited to conceive things as if they were all centres of passion and sensation. Literary psychology is not a science; it is practised by novelists and poets; yet if it is to be brilliantly executed it demands a minute and extended observation of life. Unless your psychological novelist had crammed his memory with pictures of the ways and aspects of men he would have no starting-point for his psychological

因此，尽管柏格森先生作为自然主义者的学识和他对事实的慧眼--亚里士多德也拥有这些--他像亚里士多德一样深刻地与自然格格不入。亚里士多德与自然及对自然的任何深入研究的疏离，是因为他是苏格拉底的弟子，因此本质上是道德家和逻辑学家。柏格森先生与自然的疏离则完全不同；他是一种非常现代、非常微妙且非常任意的艺术--文学心理学--的能手。在这种艺术中，想象被邀请将事物构想为激情和感觉的中心。文学心理学不是一门科学；它由小说家和诗人实践；然而，若要出色地执行，它要求对生活进行细致而广泛的观察。除非你的心理学小说家已在记忆中塞满了人们方式和面貌的图画，否则他将没有起点来创作他的心理学

fictions; he would not be able to render them circumstantial and convincing. Just so M. Bergson's achievements in psychological fiction, to be so brilliantly executed as they are, required all his learning. The history of philosophy, mathematics, and physics, and above all natural history, had to supply him first with suggestions; and if he is not really a master in any of those fields, that is not to be wondered at. His heart is elsewhere. To write a universal biological romance, such as he has sketched for us in his system, he would ideally have required all scientific knowledge, but only as Homer required the knowledge of seamanship, generalship, statecraft, augury, and charioteering, in order to turn the aspects of them into poetry, and not with that technical solidity which Plato unjustly blames him for not possessing. Just so M. Bergson's proper achievement begins where his science ends, and his philosophy lies entirely beyond the horizon of possible discoveries or empirical probabilities. In essence, it is myth or fable; but in the texture and degree of its fabulousness it differs notably from the performances of previous metaphysicians. Primitive poets, even ancient philosophers, were not psychologists; their fables were compacted out of elements found in practical life, and they reckoned in the units in which language and passion reckon—wooing, feasting, fighting, vice, virtue, happiness, justice. Above all, they talked about persons or about ideals; this man, this woman, this typical thought or sentiment was what fixed their attention and seemed to them the ultimate thing. Not so M. Bergson: he is a microscopic psychologist, and even in man what he studies by preference is not some integrated passion or idea, but something far more recondite; the minute texture of sensation, memory, or impulse. Sharp analysis is

虚构；他将无法使它们显得详尽而令人信服。正如柏格森先生在心理学小说方面的成就，若要如此出色地执行，需要他所有的学识。哲学史、数学和物理学，尤其是自然史，必须首先为他提供暗示；如果他在这些领域中并非真正的大师，那也不足为奇。他的心在别处。要写一部普遍的生物学传奇，如他在其体系中所勾勒的那样，他理想上需要所有科学知识，但仅如荷马需要航海、将略、治国、占卜和驾车知识，以便将其方面转化为诗歌，而非柏拉图不公正地指责他缺乏的那种技术坚实性。同样，柏格森先生的真正成就始于他的科学结束之处，他的哲学完全位于可能发现或经验概率的地平线之外。本质上，它是神话或寓言；但在其虚构性的质地和程度上，它与先前形而上学家的表演显著不同。原始诗人，甚至古代哲学家，不是心理学家；他们的寓言由实际生活中发现的元素压缩而成，他们以语言和激情计算的单位来计算--求爱、宴饮、战斗、恶习、美德、幸福、正义。最重要的是，他们谈论人或理想；这个男人、这个女人、这个典型的思想或情感是吸引他们注意力并似乎对他们来说是终极的东西。柏格森先生则不然：他是一位微观心理学家，甚至在人类中，他偏好的研究对象不是某种整合的激情或观念，而是某种远为深奥的东西；感觉、记忆或冲动的细微质地。敏锐的分析是

required to distinguish or arrest these elements, yet these are the predestined elements of his fable; and so his anthropomorphism is far less obvious than that of most poets and theologians, though no less real.

需要区分或阻止这些元素，然而这些正是他的寓言中注定的元素；因此，他的拟人化远不如大多数诗人和神学家的拟人化那样明显，尽管同样真实。

This peculiarity in the terms of the myth carries with it a notable extension in its propriety. The social and moral phenomena of human life cannot be used in interpreting life elsewhere without a certain conscious humour. This makes the charm of avowed writers of fable; their playful travesty and dislocation of things human, which would be puerile if they meant to be naturalists, render them piquant moralists; for they are not really interpreting animals, but under the mask of animals maliciously painting men. Such fables are morally interesting and plausible just because they are psychologically false. If Æsop could have reported what lions and lambs, ants and donkeys, really feel and think, his poems would have been perfect riddles to the public; and they would have had no human value except that of illustrating, to the truly speculative philosopher, the irresponsible variety of animal consciousness and its incommensurable types. Now M. Bergson's psychological fictions, being drawn from what is rudimentary in man, have a better chance of being literally true beyond man. Indeed what he asks us to do, and wishes to do himself, is simply to absorb so completely the aspect and habit of things that the soul of them may take possession of us: that we may know by intuition the *élan vital* which the world expresses, just as Paolo, in Dante, knew by intuition the *élan vital* that the smile of Francesca expressed.

神话术语中的这种特性，伴随着其恰当性的一种显著延伸。人类生活中的社会与道德现象，若不带有某种自觉的幽默，便不能用于解释其他领域的生命。这正是公开的寓言作家的魅力所在；他们对人事的戏谑式滑稽模仿与错位--倘若他们意在成为自然主义者，便会显得幼稚--使他们成为辛辣的道德家；因为他们并非真的在解释动物，而是在动物的面具下恶意地描绘人。这类寓言之所以在道德上有趣且显得可信，恰恰因为它们在心理学上是虚假的。倘若伊索能够报道狮子与羔羊、蚂蚁与驴子真实的感受与思想，他的诗篇对公众而言便会成为完美的谜语；除了向真正思辨的哲学家例示动物意识那不负责任的多样性及其不可通约的类型之外，它们便不会有任何人类价值。如今，柏格森先生的心理学虚构，既然取材于人类身上属于初级的东西，便更有机会在人类之外也字面为真。的确，他要求我们做的、并且他自己希望做的，不过是如此完全地吸收事物的面貌与习性，使事物的灵魂得以占据我们：使我们得以凭直觉认识世界所表达的生命冲力，正如但丁笔下的保罗凭直觉认识弗朗切斯卡的微笑所表达的生命冲力。

The correctness of such an intuition, however, rests on a circumstance which M. Bergson does not notice, because his

然而，这样一种直觉的正确性依赖于一个柏格森先生未曾注意到的情形，因为他的

psychology is literary and not scientific. It rests on the possibility of imitation. When the organism observed and that of the observer have a similar structure and can imitate one another, the idea produced in the observer by intent contemplation is like the experience present to the person contemplated. But where this contagion of attitude, and therefore of feeling, is impossible, our intuition of our neighbours' souls remains subjective and has no value as a revelation. Psychological novelists, when they describe people such as they themselves are or might have been, may describe them truly; but beyond that limit their personages are merely plausible, that is, such as might be conceived by an equally ignorant reader in the presence of the same external indications. So, for instance, the judgment which a superficial traveller passes on foreign manners or religions is plausible to him and to his compatriots just because it represents the feeling that such manifestations awaken in strangers and does not attempt to convey the very different feeling really involved for the natives; had the latter been discovered and expressed the traveller's book would have found little understanding and no sale in his own country. This plausibility to the ignorant is present in all spontaneous myth. Nothing more need be demanded of irresponsible fiction, which makes no pretensions to be a human document, but is merely a human entertainment.

心理学是文学性的，而非科学性的。它立足于模仿的可能性。当被观察的有机体与观察者的有机体具有相似的结构并能相互模仿时，观察者通过专注观照所产生的观念，便如同被观照者当下所具有的经验。但若这种态度、因而也是情感的传染不可能发生，我们对邻人灵魂的直觉便始终是主观的，作为启示毫无价值。心理小说家描写与他们自己相同或可能相同的人时，或许能真实地描写他们；但超出这一界限，他们的人物便仅仅是貌似可信，也就是说，是同样无知的读者在面对相同的外部迹象时可能构想出来的那种人物。例如，一个浅薄的旅行者对外国风俗或宗教所作的判断，对他本人及其同胞而言之所以貌似可信，恰恰因为它表现了这些现象在异乡人心中唤起的感受，而并不试图传达对当地人而言实际牵涉的截然不同的感受；倘若后一种感受被发现并表达出来，旅行者的书在本国便不会得到多少理解，也不会有什么销路。这种对无知者而言的可信性，存在于一切自发的神话之中。对不负责任的虚构不能再有更多要求，它并不自称是人类文献，而仅仅是一种人类的娱乐。

Now, a human psychology, even of the finest grain, when it is applied to the interpretation of the soul of matter, or of the soul of the whole universe, obviously yields a view of the irresponsible and subjective sort; for it is not based on any close similarity between the observed and the observer: man and the ether, man and cosmic evolution, cannot mimic one another, to discover

现在，一种人类心理学，即便最为精细，当它被应用于解释物质的灵魂，或整个宇宙的灵魂时，显然会产生一种不负责任的、主观的看法；因为它并非基于被观察者与观察者之间的任何密切相似性：人与以太、人与宇宙进化，无法相互模仿，以发现

mutually how they feel. But just because merely human, such an interpretation may remain always plausible to man; and it would be an admirable entertainment if there were no danger that it should be taken seriously. The idea Paul has of Peter, Spinoza observes, expresses the nature of Peter less than it betrays that of Paul; and so an idea framed by a man of the consciousness of things in general reveals the mind of that man rather than the mind of the universe; but the mind of the man too may be worth knowing, and the illusive hope of discovering everything may lead him truly to disclose himself. Such a disclosure of the lower depths of man by himself is M. Bergson's psychology; and the psychological romance, purporting to describe the inward nature of the universe, which he has built out of that introspection, is his metaphysics.

彼此感受如何。但正因其仅仅关乎人类，这种解释对人类而言可能始终貌似可信；倘若没有会被认真对待的危险，它便会是一种令人赞叹的娱乐。斯宾诺莎指出，保罗对彼得所抱的观念，与其说表达了彼得的本性，不如说泄露了保罗的本性；同样，一个人对万物一般意识所形成的观念，揭示的是这个人的心灵，而非宇宙的心灵；但这个人的心灵也可能值得认识，而发现一切的虚妄希望或许会引导他真实地袒露自身。柏格森先生的心理学，正是人对其自身较低深度的这样一种袒露；而他依据这种内省所构建的、意在描述宇宙内在本性的心理学传奇，便是他的形而上学。

Many a point in this metaphysics may seem strange, fantastic, and obscure; and so it really is, when dislocated and projected metaphysically; but not one will be found to be arbitrary; not one but is based on attentive introspection and perception of the immediate. Take, for example, what is M. Bergson's starting-point, his somewhat dazzling doctrine that to be is to last, or rather to feel oneself endure. This is a hypostasis of "true" (*i.e.* immediately felt) duration. In a sensuous day-dream past feelings survive in the present, images of the long ago are shuffled together with present sensations, the roving imagination leaves a bright wake behind it like a comet, and pushes a rising wave before it, like the bow of a ship; all is fluidity, continuity without identity, novelty without surprise. Hence, too, the doctrine of freedom: the images that appear in such a day-dream are often congruous in character with those that preceded, and mere prolongations of them; but this

这一形而上学中的许多要点可能显得奇特、怪诞而晦涩；当它被错位并形而上学地投射出来时，确实如此；但不会有一个要点被发觉是任意的；没有一个不是基于专注的内省和对直接之物的知觉。以柏格森先生的出发点为例，他那多少令人眩目的学说：存在即延续，或者更确切地说，即感受到自身在绵延。这是对“真正的”(即直接被感受到的)绵延的一种实体化。在一个感官的白日梦中，过去的情感在当前存活，久远过去的意象与当下的感觉混杂在一起，游荡的想象像彗星一样在身后留下明亮的尾迹，又像船首一样在身前推起一道升起的波浪；一切都是流动性，是连续而无同一性，是新奇而无惊异。自由学说亦由此而来：在这样的白日梦中出现的意象，其性质往往与先前的意象相合，仅仅是它们的延长；但这种

prolongation itself modifies them, and what develops is in no way deducible or predictable out of what exists. This situation is perfectly explicable scientifically. The movement of consciousness will be self-congruous and sustained when it rests on continuous processes in the same tissues, and yet quite unpredictable from within, because the direct sensuous report of bodily processes (in nausea, for instance, or in hunger) contains no picture of their actual mechanism. Even wholly new features, due to little crises in bodily life, may appear in a dream to flow out of what already exists, yet freely develop it; because in dreams comparison, the attempt to be consistent, is wholly in abeyance, and also because the new feature will come imbedded in others which are not new, but have dramatic relevance in the story. So immediate consciousness yields the two factors of Bergsonian freedom, continuity and indetermination.

延长本身改变了它们，而发展出来的东西绝不能从现存之物中推演或预测。这一情形在科学上完全可以解释。当意识运动依托于同一组织中的连续过程时，它便会自身相合而持续，然而从内部看却完全不可预测，因为对身体过程的直接感官报告(例如在恶心或饥饿中)并不包含其实际机制的图景。甚至由肉体生活中微小危机所致的全新特征，也可能在梦中显得是从已然存在之物中流出的，却又自由地发展了它；因为在梦中，比较、追求一致的尝试完全处于搁置状态，也因为新特征会镶嵌在其他并非新的特征之中，而这些特征在故事中具有戏剧性的关联。因此，直接意识产生了柏格森式自由的两个要素：连续性与不确定性。

Again, take the somewhat disconcerting assertion that movement exists when there is nothing that moves, and no space that it moves through. In vision, perhaps, it is not easy to imagine a consciousness of motion without some presentation of a field, and of a distinguishable something in it; but if we descend to somatic feelings (and the more we descend, with M. Bergson, the closer we are to reality), in shooting pains or the sense of intestinal movements, the feeling of a change and of a motion is certainly given in the absence of all idea of a *mobile* or of distinct points (or even of a separate field) through which it moves; consciousness begins with the sense of change, and the terms of the felt process are only qualitative limits, bred out of the felt process itself. Even a more paradoxical tenet of our philosopher's finds it justification here. He says that the units of motion are indivisible, that they are

再者，请考虑那个颇令人不安的断言：运动存在，却没有任何运动之物，也没有任何它穿行其间的空间。在视觉中，或许不难想象一种对运动的意识，而无需呈现某个场域以及其中某个可分辨之物；但如果我们下降到躯体感觉(而且如柏格森先生所言，我们下降得越深，就越接近实在)，在射痛或肠动的感觉中，一种变化与运动的感觉确实是在完全没有运动之物的观念、也没有它所穿过的清晰点(甚至没有一个分离的场域)的情况下被给予的；意识始于变化之感，而被感受到的过程的各项只是性质上的界限，是从被感受到的过程本身中滋生出来的。甚至我们这位哲学家一个更为悖谬的信条也在此找到了其正当性。他说运动的单位是不可分的，它们就是

acts; so that to solve the riddle about Achilles and the tortoise we need no mathematics of the infinitesimal, but only to ask Achilles how he accomplishes the feat. Achilles would reply that in so many strides he would do it; and we may be surprised to learn that these strides are indivisible, so that, apparently, Achilles could not have stumbled in the middle of one, and taken only half of it. Of course, in nature, in what non-Bergsonians call reality, he could: but not in his immediate feeling, for if he had stumbled, the real stride, that which he was aware of taking, would have been complete at the stumbling-point. It is certain that consciousness comes in stretches, in breaths: all its data are æsthetic wholes, like visions or snatches of melody; and we should never be aware of anything were we not aware of something all at once.

行动；因此，要解开关于阿基里斯与乌龟的谜题，我们无需无穷小的数学，只需问阿基里斯他如何完成这一壮举。阿基里斯会回答说，他将在如此多的步幅中做到；而我们可能会惊讶地得知这些步幅是不可分的，因此，显然，阿基里斯不可能在某一步幅中间绊倒，而只走了一半。当然，在自然中，在非柏格森主义者所谓的实在中，他可能做到：但在他当下的感觉中则不然，因为如果他绊倒了，那真实的步幅，即他所意识到正在迈出的步幅，就会在绊倒点处完整结束。可以肯定，意识是以一段一段、一次呼吸一次呼吸地到来的：它的所有材料都是审美性的整体，如同视象或旋律的片段；而我们若非一下子意识到某物，就永远不会意识到任何事物。

When a man has taught himself—and it is a difficult art—to revert in this way to rudimentary consciousness and to watch himself live, he will be able, if he likes, to add a plausible chapter to speculative psychology. He has unearthed in himself the animal sensibility which has thickened, budded, and crystallised into his present somewhat intellectual image of the world. He has touched again the vegetative stupor, the multiple disconnected landscapes, the "blooming buzzing confusion" which his reason has partly set in order. May he not have in all this a key to the consciousness of other creatures? Animal psychology, and sympathy with the general life of nature, are vitiated both for naturalists and for poets by the human terms they must use, terms which presuppose distinctions which non-human beings probably have not made. These distinctions correct the illusions of immediate appearance in ways which only a long and special experience has imposed upon us, and they should not be imported into other souls. We are

当一个人已经教会自己--这是一门困难的技艺--以这种方式回溯到初级意识并观察自己生活时，如果他愿意，他将能够为思辨心理学增添一个看似合理的章节。他在自身中发掘出了那种动物性的感受性，它已经增厚、发芽并结晶为他目前那多少有些理智化的世界图像。他再次触及了植物性的昏沉、多重而断开的景观，以及他的理性已部分整理就绪的“繁花似锦、嗡嗡作响的混乱”。难道他在这一切之中不可能拥有理解其他生物意识的钥匙吗?动物心理学以及对自然普遍生命的同情，对博物学家和诗人而言都因他们必须使用的人类术语而受损，这些术语预设了非人类存在者很可能未曾做出的区分。这些区分以只有长期而特殊的经验才强加于我们的方式，纠正了直接外观的幻象，它们不应被输入到其他灵魂之中。我们是

old men trying to sing the loves of children; we are wingless bipeds trying to understand the gods. But the data of the immediate are hardly human; it is probable that at that level all sentience is much alike. From that common ground our imagination can perhaps start safely, and follow such hints as observation furnishes, until we learn to live and feel as other living things do, or as nature may live and feel as a whole. Instinct, for instance, need not be, as our human prejudice suggests, a rudimentary intelligence; it may be a parallel sort of sensibility, an imageless awareness of the presence and character of other things, with a superhuman ability to change oneself so as to meet them. Do we not feel something of this sort ourselves in love, in art, in religion? M. Bergson is a most delicate and charming poet on this theme, and a plausible psychologist; his method of accumulating and varying his metaphors, and leaving our intuition to itself under that artful stimulus, is the only judicious and persuasive method he could have employed, and his knack at it is wonderful. We recover, as we read, the innocence of the mind. It seems no longer impossible that we might, like the wise men in the story-books, learn the language of birds; we share for the moment the siestas of plants; and we catch the quick consciousness of the waves of light, vibrating at inconceivable rates, each throb forgotten as the next follows upon it; and we may be tempted to play on Shakespeare and say:

"Like as the waves make towards the pebbled shore,
So do *their spirits* hasten to their end."

Some reader of M. Bergson might say to himself: All this is ingenious introspection and divination; grant that it is true, and how does that lead to a new theory of the universe? You have

试图歌唱孩童之爱的老人；我们是试图理解诸神的无翼两足动物。但直接之物 hardly 是人类的；很可能在那个层面上，一切感受性都颇为相似。从那个共同的基础出发，我们的想象或许能够安全地起步，并循着观察所提供的线索前行，直到我们学会像其他生物那样生活和感受，或者像自然作为一个整体可能生活和感受的那样。例如，本能，按照我们人类偏见的暗示，不必是一种初级智能；它可能是一种平行的感受性，一种对其他事物的存在和特性的无意象觉察，并具有一种超人的能力来改变自身以应对它们。难道我们在爱中、在艺术中、在宗教中不也感受到某种类似之物吗?柏格森先生在这个主题上是一位极其细腻迷人的诗人，也是一位看似合理的心理学家；他积累并变换隐喻、让我们的直觉在这种巧妙的刺激下自行其是的方法，是他所能采用的唯一明智而有说服力的方法，而他在这方面的技巧令人惊叹。我们在阅读时恢复了心灵的纯真。我们似乎不再不可能像故事书中的智者那样学会鸟的语言；我们暂时分享植物的午睡；我们捕捉到光波的迅疾意识，以不可思议的速率振动，每一次搏动都在下一次接踵而至时被遗忘；我们可能忍不住戏仿莎士比亚说：

“如同波浪涌向卵石海岸，他们的精神也匆匆奔向终点。”

柏格森先生的某位读者可能会自言自语：所有这一切都是精巧的内省与占卜；姑且承认它是真的，那又如何导向一种新的宇宙理论?你已经

been studying surface appearances and the texture of primitive consciousness; that is a part of the internal rumble of this great engine of the world. How should it loosen or dissolve that engine, as your philosophy evidently professes that it must? That nature exists we perceive whenever we resume our intellectual and practical life, interrupted for a moment by this interesting reversion to the immediate. The consciousness which in introspection we treat as an object is, in operation, a cognitive activity: it demonstrates the world. You would never yourself have conceived the minds of ethereal vibrations, or of birds, or of ants, or of men suspending their intelligence, if you had known of no men, ants, birds, or ether. It is the material objects that suggest to you their souls, and teach you how to conceive them. How then should the souls be substituted for the bodies, and abolish them?

一直在研究表面现象和原始意识的质地；那是这架世界伟大引擎内部轰鸣的一部分。它如何应当松动或消解那架引擎，正如你的哲学显然宣称它必须做的那样?自然存在，每当我们在被这种对直接之物的有趣回溯暂时打断之后恢复我们的理智和实践生活时，我们就感知到这一点。在内省中我们当作对象来对待的意识，在运作中是一种认知活动：它证明世界。如果你不曾知道任何人、蚂蚁、鸟或以太，你自己就永远不会构想出以太振动的心灵，或鸟的心灵，或蚂蚁的心灵，或人的心灵悬置其智能。正是物质对象向你暗示了它们的灵魂，并教会你如何构想它们。那么，灵魂如何应当取代身体并废除它们呢?

Poor guileless reader! If philosophers were straightforward men of science, adding each his mite to the general store of knowledge, they would all substantially agree, and while they might make interesting discoveries, they would not herald each his new transformation of the whole universe. But philosophers are either revolutionists or apologists, and some of them, like M. Bergson, are revolutionists in the interests of apologetics. Their art is to create some surprising inversion of things, some system of the universe contrary to common apprehension, or to defend some such inverted system, propounded by poets long ago, and perhaps consecrated by religion. It would not require a great man to say calmly: Men, birds, even ether-waves, if you will, feel after this and this fashion. The greatness and the excitement begin when he says: Your common sense, your practical intellect, your boasted science have entirely deceived you; see what the real truth is

可怜的、天真的读者啊!如果哲学家们都是直截了当的科学人，各自为知识的总宝库添上一份微薄贡献，他们大体上就会一致，虽然他们可能做出有趣的发现，却不会各自宣告对整个宇宙的又一次新改造。但哲学家们要么是革命者，要么是辩护者，其中有些人，如柏格森先生，是为辩护术服务的革命者。他们的艺术在于制造某种令人惊讶的事物颠倒，某种与常识相悖的宇宙体系，或为某种此类颠倒的体系辩护--那是由诗人很久以前提出的，也许还被宗教奉为神圣。要平静地说出：人、鸟，甚至以太波，如果你愿意，都按这种方式和那种方式感受--这并不需要一位伟人。伟大与激动始于他说：你们的常识、你们的实践理智、你们所夸耀的科学完全欺骗了你们；看看真正的真理究竟是什么吧!

instead! So M. Bergson is bent on telling us that the immediate, as he describes it, is the sole reality; all else is unreal, artificial, and a more or less convenient symbol in discourse—discourse itself being taken, of course, for a movement in immediate sensibility, which is what it is existentially, but never for an excursion into an independent logical realm, which is what it is spiritually and in intent. So we must revise all our psychological observations, and turn them into metaphysical dogmas. It would be nothing to say simply: *For immediate feeling* the past is contained in the present, movement is prior to that which moves, spaces are many, disconnected, and incommensurable, events are indivisible wholes, perception is in its object and identical with it, the future is unpredictable, the complex is bred out of the simple, and evolution is creative, its course being obedient to a general tendency or groping impulse, not to any exact law. No, we must say instead: *In the universe at large* the whole past is preserved bodily in the present; duration is real and space is only imagined; all is motion, and there is nothing substantial that moves; times are incommensurable; men, birds, and waves are nothing but the images of them (our perceptions, like their spirits, being some compendium of these images); chance intervenes in the flux, but evolution is due to an absolute Effort which exists *in vacuo* and is simplicity itself; and this Effort, without having an idea of what it pursues, nevertheless produces it out of nothing.

相反!所以柏格森先生执意要告诉我们，按他所描述的，直接的东西是唯一的实在；其余一切皆非实在、人为的，是话语中或多或少便利的符号--当然，话语本身被视为直接感性中的一种运动，这在存在上就是它之所是，但绝不被视为进入一个独立的逻辑领域的远足，而后者是它在精神上 and 意图上之所是。因此我们必须修正我们所有的心理学观察，把它们变成形而上学教义。仅仅说：对于直接感受，过去包含在现在之中，运动先于运动者，空间是众多的、不相连的、不可通约的，事件是不可分的整体，知觉在其对象之中并与它同一，未来不可预测，复杂由简单孕育而出，进化是创造性的，其进程服从于一种普遍倾向或摸索的冲动，而非任何精确规律--这样说算不了什么。不，我们必须反过来说：在整个宇宙中，全部过去都身体般地保存在现在之中；绵延是实在的，空间只是被想象的；一切皆运动，没有任何实体性的东西在运动；时间是彼此不可通约的；人、鸟和波浪不过是它们的影像(我们的知觉，如同它们的精神，是这些影像的某种概要)；偶然介入流变之中，但进化归因于一种绝对的努力，它存在于真空之中，并且本身就是单纯性；而这种努力，尽管对其所追求的东西没有观念，却仍然从无中把它产生出来。

The accuracy or the hollowness of M. Bergson's doctrine, according as we take it for literary psychology or for natural philosophy, will appear clearly in the following instance. "Any one," he writes,[3] "who has ever practised literary composition knows very well that, after he has devoted long study to the

柏格森先生的学说，究竟是精确还是空洞，取决于我们把它当作文学心理学还是自然哲学来看待，这一点在下面这个例子中会清楚地显现出来。“任何曾经从事过文学创作的人，”他写道，[3]“都非常清楚，在他长期潜心研究之后，

subject, collected all the documents, and taken all his notes, one thing more is needful before he can actually embark on the work of composition; namely, an effort, often a very painful one, to plant himself all at once in the very heart of the subject, and to fetch from as profound a depth as possible the momentum by which he need simply let himself be borne along in the sequel. This momentum, as soon as it is acquired, carries the mind forward along a path where it recovers all the facts it had gathered together, and a thousand other details besides. The momentum develops and breaks up of itself into particulars that might be retailed *ad infinitum*. The more he advances the more he finds; he will never have exhausted the subject; and nevertheless if he turns round suddenly to face the momentum he feels at his back and see what it is, it eludes him; for it is not a thing but a direction of movement, and though capable of being extended indefinitely, it is simplicity itself."

主题，收集了所有文献，做了所有笔记，在他能够真正着手写作工作之前，还需要一件事；即一种努力，往往是非常痛苦的努力，一下子把自己植入主题的最核心，并从尽可能深的深处提取出那种动量，此后他只需让自己被它承载着前行。这种动量一经获得，就带着心灵沿着一条道路向前，在这条道路上它重新找到它曾聚集起来的所有事实，以及除此之外成千上万的其他细节。这种动量自行发展并分解为可以无限零售的细节。他越前进，发现得越多；他永远不会穷尽这个主题；然而，如果他突然转身面对他背后感到的那种动量，看看它是什么，它却避开了他；因为它不是一件东西，而是一种运动的方向，尽管能够被无限延伸，它本身就是单纯性。”

This is evidently well observed: heighten the tone a little, and you might have a poem on those joyful pangs of gestation and parturition which are not denied to a male animal. It is a description of the *sensation* of literary composition, of the *immediate experience* of a writer as words and images rise into his mind. He cannot summon his memories explicitly, for he would first have to remember them to do so; his consciousness of inspiration, of literary creation, is nothing but a consciousness of pregnancy and of a certain "direction of movement," as if he were being wafted in a balloon; and just in its moments of highest tension his mind is filled with mere expectancy and mere excitement, without images, plans, or motives; and what guides it is inwardly, as M. Bergson says, simplicity itself. Yet excellent as

这显然是观察得很好的：把调子稍微提高一点，你或许就能得到一首关于那些快乐的孕育与分娩阵痛的诗--这些阵痛并未被拒绝给予雄性动物。这是对文学创作的感觉的描述，是对一位作家在词语和形象涌入其心灵时的直接经验的描述。他不能明确地召唤他的记忆，因为要这样做他首先得记住它们；他对灵感、对文学创作的意识，不过是对怀孕和某种“运动方向”的意识，仿佛他正乘着气球飘荡；而恰恰在其最紧张的时刻，他的心灵充满了纯粹的期待和纯粹的兴奋，没有形象、计划或动机；而在内里引导它的，如柏格森先生所说，是单纯性本身。然而，尽管

such a description is psychologically, it is a literary confession rather than a piece of science; for scientific psychology is a part of natural history, and when in nature we come upon such a notable phenomenon as this, that some men write and write eloquently, we should at once study the antecedents and the conditions under which this occurs; we should try, by experiment if possible, to see what variations in the result follow upon variations in the situation. At once we should begin to perceive how casual and superficial are those data of introspection which M. Bergson's account reproduces. Does that painful effort, for instance, occur always? Is it the moral source, as he seems to suggest, of the good and miraculous fruits that follow? Not at all: such an effort is required only when the writer is overworked, or driven to express himself under pressure; in the spontaneous talker or singer, in the orator surpassing himself and overflowing with eloquence, there is no effort at all; only facility, and joyous undirected abundance. We should further ask whether *all* the facts previously gathered are recovered, and all correctly, and what relation the "thousand other details" have to them; and we should find that everything was controlled and supplied by the sensuous endowment of the literary man, his moral complexion, and his general circumstances. And we should perceive at the same time that the momentum which to introspection was so mysterious was in fact the discharge of many automatisms long imprinted on the system, a system (as growth and disease show) that has its internal vegetation and crises of maturity, to which facility and error in the recovery of the past, and creation also, are closely attached. Thus we should utterly refuse to say that this momentum was capable of being extended indefinitely or was simplicity itself. It

这样的描述在心理学上很出色，它却是一种文学自白，而非科学；因为科学心理学是自然史的一部分，而当我们在自然中遇到这样一个值得注意的现象--有些人写作且写得雄辩--我们应当立即研究其先例和它发生的条件；我们应当尝试，如果可能的话通过实验，看看情境的变化会带来结果上的什么变化。我们立刻就会开始察觉，柏格森先生的叙述所复制的那些内省材料是多么偶然和肤浅。例如，那种痛苦的努力总是发生吗?它是否如他似乎暗示的那样，是随后产生的善与奇迹般果实的道德源泉?根本不是：这种努力只有在作家过度劳累，或被迫在压力下表达自己时才需要；在自发的谈话者或歌者身上，在超越自身、洋溢雄辩的演说家身上，根本没有努力；只有流畅，以及欢乐的、无方向的丰沛。我们还应当问，先前聚集的所有事实是否都被重新找回，且都正确地找回，“成千上万的其他细节”与它们有何关系；我们就会发现，一切都由文学人的感性禀赋、他的道德气质和一般境况所控制和提供。同时我们就会察觉，对内省来说如此神秘的动量，实际上是许多长期印刻在系统上的自动机制的释放，这个系统(如生长和疾病所示)有其内在的植物性生长和成熟危机，重新找回过去的流畅与错误，以及创造，都与之紧密相连。因此我们应当完全拒绝说这种动量能够被无限延伸，或者说它就是单纯性本身。它

may be a good piece of literary psychology to say that simplicity precedes complexity, for it precedes complexity in consciousness. Consciousness dwindles and flares up most irresponsibly, so long as its own flow alone is regarded, and it continually arises out of nothing, which indeed is simplicity itself. But it does not arise without real conditions outside, which cannot be discovered by introspection, nor divined by that literary psychology which proceeds by imagining what introspection might yield in others.

说简单先于复杂，或许是一种不错的文学心理学，因为它在意识中先于复杂。只要仅就其自身的流动来看，意识最为不负责任地消长与闪燃，它不断从虚无中产生，而虚无 indeed 就是简单本身。但它并非在没有外部真实条件的情况下产生，这些条件既不能被内省发现，也不能被那种通过想象他者内省可能产生什么来进行的文学心理学所猜度。

There is a deeper mystification still in this passage, where a writer is said to "plant himself in the very heart of the subject." The general tenor of M. Bergson's philosophy warrants us in taking this quite literally to mean that the field from which inspiration draws its materials is not the man's present memory nor even his past experience, but the subject itself which that experience and this memory regard: in other words, what we write about and our latent knowledge are the same thing. When Shakespeare was composing his *Antony and Cleopatra,* for instance, he planted himself in the very heart of Rome and of Egypt, and in the very heart of the Queen of Egypt herself; what he had gathered from Plutarch and from elsewhere was, according to M. Bergson's view, a sort of glimpse of the remote reality itself, as if by telepathy he had been made to witness some part of it; or rather as if the scope of his consciousness had been suddenly extended in one direction, so as to embrace and contain bodily a bit of that outlying experience. Thus when the poet sifts his facts and sets his imagination to work at unifying and completing them, what he does is to pierce to Egypt, Rome, and the inner consciousness of Cleopatra, to fetch *thence* the profound momentum which is to guide him in composition; and it is there, not in the adventitious

这段话中还有更深一层的神秘化，其中说一位作家“把自己植入题材的最核心处”。柏格森先生哲学的总旨趣使我们有理由照字面理解这句话，意即灵感从中汲取材料的领域，不是此人当下的记忆，甚至也不是他过去的经验，而是那经验与这记忆所关涉的题材本身：换言之，我们所书写的东西与我们的潜在知识是同一回事。例如，当莎士比亚创作《安东尼与克莉奥佩特拉》时，他把自己植入罗马与埃及的最核心处，也植入埃及女王本人的最核心处；依照柏格森先生的看法，他从普鲁塔克及别处所搜集到的东西，乃是对那遥远实在本身的一种瞥见，仿佛他借心灵感应被弄得目睹了它的某一部分；或者更确切地说，仿佛他的意识范围突然朝一个方向扩展，以致把那段外在经验的一小片身体般地包揽并容纳进来。于是，当诗人筛选他的事实，并让他的想象着手把它们统一并补全时，他所做的乃是穿透到埃及、罗马以及克莉奥佩特拉的内心意识，从那里取来那将要在创作中引导他的深刻动量；而正是在那里，不是在偶然的

later parts of his own mind, that he should find the thousand other details which he may add to the picture.

Here again, in an exaggerated form, we have a transcript of the immediate, a piece of really wonderful introspection, spoiled by being projected into a theory of nature, which it spoils in its turn. Doubtless Shakespeare, in the heat of dramatic vision, lived his characters, transported himself to their environment, and felt the passion of each, as we do in a dream, dictating their unpremeditated words. But all this is in imagination; it is true only within the framework of our dream. In reality, of course, Shakespeare never pierced to Rome nor to Egypt; his elaborations of his data are drawn from his own feelings and circumstances, not from those of Cleopatra. This transporting oneself into the heart of a subject is a loose metaphor: the best one can do is to transplant the subject into one's own heart and draw *from oneself* impulses as profound as possible with which to vivify tradition and make it over in one's own image. Yet I fear that to speak so is rationalism, and would be found to involve, to the horror of our philosopher, that life is cognitive and spiritual, but dependent, discontinuous, and unsubstantial. What he conceives instead is that consciousness is a stuff out of which things are made, and has all the attributes, even the most material, of its several objects; and that there is no possibility of knowing, save by becoming what one is trying to know. So perception, for him, lies where its object does, and is some part of it; memory is the past experience itself, somehow shining through into the present; and Shakespeare's Cleopatra, I should infer, would have to be some part of Cleopatra herself—in those moments when she spoke English.

他自己心灵的较后部分，以至于他应当找到他可以添加到这幅画面上的那千百个其他细节。

这里我们又一次看到，以一种夸张的形式，一份对当下之物的记录，一段真正奇妙的内省，被投射为一种自然理论而遭到败坏，而这种理论反过来又被它所败坏。毫无疑问，莎士比亚在戏剧想象的热烈之中活在他的角色里，把自己移入他们的环境，感受到每一个角色的激情，正如我们在梦中所做的那样，口授出他们未经预谋的言辞。但这一切都在想象之中；它只在我们梦的框架内才是真实的。当然，在现实中，莎士比亚从未抵达罗马，也从未抵达埃及；他对自身材料的铺展取自他自己的感受与境况，而非克利奥帕特拉的感受与境况。这种把自己移入一个主题之心的做法是一个松散的隐喻：人所能做的最好的事，是把主题移植到自己的心中，从自身之中引出尽可能深刻的冲动，用以使传统焕发生机，并按照自己的形象把它重造。然而我担心，这样说话是理性主义，并且会被发现蕴含着--令我们的哲学家惊恐的是--生命是认知性的、精神性的，但却是依赖的、不连续的、非实体的。相反，他所设想的是：意识是一种质料，事物由之而被造成，并且具有其各个对象的全部属性，甚至最物质的属性；而且，除了成为一个人试图去认识的东西之外，不存在认识的可能性。因此，对他来说，知觉位于其对象所在之处，并且是它的一部分；记忆就是过去的经验本身，以某种方式闪耀着透入当下；而莎士比亚的克利奥帕特拉，我应当推断，必定是克利奥帕特拉本人的某一部分--在她讲英语的那些时刻。

It is hard to be a just critic of mysticism because mysticism can never do itself justice in words. To conceive of an external actual Cleopatra and an external actual mind of Shakespeare is to betray the cause of pure immediacy; and I suspect that if M. Bergson heard of such criticisms as I am making, he would brush them aside as utterly blind and scholastic. As the mystics have always said that God was not far from them, but dwelt in their hearts, meaning this pretty literally: so this mystical philosophy of the immediate, which talks sometimes so scientifically of things and with such intimacy of knowledge, feels that these things are not far from it, but dwell literally in its heart. The revelation and the sentiment of them, if it be thorough, is just what the things are. The total aspects to be discerned in a body *are* that body; and the movement of those aspects, when you enact it, *is* the spirit of that body, and at the same time a part of your own spirit. To suppose that a man's consciousness (either one's own or other people's) is a separate fact over and above the shuffling of the things he feels, or that these things are anything over and above the feeling of them which exists more or less everywhere in diffusion—that, for the mystic, is to be once for all hopelessly intellectual, dualistic, and diabolical. If you cannot shed the husk of those dead categories—space, matter, mind, truth, person—life is shut out of your heart. And the mystic, who always speaks out of experience, is certainly right in this, that a certain sort of life is shut out by reason, the sort that reason calls dreaming or madness; but he forgets that reason too is a kind of life, and that of all the kinds—mystical, passionate, practical, æsthetic, intellectual—with their various degrees of light and heat, the life of reason is that which some people may prefer. I confess I am one of these, and I am not

要做一个公正的神秘主义批评者是很困难的，因为神秘主义永远无法用言语为自己伸张正义。设想一个外在的、实际的克利奥帕特拉和一个外在的、实际的莎士比亚心灵，就是背叛纯粹直接性的主张；我怀疑，如果柏格森先生听到我所做的这类批评，他会把它们当作完全盲目的和经院式的而置之不理。正如神秘主义者一直说上帝离他们不远，而是住在他们心中，这话相当字面地理解：所以这种关于直接性的神秘主义哲学，它有时如此科学地谈论事物，又以如此亲密的方式谈论知识，觉得这些事物离它不远，而是字面地住在它的心中。对它们的启示和情感，如果是彻底的，就正是这些事物本身。在一个身体中要辨别出的总体方面就是那个身体；而这些方面的运动，当你实施它时，就是那个身体的精神，同时是你自己精神的一部分。设想一个人的意识(无论是自己的还是他人的)是超越于他所感觉的事物的 shuffling 之上的一个独立事实，或者设想这些事物是超越于对它们的感觉之上的任何东西--这种感觉或多或少无处不在弥漫--对神秘主义者来说，那就是一次性地无可救药地理智主义的、二元论的和恶魔般的。如果你不能摆脱那些死范畴的壳--空间、物质、心灵、真理、人格--生命就被关在你的心门之外。而神秘主义者，他总是从经验出发说话，在这一点上确实是对的：某种生活被理性关在门外，即理性称之为做梦或疯狂的那种生活；但他忘记了理性也是一种生活，而在所有种类--神秘主义的、激情的、实践的、审美的、理智的--及其不同程度的光和热中，理性的生活是某些人可能偏好的。我承认我是其中之一，而我不是

inclined, even if I were able, to reproduce M. Bergson's sentiments as he feels them. He is his own perfect expositor. All a critic can aim at is to understand these sentiments as existing facts, and to give them the place that belongs to them in the moral world. To understand, in most cases, is intimacy enough.

Herbert Spencer says somewhere that the yolk of an egg is homogeneous, the highly heterogeneous bird being differentiated in it by the law of evolution. I cannot think what assured Spencer of this homogeneity in the egg, except the fact that perhaps it all tasted alike, which might seem good proof to a pure empiricist. Leibnitz, on the contrary, maintained that the organisation of nature was infinitely deep, every part consisting of an endless number of discrete elements. Here we may observe the difference between good philosophy and bad. The idea of Leibnitz is speculative and far outruns the evidence, but it is speculative in a well-advised, penetrating, humble, and noble fashion; while the idea of Spencer is foolishly dogmatic, it is a piece of ignorant self-sufficiency, like that insular empiricism that would deny that Chinamen were real until it had actually seen them. Nature is richer than experience and wider than divination; and it is far rasher and more arrogant to declare that any part of nature is simple than to suggest the sort of complexity that perhaps it might have. M. Bergson, however, is on the side of Spencer. After studiously examining the egg on every side—for he would do more than taste it—and considering the source and destiny of it, he would summon his intuition to penetrate to the very heart of it, to its spirit, and then he would declare that this spirit was a vital momentum without parts and without ideas, and was simplicity itself. He would add that it was the free and original creator of the

即使我有能力，也不倾向于按照柏格森先生自己感受其情感的方式来复现它们。他是他自己的完美阐释者。批评家所能瞄准的全部目标，就是把这些情感理解为存在的事实，并给予它们在道德世界中应得的位置。在大多数情况下，理解就已足够亲密。

赫伯特·斯宾塞在某处说，蛋的蛋黄是均质的，高度异质的鸟在其中通过进化法则而分化出来。我无法想象是什么使斯宾塞确信蛋中的这种均质性，除了也许它尝起来全都一样这一事实，而这对一个纯粹经验主义者来说可能似乎是很好的证明。相反，莱布尼茨主张自然的组织是无限深刻的，每一部分都由无数离散元素组成。这里我们可以观察到好哲学与坏哲学之间的区别。莱布尼茨的观念是思辨性的，远远超出证据，但它的思辨方式是有见识的、穿透的、谦逊的和高贵的；而斯宾塞的观念则是愚蠢地教条主义的，是一知半解的自以为是，就像那种岛国经验主义，除非亲眼见过中国人，否则就否认他们是真实的。自然比经验更丰富，比猜度更广阔；宣称自然的任何部分是简单的，远比提示它可能具有的那种复杂性要轻率得多、傲慢得多。然而柏格森先生站在斯宾塞一边。在仔细地从各方面检查了蛋之后--因为他会做的比尝它更多--并考虑了它的来源和命运，他会召唤他的直觉穿透到它的最核心处，穿透到它的精神，然后他会宣称这精神是一种没有部分、没有观念的生命动量，并且就是简单本身。他会补充说，它是那的自由而原初的创造者

bird, because it is of the essence of spirit to bestow more than it possesses and to build better than it knows. Undoubtedly actual spirit is simple and does not know how it builds; but for that very reason actual spirit does not really create or build anything, but merely watches, now with sympathetic, now with shocked attention, what is being created and built for it. Doubtless new things are always arising, new islands, new persons, new philosophies; but that the real cause of them should be simpler than they, that their Creator, if I may use this language, should be ignorant and give more than he has, who can stomach that?

鸟，因为精神的本质就是给予多于它所拥有的，建造优于它所知道的。毫无疑问，现实的精神是单纯的，并不知道它如何建造；但正因如此，现实的精神并不真正创造或建造任何东西，而只是观察着--时而以同情的关注，时而以震惊的关注--那正在为它被创造和建造的东西。无疑，新事物总是在产生，新的岛屿、新的人物、新的哲学；但要说它们的真正原因比它们更简单，说它们的创造者--如果我可以使用这种说法--竟然是无知的并且给予多于他所拥有的，谁能接受这一点呢?

Let us grant, however, since the thing is not abstractly inconceivable, that eggs really have no structure. To what, then, shall we attribute the formation of birds? Will it follow that evolution, or differentiation, or the law of the passage from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous, or the dialectic of the concept of pure being, or the impulse towards life, or the vocation of spirit is what actually hatches them? Alas, these words are but pedantic and rhetorical cloaks for our ignorance, and to project them behind the facts and regard them as presiding from thence over the course of nature is a piece of the most deplorable scholasticism. If eggs are really without structure, the true causes of the formation of birds are the last conditions, whatever they may be, that introduce that phenomenon and determine its character—the type of the parents, the act of fertilisation, the temperature, or whatever else observation might find regularly to precede and qualify that new birth in nature. These facts, if they were the ultimate and deepest facts in the case, would be the ultimate and only possible terms in which to explain it. They would constitute the mechanism of reproduction; and if nature

然而，让我们暂且承认--既然这件事并非抽象地不可设想--卵确实没有结构。那么，我们应当把鸟的形成归因于什么呢?难道可以推论说，进化、或分化、或从同质到异质的过渡规律、或纯粹存在概念的辩证法、或朝向生命的冲动、或精神的使命，才是真正孵化它们的东西吗?唉，这些词语不过是我们无知所披的迂腐而修辞的外衣，把它们投射到事实背后并视之为从那里支配自然进程的东西，是最可悲的经院哲学。如果卵确实没有结构，那么鸟的形成的真正原因就是那些最后的条件，无论它们是什么，这些条件引入了那个现象并决定了它的性质--父母的类型、受精行为、温度，或观察可能发现规律性地先于并限定自然中那个新诞生的一切其他条件。这些事实，如果它们是此事中终极而最深刻的事实，就会是解释此事的终极且唯一可能的术语。它们将构成生殖的机械论；而如果自然

were no finer than that in its structure, science could not go deeper than that in its discoveries. And although it is frivolous to suppose that nature ends in this way at the limits of our casual apprehension, and has no hidden roots, yet philosophically that would be as good a stopping place as any other. Ultimately we should have to be satisfied with some factual conjunction and method in events. If atoms and their collisions, by any chance, were the ultimate and inmost facts discoverable, they would supply the explanation of everything, in the only sense in which anything existent can be explained at all. If somebody then came to us enthusiastically and added that the Will of the atoms so to be and move was the true cause, or the Will of God that they should move so, he would not be reputed, I suppose, to have thrown a bright light on the subject.

在其结构中并不比这更精细，科学在其发现中也不可能比这更深入。尽管认为自然以这种方式终止于我们偶然理解的界限处、没有隐藏的根基，是轻率的，然而从哲学上说，那会是一个和任何其他停靠点一样好的停靠点。最终我们将不得不满足于事件中的某种事实性的连结和方法。如果原子及其碰撞碰巧是可发现的终极而最内在的事实，它们就会提供对一切事物的解释--在存在者能够被解释的唯一意义上。如果那时有人热情地来到我们面前补充说，原子如此存在和运动的意志是真正的原因，或者上帝要它们如此运动的意志是真正的原因，我想，他不会被认为对此问题投下了明亮的光。

Yet this is what M. Bergson does in his whole defence of metaphysical vitalism, and especially in the instance of the evolution of eyes by two different methods, which is his palmary argument. Since in some molluscs and in vertebrates organs that coincide in being organs of vision are reached by distinct paths, it cannot have been the propulsion of mechanism in each case, he says, that guided the developments, which, being divergent, would never have led to coincident results, but the double development must have been guided by a common *tendency towards vision*. Suppose (what some young man in a laboratory may by this time have shown to be false) that M. Bergson's observations have sounded the facts to the bottom; it would then be of the ultimate nature of things that, given light and the other conditions, the two methods of development will end in eyes; just as, for a peasant, it is of the ultimate nature of things that puddles

然而这正是柏格森先生在其整个为形而上学活力论的辩护中所做的，尤其是在眼睛通过两种不同方法进化的事例中，这是他的主要论据。既然在某些软体动物和脊椎动物中，作为视觉器官而一致的器官是通过不同的路径达到的，他说，那么在每个事例中引导发展的就不可能是机械论的推动力--因为发展既然是分岔的，就永远不会导致一致的结果--而双重的发展必定是由一种朝向视觉的共同倾向所引导的。假设(实验室里的某个年轻人到此时可能已经表明这是假的)柏格森先生的观察已经穷尽了事实的底蕴；那么事物的终极本质就会是：给定光和其余条件，两种发展方法将以眼睛告终；正如对一个农民来说，事物的终极本质就是水坑

can be formed in two quite opposite ways, by rain falling from heaven and by springs issuing from the earth; but as the peasant would not have reached a profound insight into nature if he had proclaimed the presence in her of a *tendency to puddles*, to be formed in inexplicably different ways; so the philosopher attains to no profound insight when he proclaims in her a *tendency to vision.* If those words express more than ignorance, they express the love of it. Even if the vitalists were right in despairing of further scientific discoveries, they would be wrong in offering their verbiage as a substitute. Nature may possibly have only a very loose hazy constitution, to be watched and understood as sailors watch and understand the weather; but Neptune and Æolus are not thereby proved to be the authors of storms. Yet M. Bergson thinks if life could only be safely shown to arise unaccountably, that would prove the invisible efficacy of a mighty tendency to life. But would the ultimate contexture and miracle of things be made less arbitrary, and less a matter of brute fact, by the presence behind them of an actual and arbitrary effort that such should be their nature? If this word "effort" is not a mere figure of rhetoric, a name for a movement in things of which the end happens to interest us more than the beginning, if it is meant to be an effort actually and consciously existing, then we must proceed to ask: Why did this effort exist? Why did it choose that particular end to strive for? How did it reach the conception of that end, which had never been realised before, and which no existent nature demanded for its fulfilment? How did the effort, once made specific, select the particular matter it was to transform? Why did this matter respond to the disembodied effort that it should change its habits? Not one of these questions is

可以通过两种截然相反的方式形成--由从天而降的雨水和由从地下涌出的泉水；但正如农民如果宣称自然中有一种形成水坑的倾向、以不可解释的不同方式形成，他并不会因此获得对自然的深刻洞见；同样，哲学家如果宣称自然中有一种朝向视觉的倾向，他也不会达到任何深刻的洞见。如果那些词语表达了多于无知的东西，它们表达的就是对无知的爱。即使活力论者在对进一步科学发现绝望这一点上是对的，他们以空洞的言辞作为替代品也是错的。自然也许只有一种非常松散模糊的构造，可以像水手观察和理解天气那样被观察和理解；但海神和风神并不因此被证明是风暴的制造者。然而柏格森先生认为，只要能可靠地表明生命不可解释地产生，那就能证明一种强大的生命倾向的不可见效力。但是，事物终极的构造和奇迹，难道会因为它们背后存在着一种实际的、任意的努力--要使它们的本性如此--而变得不那么任意、不那么是纯粹事实吗?如果“努力”这个词不是纯粹的修辞比喻，不是对事物中一种运动的命名--我们对这运动的终点碰巧比对起点更感兴趣--如果它意指一种实际且自觉地存在的努力，那么我们就必须进一步追问：这努力为何存在?它为何选择那个特定的终点去追求?它如何达到那个终点的概念--那终点从未被实现过，也没有任何存在者的本性要求它来实现?这努力一旦被具体化，如何选择它所要转化的特定物质?这物质为何回应那脱离肉体的努力，以至于它应当改变自己的习性?这些问题没有一个

easier to answer than the question why nature is living or animals have eyes. Yet without seeking to solve the only real problem, namely, how nature is actually constituted, this introduction of metaphysical powers raises all the others, artificially and without occasion. This side of M. Bergson's philosophy illustrates the worst and most familiar vices of metaphysics. It marvels at some appearance, not to investigate it, but to give it an unctuous name. Then it turns this name into a power, that by its operation creates the appearance. This is simply verbal mythology or the hypostasis of words, and there would be some excuse for a rude person who should call it rubbish.

比为什么自然有生命或动物有眼睛这个问题更容易回答。然而，如果不寻求解决唯一真正的问题，即自然实际上是如何构成的，那么这种形而上学力量的引入就人为地且无端地引发了所有其他问题。柏格森哲学的这一面例证了形而上学最糟糕和最常见的恶习。它惊奇于某种表象，不是为了研究它，而是为了给它一个油滑的名称。然后它把这个名称变成一个力量，通过其运作创造表象。这简直是言辞的神话学或词语的实体化，如果有人粗鲁地称之为垃圾，那也情有可原。

The metaphysical abuse of psychology is as extraordinary in modern Europe as that of fancy ever was in India or of rhetoric in Greece. We find, for instance, Mr. Bradley murmuring, as a matter almost too obvious to mention, that the existence of anything not sentience is unmeaning to him; or, if I may put this evident principle in other words, that nothing is able to exist unless something else is able to discover it. Yet even if discovered the poor candidate for existence would be foiled, for it would turn out to be nothing but a modification of the mind falsely said to discover it. Existence and discovery are conceptions which the malicious criticism of knowledge (which is the psychology of knowledge abused) pretends to have discarded and outgrown altogether; the conception of immediacy has taken their place. This malicious criticism of knowledge is based on the silent assumption that knowledge is impossible. Whenever you mention anything, it baffles you by talking instead about your idea of what you mention; and if ever you describe the origin of anything it substitutes, as a counter-theory, its theory of the origin of your

心理学在形而上学上的滥用，在现代欧洲正如想象在印度或修辞在希腊的滥用一样非同寻常。例如，我们发现布拉德利先生喃喃地说，几乎显而易见到不值一提，任何非感觉的存在对他而言都是无意义的；或者，如果我可以把这个明显的原则换种说法，除非某物能够发现另一物，否则后者就不能存在。然而，即使被发现，这个可怜的存在候选者也会受挫，因为它会被证明不过是心灵的变状，而心灵被错误地说成发现了它。存在与发现是知识之恶意批评(即被滥用的知识心理学)自称已抛弃并超越的概念；直接性的概念已取而代之。这种知识之恶意批评基于一个无声的假设：知识是不可能的。每当你提及任何事物，它就通过谈论你对所提及之物的观念来阻挠你；而如果你描述任何事物的起源，它就以其关于你的描述的起源的理论作为反理论来替代。

description. This, however, would not be a counter-theory at all if the criticism of knowledge had not been corrupted into a negative dogma, maintaining that ideas of things are the only things possible and that therefore only ideas and not things can have an origin. Nothing could better illustrate how deep this cognitive impotence has got into people's bones than the manner in which, in the latest schools of philosophy, it is being disavowed; for unblushing idealism is distinctly out of fashion. M. Bergson tells us he has solved a difficulty that seemed hopeless by avoiding a fallacy common to idealism and realism. The difficulty was that if you started with self-existent matter you could never arrive at mind, and if you started with self-existent mind you could never arrive at matter. The fallacy was that both schools innocently supposed there was an existing world to discover, and each thought it possible that its view should describe that world as it really was. What now is M. Bergson's solution? That no articulated world, either material or psychical, exists at all, but only a tendency or enduring effort to evolve images of both sorts; or rather to evolve images which in their finer texture and vibration are images of matter, but which grouped and foreshortened in various ways are images of minds. The idea of nature and the idea of consciousness are two apperceptions or syntheses of the same stuff of experience. The two worlds thus become substantially identical, continuous, and superposable; each can merge insensibly into the other. "To perceive all the influences of all the points of all bodies would be to sink to the condition of a material object."[4] To perceive some of these influences, by having created organs that shut out the others, is to be a mind.

This solution is obtained by substituting, as usual, the ideas of

描述。然而，如果对知识的批评没有被败坏为一种否定的教义，坚持认为关于事物的观念是唯一可能的事物，因而只有观念而非事物才能有一个起源，那么这根本就不会是一种反理论。没有什么能比最新哲学流派中这种认知无能被否认的方式更好地说明它已多么深入地渗入人们的骨髓；因为不知羞耻的唯心论显然已经不合时宜。柏格森先生告诉我们，他通过避免唯心论和实在论共有的一个谬误，解决了一个看似无望的困难。困难在于，如果你从自存物质出发，你永远无法抵达心灵；如果你从自存心灵出发，你永远无法抵达物质。谬误在于，两个流派都天真地假定有一个现存的世界有待发现，并且各自都认为自己的观点有可能如实描述那个世界。那么柏格森先生的解决方案是什么呢?即根本不存在任何清晰分节的世界，无论是物质的还是心理的，而只有一种倾向或持久的努力，去演化出两种类型的意象；或者更确切地说，去演化出这样的意象：在其更精细的纹理和振动中它们是物质的意象，但以各种方式被组合和透视缩短后则是心灵的意象。自然的观念和意识的观念是同一经验质料的两种统觉或综合。这两个世界因此变得实质上同一、连续且可叠合；每一个都能不知不觉地融入另一个。“知觉到所有物体所有点的所有影响，将沦为一个物质对象的状况。”[4] 通过创造出排除其他影响的器官而知觉到其中一些影响，则是成为一个心灵。

这一解决方案是通过像往常一样代入以下观念而得到的：

things for the things themselves and cheating the honest man who was talking about objects by answering him as if he were talking about himself. Certainly, if we could limit ourselves to feeling life flow and the whole world vibrate, we should not raise the question debated between realists and idealists; but not to raise a question is one thing and to have solved it is another. What has really been done is to offer us a history, *on the assumption of idealism,* of the idea of mind and the idea of matter. This history may be correct enough psychologically, and such as a student of the life of reason might possibly come to; but it is a mere evasion of the original question concerning the relation of this mental evolution to the world it occurs in. In truth, an enveloping world is assumed by these hereditary idealists not to exist; they rule it out *a priori,* and the life of reason is supposed by them to constitute the whole universe. To be sure, they say they transcend idealism no less than realism, because they mark the point where, by contrast or selection from other objects, the mind has come to be distinguished: but the subterfuge is vain, because by "mind" they mean simply the idea of mind, and they give no name, except perhaps experience, to the mind that forms that idea. Matter and mind, for these transcendentalists posing as realists, merge and flow so easily together only because both are images or groups of images in an original mind presupposed but never honestly posited. It is in this forgotten mind, also, as the professed idealists urge, that the relations of proximity and simultaneity between various lives can alone subsist, if to subsist is to be experienced.

以事物代替事物本身，并以回答一个谈论对象的人的方式回答他，仿佛他在谈论自己，从而欺骗那个诚实的人。当然，如果我们能限制自己只感受生命的流动和整个世界的振动，我们就不会提出实在论者和唯心论者之间争论的问题；但不提出问题是一回事，解决问题是另一回事。真正被做成的，是在唯心论的假定下，向我们提供一部关于心灵观念和物质观念的历史。这部历史在心理学上可能足够正确，而且是一个研究理性生活的人可能达到的；但它只是回避了原初问题，即这种心理进化与其所发生的世界之间的关系。事实上，这些世袭的唯心论者假定一个包裹性的世界不存在；他们先验地将其排除，并且他们认为理性生活构成了整个宇宙。诚然，他们说他们超越唯心论不亚于超越实在论，因为他们标出了心灵通过与其他对象的对比或选择而得以被区分出来的那个点：但这种托词是徒劳的，因为通过“心灵”他们仅仅指心灵的观念，并且除了也许经验之外，他们没有给形成那个观念的心灵任何名称。物质和心灵，对于这些冒充实在论者的先验论者来说，之所以如此容易地融合和流动，只是因为两者都是在一个被预设但从未被诚实设定的原初心灵中的意象或意象群。也正是在这个被遗忘的心灵中，正如公开的唯心论者所主张的，各种生命之间的邻近和同时关系才能独自存续--如果存续就是被经验的话。

There is, however, one point of real difference, at least initially, between the idealism of M. Bergson and that of his predecessors. The universal mind, for M. Bergson, is in process of actual

然而，至少在最初，柏格森先生的唯心论与他前辈们的唯心论之间有一个真正的差异点。对于柏格森先生来说，普遍心灵正处于实际

transformation. It is not an omniscient God but a cosmic sensibility. In this sensibility matter, with all its vibrations felt in detail, forms one moving panorama together with all minds, which are patterns visible at will from various points of view in that same woof of matter; and so the great experiment crawls and shoots on, the dream of a giant without a body, mindful of the past, uncertain of the future, shuffling his images, and threading his painful way through a labyrinth of cross-purposes.

转化。它不是全知全能的上帝，而是一种宇宙的感受性。在这种感受性中，物质及其所有振动被详细地感受到，与所有心灵一起形成一个流动的全景，这些心灵是在同一物质纬线中从各种视角随意可见的图案；于是伟大的实验爬行着、 shoots on，一个没有身体的巨人的梦，铭记过去，对未来不确定，shuffling his images，在交叉目的的迷宫中穿行着他痛苦的道路。

Such at least is the notion which the reader gathers from the prevailing character of M. Bergson's words; but I am not sure that it would be his ultimate conclusion. Perhaps it is to be out of sympathy with his spirit to speak of an ultimate conclusion at all; nothing comes to a conclusion and nothing is ultimate. Many dilemmas, however, are inevitable, and if the master does not make a choice himself, his pupils will divide and trace the alternative consequences for themselves in each direction. If they care most for a real fluidity, as William James did, they will stick to something like what I have just described; but if they care most for immediacy, as we may suspect that M. Bergson does, they will transform that view into something far more orthodox. For a real fluidity and an absolute immediacy are not compatible. To believe in real change you must put some trust in representation, and if you posit a real past and a real future you posit independent objects. In absolute immediacy, on the contrary, instead of change taken realistically, you can have only a feeling of change. The flux becomes an idea in the absolute, like the image of a moving spiral, always flowing outwards or inwards, but with its centre and its circumference always immovable. Duration, we must remember, is simply the sense of lasting; no time is real that is not

至少这是读者从柏格森先生言辞的普遍特征中所得出的观念；但我不确定这会是他最终的结论。或许，谈论什么最终结论本身就与他的精神不合；没有什么会达到结论，也没有什么会是最终的。然而，许多两难是不可避免的，如果大师本人不做选择，他的学生们就会分裂，并各自沿着两个方向追溯其替代性的后果。如果他们最关心的是真实的流变性，正如威廉·詹姆斯那样，他们就会坚持我刚刚描述的那种东西；但如果他们最关心的是直接性，正如我们可以猜测柏格森先生那样，他们就会把那种观点转变成某种远为正统的东西。因为真实的流变性与绝对的直接性并不相容。要相信真实的变化，你就必须对表象给予某种信任，而如果你设定一个真实的过去和一个真实的未来，你就设定了独立的对象。相反，在绝对的直接性中，你所能拥有的只是变化的感觉，而非实在论意义上所理解的变化。流变在绝对中变成了一个观念，就像旋转螺旋的形象，始终向外或向内流动，但其中心和圆周始终不动。我们必须记住，绵延不过是持续的感觉；没有时间不是被

lived through. Therefore various lives cannot be dated in a common time, but have no temporal relations to one another. Thus, if we insist on immediacy, the vaunted novelty of the future and the inestimable freedom of life threaten to become (like all else) the given *feeling* of novelty or freedom, in passing from a given image of the past to a given image of the future—all these terms being contained in the present; and we have reverted to the familiar conception of absolute immutability in absolute life. M. Bergson has studied Plotinus and Spinoza; I suspect he has not studied them in vain.

经历过的才是真实的。因此，各种生命无法在一个共同的时间中被确定日期，而是彼此之间没有时间关系。于是，如果我们坚持直接性，那么未来被吹嘘的新奇性和生命不可估量的自由，就大有变成(如同其他一切)从过去的给定形象过渡到未来的给定形象时那种给定的感觉--即新奇性或自由的感觉--的危险，而所有这些术语都包含在现在之中；于是我们又回到了绝对生命中绝对不变性这一熟悉的观念。柏格森先生研究过普罗提诺和斯宾诺莎；我怀疑他并非徒劳。

Nor is this the only point at which this philosophy, when we live a while with it, suddenly drops its mask of novelty and shows us a familiar face. It would seem, for instance, that beneath the drama of creative evolution there was a deeper nature of things. For apparently creative evolution (apart from the obstacle of matter, which may be explained away idealistically) has to submit to the following conditions: first, to create in sequence, not all at once; second, to create some particular sequence only, not all possible sequences side by side; and third, to continue the one sequence chosen, since if the additions of every new moment were irrelevant to the past, no sequence, no vital persistence or progress would be secured, and all effort would be wasted. These are compulsions; but it may also, I suppose, be thought a *duty* on the part of the vital impulse to be true to its initial direction and not to halt, as it well might, like the self-reversing Will of Schopenhauer, on perceiving the result of its spontaneous efforts. Necessity would thus appear behind liberty and duty before it. This summons to life to go on, and these conditions imposed upon it, might then very plausibly be attributed to a Deity existing

这也并非这种哲学在与我们相处一段时间后突然卸下其新奇面具、向我们展示一副熟悉面孔的唯一之处。例如，在创造进化的戏剧之下，似乎存在着事物的一种更深的本性。因为显然，创造进化(撇开物质的障碍不谈，这个障碍可以唯心主义地加以解释掉)必须服从以下条件：第一，按顺序创造，而非一次性全部创造；第二，只创造某种特定的顺序，而非所有可能的顺序并排存在；第三，延续那一个被选定的顺序，因为如果每一个新时刻的增添都与过去无关，那么就不会有任何顺序、任何生命的坚持或进步得到保证，一切努力都会白费。这些是强制性的；但我想，也可以认为生命冲力负有一种义务，即忠于其原初方向而不停滞--它很可能像叔本华那自我反转的意志一样，在察觉到其自发努力的结果时就停滞下来。于是，必然性会出现在自由之后，义务会出现在自由之前。这种对生命继续前进的召唤，以及强加于生命的这些条件，那时就可以非常合理地被归因于一位存在着的神

beyond the world, as is done in religious tradition; and such a doctrine, if M. Bergson should happen to be holding it in reserve, would perhaps help to explain some obscurities in his system, such, for instance, as the power of potentiality to actualise itself, of equipoise to become suddenly emphasis on one particular part, and of spirit to pursue an end chosen before it is conceived, and when there is no nature to predetermine it.

超越世界，正如宗教传统中所做的那样；而这样一种学说，如果柏格森先生碰巧将其保留在储备之中，或许有助于解释他体系中的一些晦涩之处，例如，潜能自我实现的力量，平衡突然变为对某一特定部分的强调，以及精神追求一个在它被构想之前就已选定的目的，而此时并没有自然来预定它。

It has been said that M. Bergson's system precludes ethics: I cannot think that observation just. Apart from the moral inspiration which appears throughout his philosophy, which is indeed a passionate attempt to exalt (or debase) values into powers, it offers, I should say, two starting-points for ethics. In the first place, the *élan vital* ought not to falter, although it can do so: therefore to persevere, labour, experiment, propagate, must be duties, and the opposite must be sins. In the second place, freedom, in adding uncaused increments to life, ought to do so in continuation of the whole past, though it might do so frivolously: therefore it is a duty to be studious, consecutive, loyal; you may move in any direction but you must carry the whole past with you. I will not say this suggests a sound system of ethics, because it would be extracted from dogmas which are physical and incidentally incredible; nor would it represent a mature and disillusioned morality, because it would look to the future and not to the eternal; nevertheless it would be deeply ethical, expressing the feelings that have always inspired Hebraic morality.

有人说柏格森先生的体系排除了伦理学：我不能认为这一观察是公正的。撇开贯穿其哲学的 moral 灵感不谈--那确实是一种将价值提升(或贬低)为力量的激情尝试--我要说，它为伦理学提供了两个出发点。首先，生命冲力不应当动摇，尽管它可以动摇：因此，坚持不懈、劳作、实验、繁衍必定是义务，而相反的东西必定是罪过。其次，自由在给生命增添无原因的增加物时，应当以延续整个过去的方式这样做，尽管它也可能轻率地这样做：因此，好学、连贯、忠诚是一种义务；你可以朝任何方向移动，但你必须携带整个过去。我不会说这暗示了一种健全的伦理学体系，因为它将从物理性的、并且附带地令人难以置信的教义中提取出来；它也不会代表一种成熟而祛魅的道德，因为它将着眼于未来而非永恒；然而，它将是深度伦理性的，表达了一直激励着希伯来道德的那些情感。

A good way of testing the calibre of a philosophy is to ask what it thinks of death. Philosophy, said Plato, is a meditation on death, or rather, if we would do justice to his thought, an aspiration to live disembodied; and Schopenhauer said that the spectacle of

检验一种哲学 caliber 的一个好方法是问它如何看待死亡。柏拉图说，哲学是对死亡的沉思，或者更确切地说，如果我们要公正对待他的思想，是一种过无形体生活的渴望；而叔本华说，那景象

death was the first provocation to philosophy. M. Bergson has not yet treated of this subject; but we may perhaps perceive for ourselves the place that it might occupy in his system.[5] Life, according to him, is the original and absolute force. In the beginning, however, it was only a potentiality or tendency. To become specific lives, life had to emphasise and bring exclusively to consciousness, here and there, special possibilities of living; and where these special lives have their chosen boundary (if this way of putting it is not too Fichtean) they posit or create a material environment. Matter is the view each life takes of what for it are rejected or abandoned possibilities of living. This might show how the absolute will to live, if it was to be carried out, would have to begin by evoking a sense of dead or material things about it; it would not show how death could ever overtake the will itself. If matter were merely the periphery which life has to draw round itself, in order to be a definite life, matter could never abolish any life; as the ring of a circus or the sand of the arena can never abolish the show for which they have been prepared. Life would then be fed and defined by matter, as an artist is served by the matter he needs to carry on his art.

死亡是哲学的第一个诱因。柏格森先生尚未处理这个主题；但我们或许可以自己察觉它在体系中所可能占据的位置。[5]根据他的说法，生命是原初的、绝对的力量。然而，在开始时，它只是一种潜能或倾向。要成为具体的生命，生命必须在此处和彼处强调并专门带入意识某些特殊的生存可能性；而一旦这些特殊的生命有了它们选定的边界(如果这种说法不太费希特式的话)，它们就设定或创造一个物质环境。物质是每一个生命对它所拒绝或放弃的生存可能性所采取的看法。这或许能表明，绝对的生存意志如果要得到贯彻，就必须首先在自身周围唤起一种死寂的或物质的事物的感觉；但它不能表明死亡如何能够降临到意志本身之上。如果物质仅仅是生命为了成为一个确定生命而必须在自己周围画出的圆周，那么物质就永远不能消灭任何生命；正如马戏团的圆环或竞技场的沙子永远不能消灭它们为之准备的那场表演。生命那时就会由物质来滋养和界定，正如艺术家由他进行艺术所需要的物质来服务一样。

Yet in actual life there is undeniably such a thing as danger and failure. M. Bergson even thinks that the facing of increased dangers is one proof that vital force is an absolute thing; for if life were an equilibrium, it would not displace itself and run new risks of death, by making itself more complex and ticklish, as it does in the higher organisms and the finer arts.[6] Yet if life is the only substance, how is such a risk of death possible at all? I suppose the special life that arises about a given nucleus of feeling, by emphasising some of the relations which that feeling has in the

然而在现实生活中，危险与失败无疑是存在的。柏格森先生甚至认为，面对日益增加的危险正是生命冲力乃绝对之物的一个明证；因为倘若生命是一种平衡，它便不会自行位移、不会通过使自身变得更加复杂和棘手而冒新的死亡风险，正如它在高等有机体和更精细的艺术中所做的那样。[6]然而，如果生命是唯一的实体，这种死亡风险究竟如何可能?我设想，围绕着某一既定感受核心而兴起的特殊生命，通过强调该感受在

world, might be abolished if a greater emphasis were laid on another set of its relations, starting from some other nucleus. We must remember that these selections, according to M. Bergson, are not apperceptions merely. They are creative efforts. The future constitution of the flux will vary in response to them. Each mind sucks the world, so far as it can, into its own vortex. A cross apperception will then amount to a contrary force. Two souls will not be able to dominate the same matter in peace and friendship. Being forces, they will pull that matter in different ways. Each soul will tend to devour and to direct exclusively the movement influenced by the other soul. The one that succeeds in ruling that movement will live on; the other, I suppose, will die, although M. Bergson may not like that painful word. He says the lower organisms store energy for the higher organisms to use; but when a sheep appropriates the energy stored up in grass, or a man that stored up in mutton, it looks as if the grass and the sheep had perished. Their *élan vital* is no longer theirs, for in this rough world to live is to kill. Nothing arises in nature, Lucretius says, save helped by the death of some other thing. Of course, this is no defeat for the *élan vital* in general; for according to our philosopher the whole universe from the beginning has been making for just that supreme sort of consciousness which man, who eats the mutton, now possesses. The sheep and the grass were only things by the way and scaffolding for our precious humanity. But would it not be better if some being should arise nobler than man, not requiring abstract intellect nor artificial weapons, but endowed with instinct and intuition and, let us say, the power of killing by radiating electricity? And might not men then turn out to have been mere explosives, in which energy was stored for

世界中某些关系，若转而从另一核心出发、对其另一组关系施加更大的强调，便可能被废除。我们必须记住，按照柏格森先生的说法，这些选择并非仅仅是统觉。它们是创造性的努力。流变的未来构造将随它们而变。每个心灵尽其所能地将世界吸入自己的漩涡。那么，交叉的统觉便相当于一种相反的力量。两个灵魂无法和平友好地支配同一物质。作为力量，它们将以不同方式拉扯那物质。每个灵魂都将倾向于吞并并专一地引导受另一灵魂影响的运动。在这场争夺中成功支配那运动的灵魂将继续存活；另一个，我设想，将会死去，尽管柏格森先生或许不喜欢这个令人痛苦的词。他说低等有机体为高等有机体储存能量以供其使用；但当一只羊占有储存在草中的能量，或一个人占有储存在羊肉中的能量时，看起来草和羊已经消亡了。它们的生命冲力不再属于它们，因为在这个粗野的世界里，生存即是杀戮。卢克莱修说，自然中没有任何事物产生，除非借助于另一事物的死亡。当然，这对一般的生命冲力而言并非失败；因为按照我们这位哲学家的说法，整个宇宙自始便一直在趋向于恰恰那种至高的意识，而吃羊肉的人如今正拥有着它。羊和草只不过是为我们宝贵的人性铺路搭桥的过场之物。但倘若某种比人更高贵的生物出现，既不需要抽象理智也不需要人造武器，而是被赋予本能与直觉，并且--不妨说--拥有以辐射电流杀生的能力，岂不更好?而那时人类岂不有可能被证明不过是炸药，能量储存在其中以供

convenient digestion by that superior creature? A shocking thought, no doubt, like the thought of death, and more distressing to our vital feelings than is the pleasing assimilation of grass and mutton in our bellies. Yet I can see no ground, except a desire to flatter oneself, for not crediting the *élan vital* with some such digestive intention. M. Bergson's system would hardly be more speculative if it entertained this possibility, and it would seem more honest.

那个优越生物方便消化?一个令人震惊的想法，无疑，就像死亡的想法一样，而且比我们肚子里对草和羊肉的愉快同化更令我们的生命感受不安。然而，我看不出任何理由，除了想要奉承自己之外，不把某种这样的消化意图归给生命冲力。如果柏格森先生的体系考虑这种可能性，它几乎不会更具思辨性，而且它似乎会更诚实。

The vital impulse is certainly immortal; for if we take it in the naturalistic exoteric sense, for a force discovered in biology, it is an independent agent coming down into matter, organising it against its will, and stirring it like the angel the pool of Bethesda. Though the ripples die down, the angel is not affected. He has merely flown away. And if we take the vital impulse mystically and esoterically, as the *only* primal force, creating matter in order to play with it, the immortality of life is even more obvious; for there is then nothing else in being that could possibly abolish it. But when we come to immortality for the individual, all grows obscure and ambiguous. The original tendency of life was certainly cosmic and not distinguished into persons: we are told it was like a wireless message sent at the creation which is being read off at last by the humanity of to-day. In the naturalistic view, the diversity of persons would seem to be due to the different material conditions under which one and the same spiritual purpose must fight its way towards realisation in different times and places. It is quite conceivable, however, that in the mystical view the very sense of the original message should comport this variety of interpretations, and that the purpose should always have been to produce diverse individuals.

生命冲力当然是不朽的；因为若我们在自然主义的显白意义上将其理解为一种在生物学中发现的力量，它便是一个独立的作用者，降临于物质之中，违背物质的意志将其组织起来，并像天使搅动毕士大池水那样搅动它。涟漪虽平息，天使却不受影响。他不过是飞走了而已。而若我们在神秘主义的隐微意义上将生命冲力理解为那唯一的原始力量，为戏弄物质而创造物质，那么生命的不朽便更加显然；因为此时存在中再无他物能够废除它。但当我们论及个体的不朽时，一切便变得晦暗而含混。生命最初的倾向当然是宇宙性的，并未区分为诸人格：我们被告知，它就像创世时发出的一则无线讯息，最终正被今日的人类解读出来。在自然主义的观点看来，诸人格的差异似乎应归因于不同的物质条件，同一精神目的必须在这些条件下、在不同时间和地点奋力走向实现。然而完全可以设想，在神秘主义的观点中，原初讯息的意义本身便蕴含着这种解释的多样性，而那目的始终便是要产生出各别的个体。

The first view, as usual, is the one which M. Bergson has prevailingly in mind, and communicates most plausibly; while he holds to it he is still talking about the natural world, and so we still know what he is talking about. On this view, however, personal immortality would be impossible; it would be, if it were aimed at, a self-contradiction in the aim of life; for the diversity of persons would be due to impediments only, and souls would differ simply in so far as they mutilated the message which they were all alike trying to repeat. They would necessarily, when the spirit was victorious, be reabsorbed and identified in the universal spirit. This view also seems most consonant with M. Bergson's theory of primitive reality, as a flux of fused images, or a mind lost in matter; to this view, too, is attributable his hostility to intelligence, in that it arrests the flux, divides the fused images, and thereby murders and devitalises reality. Of course the destiny of spirit would not be to revert to that diffused materiality; for the original mind lost in matter had a very short memory; it was a sort of cosmic trepidation only, whereas the ultimate mind would remember all that, in its efforts after freedom, it had ever super added to that trepidation or made it turn into. Even the abstract views of things taken by the practical intellect would, I fear, have to burden the universal memory to the end. We should be remembered, even if we could no longer exist.

第一种观点，一如往常，是柏格森先生心中主要持有的、并且表述得最合情合理的观点；当他坚持这一观点时，他谈论的仍然是自然世界，因此我们仍然知道他在谈论什么。然而，按照这一观点，个人不朽将是不可能的；如果以个人不朽为目标，那将是生命目标中的自相矛盾；因为人的多样性只会归因于障碍，而灵魂之间的差异仅仅在于它们各自肢解了它们都在试图重复的同一个信息。当精神取得胜利时，它们必然会被重新吸收并同一于普遍精神之中。这一观点似乎也最符合柏格森先生关于原始实在的理论，即原始实在是一种融合意象的流变，或一种迷失于物质中的心灵；他对智力的敌意也可归因于这一观点，因为智力阻断了流变，分割了融合的意象，从而谋杀了实在并使其丧失活力。当然，精神的命运不会是回到那种弥散的物质性；因为原初迷失于物质中的心灵记忆极为短暂；它只是一种宇宙性的颤栗而已，而终极的心灵则会记得一切--在它追求自由的努力中，它曾附加于那种颤栗之上或使之转变而成的一切。甚至实践智力所采取的关于事物的抽象观点，我担心，也将不得不拖累普遍记忆直至终结。我们将被记忆，即使我们已不能再存在。

On the other more profound view, however, might not personal immortality be secured? Suppose the original message said: Translate me into a thousand tongues! In fulfilling its duty, the universe would then continue to divide its dream into phantom individuals; as it had to insulate its parts in the beginning in order to dominate and transform them freely, so it would always

然而，按照另一种更为深刻的观点，个人的不朽难道不可能得到保证吗?假设最初的信息是：把我翻译成一千种语言!在履行其职责时，宇宙便会继续将其梦境分割为幻影般的个体；正如它起初不得不将其各部分隔离开来，以便自由地支配和转化它们，它也将始终

continue to insulate them, so as not to lose its cross-vistas and its mobility. There is no reason, then, why individuals should not live for ever. But a condition seems to be involved which may well make belief stagger. It would be impossible for the universe to divide its images into particular minds unless it preserved the images of their particular bodies also. Particular minds arise, according to this philosophy, in the interests of practice: which means, biologically, to secure a better adjustment of the body to its environment, so that it may survive. Mystically, too, the fundamental force is a half-conscious purpose that practice, or freedom, should come to be; or rather, that an apparition or experience of practice and freedom should arise; for in this philosophy appearance is all. To secure this desirable apparition of practice special tasks are set to various nuclei in felt space (such, for instance, as the task to see), and the image of a body (in this case that of an eye) is gradually formed, in order to execute that task; for evidently the Absolute can see only if it looks, and to look it must first choose a point of view and an optical method. This point of view and this method posit the individual; they fix him in time and space, and determine the quality and range of his passive experience: they are his body. If the Absolute, then, wishes to retain the individual not merely as one of its memories but as one of its organs of practical life, it must begin by retaining the image of his body. His body must continue to figure in that landscape of nature which the absolute life, as it pulses, keeps always composing and recomposing. Otherwise a personal mind, a sketch of things made from the point of view and in the interests of that body, cannot be preserved.

M. Bergson, accordingly, should either tell us that our bodies are

继续使它们保持隔离，以免失去其交叉视野和流动性。因此，没有理由说个体不应永存。但似乎涉及一个条件，这个条件很可能使信仰动摇。宇宙若非也保存个体身体的意象，便不可能将其意象分配给各个特殊心灵。按照这一哲学，特殊心灵产生于实践的利益：这在生物学上意味着确保身体对其环境有更好的适应，以便它能存活。从神秘主义角度看，根本力量也是一种半自觉的目的，即实践或自由应当产生；或者更确切地说，实践和自由的显现或经验应当产生；因为在这一哲学中，显现就是一切。为确保实践这一可欲的显现，各种任务被分配给可感空间中的各个核心(例如看的任务)，而一个身体的意象(在此情形下是一只眼睛的意象)逐渐形成，以执行该任务；因为显然，绝对只有观看才能看见，而要观看它必须首先选择一个视角和一种光学方法。这一视角和这一方法设定了个体；它们将个体固定在时间和空间中，并决定其被动经验的性质和范围：它们就是他的身体。因此，如果绝对想要保留个体，不仅作为其记忆之一，而且作为其实践生活的器官之一，它就必须首先保留其身体的意象。他的身体必须继续出现在自然的那幅风景中，而绝对生命在搏动时始终在构成和重新构成那幅风景。否则，一个个人心灵--从那个身体的角度并为其利益而对事物所作的素描--便不能被保存。

因此，柏格森先生应当要么告诉我们，我们的身体是

going to rise again, or he should not tell us, or give us to understand, that our minds are going to endure. I suppose he cannot venture to preach the resurrection of the body to this weak-kneed generation; he is too modern and plausible for that. Yet he is too amiable to deny to our dilated nostrils some voluptuous whiffs of immortality. He asks if we are not "led to suppose" that consciousness passes through matter to be tempered like steel, to constitute distinct personalities, and prepare them for a higher existence. Other animal minds are but human minds arrested; men at last (what men, I wonder?) are "capable of remembering all and willing all and controlling their past and their future," so that "we shall have no repugnance in admitting that in man, though perhaps in man alone, consciousness pursues its path beyond this earthly life." Elsewhere he says, in a phrase already much quoted and perhaps destined to be famous, that in man the spirit can "spurn every kind of resistance and break through many an obstacle, perhaps even death." Here the tenor has ended on the inevitable high note, and the gallery is delighted. But was that the note set down for him in the music? And has he not sung it in falsetto?

将要复活，或者他不应告诉我们，或让我们理解，我们的心灵将要延续。我想他不敢向这软弱的一代宣讲身体的复活；他太现代、太合情合理了，不会那样做。然而他又太和蔼可亲，不至于拒绝给我们扩张的鼻孔一些不朽的淫逸气息。他问我们是否不“被引导去设想”意识穿过物质而被淬炼如钢，构成 distinct 的人格，并为更高的存在做准备。其他动物的心灵不过是受阻的人类心灵；人类最终(哪些人类，我纳闷?)“能够记忆一切、意愿一切并控制其过去和未来”，因此“我们将不会不愿承认，在人身上，也许仅在人身上，意识沿着其道路超越了这尘世生命。”他在别处说--用一句已被广泛引用、也许注定要出名的话--在人身上，精神能够“蔑视一切抵抗，冲破许多障碍，也许甚至冲破死亡。”至此，主旨已结束于那不可避免的高音上，顶层楼座的观众欣喜若狂。但那是否就是乐谱上为他写下的音符?他难道不是用假声唱的吗?

The immediate knows nothing about death; it takes intelligence to conceive it; and that perhaps is why M. Bergson says so little about it, and that little so far from serious. But he talks a great deal about life, he feels he has penetrated deeply into its nature; and yet death, together with birth, is the natural analysis of what life is. What is this creative purpose, that must wait for sun and rain to set it in motion? What is this life, that in any individual can be suddenly extinguished by a bullet? What is this *elan-vital*, that a little fall in temperature would banish altogether from the

直接经验对死亡一无所知；构想死亡需要智力；也许这就是为什么柏格森先生对此谈得如此之少，而且那一点点谈论也远非严肃。但他大谈生命，他觉得自己已深入其本质；然而死亡，连同出生，正是对生命之所是的自然分析。这个创造性的目的究竟是什么，竟必须等待阳光和雨露来启动它?这个生命究竟是什么，在任何个体中竟能被一颗子弹突然熄灭?这个*elan-vital*究竟是什么，温度稍降便会将其从

universe? The study of death may be out of fashion, but it is never out of season. The omission of this, which is almost the omission of wisdom from philosophy, warns us that in M. Bergson's thought we have something occasional and partial, the work of an astute apologist, a party man, driven to desperate speculation by a timid attachment to prejudice. Like other terrified idealisms, the system of M. Bergson has neither good sense, nor rigour, nor candour, nor solidity. It is a brilliant attempt to confuse the lessons of experience by refining upon its texture, an attempt to make us halt, for the love of primitive illusions, in the path of discipline and reason. It is likely to prove a successful attempt, because it flatters the weaknesses of the moment, expresses them with emotion, and covers them with a feint at scientific speculation. It is not, however, a powerful system, like that of Hegel, capable of bewildering and obsessing many who have no natural love for shams. M. Bergson will hardly bewilder; his style is too clear, the field where his just observations lie—the immediate—is too well defined, and the mythology which results from projecting the terms of the immediate into the absolute, and turning them into powers, is too obviously verbal. He will not long impose on any save those who enjoy being imposed upon; but for a long time he may increase their number. His doctrine is indeed alluring. Instead of telling us, as a stern and contrite philosophy would, that the truth is remote, difficult, and almost undiscoverable by human efforts, that the universe is vast and unfathomable, yet that the knowledge of its ways is precious to our better selves, if we would not live befooled, this philosophy rather tells us that nothing is truer or more precious than our rudimentary consciousness, with its vague instincts and premonitions, that

宇宙中完全驱逐?对死亡的研究也许不合时尚，但它永远不会不合时宜。这一遗漏--几乎是哲学中对智慧的遗漏--警告我们，在柏格森先生的思想中，我们面对的是某种应时之作和片面之作，是一位精明的辩护者、一个党派人士的作品，他被对偏见的怯懦依附驱使而进行绝望的思辨。像其他惊恐的唯心论一样，柏格森先生的体系既无健全的判断力，也无严谨，也无坦率，也无坚实性。它是一次辉煌的尝试，通过精炼经验的纹理来混淆经验的教训，是一次试图让我们出于对原始幻觉的爱而在纪律和理性的道路上停步的尝试。它很可能被证明是一次成功的尝试，因为它迎合了当下的弱点，用情感表达这些弱点，并以科学思辨的假象掩盖它们。然而，它不是一个强大的体系，不像黑格尔的体系那样能够迷惑和纠缠许多并无天然爱好虚假之物的人。柏格森先生几乎不会使人迷惑；他的文风太清晰了，他的正确观察所在的领域--直接经验--太明确界定了，而将直接经验的术语投射到绝对之中并将它们转化为力量所产生的神话，又太明显是言辞上的了。他不会长久地欺骗任何人，除了那些乐于被欺骗的人；但在很长一段时间里，他可能增加这些人的数量。他的学说确实诱人。一种严峻而悔悟的哲学会告诉我们，真理是遥远的、困难的、几乎非人力所能发现的，宇宙是浩瀚而深不可测的，然而对其道路的认识对我们更好的自我来说是宝贵的，如果我们不愿被愚弄地活着的话；与此不同，这一哲学反倒告诉我们，没有什么比我们初级的意识及其模糊的本能和预感更真实或更宝贵的了，那

everything ideal is fictitious, and that the universe, at heart, is as palpitating and irrational as ourselves. Why then strain the inquiry? Why seek to dominate passion by understanding it? Rather live on; work, it matters little at what, and grow, it matters nothing in what direction. Exert your instinctive powers of vegetation and emotion; let your philosophy itself be a frank expression of this flux, the roar of the ocean in your little sea-shell, a momentary posture of your living soul, not a stark adoration of things reputed eternal.

一切理想的东西都是虚构的，而宇宙在根本上也和我们自己一样悸动不安、非理性。那么何必还要费力探究?何必试图通过知性来支配情感?不如活下去；工作，做什么无关紧要，成长，朝哪个方向也无关紧要。施展你本能的生长与情感之力；让你的哲学本身成为这种流变的坦率表达，成为你小小海螺壳中海洋的咆哮，成为你活着的灵魂的 momentary 姿态，而不是对所谓永恒之物的僵硬崇拜。

So the intellectual faithlessness and the material servility of the age are flattered together and taught to justify themselves theoretically. They cry joyfully, *non peccavi*, which is the modern formula for confession. M. Bergson's philosophy itself is a confession of a certain mystical rebellion and atavism in the contemporary mind. It will remain a beautiful monument to the passing moment, a capital film for the cinematography of history, full of psychological truth and of a kind of restrained sentimental piety. His thought has all the charm that can go without strength and all the competence that can go without mastery. This is not an age of mastery; it is confused with too much business; it has no brave simplicity. The mind has forgotten its proper function, which is to crown life by quickening it into intelligence, and thinks if it could only prove that it accelerated life, that might perhaps justify its existence; like a philosopher at sea who, to make himself useful, should blow into the sail.

因此，这个时代的智识上的无信仰与物质上的奴性被一并奉承，并被教导要在理论上为自己辩护。它们欢欣地高呼*non peccavi*，这是现代忏悔的公式。柏格森先生本人的哲学，就是当代心灵中某种神秘的反叛与返祖现象的忏悔。它将作为一座属于流逝瞬间的美丽纪念碑而留存，成为历史 cinematography 的一卷上佳胶片，充满心理学的真理与一种克制的感伤虔诚。他的思想具备一切无需力量即可拥有的魅力，以及一切无需精通即可具备的能力。这不是一个精通的时代；它被过多的实务所搅扰；它没有勇敢的单纯。心灵已遗忘其本分职能，即通过将生命激化为知性来为生命加冕，并且认为，只要它能证明自己加速了生命，那或许就能为其存在辩护；就像一个在海上、为使自己有用而应当向帆吹气的哲学家。

FOOTNOTES:

脚注：

[3] "Introduction a la Métaphysique." *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, Janvier, 1903.

[3] “形而上学导论。”《形而上学与道德评论》，1903年1月。

[4] *Matière et Mémoire*, p. 38.

[5] M. Bergson has shown at considerable length that the idea of non-existence is more complex, psychologically, than the idea of existence, and posterior to it. He evidently thinks this disposes of the reality of non-existence also: for it is the reality that he wishes to exorcise by his words. If, however, non-existence and the idea of non-existence were identical, it would have been impossible for me not to exist before I was born: my non-existence then would be more complex than my existence now, and posterior to it. The initiated would not recoil from this consequence, but it might open the eyes of some catechumens. It is a good test of the malicious theory of knowledge.

[6] This argument against mechanism is a good instance of the difficulties which mythological habits of mind import unnecessarily into science. An equilibrium would not displace itself! But an equilibrium is a natural result, not a magical entity. It is continually displaced, as its constituents are modified by internal movements or external agencies; and while many a time the equilibrium is thereby destroyed altogether, sometimes it is replaced by a more elaborate and perilous equilibrium; as glaciers carry many rocks down, but leave some, here and there, piled in the most unlikely pinnacles and pagodas.

IV

THE PHILOSOPHY OF MR. BERTRAND RUSSELL

[4] 《物质与记忆》，第38页。

[5] 柏格森先生已相当详尽地表明，非存在的观念在心理学上比存在的观念更为复杂，并且后于它。他显然认为这同时也处理掉了非存在的实在性：因为他想用他的言辞驱除的正是那实在性。然而，如果非存在与非存在的观念是同一的，那么在我出生之前我不存在就是不可能的：我那时的非存在就会比我现在的存在更为复杂，并且后于它。入门者不会因这一后果而退缩，但它或许能让某些初学者的眼睛睁开。这是对那恶意知识论的一个良好检验。

[6] 这一反对机械论的论证很好地说明了神话式思维习惯如何不必要地将困难引入科学。一个平衡状态不会自行移位!但平衡状态是一种自然结果，而非神奇的实体。它不断被移位，因为其构成成分被内部运动或外部作用所改变；尽管平衡状态多次因此被彻底破坏，有时它会被一种更复杂、更危险的平衡状态所取代；正如冰川携带许多岩石而下，却在此处或彼处留下一些，堆成最不可能的尖峰和宝塔。

IV

伯特兰·罗素先生的哲学

I. A NEW SCHOLASTICISM

In its chase after idols this age has not wholly forgotten the gods, and reason and faith in reason are not left without advocates. Some years ago, at Trinity College, Cambridge, Mr. G.E. Moore began to produce a very deep impression amongst the younger spirits by his powerful and luminous dialectic. Like Socrates, he used all the sharp arts of a disputant in the interests of common sense and of an almost archaic dogmatism. Those who heard him felt how superior his position was, both in rigour and in force, to the prevailing inversions and idealisms. The abuse of psychology, rampant for two hundred years, seemed at last to be detected and challenged; and the impressionistic rhetoric that philosophy was saturated with began to be squeezed out by clear questions, and by a disconcerting demand for literal sincerity. German idealism, when we study it as a product of its own age and country, is a most engaging phenomenon; it is full of afflatus, sweep, and deep searchings of heart; but it is essentially romantic and egotistical, and all in it that is not soliloquy is mere system-making and sophistry. Therefore when it is taught by unromantic people *ex cathedra,* in stentorian tones, and represented as the rational foundation of science and religion, with neither of which it has any honest sympathy, it becomes positively odious—one of the worst imposture and blights to which a youthful imagination could be subjected. It is chiefly against the incubus of this celestial monster that Mr. Moore dared to lift up his eyes; and many a less courageous or less clear-sighted person was thankful to him for it. But a man with such a mission requires a certain narrowness and concentration of mind; he has to be intolerant and to pound a good deal on the same notes. We need not wonder if Mr. Moore

一、新经院哲学

在追逐偶像的过程中，这个时代并未完全忘记诸神，理性以及对理性的信仰也并非没有拥护者。数年前，在剑桥大学三一学院，G.E.摩尔先生以其有力而明晰的辩证法开始在年轻心灵中产生极为深刻的印象。像苏格拉底一样，他为了常识和一种近乎古老的教义主义的利益，使用了论辩者的一切尖锐技艺。听过他讲话的人感到，他的立场在严格性和力量上都远胜于流行的颠倒和唯心论。心理学的滥用肆虐了两百年，似乎终于被察觉和挑战；哲学所浸透的印象主义修辞开始被清晰的问题以及对字面真诚的令人不安的要求所挤出。德国唯心论，当我们将其作为其自身时代和国家的产物来研究时，是一个极为引人入胜的现象；它充满灵感、气势和内心深处的研究；但它在本质上是浪漫的和自我中心的，其中一切非独白的东西都只是体系制造和诡辩。因此，当不浪漫的人以权威口吻、用洪亮声调讲授它，并将其表述为科学和宗教的理性基础--而它对这两者都没有任何诚实的同情--它变得正面可憎--是年轻想象所能遭受的最恶劣的欺骗和摧残之一。摩尔先生敢于抬起眼睛对抗的主要正是这个天上怪物的梦魇；许多勇气较小或眼光较不明亮的人为此感谢他。但一个有如此使命的人需要某种狭隘和心灵集中；他必须不宽容，并大量敲打同样的音符。我们不必奇怪，如果摩尔先生

has written rather meagerly, and with a certain vehemence and want of imagination.

All this, however, was more than made up by the powerful ally who soon came to his aid. Mr. Bertrand Russell began by adopting Mr. Moore's metaphysics, but he has given as much as he has received. Apart from his well-known mathematical attainments, he possesses by inheritance the political and historical mind, and an intrepid determination to pierce convention and look to ultimate things. He has written abundantly and, where the subject permits, with a singular lucidity, candour, and charm. Especially his *Philosophical Essays* and his little book on *The Problems of Philosophy* can be read with pleasure by any intelligent person, and give a tolerably rounded picture of the tenets of the school. Yet it must be remembered that Mr. Russell, like Mr. Moore, is still young and his thoughts have not assumed their ultimate form. Moreover, he lives in an atmosphere of academic disputation which makes one technical point after another acquire a preponderating influence in his thoughts. His book on *The Problems of Philosophy* is admirable in style, temper, and insight, but it hardly deserves its title; it treats principally, in a somewhat personal and partial way, of the relation of knowledge to its objects, and it might rather have been called "The problems which Moore and I have been agitating lately." Indeed, his philosophy is so little settled as yet that every new article and every fresh conversation revokes some of his former opinions, and places the crux of philosophical controversy at a new point. We are soon made aware that exact thinking and true thinking are not synonymous, but that one exact thought, in the same mind, may be the exact opposite of the next. This inconstancy, which after all

写得相当贫乏，带有某种激烈和缺乏想象。

然而，这一切都因一位强有力的盟友的及时援助而得到了远超补偿。伯特兰·罗素先生起初采纳了摩尔先生的形而上学，但他所给予的与他所接受的一样多。除了众所周知的数学造诣之外，他还通过继承而拥有政治与历史的心灵，以及一种无畏的决心，要穿透习俗、直视终极之物。他著述宏富，且在题材允许之处，具有非凡的明晰、坦率与魅力。尤其是他的哲学论文集以及他那本论哲学问题的小书，任何有识之士都能愉快地阅读，并能从中获得该学派信条的一个尚算完整的图景。然而必须记住，罗素先生与摩尔先生一样，仍然年轻，他的思想尚未采取其终极形态。此外，他生活于学术论辩的氛围之中，这使一个又一个技术要点在他的思想中获得压倒性的影响。他那本论哲学问题的书在风格、气质与洞见上都令人钦佩，但它几乎不配其标题；它主要以某种个人化且偏颇的方式处理知识与对象的关系，或许更应题为「摩尔与我近来所搅动的那些问题」。的确，他的哲学至今如此未定，以致每一篇新文章和每一次新的谈话都会撤销他先前的一些意见，并把哲学争论的症结置于一个新的点上。我们很快就意识到，精确的思想与真实的思想并非同义，而是在同一心灵中，一个精确的思想可能恰好是下一个精确思想的反面。这种反复无常--毕竟

does not go very deep, is a sign of sincerity and pure love of truth; it marks the freshness, the vivacity, the self-forgetfulness, the logical ardour belonging to this delightful reformer. It may seem a paradox, but at bottom it is not, that the vitalists should be oppressed, womanish, and mystical, and only the intellectualists keen, argumentative, fearless, and full of life. I mention this casualness and inconstancy in Mr. Russell's utterances not to deride them, but to show the reader how impossible it is, at this juncture, to give a comprehensive account of his philosophy, much less a final judgment upon it.

并不十分深刻--是真诚与对真理之纯粹热爱的标志；它标志着这位令人愉快的改革者所具有的新鲜、活力、忘我与逻辑的热忱。这看似悖论，但根本上并非悖论：活力论者应当是压抑的、女性气的、神秘的，而唯有理智主义者才是敏锐的、好辩的、无畏的、充满生气的。我提及罗素先生言论中的这种随意与反复无常，并非为了嘲弄它们，而是为了向读者表明，在此关头，要对其哲学作出全面的说明是多么不可能，更遑论对其作出最终的评判。

The principles most fundamental and dominant in his thought are perhaps the following: That the objects the mind deals with, whether material or ideal, are what and where the mind says they are, and independent of it; that some general principles and ideas have to be assumed to be valid not merely for thought but for things; that relations may subsist, arise, and disappear between things without at all affecting these things internally; and that the nature of everything is just what it is, and not to be confused either with its origin or with any opinion about it. These principles, joined with an obvious predilection for Plato and Leibnitz among philosophers, lead to the following doctrines, among others: that the mind or soul is an entity separate from its thoughts and pre-existent; that a material world exists in space and time; that its substantial elements may be infinite in number, having position and quality, but no extension, so that each mind or soul might well be one of them; that both the existent and the ideal worlds may be infinite, while the ideal world contains an infinity of things not realised in the actual world; and that this ideal world is knowable by a separate mental consideration, a

他思想中最根本、最主导的原则或许如下：心灵所处理的对象，无论是物质的还是观念的，都是心灵所说的那个样子、在心灵所说的那个地方，并且独立于心灵；某些一般原则与观念必须被假定为不仅对思想有效，而且对事物有效；关系可以在事物之间存续、产生和消失，而完全不在内部影响这些事物；每一事物的本性恰是其所是，既不可与其起源相混淆，也不可与关于它的任何意见相混淆。这些原则，加上对哲学家中柏拉图和莱布尼茨的明显偏爱，导致了以下诸学说：心灵或灵魂是一个与其思想相分离且先于其思想而存在的实体；一个物质世界存在于空间与时间之中；其实体性元素在数目上可能是无限的，具有位置与性质，但没有广延，因此每一个心灵或灵魂很可能就是其中之一；存在者世界与观念世界都可能是无限的，而观念世界包含着无限多未在现实世界中实现的事物；这个观念世界是可由一种分离的心灵考量来认识的，一种

consideration which is, however, empirical in spirit, since the ideal world of ethics, logic, and mathematics has a special and surprising constitution, which we do not make but must attentively discover.

The reader will perceive, perhaps, that if the function of philosophy is really, as the saying goes, to give us assurance of God, freedom, and immortality, Mr. Russell's philosophy is a dire failure. In fact, its author sometimes gives vent to a rather emphatic pessimism about this world; he has a keen sense for the manifold absurdities of existence. But the sense for absurdities is not without its delights, and Mr. Russell's satirical wit is more constant and better grounded than his despair. I should be inclined to say of his philosophy what he himself has said of that of Leibnitz, that it is at its best in those subjects which are most remote from human life. It needs to be very largely supplemented and much ripened and humanised before it can be called satisfactory or wise; but time may bring these fulfilments, and meantime I cannot help thinking it auspicious in the highest degree that, in a time of such impressionistic haste and plebeian looseness of thought, scholastic rigour should suddenly raise its head again, aspiring to seriousness, solidity, and perfection of doctrine: and this not in the interests of religious orthodoxy, but precisely in the most emancipated and unflinchingly radical quarter. It is refreshing and reassuring, after the confused, melodramatic ways of philosophising to which the idealists and the pragmatists have accustomed us, to breathe again the crisp air of scholastic common sense. It is good for us to be held down, as the Platonic Socrates would have held us, to saying what we really believe, and sticking to what we say. We seem to regain our

然而这一考量在精神上是经验性的，因为伦理学、逻辑和数学的理想世界具有一种特殊而令人惊讶的构造，这种构造并非我们所制造，而是我们必须专注地加以发现。

读者或许会察觉，如果哲学的功能真的如俗语所说，是给予我们对上帝、自由与不朽的保证，那么罗素先生的哲学便是一次可怕的失败。事实上，其作者有时对这个世界的悲观论调颇为激烈；他对存在的种种荒谬有着敏锐的感受。但对荒谬的感受并非没有其乐趣，而罗素先生的讽刺才智比他的绝望更为恒常、更有根据。我倾向于用他自己论莱布尼茨哲学的话来论他的哲学：它在那些最远离人类生活的主题上处于最佳状态。它需要被极大地补充、充分地成熟与人化，才能被称为令人满意或明智的；但时间可能带来这些圆满，而与此同时，我不禁认为，在这样一个充满印象主义式匆忙与庸俗思想松散的時代，经院式的严谨竟能重新抬起头来，追求学说的严肃、坚实与完善，这在最高程度上是吉祥的征兆：而且这并非出于宗教正统的利益，而恰恰是在最解放、最不屈不挠地激进的那一方。在唯心论者与实用主义者使我们习以为常的那种混乱、情节剧式的哲学化方式之后，重新呼吸到经院式常识的清爽空气，令人耳目一新、令人安心。让我们被按住--如柏拉图式的苏格拉底会按住我们那样--说出我们真正相信的东西，并坚持我们所说的话，这对我们有好处。我们似乎重新获得了我们的

intellectual birthright when we are allowed to declare our genuine intent, even in philosophy, instead of begging some kind psychologist to investigate our "meaning" for us, or even waiting for the flux of events to endow us with what "meaning" it will. It is also instructive to have the ethical attitude purified of all that is not ethical and turned explicitly into what, in its moral capacity, it essentially is: a groundless pronouncement upon the better and the worse.

当我们被允许宣告我们真正的意图时--即使在哲学中也是如此--而不是乞求某位好心的心理学家为我们探究我们的"意义"，甚至等待事件的流变赋予我们它所愿意赋予的"意义"，这便是我们的智识天赋权利。将伦理态度净化掉一切非伦理的成分，并明确地将其转化为它在道德能力上本质上所是的东西，这也是有教益的：一种对较好与较坏的毫无根据的宣告。

Here a certain one-sidedness begins to make itself felt in Mr. Russell's views. The ethical attitude doubtless has no *ethical* ground, but that fact does not prevent it from having a *natural* ground; and the observer of the animate creation need not have much difficulty in seeing what that natural ground is. Mr. Russell, however, refuses to look also in that direction. He insists, rightly enough, that good is predicated categorically by the conscience; he will not remember that all life is not moral bias merely, and that, in the very act of recognising excellence and pursuing it, we may glance back over our shoulder and perceive how our moral bias is conditioned, and what basis it has in the physical order of things. This backward look, when the hand is on the plough, may indeed confuse our ethical self-expression, both in theory and in practice; and I am the last to deny the need of insisting, in ethics, on ethical judgments in all their purity and dogmatic sincerity. Such insistence, if we had heard more of it in our youth, might have saved many of us from chronic entanglements; and there is nothing, next to Plato, which ought to be more recommended to the young philosopher than the teachings of Messrs. Russell and Moore, if he wishes to be a moralist and a logician, and not merely to seem one. Yet this salutary doctrine, though correct, is

在此，某种片面性开始在罗素先生的观点中显现出来。伦理态度无疑没有伦理的根据，但这一事实并不妨碍它具有自然的根据；而观察有生命之造物的人，要看出那自然根据是什么，想必不会有多大困难。然而，罗素先生拒绝也朝那个方向看。他颇为正确地坚持，善是由良心绝对地断定的；他不愿记住，并非一切生命都仅仅是道德偏向，而且，在承认卓越并追求卓越的同一行为中，我们可能回头一瞥，察觉我们的道德偏向是如何被制约的，以及它在事物的物理秩序中有什么基础。这种回头一瞥，当手扶在犁上时，确实可能搅乱我们的伦理自我表达，无论在理论上还是在实践上；而我绝不否认在伦理学中需要坚持伦理判断的全部纯粹性与教条式的真诚。这种坚持，如果我们在年轻时多听到一些，或许会使我们许多人免于长期的纠缠；而且，仅次于柏拉图，最应当推荐给年轻哲学家的，莫过于罗素先生与摩尔先生的教导，如果他希望成为一个道德家和一个逻辑学家，而不仅仅是显得如此。然而，这一有益的学说，尽管正确，却是

inadequate. It is a monocular philosophy, seeing outlines clear, but missing the solid bulk and perspective of things. We need binocular vision to quicken the whole mind and yield a full image of reality. Ethics should be controlled by a physics that perceives the material ground and the relative status of whatever is moral. Otherwise ethics itself tends to grow narrow, strident, and fanatical; as may be observed in asceticism and puritanism, or, for the matter of that, in Mr. Moore's uncivilised leaning towards the doctrine of retributive punishment, or in Mr. Russell's intolerance of selfishness and patriotism, and in his refusal to entertain any pious reverence for the nature of things. The quality of wisdom, like that of mercy, is not strained. To choose, to love and hate, to have a moral life, is inevitable and legitimate in the part; but it is the function of the part as part, and we must keep it in its place if we wish to view the whole in its true proportions. Even to express justly the aim of our own life we need to retain a constant sympathy with what is animal and fundamental in it, else we shall give a false place, and too loud an emphasis, to our definitions of the ideal. However, it would be much worse not to reach the ideal at all, or to confuse it for want of courage and sincerity in uttering our true mind; and it is in uttering our true mind that Mr. Russell can help us, even if our true mind should not always coincide with his.

是不充分的。这是一种单眼哲学，看清轮廓，却错失了事物的坚实体积与透视。我们需要双眼视觉来激活整个心灵，并产生现实的完整图像。伦理学应当受一种物理学的支配，这种物理学感知物质基础以及任何道德之物的相对地位。否则，伦理学本身倾向于变得狭隘、尖锐和狂热；正如在禁欲主义和清教主义中所能观察到的那样，或者，就此而言，在摩尔先生对报应惩罚学说的不文明倾向中，或在罗素先生对自私和爱国主义的不宽容中，以及在他拒绝对事物本性抱有任何虔诚敬畏中。智慧的品质，如同怜悯的品质一样，不是勉强的。选择、爱和恨、过一种道德生活，在部分中是不可避免且正当的；但这是部分作为部分的功能，如果我们想按其真实比例观看整体，就必须把它保持在适当位置。甚至为了公正地表达我们自己生活的目标，我们也需要对其中的动物性和基本性保持持续同情，否则我们就会对我们关于理想的定义给予错误的位置和过于响亮的强调。然而，根本达不到理想，或由于缺乏勇气和真诚来表达我们真实心灵而混淆理想，那会糟糕得多；而正是在表达我们真实心灵方面，罗素先生能帮助我们，即使我们的真实心灵并不总是与他的一致。

In the following pages I do not attempt to cover all Mr. Russell's doctrine (the deeper mathematical purls of it being beyond my comprehension), and the reader will find some speculations of my own interspersed in what I report of his. I merely traverse after him three subjects that seem of imaginative interest, to indicate the inspiration and the imprudence, as I think them, of this young

在以下篇幅中，我并不试图涵盖罗素先生的全部学说(其中较深的数学部分超出我的理解)，读者将在我的报告中发现穿插其中的一些我自己的思辨。我仅仅是跟随他遍历三个似乎具有想象趣味的主题，以指出这位年轻

philosophy.

II. THE STUDY OF ESSENCE

"The solution of the difficulties which formerly surrounded the mathematical infinite is probably," says Mr. Russell, "the greatest achievement of which our own age has to boast.... It was assumed as self-evident, until Cantor and Dedekind established the opposite, that if, from any collection of things, some were taken away, the number of things left must always be less than the original number of things. This assumption, as a matter of fact, holds only of finite collections; and the rejection of it, where the infinite is concerned, has been shown to remove all the difficulties that hitherto baffled human reason in this matter." And he adds in another place: "To reconcile us, by the exhibition of its awful beauty, to the reign of Fate ... is the task of tragedy. But mathematics takes us still further from what is human, into the region of absolute necessity, to which not only the actual world, but every possible world, must conform; and even here it builds a habitation, or rather finds a habitation eternally standing, where our ideals are fully satisfied and our best hopes are not thwarted. It is only when we thoroughly understand the entire independence of ourselves, which belongs to this world that reason finds, that we can adequately realise the profound importance of its beauty."

Mathematics seems to have a value for Mr. Russell akin to that of religion. It affords a sanctuary to which to flee from the world, a heaven suffused with a serene radiance and full of a peculiar sweetness and consolation. "Real life," he writes, "is to most men a long second-best, a perpetual compromise between the ideal and the possible; but the world of pure reason knows no compromise,

哲学。

II.本质的研究

“从前围绕数学无限性的种种困难的解决，或许，”罗素先生说，“是我们这个时代引以为豪的最伟大成就……直到康托尔和戴德金确立了相反结论之前，这一点一直被假定为自明的：如果从任何事物集合中取走一些，剩下的事物的数目必定总是少于原来事物的数目。事实上，这一假定只适用于有限集合；而在涉及无限的地方，拒绝这一假定已被表明消除了迄今使人类理性在此问题上受挫的所有困难。”他还在另一处补充说：“通过展示其令人敬畏的美，使我们与命运之统治和解……是悲剧的任务。但数学把我们带得离人类更远，带入绝对必然性的领域，不仅实际世界，而且每一个可能世界，都必须服从这一领域；甚至在这里，它也建造了一个居所，或者更确切地说，发现了一个永恒矗立的居所，在那里我们的理想得到充分满足，我们最好的希望不会受挫。只有当我们彻底理解属于这个由理性发现的世界的那种完全独立于我们自身时，我们才能充分认识到其美的深刻重要性。”

数学对罗素先生似乎具有一种类似于宗教的价值。它提供了一个避难所，可以从中逃离世界，一个弥漫着宁静光辉、充满一种奇特甜美与慰藉的天堂。"现实生活"，他写道，"对大多数人而言是一个漫长的次优选择，是理想与可能之间永恒的妥协；但纯粹理性的世界不知妥协，

no practical limitations, no barrier to the creative activity embodying in splendid edifices the passionate aspiration after the perfect from which all great work springs. Remote from human passions, remote even from the pitiful laws of nature, the generations have gradually created an ordered cosmos where pure thought can dwell as in its natural home, and where one, at least, of our nobler impulses can escape from the dreary exile of the actual world." This study is one of "those elements in human life which merit a place in heaven." "The true spirit of delight, the exaltation, the sense of being more than man, which is the touchstone of the highest excellence, is to be found in mathematics as surely as in poetry."

没有实际限制，没有障碍阻止创造性活动在辉煌建筑中体现对完美的那种激情渴望，一切伟大作品都源于这种渴望。远离人类激情，甚至远离可怜的自然法则，一代代人逐渐创造了一个有序的宇宙，在那里纯粹思想可以像在其自然家园中一样栖居，在那里我们至少有一种更高贵的冲动可以逃离实际世界的凄凉流放。”这项研究是“人类生活中那些值得在天堂占有一席之地的要素”之一。“真正的愉悦精神、那种升华、那种超越人之为人的感觉，是最高卓越的试金石，在数学中正如在诗歌中一样确实可以找到。”

This enthusiastic language might have, I should think, an opposite effect upon some readers to that which Mr. Russell desires. It might make them suspect that the claim to know an absolute ideal necessity, so satisfying to one of our passionate impulses, might be prompted by the same conceit, and subject to the same illusion, as the claim to know absolute truth in religion. Beauty, when attributed to necessary relations between logical entities, casts a net of subjectivity over them; and at this net the omnivorous empiricist might be tempted to haul, until he fancied he had landed the whole miraculous draught of fishes. The fish, however, would have slipped through the meshes; and it would be only his own vital emotion, projected for a moment into the mathematical world, that he would be able to draw back and hug to his bosom. Eternal truth is as disconsolate as it is consoling, and as dreary as it is interesting: these moral values are, in fact, values which the activity of contemplating that sort of truth has for different minds; and it is no congruous homage offered to ideal necessity, but

我认为，这种热情洋溢的语言对某些读者可能产生与罗素先生所期望的相反效果。它可能使他们怀疑，那种声称认识一种绝对理想必然性--如此满足我们某种激情冲动--的主张，可能出于同样的自负，并受同样的幻觉支配，正如在宗教中声称认识绝对真理一样。当美被归因于逻辑实体之间的必然关系时，就给它们罩上了一张主体性之网；而无所不吃的经验主义者可能会被引诱去拉这张网，直到他幻想自己已经捞起了那整网奇迹般的鱼。然而，鱼会从网眼中滑脱；他能拉回来并抱在胸前的，只会是他自己的生命情感，暂时投射到数学世界中。永恒真理既令人慰藉又令人沮丧，既有趣又沉闷：事实上，这些道德价值是沉思那种真理的活动对不同心灵所具有的价值；而称它美或善，并不是对理想必然性献上的相称敬意，而

merely a private endearment, to call it beautiful or good. The case is not such as if we were dealing with existence. Existence is arbitrary; it is a questionable thing needing justification; and we, at least, cannot justify it otherwise than by taking note of some affinity which it may show to human aspirations. Therefore our private endearments, when we call some existing thing good or beautiful, are not impertinent; they assign to this chance thing its only assignable excuse for being, namely, the service it may chance to render to the spirit. But ideal necessity or, what is the same thing, essential possibility has its excuse for being in itself, since it is not contingent or questionable at all. The affinity which the human mind may develop to certain provinces of essence is adventitious to those essences, and hardly to be mentioned in their presence. It is something the mind has acquired, and may lose. It is an incident in the life of reason, and no inherent characteristic of eternal necessity.

仅仅是一种私人的爱慕。情况并不像我们在处理存在时那样。存在是任意的；它是一个可疑之物，需要辩护；而我们至少不能以别的方式为它辩护，只能注意它可能显示出的与人类渴望的某种亲和性。因此，当我们称某个存在物为善或美时，我们的私人爱慕并非不恰当；它们赋予这个偶然之物唯一可指定的存在理由，即它可能偶然为精神提供的服务。但理想必然性，或者同一回事，本质可能性，其存在理由在自身之中，因为它根本不是偶然的或可疑的。人类心灵可能对某些本质领域发展出的亲和性，对那些本质而言是外在的，在它们面前几乎不值得一提。这是心灵已经获得、也可能失去的东西。它是理性生活中的一个事件，而不是永恒必然性的固有特征。

The realm of essence contains the infinite multitude of Leibnitz's possible worlds, many of these worlds being very small and simple, and consisting merely of what might be presented in some isolated moment of feeling. If any such feeling, however, or its object, never in fact occurs, the essence that it would have presented if it had occurred remains possible merely; so that nothing can ever exist in nature or for consciousness which has not a prior and independent locus in the realm of essence. When a man lights upon a thought or is interested in tracing a relation, he does not introduce those objects into the realm of essence, but merely selects them from the plenitude of what lies there eternally. The ground of this selection lies, of course, in his human nature and circumstances; and the satisfaction he may find in so

本质的领域包含着莱布尼茨诸可能世界的无限杂多，其中许多世界非常微小而简单，仅仅由可能在某个孤立的感受瞬间被呈现的东西所构成。然而，如果任何这样的感受或其对象事实上从未发生，那么它若发生便会呈现的本质就仍然仅仅是可能的；因此，在自然中或对意识而言，任何东西都不可能存在，除非它在本质的领域中拥有一个先在而独立的位置。当一个人偶然想到一个思想，或对追踪某种关系产生兴趣时，他并不是把这些对象引入本质的领域，而只是从永恒地存在于那里的丰盈之中选取它们。这种选取的根据，当然在于他的人性和处境；而他在如此

exercising his mind will be a consequence of his mental disposition and of the animal instincts beneath. Two and two would still make four if I were incapable of counting, or if I found it extremely painful to do so, or if I thought it naive and pre-Kantian of these numbers not to combine in a more vital fashion, and make five. So also, if I happen to enjoy counting, or to find the constancy of numbers sublime, and the reversibility of the processes connecting them consoling, in contrast to the irrevocable flux of living things, all this is due to my idiosyncrasy. It is no part of the essence of numbers to be congenial to me; but it has perhaps become a part of my genius to have affinity to them.

运用其心灵时可能获得的满足，将是他心智禀赋以及其下动物本能的结果。即使我无法计数，或者觉得计数极其痛苦，或者认为这些数字不以更具生命力的方式结合并得出五乃是幼稚且前康德的，二加二仍然等于四。同样，如果我碰巧享受计数，或者觉得数字的恒常性崇高，觉得连接它们的过程之可逆性令人慰藉--与活物那不可挽回的流变相对照--这一切都归因于我的特异体质。与我和睦相处并非数字之本质的一部分；但对我而言，与它们有亲和力或许已成为我的天赋的一部分。

And how, may I ask, has it become a part of my genius? Simply because nature, of which I am a part, and to which all my ideas must refer if they are to be relevant to my destiny, happens to have mathematical form. Nature had to have some form or other, if it was to exist at all; and whatever form it had happened to take would have had its prior place in the realm of essence, and its essential and logical relations there. That particular part of the realm of essence which nature chances to exemplify or to suggest is the part that may be revealed to me, and that is the predestined focus of all my admirations. Essence as such has no power to reveal itself, or to take on existence; and the human mind has no power or interest to trace all essence. Even the few essences which it has come to know, it cannot undertake to examine exhaustively; for there are many features nestling in them, and many relations radiating from them, which no one needs or cares to attend to. The implications which logicians and mathematicians actually observe in the terms they use are a small selection from all those

那么，请问，它如何成为我的天赋的一部分?仅仅因为自然--我是自然的一部分，而我的一切观念若要与我命运相关就必须参照自然--碰巧具有数学形式。自然若要存在，就必须具有某种形式或别的形式；而无论它碰巧采取何种形式，该形式都会在本质的领域中拥有其先在的位置，并在那里拥有其本质的和逻辑的关系。本质领域中自然碰巧例示或暗示的那个特定部分，就是可能向我揭示的部分，也是我一切赞赏之 predestined 焦点。本质本身没有力量揭示自身，或取得存在；而人的心灵也没有力量或兴趣去追踪一切本质。即便是它已然认识的那少数诸本质，它也无法承担对其加以详尽无遗的考察；因为其中潜藏着许多特征，并从它们辐射出许多关系，而没有人需要或愿意去关注。逻辑学家和数学家实际上在他们所使用的词项中观察到的蕴涵，只是所有那些蕴涵中的一小部分选取

that really obtain, even in their chosen field; so that, for instance, as Mr. Russell was telling us, it was only the other day that Cantor and Dedekind observed that although time continually eats up the days and years, the possible future always remains as long as it was before. This happens to be a fact interesting to mankind. Apart from the mathematical puzzles it may help to solve, it opens before existence a vista of perpetual youth, and the vital stress in us leaps up in recognition of its inmost ambition. Many other things are doubtless implied in infinity which, if we noticed them, would leave us quite cold; and still others, no doubt, are inapprehensible with our sort and degree of intellect. There is of course nothing in essence which an intellect postulated *ad hoc* would not be able to apprehend; but the kind of intellect we know of and possess is an expression of vital adjustments, and is tethered to nature.

真正获得的，即便在他们选定的领域内；因此，举例来说，正如罗素先生告诉我们的，直到不久前，康托尔和戴德金才注意到，尽管时间不断吞噬着日子和岁月，可能的未来却始终如从前一样长。这恰好是一个对人类有趣的事实。除了它可能帮助解决的数学谜题之外，它为存在展开了一幅永恒青春的远景，而我们内在的生命力跃起，认出了它最深的抱负。无疑，无限中还蕴含着许多其他东西，如果我们注意到它们，会让我们完全无动于衷；还有另一些东西，无疑是我们这种类型和程度的智力所无法理解的。当然，在本质中没有任何东西是一个专门假设的智力所不能理解的；但我们所知并拥有的那种智力是生命调整的表达，被拴系于自然。

That a few eternal essences, then, with a few of their necessary relations to one another, do actually appear to us, and do fascinate our attention and excite our wonder, is nothing paradoxical. This is merely what was bound to happen, if we became aware of anything at all; for the essence embodied in anything is eternal and has necessary relations to some other essences. The air of presumption which there might seem to be in proclaiming that mathematics reveals what has to be true always and everywhere, vanishes when we remember that everything that is true of any essence is true of it always and everywhere. The most trivial truths of logic are as necessary and eternal as the most important; so that it is less of an achievement than it sounds when we say we have grasped a truth that is eternal and necessary.

那么，少数永恒的本质，连同它们彼此之间的一些必然关系，确实实际地出现在我们面前，确实吸引我们的注意并激起我们的惊奇，这并没有什么悖谬之处。这仅仅是，如果我们意识到任何事物的话，就必然会发生的事情；因为体现在任何事物中的本质都是永恒的，并且与某些其他本质具有必然的关系。宣称数学揭示了在任何地方任何时候都必然为真的东西，这其中可能显得有一种冒昧的气息，但当我们记得，关于任何本质为真的一切，在任何地方任何时候都为真时，这种气息便消失了。逻辑中最琐碎的真理与最重要的真理一样必然和永恒；因此，当我们说我们把握了一个永恒而必然的真理时，这并不像听起来那样是一项了不起的成就。

This fact will be more clearly recognised, perhaps, if we remember that the cogency of our ideal knowledge follows upon our intent in fixing its object. It hangs on a virtual definition, and explicates it. We cannot oblige anybody or anything to reproduce the idea which we have chosen; but that idea will remain the idea it is whether forgotten or remembered, exemplified or not exemplified in things. To penetrate to the foundation of being is possible for us only because the foundation of being is distinguishable quality; were there no set of differing characteristics, one or more of which an existing thing might appropriate, existence would be altogether impossible. The realm of essence is merely the system or chaos of these fundamental possibilities, the catalogue of all exemplifiable natures; so that any experience whatsoever must tap the realm of essence, and throw the light of attention on one of its constituent forms. This is, if you will, a trivial achievement; what would be really a surprising feat, and hardly to be credited, would be that the human mind should grasp the *constitution of nature*; that is, should discover which is the particular essence, or the particular system of essences, which actual existence illustrates. In the matter of physics, truly, we are reduced to skimming the surface, since we have to start from our casual experiences, which form the most superficial stratum of nature, and the most unstable. Yet these casual experiences, while they leave us so much in the dark as to their natural basis and environment, necessarily reveal each its ideal object, its specific essence; and we need only arrest our attention upon it, and define it to ourselves, for an eternal possibility, and some of its intrinsic characters, to have been revealed to our thought.

Whatever, then, a man's mental and moral habit might be, it

也许，如果我们记得，我们理想知识的说服力取决于我们确定其对象时的意图，这一事实就会得到更清楚的承认。它依赖于一个虚拟的定义，并阐释该定义。我们不能强迫任何人或任何事物复制我们所选择的观念；但那个观念将保持其为那个观念，无论被遗忘还是被记住，无论在事物中被例示还是未被例示。我们之所以能够深入到存在的基础，仅仅是因为存在的基础是可区分的性质；如果没有一组不同的特征--其中一个或多个可能被一个存在物所占有--存在就完全不可能。本质的领域仅仅是这些基本可能性的系统或混沌，是所有可例示本性的目录；因此，任何经验 whatsoever 都必须触及本质的领域，并将注意之光投射到其构成形式之一上。如果你愿意，这是一项微不足道的成就；真正令人惊讶的壮举，几乎令人难以置信的，将是人类心灵把握自然的构造；也就是说，发现实际存在所例示的是哪一个特定的本质，或哪一个特定的本质系统。在物理学的事务中，确实，我们被迫只浮于表面，因为我们不得不从我们偶然的经验出发，而这些经验构成了自然最表层的、最不稳定的层面。然而，这些偶然的经验，尽管在它们的自然基础和环境方面让我们如此茫然，却必然各自揭示其理想对象，其特定的本质；我们只需将注意力停留在它上面，为我们自己定义它，一个永恒的可能性及其一些内在特征就已经被揭示给我们的思想了。

无论一个人的心智与道德习惯如何，它

would perforce have affinity to some essence or other; his life would revolve about some congenial ideal object; he would find some sorts of form, some types of relation, more visible, beautiful, and satisfying than others. Mr. Russell happens to have a mathematical genius, and to find comfort in laying up his treasures in the mathematical heaven. It would be highly desirable that this temperament should be more common; but even if it were universal it would not reduce mathematical essence to a product of human attention, nor raise the "beauty" of mathematics to part of its essence. I do not mean to suggest that Mr. Russell attempts to do the latter; he speaks explicitly of the *value* of mathematical study, a point in ethics and not directly in logic; yet his moral philosophy is itself so much assimilated to logic that the distinction between the two becomes somewhat dubious; and as Mr. Russell will never succeed in convincing us that moral values are independent of life, he may, quite against his will, lead us to question the independence of essence, with that blind gregarious drift of all ideas, in this direction or in that, which is characteristic of human philosophising.

III. THE CRITIQUE OF PRAGMATISM

The time has not yet come when a just and synthetic account of what is called pragmatism can be expected of any man. The movement is still in a nebulous state, a state from which, perhaps, it is never destined to issue. The various tendencies that compose it may soon cease to appear together; each may detach itself and be lost in the earlier system with which it has most affinity. A good critic has enumerated "Thirteen Pragmatisms;" and besides

必然与某种本质具有亲和力；他的生活将围绕某个相投的理想对象运转；他会发现某些形式、某些关系类型比其他更可见、更美、更令人满足。罗素先生恰好具有数学天赋，并在将他的宝藏储存在数学天堂中找到慰藉。这种气质能更为普遍将是极为可取的；但即使它变得普遍，也不会将数学本质还原为人类注意力的产物，也不会将数学的“美”提升为其本质的一部分。我并非暗示罗素先生试图做后者；他明确谈到数学研究的价值，这是伦理学中的一个要点，而非直接属于逻辑；然而他的道德哲学本身如此多地同化于逻辑，以至于两者之间的区分变得有些可疑；并且，由于罗素先生永远无法使我们相信道德价值独立于生命，他可能完全违背自己的意愿，引导我们质疑本质的独立性，伴随着所有观念那种盲目的群集漂移，朝这个方向或那个方向，这正是人类哲学化的特征。

III.对实用主义的批判

对所谓实用主义作出公正而综合的阐述的时代尚未到来，任何人也无法指望做到这一点。这场运动仍处于一种模糊不清的状态，也许它注定永远无法走出这种状态。构成它的各种倾向可能很快就会不再一同出现；每一种倾向都可能脱离出去，消融在与之最为亲缘的较早体系之中。一位优秀的批评家已经列举出“十三个实用主义”；此外

such distinguishable tenets, there are in pragmatism echoes of various popular moral forces, like democracy, impressionism, love of the concrete, respect for success, trust in will and action, and the habit of relying on the future, rather than on the past, to justify one's methods and opinions. Most of these things are characteristically American; and Mr. Russell touches on some of them with more wit than sympathy. Thus he writes: "The influence of democracy in promoting pragmatism is visible in almost every page of William James's writing. There is an impatience of authority, an unwillingness to condemn widespread prejudices, a tendency to decide philosophical questions by putting them to a vote, which contrast curiously with the usual dictatorial tone of philosophic writings.... A thing which simply is true, whether you like it or not, is to him as hateful as a Russian autocracy; he feels that he is escaping from a prison, made not by stone walls but by 'hard facts,' when he has humanised truth, and made it, like the police force in a democracy, the servant of the people instead of their master. The democratic temper pervades even the religion of the pragmatists; they have the religion they have chosen, and the traditional reverence is changed into satisfaction with their own handiwork. 'The prince of darkness,' James says, 'may be a gentleman, as we are told he is, but whatever the God of earth and heaven is, he can surely be no gentleman,' He is rather, we should say, conceived by pragmatists as an elected president, to whom we give a respect which is really a tribute to the wisdom of our own choice. A government in which we have no voice is repugnant to the democratic temper. William James carries up to heaven the revolt of his New England ancestors: the Power to which we can yield respect must be a

这些可区分的信条，在实用主义中回响着各种流行的道德力量，如民主、印象主义、对具体之物的热爱、对成功的尊重、对意志和行动的信任，以及依赖未来而非过去来证明一个人的方法和意见的习惯。其中大部分是典型的美国式的；罗素先生以更多的机智而非同情触及了其中一些。因此他写道：“民主在促进实用主义方面的影响在威廉·詹姆斯的写作中几乎每一页都可见。有一种对权威的不耐烦，一种不愿谴责广泛偏见的意愿，一种通过将哲学问题付诸投票来决定它们的倾向，这与哲学著作通常的独断语气形成奇特的对比……一件仅仅为真的事情，无论你喜欢与否，对他而言如同俄罗斯专制一样可恨；他感到自己正在逃离一座监狱，这座监狱不是由石墙而是由‘硬事实’构成的，当他将真理人性化，并使之像民主中的警察力量一样，成为人民的仆人而非主人。民主气质甚至渗透到实用主义者的宗教中；他们拥有他们选择的宗教，传统的敬畏转变为对自己手工制品的满足。‘黑暗王子，’詹姆斯说，‘可能是一位绅士，正如我们被告知的那样，但无论天地间的上帝是什么，他肯定不可能是一位绅士。’我们应当说，他被实用主义者构想为一位当选的总统，我们给予他的尊重实际上是对我们自己选择之智慧的致敬。一个我们没有发言权的政府是与民主气质相抵触的。威廉·詹姆斯将他新英格兰祖先的反叛带到了天堂：我们能够对其表示尊重的力量必须是一个

George Washington rather than a George III."

A point of fundamental importance, about which pragmatists have been far from clear, and perhaps not in agreement with one another, is the sense in which their psychology is to be taken. "The facts that fill the imaginations of pragmatists," Mr. Russell writes, "are psychical facts; where others might think of the starry heavens, pragmatists think of the perception of the starry heavens; where others think of God, pragmatists think of the belief in God, and so on. In discussing the sciences, they never think, like scientific specialists, about the facts upon which scientific theories are based; they think about the theories themselves. Thus their initial question and their habitual imaginative background are both psychological." This is so true that unless we make the substitution into psychic terms instinctively, the whole pragmatic view of things will seem paradoxical, if not actually unthinkable. For instance, pragmatists might protest against the accusation that "they never think about the facts upon which scientific theories are based," for they lay a great emphasis on facts. Facts are the cash which the credit of theories hangs upon. Yet this protest, though sincere, would be inconclusive, and in the end it would illustrate Mr. Russell's observation, rather than refute it. For we should presently learn that these facts can be made by thinking, that our faith in them may contribute to their reality, and may modify their nature; in other words, these facts are our immediate apprehensions of fact, which it is indeed conceivable that our temperaments, expectations, and opinions should modify. Thus the pragmatist's reliance on facts does not carry him beyond the psychic sphere; his facts are only his personal experiences. Personal experiences may well be the basis for no less personal

乔治·华盛顿而不是乔治三世。

一个根本重要的问题--实用主义者对此远未说清，或许彼此之间也不一致--在于他们的心理学应当在何种意义上被理解。罗素先生写道：“充满实用主义者想象的事实是心理事实；别人可能想到星空，实用主义者想到的却是对星空的知觉；别人想到上帝，实用主义者想到的却是对上帝的信仰，如此等等。在讨论各门科学时，他们从不像科学专家那样思考科学理论所依据的事实；他们思考的是理论本身。因此，他们最初的问题和他们惯常的想象背景都是心理学的。”这话如此真切，以至于除非我们本能地代之以心理的术语，否则整个实用主义的观点看来就会显得悖谬，甚至实际上不可思议。例如，实用主义者可能会抗议“他们从不思考科学理论所依据的事实”这一指控，因为他们极为强调事实。事实是理论信用所凭靠的现金。然而这一抗议，尽管真诚，却不会有定论，最终只会印证而非驳倒罗素先生的观察。因为我们不久就会得知，这些事实可以由思维造成，我们对它们的信仰可能有助于它们的实在，并可能改变它们的性质；换言之，这些事实是我们对事实的直接领会，而我们的气质、期待和意见确实可以改变这种领会。因此，实用主义者对事实的依赖并未使他越出心理的领域；他的事实只是他个人的经验。个人经验完全可以成为同样个人的

myths; but the effort of intelligence and of science is rather to find the basis of the personal experiences themselves; and this non-psychic basis of experience is what common sense calls the facts, and what practice is concerned with. Yet these are not the *pragmata* of the pragmatist, for it is only the despicable intellectualist that can arrive at them; and the bed-rock of facts that the pragmatist builds upon is avowedly drifting sand. Hence the odd expressions, new to literature and even to grammar, which bubble up continually in pragmatist writings. "For illustration take the former fact that the earth is flat," says one, quite innocently; and another observes that "two centuries later, nominalism was evidently true, because it alone would legitimise the local independence of cities." Lest we should suppose that the historical sequence of these "truths" or illusions is, at least, fixed and irreversible, we are soon informed that the past is always changing, too; that is (if I may rationalise this mystical dictum), that history is always being rewritten, and that the growing present adds new relations to the past, which lead us to conceive or to describe it in some new fashion. Even if the ultimate inference is not drawn, and we are not told that this changing idea of the past is the only past that exists—the real past being unattainable and therefore, for personal idealism, non-existent—it is abundantly clear that the effort to distinguish fact from theory cannot be successful, so long as the psychological way of thinking prevails; for a theory, psychologically considered, is a bare fact in the experience of the theorist, and the other facts of his experience are so many other momentary views, so many scant theories, to be immediately superseded by other "truths in the plural." Sensations and ideas are really distinguishable only by

神话的基础；但智力和科学的努力倒更在于寻找个人经验本身的基础；而这种非心理的经验基础，正是常识所称的事实，也正是实践所关涉的东西。然而这些并不是实用主义者的*pragmata*，因为只有可鄙的理智主义者才能达到它们；而实用主义者所依据的事实基岩，公开承认是流沙。于是实用主义者著作中不断冒出的那些对文学甚至对语法都陌生的古怪说法。一人十分天真地说："为作说明，试取地球是平的这一先前的事实"；另一人则评论说："两个世纪之后，唯名论显然为真，因为唯有它才能使各城市的局部独立合法化。"唯恐我们会以为这些"真理"或幻觉的历史序列至少是固定而不可逆的，我们不久便被告知，过去也总是在变化；也就是说(如果我可以把这一神秘箴言理性化)，历史总是在被重写，而不断生长的现在给过去增添了新的关系，引导我们以某种新的方式去设想或描述它。即使最终的推论并未引出，也没有人告诉我们，这种变化着的过去观念是唯一存在的过去--真实的过去不可企及，因而对个人唯心论而言并不存在--也已经十分清楚：只要心理的思维方式盛行，区分事实与理论的努力就不可能成功；因为一种理论，从心理学上考虑，在理论家的经验中就是一个赤裸的事实，而他经验中的其他事实则是同样多的其他 momentary 观点，同样多的浅薄理论，随即被其他"复数化的真理"所取代。感觉与观念真正可区分的依据只在于

reference to what is assumed to lie without; of which external reality experience is always an effect (and in that capacity is called sensation) and often at the same time an apprehension (and in that capacity is called idea).

指涉被假定存在于外部的某物；经验始终是这一外部现实的一种效果(在此意义上被称为感觉)，并且常常同时是一种领会(在此意义上被称为观念)。

It is a crucial question, then, in the interpretation of pragmatism, whether the psychological point of view, undoubtedly prevalent in that school, is the only or the ultimate point of view which it admits. The habit of studying ideas rather than their objects might be simply a matter of emphasis or predilection. It might merely indicate a special interest in the life of reason, and be an effort, legitimate under any system of philosophy, to recount the stages by which human thought, developing in the bosom of nature, may have reached its present degree of articulation. I myself, for instance, like to look at things from this angle: not that I have ever doubted the reality of the natural world, or been able to take very seriously any philosophy that denied it, but precisely because, when we take the natural world for granted, it becomes a possible and enlightening inquiry to ask how the human animal has come to discover his real environment, in so far as he has done so, and what dreams have intervened or supervened in the course of his rational awakening. On the other hand, a psychological point of view might be equivalent to the idealistic doctrine that the articulation of human thought constitutes the only structure of the universe, and its whole history. According to this view, pragmatism would seem to be a revised version of the transcendental logic, leaving logic still transcendental, that is, still concerned with the evolution of the categories. The revision would consist chiefly in this, that empirical verification, utility, and survival would take the place of dialectical irony as the force

那么，在解释实用主义时，一个关键问题便是：该学派中无疑盛行的心理学观点，究竟是它唯一承认的观点，还是它最终承认的观点。研究观念而非其对象的习惯，也许只是侧重或偏好问题。它也许仅仅表明对理性生活有一种特殊兴趣，并且是在任何哲学体系下都正当的努力，即叙述人类思想在自然的怀抱中发展、可能达到其目前表述程度所经历的各个阶段。例如，我自己就喜欢从这个角度看待事物：并非因为我曾怀疑自然世界的实在，或能够认真对待任何否认它的哲学，而恰恰是因为，当我们把自然世界视为理所当然时，追问人类动物如何逐渐发现其真实环境(就其所及而言)，以及在理性觉醒的过程中有哪些梦境介入或随后出现，便成为一项可能而有启发性的探究。另一方面，心理学观点可能等同于唯心论学说，即人类思想的表述构成宇宙的唯一结构及其全部历史。按照这一观点，实用主义似乎就是先验逻辑的一个修订版本，使逻辑仍然是先验的，也就是说，仍然关涉诸范畴的进化。修订主要在于：经验的证实、效用和生存将取代辩证的反讽，成为支配进化的力量

governing the evolution. It would still remain possible for other methods of approach than this transcendental pragmatism, for instinct, perhaps, or for revelation, to bring us into contact with things-in-themselves. A junction might thus be effected with the system of M. Bergson, which would lead to this curious result: that pragmatic logic would be the method of intelligence, because intelligence is merely a method, useful in practice, for the symbolic and improper representation of reality; while another non-pragmatic method—sympathy and dream—would alone be able to put us in possession of direct knowledge and genuine truth. So that, after all, the pragmatic "truth" of working ideas would turn out to be what it has seemed hitherto to mankind, namely, no real truth, but rather a convenient sort of fiction, which ceases to deceive when once its merely pragmatic value is discounted by criticism. I remember once putting a question on this subject to Professor James; and his answer was one which I am glad to be able to record. In relation to his having said that "as far as the past facts go, there is no difference ... be the atoms or be the God their cause,"[7] I asked whether, if God had been the cause, apart from the value of the idea of him in our calculations, his existence would not have made a difference to him, as he would be presumably self-conscious. "Of course," said Professor James, "but I wasn't considering that side of the matter; I was thinking of our idea." The choice of the subjective point of view, then, was deliberate here, and frankly arbitrary; it was not intended to exclude the possibility or legitimacy of the objective attitude. And the original reason for deliberately ignoring, in this way, the realistic way of thinking, even while admitting that it represents the real state of affairs, would have been, I suppose,

支配着进化。对于除这种先验实用主义之外的其他接近方法--或许是本能，或许是启示--来说，仍然有可能将我们带入与自在之物的接触之中。因此，或许可以与柏格森先生的体系建立一种连接，这将导致这样一个奇特的结果：实用主义的逻辑将成为智力的方法，因为智力仅仅是一种在实践中有用的方法，用于对现实进行象征性的和不恰当的再现；而另一种非实用主义的方法--同情与梦想--则唯独能够使我们获得直接的知识和真正的真理。因此，归根结底，起作用观念的实用主义「真理」将证明是迄今为止在人类看来它一直所是的东西，即并非真正的真理，而毋宁说是一种便利的虚构，一旦其纯粹的实用价值被批评所贬低，它便不再欺骗。我记得曾就这个问题向詹姆斯教授提出过一个疑问；他的回答是我很高兴能够记录下来的。关于他曾说过「就过去的事实而言，没有差别……无论是原子还是上帝作为它们的原因」，我问道：如果上帝是原因，撇开上帝观念在我们计算中的价值不谈，他的存在难道不会对他本身造成差别吗，因为他想必是具有自我意识的。「当然，」詹姆斯教授说，「但我当时没有考虑事情的那一面；我想到的是我们的观念。」因此，这里对主观观点的选择是有意的，并且坦率地说是任意的；它并非意在排除客观态度的可能性或合法性。而这种有意以这种方式忽视实在论思维方式--即便承认它代表了事物的真实状态--的原初理由，我想，大概会是，

that what could be verified was always some further effect of the real objects, and never those real objects themselves; so that for interpreting and predicting our personal experience only the hypothesis of objects was pertinent, while the objects themselves, except as so represented, were useless and unattainable. The case, if I may adapt a comparison of Mr. Russell's, was as if we possessed a catalogue of the library at Alexandria, all the books being lost for ever; it would be only in the catalogue that we could practically verify their existence or character, though doubtless, by some idle flight of imagination, we might continue to think of the books, as well as of those titles in the catalogue which alone could appear to us in experience. Pragmatism, approached from this side, would then seem to express an acute critical conscience, a sort of will not to believe; not to believe, I mean, more than is absolutely necessary for solipsistic practice.

能够被证实的始终是真实对象的某种进一步效果，而绝不是那些真实对象本身；因此，为了解释和预测我们的个人经验，只有关于对象的假设才是相关的，而对象本身，除非被如此表象，否则是无用而不可企及的。这种情况，如果我可以借用罗素先生的一个比喻，就好像我们拥有一份亚历山大图书馆的目录，而所有书籍都已永远失失；我们只能在目录中实际证实它们的存在或性质，尽管无疑，凭借某种闲散的想象飞翔，我们仍可以继续想着那些书籍，以及目录中那些唯独能在经验中向我们呈现的书名。从这一方面接近，实用主义似乎便表达了一种敏锐的批判良心，一种不愿相信的意志；我的意思是，不愿相信超出唯我论实践绝对必需之外的东西。

Such economical faith, enabling one to dissolve the hard materialistic world into a work of mind, which mind might outflank, was traditional in the radical Emersonian circles in which pragmatism sprang up. It is one of the approaches to the movement; yet we may safely regard the ancestral transcendentalism of the pragmatists as something which they have turned their back upon, and mean to disown. It is destined to play no part in the ultimate result of pragmatism. This ultimate result promises to be, on the contrary, a direct materialistic sort of realism. This alone is congruous with the scientific affinities of the school and its young-American temper. Nor is the transformation very hard to effect. The world of solipsistic practice, if you remove the romantic self that was supposed to evoke it, becomes at once the sensible world; and the problem is only to find a place in the

这种经济性的信仰，使人得以将坚硬的唯物主义世界消解为心灵的作品，而心灵或可迂回包抄之，这在实用主义发源的激进爱默生派圈子中乃是传统。这是通往该运动的途径之一；然而我们可以稳妥地认为，实用主义者对其祖传的超验主义已背过身去，意欲弃绝。它注定在实用主义的最终结果中不扮演任何角色。相反，这一最终结果有望成为一种直接的唯物主义式的实在论。唯有此点才与该学派的科学亲缘及其年轻美国的性情相协调。而这种转变也并不难以实现。唯我论的实践世界，若你移除那被设想为唤起它的浪漫自我，便立刻成为可感世界；问题仅在于在

mosaic of objects of sensation for those cognitive and moral functions which the soul was once supposed to exercise in the presence of an independent reality. But this problem is precisely the one that pragmatists boast they have already solved; for they have declared that consciousness does not exist, and that objects of sensation (which at first were called feelings, experiences, or "truths") know or mean one another when they lead to one another, when they are poles, so to speak, in the same vital circuit. The spiritual act which was supposed to take things for its object is to be turned into "objective spirit," that is, into dynamic relations between things. The philosopher will deny that he has any other sort of mind himself, lest he should be shut up in it again, like a sceptical and disconsolate child; while if there threatens to be any covert or superfluous reality in the self-consciousness of God, nothing will be easier than to deny that God is self-conscious; for indeed, if there is no consciousness on earth, why should we imagine that there is any in heaven? The psychologism with which the pragmatists started seems to be passing in this way, in the very effort to formulate it pragmatically, into something which, whatever it may be, is certainly not psychologism. But the bewildered public may well ask whether it is pragmatism either.

There is another crucial point in pragmatism which the defenders of the system are apt to pass over lightly, but which Mr. Russell regards (justly, I think) as of decisive importance. Is, namely, the pragmatic account of truth intended to cover all knowledge, or one kind of knowledge only? Apparently the most authoritative pragmatists admit that it covers one kind only; for there are two sorts of self-evidence in which, they say, it is not concerned: first,

感觉对象的镶嵌图中为那些认知与道德功能找到位置，这些功能曾被设想为灵魂在独立实在面前所行使的。但这一问题恰恰是实用主义者夸口已解决的；因为他们已宣称意识不存在，而感觉对象(起初被称为感觉、经验或“真理”)在彼此导向彼此之时，当它们是同一生命回路中的两极，可以说，便相互认识或意指。那被设想为以事物为对象的精神活动，将被转变为“客观精神”，即转变为事物之间的动态关系。哲学家将否认他自己拥有任何其他种类的心灵，以免再次被关入其中，像一个怀疑而沮丧的孩子；而倘若在上帝的自我意识中威胁存在任何隐秘或多余的东西，那么否认上帝是自我意识的便再容易不过；因为确实，如果世上没有意识，我们为何要想象天上有呢?实用主义者出发时所持的心理主义，似乎正以这种方式，在将其实用主义地表述的努力中，转变为某种无论是什么、却肯定不是心理主义的东西。但困惑的公众不妨问一问，那是否还是实用主义。

实用主义中还有另一个关键点，该体系的辩护者们往往轻描淡写地略过，但罗素先生认为(我认为这是公正的)它具有决定性的重要性。那就是：实用主义关于真理的说明，究竟意在涵盖一切知识，还是只涵盖某一类知识?显然，最权威的实用主义者承认它只涵盖一类知识；因为他们说，有两种自明性与之无关：第一，

the dialectical relation between essences; and second, the known occurrence or experience of facts. There are obvious reasons why these two kinds of cognitions, so interesting to Mr. Russell, are not felt by pragmatists to constitute exceptions worth considering. Dialectical relations, they will say, are verbal only; that is, they define ideal objects, and certainty in these cases does not coerce existence, or touch contingent fact at all. On the other hand, such apprehension as seizes on some matter of fact, as, for instance, "I feel pain," or "I expected to feel this pain, and it is now verifying my expectation," though often true propositions, are not *theoretical* truths; they are not, it is supposed, questionable beliefs but rather immediate observations. Yet many of these apprehensions of fact (or all, perhaps, if we examine them scrupulously) involve the veracity of memory, surely a highly questionable sort of truth; and, moreover, verification, the pragmatic test of truth, would be obviously impossible to apply, if the prophecy supposed to be verified were not assumed to be truly remembered. How shall we know that our expectation is fulfilled, if we do not know directly that we had such an expectation? But if we know our past experience directly—not merely knew it when present, but know now what it was, and how it has led down to the present—this amounts to enough knowledge to make up a tolerable system of the universe, without invoking pragmatic verification or "truth" at all. I have never been able to discover whether, by that perception of fact which is not "truth" but fact itself, pragmatists meant each human apprehension taken singly, or the whole series of these apprehensions. In the latter case, as in the philosophy of M. Bergson, all past reality might constantly lie open to retentive intuition, a form of knowledge soaring quite over the head of any

诸本质之间的辩证关系；第二，事实的已知发生或经验。有显而易见的理由说明为何这两类认识--罗素先生如此感兴趣--不被实用主义者觉得构成值得考虑例外。他们会说，辩证关系仅是言辞的；也就是说，它们界定理想对象，而这些情形中的确定性并不强制存在，或根本不触及偶然事实。另一方面，诸如抓住某件事实的领会，例如“我感到疼痛”，或“我预期感到这疼痛，而它现在正证实我的预期”，尽管常常是真实命题，却不是理论真理；它们被设想为并非可疑的信念，而是直接的观察。然而许多这类对事实的领会(或者，若我们严格审视，也许全部)涉及记忆的真实性，这 surely 是一种高度可疑的真理；而且，证实--真理的实用主义检验--若被设想证实的预言不被假定为被真实记忆，显然将无法应用。我们若不能直接知道我们曾有这样的预期，如何知道我们的预期被满足了呢?但如果我们直接知道我们过去的经验--不仅在它在场时知道它，而且现在知道它曾是什么，以及它如何导致现在--这便等于足够的知识，足以构成一个尚可的宇宙体系，而根本无需援引实用主义的证实或“真理”。我从未能发现，通过那种并非“真理”而是事实本身的事实知觉，实用主义者是指每一个单独的人类领会，还是指这些领会的整个系列。在后一种情形中，如柏格森先生的哲学，一切过去的实在可能不断向保持性的直觉敞开，这是一种高翔于任何

pragmatic method or pragmatic "truth." It looks, indeed, as if the history of at least personal experience were commonly taken for granted by pragmatists, as a basis on which to rear their method. Their readiness to make so capital an assumption is a part of their heritage from romantic idealism. To the romantic idealist science and theology are tales which ought to be reduced to an empirical equivalent in his personal experience; but the tale of his personal experience itself is a sacred figment, the one precious conviction of the romantic heart, which it would be heartless to question. Yet here is a kind of assumed truth which cannot be reduced to its pragmatic meaning, because it must be true literally in order that the pragmatic meaning of other beliefs may be conceived or tested at all.

实用主义方法或实用主义“真理”之上的知识形式。确实，看起来至少个人经验的历史通常被实用主义者视为理所当然，作为建立其方法的基础。他们如此爽快地作出如此重大的假定，是其浪漫唯心论遗产的一部分。对浪漫唯心论者而言，科学与神学是故事，应被还原为其个人经验中的经验等价物；但个人经验本身的故事却是一个神圣的虚构，是浪漫心灵唯一珍贵的确信，质疑它将是无情无义的。然而这里有一种被假定的真理，它不能被还原为其实用主义意义，因为它必须字面为真，其他信念的实用主义意义才可能被设想或检验。

Now, if it be admitted that the pragmatic theory of truth does not touch our knowledge either of matters of fact or of the necessary implications of ideas, the question arises: What sort of knowledge remains for pragmatic theory to apply to? Simply, Mr. Russell answers, those "working hypotheses" to which "prudent people give only a low degree of belief." For "we hold different beliefs with very different degrees of conviction. Some—such as the belief that I am sitting in a chair, or that $2+2=4$—can be doubted by few except those who have had a long training in philosophy. Such beliefs are held so firmly that non-philosophers who deny them are put into lunatic asylums. Other beliefs, such as the facts of history, are held rather less firmly.... Beliefs about the future, as that the sun will rise to-morrow and that the trains will run approximately as in Bradshaw, may be held with almost as great conviction as beliefs about the past. Scientific laws are generally believed less firmly.... Philosophical beliefs, finally, will,

现在，如果承认实用主义真理理论既不触及我们关于事实的知识，也不触及观念之必然蕴含的知识，那么问题便产生了：还剩下何种知识供实用主义理论应用?罗素先生回答：简言之，就是那些“谨慎的人只给予低度相信”的“工作假设”。因为“我们持有不同信念，其确信程度极为不同。有些--例如相信我正坐在椅子上，或2+2=4--除那些长期受哲学训练者外，鲜有人能怀疑。这类信念被如此坚定地持有，以至于否认它们的非哲学家会被送进精神病院。其他信念，例如历史事实，则被持有得较为不坚定.....关于未来的信念，如太阳明天将升起、火车将大致按布拉德肖时刻表运行，可能被持有得几乎与关于过去的信念同样确信。科学定律一般被相信得较不坚定.....最后，哲学信念将，

with most people, take a still lower place, since the opposite beliefs of others can hardly fail to induce doubt. Belief, therefore, is a matter of degree. To speak of belief, disbelief, doubt, and suspense of judgment as the only possibilities is as if, from the writing on the thermometer, we were to suppose that blood heat, summer heat, temperate, and freezing were the only temperatures." Beliefs which require to be confirmed by future experience, or which actually refer to it, are evidently only presumptions; it is merely the truth of presumptions that empirical logic applies to, and only so long as they remain presumptions. Presumptions may be held with very different degrees of assurance, and yet be acted upon, in the absence of any strong counter-suggestion; as the confidence of lovers or of religious enthusiasts may be at blood heat at one moment and freezing at the next, without a change in anything save in the will to believe. The truth of such presumptions, whatever may be the ground of them, depends in fact on whether they are to lead (or, rather, whether the general course of events is to lead) to the further things presumed; for these things are what presumptions refer to explicitly.

对大多数人来说，地位还要更低，因为他人相反的信念几乎必然引起怀疑。因此，信念是一个程度问题。把相信、不信、怀疑和悬置判断说成是仅有的可能性，就好比我们根据温度计上的刻度，以为血温、夏热、温和与冰点就是仅有的温度。"需要由未来经验来确认、或实际上指向未来经验的信念，显然只是推定；经验逻辑所适用的仅仅是推定的真理，而且只在它们仍然是推定的时候。推定可以以极为不同的确信程度被持有，然而在没有任何强烈反暗示的情况下仍可据以行动；正如恋人或宗教狂热者的信心可能此刻处于血温，下一刻便降至冰点，而除了相信的意志之外，一切都没有变化。这类推定的真理，无论其根据是什么，事实上取决于它们是否将导致(或者更确切地说，事件的总体进程是否将导致)所推定的进一步的事情；因为这些事情正是推定所明确指向的。

It sometimes happens, however, that presumptions (being based on voluminous blind instinct rather than on distinct repeated observations) are expressed in consciousness by some symbol or myth, as when a man says he believes in his luck; the presumption really regards particular future chances and throws of the dice, but the emotional and verbal mist in which the presumption is wrapped, veils the pragmatic burden of it; and a metaphysical entity arises, called luck, in which a man may think he believes rather than in a particular career that may be awaiting him. Now

然而，有时也会发生这样的情况：推定(基于大量盲目的本能而非明确的反复观察)在意识中由某种象征或神话来表达，比如一个人说他相信自己的运气；这一推定实际上关涉的是未来的特定机会和掷骰子的结果，但包裹着这一推定的情感与语词迷雾，遮蔽了它的实用主义负担；于是一个被称为运气的形而上学实体产生了，一个人可能以为自己相信的是它，而不是相信那可能等待着他的特定前程。现在

since this entity, luck, is a mere word, confidence in it, to be justified at all, must be transferred to the concrete facts it stands for. Faith in one's luck must be pragmatic, but simply because faith in such an entity is not needful nor philosophical at all. The case is the same with working hypotheses, when that is all they are; for on this point there is some confusion. Whether an idea is a working hypothesis merely or an anticipation of matters open to eventual inspection may not always be clear. Thus the atomic theory, in the sense in which most philosophers entertain it to-day, seems to be a working hypothesis only; for they do not seriously believe that there are atoms, but in their ignorance of the precise composition of matter, they find it convenient to speak of it as if it were composed of indestructible particles. But for Democritus and for many modern men of science the atomic theory is not a working hypothesis merely; they do not regard it as a provisional makeshift; they regard it as a probable, if not a certain, anticipation of what inspection would discover to be the fact, could inspection be carried so far; in other words, they believe the atomic theory is true. If they are right, the validity of this theory would not be that of pragmatic "truth" but of pragmatic "fact"; for it would be a view, such as memory or intuition or sensation might give us, of experienced objects in their experienced relations; it would be the communication to us, in a momentary dream, of what would be the experience of a universal observer. It would be knowledge of reality in M. Bergson's sense. Pragmatic "truth," on the contrary, is the relative and provisional justification of fiction; and pragmatism is not a theory of truth at all, but a theory of theory, when theory is instrumental.

既然这个实体--运气--只是一个词，对它的信心若要得到辩护，就必须转移到它所代表的具体事实上去。对自己运气的信仰必须是实用主义的，但仅仅是因为对这种实体的信仰根本不是必需的，也根本不是哲学的。工作假说也是如此，当它们仅仅是工作假说的时候；因为在这个问题上存在一些混乱。一个观念究竟仅仅是工作假说，还是对最终可供检验的事情的预期，可能并不总是清楚的。因此，原子论，在大多数哲学家今天所持的意义上，似乎仅仅是工作假说；因为他们并不真正相信存在原子，而是在对物质精确构成的无知中，他们觉得方便地谈论它，就好像它是由不可毁灭的粒子构成的一样。但对德谟克利特和许多现代科学人来说，原子论并不仅仅是工作假说；他们不把它视为临时的权宜之计；他们把它视为对检验所能发现的事实的一种或然的、如果不是确定的预期--假如检验能够进行到那么远的话；换句话说，他们相信原子论是真的。如果他们是对的，这一理论的有效性就不会是实用主义"真理"的有效性，而是实用主义"事实"的有效性；因为它将是一种观点，如同记忆、直觉或感觉可能给予我们的那样，是关于经验对象在其经验关系中的观点；它将是把一位普遍观察者将会经验到的东西，在一个瞬间的梦中传达给我们。它将是柏格森先生意义上的关于实在的知识。相反，实用主义"真理"是对虚构的相对的和临时的辩护；而实用主义根本不是一种真理理论，而是一种理论的理论，当理论是工具性的时候。

For theory too has more than one signification. It may mean such a symbolic or foreshortened view, such a working hypothesis, as true and full knowledge might supersede; or it may mean this true and full knowledge itself, a synthetic survey of objects of experience in their experimental character. Algebra and language are theoretical in the first sense, as when a man believes in his luck; historical and scientific imagination are theoretical in the second sense, when they gather objects of experience together without distorting them. But it is only to the first sort of theory that pragmatism can be reasonably applied; to apply it also to the second would be to retire into that extreme subjectivism which the leading pragmatists have so hotly disclaimed. We find, accordingly, that it is only when a theory is avowedly unreal, and does not ask to be believed, that the value of it is pragmatic; since in that case belief passes consciously from the symbols used to the eventual facts in which the symbolism terminates, and for which it stands.

因为理论也有不止一种含义。它可能指这样一种象征性的或缩略的观点，这样一种工作假说，真正的、完整的知识可能会取代它；或者它可能指这种真正的、完整的知识本身，即对经验对象在其实验特性中的综合审视。代数和语言是在第一种意义上的理论性的，比如一个人相信自己的运气时；历史的和科学的想象是在第二种意义上的理论性的，当它们把经验对象聚集在一起而不扭曲它们的时候。但实用主义只能合理地应用于第一种理论；若把它也应用于第二种，就会退入那些主要实用主义者如此激烈地否认的极端主观主义。因此我们发现，只有当一种理论公开是不实在的、并且不要求被相信时，它的价值才是实用主义的；因为在那种情况下，信念有意识地从所使用的象征过渡到象征所终止、所代表的最终事实。

It may seem strange that a definition of truth should have been based on the consideration of those ideas exclusively for which truth is not claimed by any critical person, such ideas, namely, as religious myths or the graphic and verbal machinery of science. Yet the fact is patent, and if we considered the matter historically it might not prove inexplicable. Theology has long applied the name truth pre-eminently to fiction. When the conviction first dawned upon pragmatists that there was no absolute or eternal truth, what they evidently were thinking of was that it is folly, in this changing world, to pledge oneself to any final and inflexible creed. The pursuit of truth, since nothing better was possible, was to be accepted instead of the possession of it. But it is

看起来可能很奇怪，真理的定义竟然建立在仅仅考虑那些任何批判者都不主张其为真理的观念之上，即诸如宗教神话或科学的图形与语词机制之类的观念。然而事实是显而易见的，如果我们从历史角度考虑此事，它也许并非不可解释。神学长期以来把真理之名卓越地应用于虚构。当实用主义者第一次朦胧地意识到不存在绝对或永恒的真理时，他们显然想到的是：在这个变化的世界中，把自己托付给任何最终的和不可变通的信条乃是愚蠢的。对真理的追求，既然没有更好的可能，就应当被接受以代替对真理的占有。但这是

characteristic of Protestantism that, when it gives up anything, it transfers to what remains the unction, and often the name, proper to what it has abandoned. So, if truth was no longer to be claimed or even hoped for, the value and the name of truth could be instinctively transferred to what was to take its place—spontaneous, honest, variable conviction. And the sanctions of this conviction were to be looked for, not in the objective reality, since it was an idle illusion to fancy we could get at that, but in the growth of this conviction itself, and in the prosperous adventure of the whole soul, so courageous in its self-trust, and so modest in its dogmas.

新教的特征是，当它放弃任何东西时，它会将本属于所弃之物的膏油，且往往是名称，转移给留存之物。因此，如果真理不再被主张甚至不再被希望，真理的价值与名称便可本能地转移至其替代者--自发的、诚实的、可变的信念。而这种信念的制裁，不应在客观现实中寻求，因为幻想我们能触及客观现实乃是无益的错觉，而应在信念自身的成长中，在整全灵魂的繁荣冒险中寻求--这灵魂在自信中如此勇敢，在其教义中又如此谦逊。

Science, too, has often been identified, not with the knowledge men of science possess, but with the language they use. If science meant knowledge, the science of Darwin, for instance, would lie in his observations of plants and animals, and in his thoughts about the probable ancestors of the human race—all knowledge of actual or possible facts. It would not be knowledge of selection or of spontaneous variation, terms which are mere verbal bridges over the gaps in that knowledge, and mark the *lacunae* and unsolved problems of the science. Yet it is just such terms that seem to clothe "Science" in its pontifical garb; the cowl is taken for the monk; and when a penetrating critic, like M. Henri Poincaré, turned his subtle irony upon them, the public cried that he had announced the "bankruptcy of science," whereas it is merely the language of science that he had reduced to its pragmatic value—to convenience and economy in the registering of facts—and had by no means questioned that positive and cumulative knowledge of facts which science is attaining. It is an incident in the same general confusion that a critical epistemology, like pragmatism,

科学也常常被等同于科学家所使用的语言，而非他们所拥有的知识。如果科学意味着知识，那么例如达尔文的科学，便在于他对植物和动物的观察，以及他关于人类可能祖先的思考--所有这些都是关于实际或可能事实的知识。它不会是关于选择或自发变异的知识，这些术语不过是跨越知识缺口的言辞桥梁，标志着科学的空白与未解决的问题。然而，正是这类术语似乎为“科学”披上了主教的法衣；兜帽被当作了修士；而当一位敏锐的批评家，如亨利·庞加莱先生，将他的微妙讽刺转向它们时，公众便叫嚷说他宣告了“科学的破产”，而实际上他不过是将科学的语言还原为其实用主义价值--在记录事实时的便利与经济--并且绝未质疑科学正在获得的关于事实的实证与累积的知识。批判性认识论，如实用主义，也属于同一普遍混淆的一个插曲，

analysing these figments of scientific or theological theory, should innocently suppose that it was analysing truth; while the only view to which it really attributes truth is its view of the system of facts open to possible experience, a system which those figments presuppose and which they may help us in part to divine, where it is accidentally hidden from human inspection.

在分析这些科学或神学理论的虚构物时，竟天真地以为自己在分析真理；而它真正赋予真理的唯一观点，是它对那些可能经验所敞开的事实系统的看法，这个系统是那些虚构物所预设的，并且它们或许能帮助我们在某种程度上猜测到它，当它偶然地隐藏于人类审视之外时。

IV. HYPOSTATIC ETHICS

If Mr. Russell, in his essay on "The Elements of Ethics," had wished to propitiate the unregenerate naturalist, before trying to convert him, he could not have chosen a more skilful procedure; for he begins by telling us that "what is called good conduct is conduct which is a means to other things which are good on their own account; and hence ... the study of what is good or bad on its own account must be included in ethics." Two consequences are involved in this: first, that ethics is concerned with the economy of all values, and not with "moral" goods only, or with duty; and second, that values may and do inhere in a great variety of things and relations, all of which it is the part of wisdom to respect, and if possible to establish. In this matter, according to our author, the general philosopher is prone to one error and the professed moralist to another. "The philosopher, bent on the construction of a system, is inclined to simplify the facts unduly ... and to twist them into a form in which they can all be deduced from one or two general principles. The moralist, on the other hand, being primarily concerned with conduct, tends to become absorbed in means, to value the actions men ought to perform more than the ends which such actions serve.... Hence most of what they value in this world would have to be omitted by many moralists from

四、实体化伦理学

如果罗素先生在其《伦理学要素》一文中，在试图改变那些未获重生的自然主义者之前，曾希望安抚他们，他本不可能选择更为巧妙的程序；因为他一开始就告诉我们，“所谓良好行为，就是作为达到其他本身即为善的事物之手段的行为；因此……对本身即为善或恶之物的研究必须纳入伦理学之中。”这其中涉及两个后果：第一，伦理学关涉一切价值的经营，而不仅关涉“道德的”善，或关涉义务；第二，价值可能并且确实内在于种类繁多的物与关系之中，智慧的本分就是尊重这一切，并在可能时确立这一切。在这件事上，据我们的作者说，一般哲学家易于犯一种错误，而自称的道德学家则易于犯另一种错误。“哲学家致力于体系的建构，倾向于过度简化事实……并把它们扭曲为一种形式，使它们都能从一两条一般原则中推演出来。另一方面，道德学家主要关涉行为，倾向于沉溺于手段，看重人应当做的行动甚于这些行动所服务的目的……因此，许多道德学家将不得不从

any imagined heaven, because there such things as self-denial and effort and courage and pity could find no place.... Kant has the bad eminence of combining both errors in the highest possible degree, since he holds that there is nothing good except the virtuous will—a view which simplifies the good as much as any philosopher could wish, and mistakes means for ends as completely as any moralist could enjoin."

Those of us who are what Mr. Russell would call ethical sceptics will be delighted at this way of clearing the ground; it opens before us the prospect of a moral philosophy that should estimate the various values of things known and of things imaginable, showing what combinations of goods are possible in any one rational system, and (if fancy could stretch so far) what different rational systems would be possible in places and times remote enough from one another not to come into physical conflict. Such ethics, since it would express in reflection the dumb but actual interests of men, might have both influence and authority over them; two things which an alien and dogmatic ethics necessarily lacks. The joy of the ethical sceptic in Mr. Russell is destined, however, to be short-lived. Before proceeding to the expression of concrete ideals, he thinks it necessary to ask a preliminary and quite abstract question, to which his essay is chiefly devoted; namely, what is the right definition of the predicate "good," which we hope to apply in the sequel to such a variety of things? And he answers at once: The predicate "good" is indefinable. This answer he shows to be unavoidable, and so evidently unavoidable that we might perhaps have been absolved from asking the question; for, as he says, the so-called definitions of "good"—that it is pleasure, the desired, and so forth—are not definitions of the predicate

任何想象的天堂，因为在那里，诸如自我否定、努力、勇气和怜悯之类的事物都找不到位置.....康德以最高程度将两种错误结合于一身，享有糟糕的卓越地位，因为他认为除了有德性的意志之外没有任何善--这一观点将善简化到了任何哲学家所能期望的程度，并且像任何道德家所能吩咐的那样，完全将手段误认为目的。”

我们这些会被罗素先生称为伦理怀疑论者的人，将会因这种清理地基的方式而欣喜；它在我们面前展开了一种道德哲学的前景，这种道德哲学应当评估已知事物与可想象事物的各种价值，展示在任何一种理性体系中哪些善的组合是可能的，并且(如果幻想能够伸展得如此之远)在彼此相距足够遥远、不至于发生物理冲突的地点和时代中，哪些不同的理性体系会是可能的。这样的伦理学，由于它会在反思中表达人类沉默而实际的利益，可能对它们既有影响又有权威；这两样东西是一种异己而独断的伦理学必然缺乏的。然而，伦理怀疑论者在罗素先生那里所感到的喜悦注定是短暂的。在着手表达具体理想之前，他认为有必要提出一个预备性的、相当抽象的问题，他的文章主要就致力于此；即，我们希望随后应用于如此多样事物的谓词“善”的正确定义是什么?他立刻回答：谓词“善”是不可定义的。他表明这个回答是不可避免的，而且显然如此不可避免，以至于我们或许本可以免于提出这个问题；因为，如他所说，所谓“善”的定义--即它是快乐、被欲求者等等--并不是谓词

"good," but designations of the things to which this predicate is applied by different persons. Pleasure, and its rivals, are not synonyms for the abstract quality "good," but names for classes of concrete facts that are supposed to possess that quality. From this correct, if somewhat trifling, observation, however, Mr. Russell, like Mr. Moore before him, evokes a portentous dogma. Not being able to define good, he hypostasises it. "Good and bad," he says, "are qualities which belong to objects independently of our opinions, just as much as round and square do; and when two people differ as to whether a thing is good, only one of them can be right, though it may be very hard to know which is right." "We cannot maintain that for me a thing ought to exist on its own account, while for you it ought not; that would merely mean that one of us is mistaken, since in fact everything either ought to exist, or ought not." Thus we are asked to believe that good attaches to things for no reason or cause, and according to no principles of distribution; that it must be found there by a sort of receptive exploration in each separate case; in other words, that it is an absolute, not a relative thing, a primary and not a secondary quality.

That the quality "good" is indefinable is one assertion, and obvious; but that the presence of this quality is unconditioned is another, and astonishing. My logic, I am well aware, is not very accurate or subtle; and I wish Mr. Russell had not left it to me to discover the connection between these two propositions. Green is an indefinable predicate, and the specific quality of it can be given only in intuition; but it is a quality that things acquire under certain conditions, so much so that the same bit of grass, at the same moment, may have it from one point of view and not from

“善”的定义，而是对不同的人应用这个谓词的那些事物的指称。快乐及其对手们，并不是抽象性质“善”的同义词，而是被认为拥有那种性质的具体事实类别的名称。然而，从这一正确--尽管有些琐细--的观察中，罗素先生像他之前的摩尔先生一样，引出了一个不祥的教义。由于不能定义善，他便将其实体化。“善与恶，”他说，“是属于对象的性质，独立于我们的意见，正如圆与方一样；当两个人就一件事物是否善而发生分歧时，其中只有一个人可能是对的，尽管可能很难知道谁是对的。”“我们不能主张，对我来说一件事物本身应当存在，而对你来说它不应当存在；那只会意味着我们之中有一个人错了，因为事实上每件事物要么应当存在，要么不应当存在。”于是我们被要求相信，善附着于事物是没有理由或原因的，也不按照任何分配原则；它必须在每个个别情形中通过某种接受性的探索而被发现；换言之，它是绝对的而非相对的事物，是第一性的而非第二性的性质。

“善”这种性质不可定义，这是一个断言，而且显而易见；但这种性质的存在是无条件的，这是另一个断言，而且令人惊异。我很清楚，我的逻辑并不十分精确或微妙；我希望罗素先生没有把发现这两个命题之间联系的任务留给我。绿色是一个不可定义的谓词，它的特定性质只能在直觉中被给予；但它是一种事物在某些条件下获得的性质，以至于同一片草在同一时刻可能从一个角度看具有它，而从

another. Right and left are indefinable; the difference could not be explained without being invoked in the explanation; yet everything that is to the right is not to the right on no condition, but obviously on the condition that some one is looking in a certain direction; and if some one else at the same time is looking in the opposite direction, what is truly to the right will be truly to the left also. If Mr. Russell thinks this is a contradiction, I understand why the universe does not please him. The contradiction would be real, undoubtedly, if we suggested that the idea of good was at any time or in any relation the idea of evil, or the intuition of right that of left, or the quality of green that of yellow; these disembodied essences are fixed by the intent that selects them, and in that ideal realm they can never have any relations except the dialectical ones implied in their nature, and these relations they must always retain. But the contradiction disappears when, instead of considering the qualities in themselves, we consider the things of which those qualities are aspects; for the qualities of things are not compacted by implication, but are conjoined irrationally by nature, as she will; and the same thing may be, and is, at once yellow and green, to the left and to the right, good and evil, many and one, large and small; and whatever verbal paradox there may be in this way of speaking (for from the point of view of nature it is natural enough) had been thoroughly explained and talked out by the time of Plato, who complained that people should still raise a difficulty so trite and exploded.[8] Indeed, while square is always square, and round round, a thing that is round may actually be square also, if we allow it to have a little body, and to be a cylinder.

另一个角度看则不具有。右与左是不可定义的；若不把这种区别引入解释之中，就无法解释它；然而，一切在右边的东西并不是无条件的在右边，而显然是基于某个人正朝某个方向看的条件；如果另一个人同时正朝相反方向看，那么真正在右边的东西也将真正在左边。如果罗素先生认为这是矛盾，我就明白为什么宇宙不令他满意了。如果我们提出善的观念在任何时候或在任何关系中就是恶的观念，或者右的直觉就是左的直觉，或者绿的性质就是黄的性质，那么这种矛盾无疑会是真实的；这些脱去形体的诸本质由选择它们的意图所固定，而在这个理想领域中，除了其本性所蕴含的辩证关系之外，它们永远不可能有任何关系，并且它们必须始终保留这些关系。但是，当我们不是考虑性质本身，而是考虑那些以这些性质为方面的事物时，矛盾就消失了；因为事物的性质并不是由蕴涵关系压缩而成的，而是由自然非理性地按其意愿联结起来的；同一事物可以并且确实是同时既黄又绿、既左又右、既善又恶、既多又一、既大又小；这种说法中无论有什么言辞上的悖论(因为从自然的观点看，它足够自然)，到柏拉图时代都已经被彻底解释并谈论殆尽，柏拉图曾抱怨人们竟然还提出如此陈腐且已被驳倒的困难。[8] 的确，方始终是方，圆始终是圆，但一个圆的东西实际上也可能同时是方的，如果我们允许它有一点体积，并且是一个圆柱体。

But perhaps what suggests this hypostasis of good is rather the fact that what others find good, or what we ourselves have found good in moods with which we retain no sympathy, is sometimes pronounced by us to be bad; and far from inferring from this diversity of experience that the present good, like the others, corresponds to a particular attitude or interest of ours, and is dependent upon it, Mr. Russell and Mr. Moore infer instead that the presence of the good must be independent of all interests, attitudes, and opinions. They imagine that the truth of a proposition attributing a certain relative quality to an object contradicts the truth of another proposition, attributing to the same object an opposite relative quality. Thus if a man here and another man at the antipodes call opposite directions up, "only one of them can be right, though it may be very hard to know which is right."

但或许，暗示这种善的实体化的，毋宁是这样的事实：别人认为善的东西，或我们自己曾在不再抱有任何同情的情绪中认为善的东西，有时被我们宣称为恶；而罗素先生和摩尔先生远非从这种经验的多样性推断出当下的善如同其他善一样，对应于我们的某种特定态度或利益，并依赖于它，反而推断善的存在必定独立于一切利益、态度和意见。他们想象，赋予某对象某种相对性质的命题之真，与赋予同一对象相反相对性质的另一命题之真相互矛盾。因此，如果这里一个人和对跖点的另一个人把相反的方向称为上，“只有一个人可能是对的，尽管可能很难知道哪个人是对的。”

To protect the belated innocence of this state of mind, Mr. Russell, so far as I can see, has only one argument, and one analogy. The argument is that "if this were not the case, we could not reason with a man as to what is right." "We do in fact hold that when one man approves of a certain act, while another disapproves, one of them is mistaken, which would not be the case with a mere emotion. If one man likes oysters and another dislikes them, we do not say that either of them is mistaken." In other words, we are to maintain our prejudices, however absurd, lest it should become unnecessary to quarrel about them! Truly the debating society has its idols, no less than the cave and the theatre. The analogy that comes to buttress somewhat this singular argument is the analogy between ethical propriety and physical or logical truth. An ethical

为保护这种心态那迟来的天真，据我所见，罗素先生只有一个论证和一个类比。这个论证是：“若非如此，我们就无法与人推理什么是正确的。”“我们确实认为，当一个人赞同某一行为而另一个人不赞同，他们中有一个是错的，而纯粹的情感则不会如此。如果一个人喜欢牡蛎而另一个人不喜欢，我们不会说他们中哪一个错了。”换言之，我们要维护我们的偏见，无论多么荒谬，以免争吵变得不必要!确实，辩论社有其偶像，不亚于洞穴和剧场。多少支撑这一奇特论证的类比，是伦理正当性与物理或逻辑真理之间的类比。一个伦理

proposition may be correct or incorrect, in a sense justifying argument, when it touches what is good as a means, that is, when it is not intrinsically ethical, but deals with causes and effects, or with matters of fact or necessity. But to speak of the truth of an ultimate good would be a false collocation of terms; an ultimate good is chosen, found, or aimed at; it is not opined. The ultimate intuitions on which ethics rests are not debatable, for they are not opinions we hazard but preferences we feel; and it can be neither correct nor incorrect to feel them. We may assert these preferences fiercely or with sweet reasonableness, and we may be more or less incapable of sympathising with the different preferences of others; about oysters we may be tolerant, like Mr. Russell, and about character intolerant; but that is already a great advance in enlightenment, since the majority of mankind have regarded as hateful in the highest degree any one who indulged in pork, or beans, or frogs' legs, or who had a weakness for anything called "unnatural"; for it is the things that offend their animal instincts that intense natures have always found to be, intrinsically and *par excellence*, abominations.

命题在涉及作为手段的善时，可以在一种为论证辩护的意义上是正确或不正确的，也就是说，当它并非内在地伦理的，而是涉及原因与结果，或涉及事实或必然性时。但谈论终极善的真理，则是术语的错误搭配；终极善是被选择、被发现或被追求的东西；它不是被意见的对象。伦理学所依据的终极直觉是不可争辩的，因为它们不是我们冒险持有的意见，而是我们感受到的偏好；感受它们既无正确也无错误。我们可以激烈地或带着甜美的合理性来断言这些偏好，我们可能或多或少无法同情他人的不同偏好；对于牡蛎，我们可以像罗素先生那样宽容，而对于品格则不宽容；但这已经是启蒙的一大进步，因为人类大多数把任何沉溺于猪肉、豆子、蛙腿，或对任何被称为“不自然的”东西有弱点的人，视为最高程度的可憎；因为冒犯他们动物本能的东西，历来被强烈的天性视为本质上且卓越地可憎。

I am not sure whether Mr. Russell thinks he has disposed of this view where he discusses the proposition that the good is the desired and refutes it on the ground that "it is commonly admitted that there are bad desires; and when people speak of bad desires, they seem to mean desires for what is bad." Most people undoubtedly call desires bad when they are generically contrary to their own desires, and call objects that disgust them bad, even when other people covet them. This human weakness is not, however, a very high authority for a logician to appeal to, being too like the attitude of the German lady who said that Englishmen

我不确定罗素先生是否认为他在讨论“善是所欲求的”这一命题时已经处理了这种观点，并以“人们普遍承认有坏的欲望；而当人们谈论坏的欲望时，他们似乎意指对坏东西的欲望”为由反驳它。大多数人无疑把与自己欲望根本相反的欲望称为坏的，把令自己厌恶的对象称为坏的，即使别人贪求它们。然而，这种人类弱点并不是逻辑学家可以诉诸的很高权威，它太像那位德国女士的态度了，她说英国人

called a certain object *bread*, and Frenchmen called it *pain*, but that it really was *Brod*. Scholastic philosophy is inclined to this way of asserting itself; and Mr. Russell, though he candidly admits that there are ultimate differences of opinion about good and evil, would gladly minimise these differences, and thinks he triumphs when he feels that the prejudices of his readers will agree with his own; as if the constitutional unanimity of all human animals, supposing it existed, could tend to show that the good they agreed to recognise was independent of their constitution.

In a somewhat worthier sense, however, we may admit that there are desires for what is bad, since desire and will, in the proper psychological sense of these words, are incidental phases of consciousness, expressing but not constituting those natural relations that make one thing good for another. At the same time the words desire and will are often used, in a mythical or transcendental sense, for those material dispositions and instincts by which vital and moral units are constituted. It is in reference to such constitutional interests that things are "really" good or bad; interests which may not be fairly represented by any incidental conscious desire. No doubt any desire, however capricious, represents some momentary and partial interest, which lends to its objects a certain real and inalienable value; yet when we consider, as we do in human society, the interests of men, whom reflection and settled purposes have raised more or less to the ideal dignity of individuals, then passing fancies and passions may indeed have bad objects, and be bad themselves, in that they thwart the more comprehensive interests of the soul that entertains them. Food and poison are such only relatively, and in view of particular bodies, and the same material thing may be food and poison at once; the

把某个对象称为*bread*，法国人称之为*pain*，但它真正是*Brod*。经院哲学倾向于这种自我断言的方式；而罗素先生虽然坦率承认关于善恶存在终极的意见分歧，却乐于尽量减少这些分歧，并且当他感到其读者的偏见会与自己的偏见一致时，便认为自己胜利了；仿佛所有人类动物的体质性一致--假如存在的话--能够表明他们所同意承认的善独立于他们的体质。

然而，在一种较为可取的意涵上，我们可以承认存在对恶的欲望，因为就这些词的严格心理学意义而言，欲望与意志是意识的附带阶段，它们表达而非构成那些使一物对另一物为善的自然关系。同时，欲望与意志这两个词常以神话式或先验式的意义被使用，指称那些借以构成生命与道德单元的物质禀性与本能。正是参照这类构成性关切，事物才“真正地”为善或为恶；而这些关切未必能被任何附带的意识欲望恰当地代表。毫无疑问，任何欲望，无论多么反复无常，都代表着某种暂时的、局部的关切，这赋予其对象某种真实的、不可剥夺的价值；然而，当我们像在人类社会中那样考虑人的关切时--反思与固定的目的已或多或少将人提升至个体的理想尊严--那么，一时的幻想与激情确实可能拥有恶的对象，并且自身即为恶，因为它们挫败了怀有它们的灵魂更为整全的关切。食物与毒药只是相对地、并且相对于特定身体而言才是如此，同一物质事物可以同时既是食物又是毒药；

child, and even the doctor, may easily mistake one for the other. For the human system whiskey is truly more intoxicating than coffee, and the contrary opinion would be an error; but what a strange way of vindicating this real, though relative, distinction, to insist that whiskey is more intoxicating in itself, without reference to any animal; that it is pervaded, as it were, by an inherent intoxication, and stands dead drunk in its bottle! Yet just in this way Mr. Russell and Mr. Moore conceive things to be dead good and dead bad. It is such a view, rather than the naturalistic one, that renders reasoning and self-criticism impossible in morals; for wrong desires, and false opinions as to value, are conceivable only because a point of reference or criterion is available to prove them such. If no point of reference and no criterion were admitted to be relevant, nothing but physical stress could give to one assertion of value greater force than to another. The shouting moralist no doubt has his place, but not in philosophy.

儿童，甚至医生，都容易将二者混淆。对于人体系统而言，威士忌确实比咖啡更令人陶醉，相反的意见将是一种错误；但是，要以何种奇怪的方式来维护这一真实的、尽管是相对的区分呢--坚持威士忌本身更具陶醉性，不参照任何动物；仿佛它被一种固有的醉意所渗透，在瓶中烂醉如泥!然而，罗素先生与摩尔先生正是以这种方式设想事物是死板的善与死板的恶。正是这样一种观点，而非自然主义的观点，使得在道德中进行推理与自我批评成为不可能；因为错误的欲望以及对价值的错误意见之所以可设想，仅仅是因为有一个参照点或标准可用来证明它们如此。如果不承认任何参照点与任何标准是相关的，那么除了物理压力之外，没有什么能赋予一种价值断言比另一种更大的力量。大声疾呼的道德家无疑有其位置，但不在哲学中。

That good is not an intrinsic or primary quality, but relative and adventitious, is clearly betrayed by Mr. Russell's own way of arguing, whenever he approaches some concrete ethical question. For instance, to show that the good is not pleasure, he can avowedly do nothing but appeal "to ethical judgments with which almost every one would agree." He repeats, in effect, Plato's argument about the life of the oyster, having pleasure with no knowledge. Imagine such mindless pleasure, as intense and prolonged as you please, and would you choose it? Is it your good? Here the British reader, like the blushing Greek youth, is expected to answer instinctively, No! It is an *argumentum ad hominem* (and there can be no other kind of argument in ethics);

善并非一种内在的或首要的性质，而是相对的、偶然的，这一点在罗素先生本人接近某个具体伦理问题时的论证方式中清楚地暴露出来。例如，为了表明善不是快乐，他公开承认只能诉诸“几乎每个人都会同意的伦理判断”。他实际上重复了柏拉图关于牡蛎生活的论证：有快乐而无知识。想象这样一种无心的快乐，随你意愿使其强烈而持久，你会选择它吗?它是你的善吗?在这里，英国读者就像脸红的希腊青年一样，被期望本能地回答：不!这是一个 *argumentum ad hominem*(而在伦理学中不可能有别的论证方式);

but the man who gives the required answer does so not because the answer is self-evident, which it is not, but because he is the required sort of man. He is shocked at the idea of resembling an oyster. Yet changeless pleasure, without memory or reflection, without the wearisome intermixture of arbitrary images, is just what the mystic, the voluptuary, and perhaps the oyster find to be good. Ideas, in their origin, are probably signals of alarm; and the distress which they marked in the beginning always clings to them in some measure, and causes many a soul, far more profound than that of the young Protarchus or of the British reader, to long for them to cease altogether. Such a radical hedonism is indeed inhuman; it undermines all conventional ambitions, and is not a possible foundation for political or artistic life. But that is all we can say against it. Our humanity cannot annul the incommensurable sorts of good that may be pursued in the world, though it cannot itself pursue them. The impossibility which people labour under of being satisfied with pure pleasure as a goal is due to their want of imagination, or rather to their being dominated by an imagination which is exclusively human.

但是，给出所要求答案的人之所以如此，并非因为该答案自明--它并不自明--而是因为他是所要求的那类人。他被与牡蛎相似的想法所震惊。然而，无记忆、无反思、没有任意意象令人厌倦的混杂的恒常快乐，恰恰是神秘主义者、纵欲者、或许还有牡蛎所认为的善。观念在其起源上很可能是警报信号；而它们在开端所标志的痛苦总是在某种程度上附着于它们，并使许多远比年轻的普罗塔库斯或英国读者的灵魂更为深邃的灵魂渴望它们完全停止。这样一种彻底的快乐主义确实是非人的；它瓦解一切常规的抱负，并且不是政治生活或艺术生活的可能基础。但这就是我们所能反对它的全部。我们的人性无法取消世界上可能被追求的各种不可通约的善，尽管它自身无法追求它们。人们难以满足于纯粹快乐作为目标，这一不可能性源于他们缺乏想象，或者更确切地说，源于他们被一种 exclusively human 的想象所支配。

The author's estrangement from reality reappears in his treatment of egoism, and most of all in his "Free Man's Religion." Egoism, he thinks, is untenable because "if I am right in thinking that my good is the only good, then every one else is mistaken unless he admits that my good, not his, is the only good." "Most people ... would admit that it is better two people's desires should be satisfied than only one person's.... Then what is good is not good *for me* or *for you*, but is simply good." "It is, indeed, so evident that it is better to secure a greater good for *A* than a lesser good for *B*, that it is hard to find any still more evident principle by which to

作者与现实的疏离在他对利己主义的处理中再度出现，而最突出地体现在他的“自由人的宗教”中。他认为利己主义是站不住脚的，因为“如果我正确地认为我的善是唯一的善，那么其他每个人都是错误的，除非他承认我的善、而非他的善，是唯一的善。”“大多数人……会承认两个人的欲望得到满足比只有一个人的欲望得到满足更好……那么，善就不是对我或对你而言的善，而就是善。”“确实，为*A*确保较大的善比为*B*确保较小的善更好，这一点如此明显，以至于很难找到任何更为明显的原则来

prove this. And if *A* happens to be some one else, and *B* to be myself, that cannot affect the question, since it is irrelevant to the general question who *A* and *B* may be." To the question, as the logician states it after transforming men into letters, it is certainly irrelevant; but it is not irrelevant to the case as it arises in nature. If two goods are somehow rightly pronounced to be equally good, no circumstance can render one better than the other. And if the locus in which the good is to arise is somehow pronounced to be indifferent, it will certainly be indifferent whether that good arises in me or in you. But how shall these two pronouncements be made? In practice, values cannot be compared save as represented or enacted in the private imagination of somebody: for we could not conceive that an alien good *was* a good (as Mr. Russell cannot conceive that the life of an ecstatic oyster is a good) unless we could sympathise with it in some way in our own persons; and on the warmth which we felt in so representing the alien good would hang our conviction that it was truly valuable, and had worth in comparison with our own good. The voice of reason, bidding us prefer the greater good, no matter who is to enjoy it, is also nothing but the force of sympathy, bringing a remote existence before us vividly *sub specie boni*. Capacity for such sympathy measures the capacity to recognise duty and therefore, in a moral sense, to have it. Doubtless it is conceivable that all wills should become co-operative, and that nature should be ruled magically by an exact and universal sympathy; but this situation must be actually attained in part, before it can be conceived or judged to be an authoritative ideal. The tigers cannot regard it as such, for it would suppress the tragic good called ferocity, which makes, in their eyes, the chief glory of the universe. Therefore the inertia of

证明这一点。而如果*A*碰巧是另一个人，*B*碰巧是我自己，那也不能影响这个问题，因为这与*A*和*B*可能是谁这个一般性问题无关。”对于逻辑学家在把人变成字母之后所陈述的这个问题，它确实无关；但对于在自然中出现的实际情况，它并非无关。如果两种善以某种方式被正确地宣称为同等善，那么任何情况都不能使一种比另一种更好。而如果善将要产生的场所被以某种方式宣称为无关紧要，那么该善产生于我或产生于你，确实都将无关紧要。但这两个宣称该如何作出呢?在实践中，价值除非被某人的私人想象所表征或enact，否则无法比较：因为我们无法设想一种异己的善曾是善(正如罗素先生无法设想狂喜的牡蛎的生命是一种善)，除非我们能以某种方式在自己身上对它产生同情；而我们在如此表征异己的善时所感到的温暖，将决定我们相信它真正有价值、并与我们自己的善相比具有价值的信念。理性的声音吩咐我们偏好更大的善，无论由谁来享受它，这声音也不过是同情的力量，将一种遥远的存在生动地置于我们面前*sub specie boni*。这种同情的能力衡量着认识义务的能力，因而在道德意义上，也衡量着拥有义务的能力。无疑可以设想，所有意志都应当变得合作，自然应当被一种精确而普遍的同情以魔法般的方式所统治；但这一境况必须部分地实际达到，然后才能被设想或被判定为一种权威性的理想。老虎不能把它视为如此，因为它会压制那被称为凶猛的悲剧性善，而在老虎眼中，正是这种善构成了宇宙的主要荣耀。因此，那惰性

nature, the ferocity of beasts, the optimism of mystics, and the selfishness of men and nations must all be accepted as conditions for the peculiar goods, essentially incommensurable, which they can generate severally. It is misplaced vehemence to call them intrinsically detestable, because they do not (as they cannot) generate or recognise the goods we prize.

自然、野兽的凶残、神秘主义者的乐观主义，以及人和国家的自私，都必须被接受为条件，以促成它们各自所能产生的、本质上不可通约的独特善。将它们称为内在可憎之物是错位的激烈，因为它们并不(也不可能)产生或承认我们所珍视的善。

In the real world, persons are not abstract egos, like *A* and *B*, so that to benefit one is clearly as good as to benefit another. Indeed, abstract egos could not be benefited, for they could not be modified at all, even if somehow they could be distinguished. It would be the qualities or objects distributed among them that would carry, wherever they went, each its inalienable cargo of value, like ships sailing from sea to sea. But it is quite vain and artificial to imagine different goods charged with such absolute and comparable weights; and actual egoism is not the thin and refutable thing that Mr. Russell makes of it. What it really holds is that a given man, oneself, and those akin to him, are qualitatively better than other beings; that the things they prize are intrinsically better than the things prized by others; and that therefore there is no injustice in treating these chosen interests as supreme. The injustice, it is felt, would lie rather in not treating things so unequal unequally. This feeling may, in many cases, amuse the impartial observer, or make him indignant; yet it may, in every case, according to Mr. Russell, be absolutely just. The refutation he gives of egoism would not dissuade any fanatic from exterminating all his enemies with a good conscience; it would merely encourage him to assert that what he was ruthlessly establishing was the absolute good. Doubtless such conscientious tyrants would be wretched themselves, and compelled to make

在现实世界中，人并非像*A*和*B*那样的抽象自我，以至于造福一个人显然与造福另一个人同样好。确实，抽象自我根本无法被造福，因为它们根本不能被改变，即使它们能以某种方式被区分开来。在它们之间分配的性质或对象才会携带着各自不可剥夺的价值货物，无论它们去往何处，就像船只从一片海驶向另一片海。但想象不同的善被赋予如此绝对且可比较的重量，是完全徒劳和人为的；而实际的利己主义并不是罗素先生所塑造的那种单薄且可反驳的东西。它真正主张的是：一个给定的人、你自己以及与你相近的人，在质上优于其他存在者；他们所珍视的事物在本质上优于他人所珍视的事物；因此，将这些选定的利益视为至高无上并无不义。人们感到，不义毋宁在于不如此不平等地对待如此不平等的事物。这种感觉在许多情况下可能令公正的观察者觉得有趣，或令他愤慨；然而，根据罗素先生，它在每一种情况下都可能绝对公正。他对利己主义的反驳不会劝阻任何狂热者以清白的良心消灭所有敌人；它只会鼓励他断言，他正在无情建立的东西就是绝对善。无疑，这样凭良心行事的暴君自身会很悲惨，并被迫作出

sacrifices which would cost them dear; but that would only extend, as it were, the pernicious egoism of that part of their being which they had allowed to usurp a universal empire. The twang of intolerance and of self-mutilation is not absent from the ethics of Mr. Russell and Mr. Moore, even as it stands; and one trembles to think what it may become in the mouths of their disciples. Intolerance itself is a form of egoism, and to condemn egoism intolerantly is to share it. I cannot help thinking that a consciousness of the relativity of values, if it became prevalent, would tend to render people more truly social than would a belief that things have intrinsic and unchangeable values, no matter what the attitude of any one to them may be. If we said that goods, including the right distribution of goods, are relative to specific natures, moral warfare would continue, but not with poisoned arrows. Our private sense of justice itself would be acknowledged to have but a relative authority, and while we could not have a higher duty than to follow it, we should seek to meet those whose aims were incompatible with it as we meet things physically inconvenient, without insulting them as if they were morally vile or logically contemptible. Real unselfishness consists in sharing the interests of others. Beyond the pale of actual unanimity the only possible unselfishness is chivalry—a recognition of the inward right and justification of our enemies fighting against us. This chivalry has long been practised in the battle-field without abolishing the causes of war; and it might conceivably be extended to all the conflicts of men with one another, and of the warring elements within each breast. Policy, hypnotisation, and even surgery may be practised without exorcisms or anathemas. When a man has decided on a course of

牺牲，这些牺牲将使他们付出高昂代价；但这只会扩展，可以说，他们存在中那部分被他们允许篡夺普遍帝国的有害利己主义。不宽容和自我残害的腔调，即使就现状而言，也并未从罗素先生和摩尔先生的伦理学中消失；人们不禁颤抖地想到，它在他们门徒口中会变成什么。不宽容本身就是利己主义的一种形式，而不宽容地谴责利己主义就是分享它。我不禁认为，对价值相对性的意识，如果变得普遍，将比相信事物具有内在且不可变的价值的信念--无论任何人对它们持何种态度--更能使人们真正地社会化。如果我们说善，包括善的正当分配，是相对于特定本性的，那么道德斗争将继续，但不会用毒箭。我们私人的正义感本身将被承认为只具有相对的权威，而虽然我们不可能有比遵循它更高的义务，我们应当设法与那些目标与之不相容的人相遇，就像我们遇到物理上不便的事物一样，而不侮辱他们，仿佛他们在道德上卑劣或在逻辑上可鄙。真正的无私在于分享他人的利益。在实际一致的范围之外，唯一可能的无私是骑士精神--承认与我们作战的敌人的内在权利和正当性。这种骑士精神早已在战场上实践，却并未废除战争的原因；可以设想它可被扩展到人与人之间的一切冲突，以及每个人胸中交战元素之间的冲突。政策、催眠，甚至外科手术都可以实践，而无需驱魔或诅咒。当一个人已决定采取某一行动

action, it is a vain indulgence in expletives to declare that he is sure that course is absolutely right. His moral dogma expresses its natural origin all the more clearly the more hotly it is proclaimed; and ethical absolutism, being a mental grimace of passion, refutes what it says by what it is. Sweeter and more profound, to my sense, is the philosophy of Homer, whose every line seems to breathe the conviction that what is beautiful or precious has not thereby any right to existence; nothing has such a right; nor is it given us to condemn absolutely any force—god or man—that destroys what is beautiful or precious, for it has doubtless something beautiful or precious of its own to achieve.

方针时，宣称他确信该方针绝对正确，不过是徒劳地沉溺于感叹词。他的道德教义越是热烈地被宣告，就越是清楚地表达其自然起源；而伦理绝对论，作为激情的一种心理鬼脸，以其所是反驳其所说。在我看来，更甜美、更深刻的是荷马的哲学，其每一行似乎都呼吸着这样一种信念：美或珍贵的东西并不因此就有任何存在的权利；没有任何东西有这样的权利；我们也没有被赋予绝对谴责任何毁灭美或珍贵之物的力量--神或人--的权利，因为它无疑有自己要去成就的某种美或珍贵之物。

The consequences of a hypostasis of the good are no less interesting than its causes. If the good were independent of nature, it might still be conceived as relevant to nature, by being its creator or mover; but Mr. Russell is not a theist after the manner of Socrates; his good is not a power. Nor would representing it to be such long help his case; for an ideal hypostasised into a cause achieves only a mythical independence. The least criticism discloses that it is natural laws, zoological species, and human ideals, that have been projected into the empyrean; and it is no marvel that the good should attract the world where the good, by definition, is whatever the world is aiming at. The hypostasis accomplished by Mr. Russell is more serious, and therefore more paradoxical. If I understand it, it may be expressed as follows: In the realm of eternal essences, before anything exists, there are certain essences that have this remarkable property, that they ought to exist, or at least that, if anything exists, it ought to conform to them. What exists, however, is deaf to this moral emphasis in the eternal; nature

善之实体化的后果与其原因同样有趣。如果善独立于自然，它仍可被设想为与自然相关，因为它是自然的创造者或推动者；但罗素先生不是苏格拉底式的有神论者；他的善不是一种力量。把它表征为如此也不会长久有助于他的论证；因为一个被实体化为原因的理想要么只获得一种神话式的独立。最轻微的批评就会揭示，被投射到最高天去的是自然规律、动物学物种和人类理想；而善应当吸引世界，这并不奇怪，因为按定义，善就是世界所追求的东西。罗素先生所完成的实体化更为严肃，因而也更为悖谬。如果我理解得不错，它可以表述如下：在水恒诸本质的领域中，在任何事物存在之前，就有某些本质具有这种显著特性：它们应当存在，或者至少，如果任何事物存在，它就应当符合它们。然而，存在者对这种永恒中的道德强调充耳不闻；自然

exists for no reason; and, indeed, why should she have subordinated her own arbitrariness to a good that is no less arbitrary? This good, however, is somehow good notwithstanding; so that there is an abysmal wrong in its not being obeyed. The world is, in principle, totally depraved; but as the good is not a power, there is no one to redeem the world. The saints are those who, imitating the impotent dogmatism on high, and despising their sinful natural propensities, keep asserting that certain things are in themselves good and others bad, and declaring to be detestable any other saint who dogmatises differently. In this system the Calvinistic God has lost his creative and punitive functions, but continues to decree groundlessly what is good and what evil, and to love the one and hate the other with an infinite love or hatred. Meanwhile the reprobate need not fear hell in the next world, but the elect are sure to find it here.

存在是毫无理由的；而且，确实，她为何应当把自己的任意性服从于一种同样任意的善呢?然而，这种善无论如何仍然是善的；因此，不服从它便是一种深重的错误。世界在原则上是完全败坏的；但由于善并不是一种力量，所以没有人来救赎世界。圣徒们就是那些模仿高高在上的无能教条主义、蔑视自己罪恶的自然倾向、坚持断言某些事物本身是善的而另一些是恶的、并宣布任何以不同方式教条化的其他圣徒都是可憎的人。在这个体系中，加尔文主义的上帝失去了其创造和惩罚的职能，但继续无根据地规定什么是善、什么是恶，并以无限的爱或恨爱其一而恨其二。与此同时，被弃绝者不必畏惧来世的地狱，但选民却必定在此世发现它。

What shall we say of this strangely unreal and strangely personal religion? Is it a ghost of Calvinism, returned with none of its old force but with its old aspect of rigidity? Perhaps: but then, in losing its force, in abandoning its myths, and threats, and rhetoric, this religion has lost its deceptive sanctimony and hypocrisy; and in retaining its rigidity it has kept what made it noble and pathetic; for it is a clear dramatic expression of that human spirit —in this case a most pure and heroic spirit—which it strives so hard to dethrone. After all, the hypostasis of the good is only an unfortunate incident in a great accomplishment, which is the discernment of the good. I have dwelt chiefly on this incident, because in academic circles it is the abuses incidental to true philosophy that create controversy and form schools. Artificial systems, even when they prevail, after a while fatigue their

我们该如何评说这种奇异地不真实而又奇异地个人性的宗教呢?它是加尔文主义的一个幽灵，带着其旧有的僵化面貌归来，却已不具其旧有的力量吗?也许如此：但这样一来，在失去其力量、放弃其神话、威胁和修辞的过程中，这种宗教已经失去了其欺骗性的伪善和虚伪；而在保留其僵化的过程中，它保留了使其高贵而悲怆的东西；因为它是那种人类精神--在此情形下是一种最纯粹、最英勇的精神--的清晰的戏剧性表达，而它却如此努力地想要废黜这种精神。毕竟，善的实体化只是一个伟大成就中的不幸事件，而这个成就就是对善的辨识。我主要详述了这一事件，因为在学术圈中，正是真正哲学所附带产生的滥用才引发了争论并形成了学派。人为的体系，即使当它们盛行时，过一段时间也会使其

adherents, without ever having convinced or refuted their opponents, and they fade out of existence not by being refuted in their turn, but simply by a tacit agreement to ignore their claims: so that the true insight they were based on is too often buried under them. The hypostasis of philosophical terms is an abuse incidental to the forthright, unchecked use of the intellect; it substitutes for things the limits and distinctions that divide them. So physics is corrupted by logic; but the logic that corrupts physics is perhaps correct, and when it is moral dialectic, it is more important than physics itself. Mr. Russell's ethics *is* ethics. When we mortals have once assumed the moral attitude, it is certain that an indefinable value accrues to some things as opposed to others, that these things are many, that combinations of them have values not belonging to their parts, and that these valuable things are far more specific than abstract pleasure, and far more diffused than one's personal life. What a pity if this pure morality, in detaching itself impetuously from the earth, whose bright satellite it might be, should fly into the abyss at a tangent, and leave us as much in the dark as before!

FOOTNOTES:

[7] *Pragmatism*, p. 101.

[8] Plato, *Philebus*, 14, D. The dialectical element in this dialogue is evidently the basis of Mr. Russell's, as of Mr. Moore's, ethics; but they have not adopted the other elements in it, I mean the political and the theological. As to the political element, Plato everywhere conceives the good as the eligible in life, and refers it to human nature and to the pursuit of happiness—that happiness which Mr. Russell, in a rash moment, says is but a name which

追随者感到厌倦，却从未说服或驳倒其对手，它们淡出存在并非由于反过来被驳倒，而仅仅由于一种默许的约定去忽视其主张：以至于它们所依据的真正洞见太常常被埋没在它们之下。哲学术语的实体化是理智直率而无拘束地使用时所附带产生的一种滥用；它用划分事物的界限和区分取代了事物本身。于是物理学被逻辑所败坏；但败坏物理学的逻辑也许是正确的，而当它是道德辩证法时，它比物理学本身更重要。罗素先生的伦理学是伦理学。当我们凡人一旦采取了道德态度，就必定会有一种不可定义的价值归于某些事物而非另一些事物，这些事物是众多的，它们的组合具有不属于其各部分的价值，而这些有价值的事物远比抽象的快乐更为具体，也远比个人的生命更为弥散。多么可惜，如果这种纯粹的道德，在猛烈地从大地--它本可以是大地明亮的卫星--脱离时，竟沿切线飞入深渊，并让我们一如从前地留在黑暗之中!

脚注：

[7] 实用主义，第101页。

[8]柏拉图，《斐莱布篇》,14,D。这篇对话中的辩证元素显然是罗素先生伦理学的基础，正如也是摩尔先生伦理学的基础；但他们没有采纳其中的其他元素，我指的是政治元素和神学元素。至于政治元素，柏拉图在在处处都将善设想为生活中值得选择的东西，并将其归诸人性以及对幸福的追求--那种幸福，罗素先生在一个轻率的时刻说，不过是一个名称，而

some people prefer to give to pleasure. Thus in the *Philebus* (11, D) the good looked for is declared to be "some state and disposition of the soul which has the property of making all men happy"; and later (66, D) the conclusion is that insight is better than pleasure "as an element in human life." As to the theological element, Plato, in hypostasising the good, does not hypostasise it as good, but as cause or power, which is, it seems to me, the sole category that justifies hypostasis, and logically involves it; for if things have a ground at all, that ground must exist before them and beyond them. Hence the whole Platonic and Christian scheme, in making the good independent of private will and opinion, by no means makes it independent of the direction of nature in general and of human nature in particular; for all things have been created with an innate predisposition towards the creative good, and are capable of finding happiness in nothing else. Obligation, in this system, remains internal and vital. Plato attributes a single vital direction and a single moral source to the cosmos. This is what determines and narrows the scope of the true good; for the true good is that relevant to nature. Plato would not have been a dogmatic moralist, had he not been a theist.

有些人更愿意诉诸快乐。因此，在《菲勒布斯篇》(11,D)中，所寻求的善被宣称为“灵魂的某种状态和禀性，它具有使所有人幸福的性质”；随后(66,D)得出的结论是，洞见“作为人类生活中的一个要素”优于快乐。至于神学要素，柏拉图在将善实体化时，并非将其作为善而实体化，而是作为原因或力量，在我看来，这是唯一为实体化提供正当理由并逻辑地蕴含它的范畴；因为如果事物终究有一个根据，那个根据必定先于它们并超乎它们而存在。因此，整个柏拉图式和基督教的方案，在使善独立于私人意志和意见时，绝没有使它独立于一般自然的方向、尤其独立于人性的方向；因为一切事物被创造时都带有一种朝向创造性善的先天倾向，并且不可能在别的东西中找到幸福。在这一体系中，义务始终是内在的和生命性的。柏拉图将单一的生命方向和单一的道德源泉赋予宇宙。正是这一点规定并限定了真正善的范围；因为真正的善是与自然相关的善。柏拉图若不是一个有神论者，就不会是一个独断的道德主义者。

V

SHELLEY: OR THE POETIC VALUE OF REVOLUTIONARY PRINCIPLES

It is possible to advocate anarchy in criticism as in politics, and there is perhaps nothing coercive to urge against a man who

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雪莱：或革命原则的诗意价值

有可能在批评中如同在政治中一样倡导无政府主义，并且或许没有什么强制性的东西可以用来反对一个

maintains that any work of art is good enough, intrinsically and incommensurably, if it pleased anybody at any time for any reason. In practice, however, the ideal of anarchy is unstable. Irrefutable by argument, it is readily overcome by nature. It melts away before the dogmatic operation of the anarchist's own will, as soon as he allows himself the least creative endeavour. In spite of the infinite variety of what is merely possible, human nature and will have a somewhat definite constitution, and only what is harmonious with their actual constitution can long maintain itself in the moral world. Hence it is a safe principle in the criticism of art that technical proficiency, and brilliancy of fancy or execution, cannot avail to establish a great reputation. They may dazzle for a moment, but they cannot absolve an artist from the need of having an important subject-matter and a sane humanity.

主张任何艺术作品，就其本身而言，只要曾在任何时候因任何理由取悦过任何人，便是足够好的，且是不可通约地好。然而在实践中，无政府的理想是不稳定的。它无法被论证驳倒，却容易被自然所克服。一旦无政府主义者容许自己作哪怕最微小的创造性努力，它便在其自身意志的教义式运作面前消融殆尽。尽管仅仅可能之物有着无限的多样性，人性与意志却具有某种确定的构造，唯有与它们实际构造相和谐者，才能在道德世界中长久维持自身。因此，在艺术批评中，这是一个稳妥的原则：技术上的精湛，以及想象或表现上的辉煌，都不足以确立伟大的声誉。它们或许能炫目一时，却不能免除艺术家拥有重要题材与健全人性的需要。

If this principle is accepted, however, it might seem that certain artists, and perhaps the greatest, might not fare well at our hands. How would Shelley, for instance, stand such a test? Every one knows the judgment passed on Shelley by Matthew Arnold, a critic who evidently relied on this principle, even if he preferred to speak only in the name of his personal tact and literary experience. Shelley, Matthew Arnold said, was "a beautiful and ineffectual angel, beating his wings in a luminous void in vain." In consequence he declared that Shelley was not a classic, especially as his private circle had had an unsavoury morality, to be expressed only by the French word *sale*, and as moreover Shelley himself occasionally showed a distressing want of the sense of humour, which could only be called *bête*. These strictures, if a bit incoherent, are separately remarkably just. They unmask essential weaknesses not only in Shelley, but in all revolutionary people.

然而，倘若接受这一原则，某些艺术家，或许还是最伟大的艺术家，在我们手中似乎就未必能得到好评。例如，雪莱将如何经受这样的检验?人人都知道马修·阿诺德对雪莱所作的评判，这位批评家显然倚重这一原则，即便他宁愿只以个人 tact 与文学经验的名义发言。马修·阿诺德说，雪莱是“一个美丽而无用的天使，徒然在光明的虚空中拍打翅膀”。因此他宣称雪莱不是古典作家，尤其是因为他的私人圈子有一种令人厌恶的道德，只能用法语词*sale*来表达，而且雪莱本人偶尔还表现出一种令人苦恼的幽默感的匮乏，这只能被称为*bête*。这些苛评，即便有些前后不一，分开来看却极为公正。它们揭露的不仅是雪莱，而且是一切革命者身上的本质弱点。

The life of reason is a heritage and exists only through tradition. Half of it is an art, an adjustment to an alien reality, which only a long experience can teach: and even the other half, the inward inspiration and ideal of reason, must be also a common inheritance in the race, if people are to work together or so much as to understand one another. Now the misfortune of revolutionists is that they are disinherited, and their folly is that they wish to be disinherited even more than they are. Hence, in the midst of their passionate and even heroic idealisms, there is commonly a strange poverty in their minds, many an ugly turn in their lives, and an ostentatious vileness in their manners. They wish to be the leaders of mankind, but they are wretched representatives of humanity. In the concert of nature it is hard to keep in tune with oneself if one is out of tune with everything. We should not then be yielding to any private bias, but simply noting the conditions under which art may exist and may be appreciated, if we accepted the classical principle of criticism and asserted that substance, sanity, and even a sort of pervasive wisdom are requisite for supreme works of art. On the other hand—who can honestly doubt it?—the rebels and individualists are the men of direct insight and vital hope. The poetry of Shelley in particular is typically poetical. It is poetry divinely inspired; and Shelley himself is perhaps no more ineffectual or more lacking in humour than an angel properly should be. Nor is his greatness all a matter of æsthetic abstraction and wild music. It is a fact of capital importance in the development of human genius that the great revolution in Christendom against Christianity, a revolution that began with the Renaissance and is not yet completed, should have found angels to herald it, no less than that other revolution did

理性的生活是一种遗产，并且只通过传统而存在。它的一半是一门艺术，一种对异己现实的调适，唯有长期的经验才能教会：而即便是另一半，即理性内在的灵感与理想，也必须是种族中的共同继承物，倘若人们要共同工作，或者哪怕只是要相互理解的话。如今，革命者的不幸在于他们被剥夺了继承权，而他们的愚蠢在于他们希望被剥夺得比实际更多。因此，在他们热烈乃至英勇的唯心论之中，通常存在着一种奇特的心灵贫乏，他们生活中有许多丑陋的转折，举止中有一种招摇的卑劣。他们希望成为人类的领袖，却是人类可悲的代表。在自然的合奏中，一个人若与一切都不合拍，便难以与自己合拍。那么，我们若接受批评的古典原则，断言实质、健全乃至某种弥漫性的智慧是至高艺术作品所必需的，我们便不是在屈从任何私人偏见，而只是注意到艺术得以存在并得以被欣赏的条件。另一方面--谁能诚实地怀疑这一点呢?--反叛者与个人主义者才是具有直接洞见与生命希望的人。尤其是雪莱的诗是典型的诗。它是神启的诗；而雪莱本人或许并不比一个天使所应有的样子更无用或更缺乏幽默。他的伟大也并非全然是审美抽象与狂野音乐之事。在人类天才的发展中，有一件至关重要的事实：基督教世界反对基督教的那场伟大革命--这场革命始于文艺复兴而尚未完成--应当像那另一场革命一样，找到了天使来宣告它

which began at Bethlehem; and that among these new angels there should have been one so winsome, pure, and rapturous as Shelley. How shall we reconcile these conflicting impressions? Shall we force ourselves to call the genius of Shelley second rate because it was revolutionary, and shall we attribute all enthusiasm for him to literary affectation or political prejudice? Or shall we rather abandon the orthodox principle that an important subject-matter and a sane spirit are essential to great works? Or shall we look for a different issue out of our perplexity, by asking if the analysis and comprehension are not perhaps at fault which declare that these things are not present in Shelley's poetry? This last is the direction in which I conceive the truth to lie. A little consideration will show us that Shelley really has a great subject-matter—what ought to be; and that he has a real humanity—though it is humanity in the seed, humanity in its internal principle, rather than in those deformed expressions of it which can flourish in the world.

那另一场革命始于伯利恒；而在这些新天使之中，应当有一位像雪莱这般迷人、纯洁而狂喜。我们该如何调和这些相互冲突的印象?我们是否要强迫自己因为雪莱的天才是革命的便称其为二流，并把对他的一切热情都归因于文学上的做作或政治偏见?还是我们宁可放弃那条正统原则，即重要题材与健全精神是伟大作品所必需的?还是我们应当为摆脱困惑而寻求另一种出路，追问那宣称雪莱诗中不具备这些东西的分析与理解是否也许有误?我认为真理正存在于最后这个方向。稍加思索便会向我们表明，雪莱确实有一个伟大的题材--应当存在之物；而且他有一种真正的人性--尽管那是种子中的人性，是其内在原则中的人性，而非那些能在世间繁茂生长的变形表现。

Shelley seems hardly to have been brought up; he grew up in the nursery among his young sisters, at school among the rude boys, without any affectionate guidance, without imbibing any religious or social tradition. If he received any formal training or correction, he instantly rejected it inwardly, set it down as unjust and absurd, and turned instead to sailing paper boats, to reading romances or to writing them, or to watching with delight the magic of chemical experiments. Thus the mind of Shelley was thoroughly disinherited; but not, like the minds of most revolutionists, by accident and through the niggardliness of fortune, for few revolutionists would be such if they were heirs to a baronetcy. Shelley's mind disinherited itself out of allegiance to

雪莱似乎几乎未曾受过教养；他在育儿室里在年幼的姐妹中间长大，在学校里在粗野的男孩中间长大，没有任何充满关爱的引导，没有汲取任何宗教或社会传统。倘若他受到任何正式的训导或纠正，他立刻在内心里加以拒斥，将其断定为不义与荒谬，转而去做纸船、读传奇或写传奇，或欣喜地观看化学实验的魔力。因此，雪莱的心灵被彻底剥夺了继承权；但并非像大多数革命者的心灵那样，出于偶然和命运的吝啬，因为倘若能继承从男爵爵位，很少有革命者会成为革命者。雪莱的心灵是出于对……的忠诚而自行剥夺了继承权

itself, because it was too sensitive and too highly endowed for the world into which it had descended. It rejected ordinary education, because it was incapable of assimilating it. Education is suitable to those few animals whose faculties are not completely innate, animals that, like most men, may be perfected by experience because they are born with various imperfect alternative instincts rooted equally in their system. But most animals, and a few men, are not of this sort. They cannot be educated, because they are born complete. Full of predeterminate intuitions, they are without intelligence, which is the power of seeing things as they are. Endowed with a specific, unshakable faith, they are impervious to experience: and as they burst the womb they bring ready-made with them their final and only possible system of philosophy.

它本身，因为它对它降临于其中的世界来说过于敏感、禀赋过高。它拒绝普通教育，因为它无法同化这种教育。教育适合那些少数动物，它们的官能并非完全天生，这些动物像大多数人一样，可能因经验而臻于完善，因为它们生来就带有各种不完善的替代性本能，这些本能同样植根于它们的系统之中。但大多数动物，以及少数人，并非此类。他们无法受教育，因为他们生来就是完整的。充满预先确定的直觉，他们没有知性，而知性是以事物本来的样子来看待事物的能力。被赋予一种特定的、不可动摇的信仰，他们对经验无动于衷：当他们冲出子宫时，他们随身带来了他们最终的、唯一可能的哲学体系。

Shelley was one of these spokesmen of the *a priori*, one of these nurslings of the womb, like a bee or a butterfly; a dogmatic, inspired, perfect, and incorrigible creature. He was innocent and cruel, swift and wayward, illuminated and blind. Being a finished child of nature, not a joint product, like most of us, of nature, history, and society, he abounded miraculously in his own clear sense, but was obtuse to the droll, miscellaneous lessons of fortune. The cannonade of hard, inexplicable facts that knocks into most of us what little wisdom we have left Shelley dazed and sore, perhaps, but uninstructed. When the storm was over, he began chirping again his own natural note. If the world continued to confine and obsess him, he hated the world, and gasped for freedom. Being incapable of understanding reality, he revelled in creating world after world in idea. For his nature was not merely predetermined and obdurate, it was also sensitive, vehement, and fertile. With the soul of a bird, he had the senses of a man-child;

雪莱就是这些*a priori*的代言人之一，这些子宫的哺育儿之一，像蜜蜂或蝴蝶一样；一个教义的、受启发的、完美的、不可矫正的生物。他天真而残忍，迅捷而任性，被照亮而盲目。作为自然的完成之子，而非像我们大多数人那样是自然、历史和社会的联合产物，他奇迹般地充盈于他自己清晰的感官之中，但对命运那滑稽而杂多的教训却迟钝不敏。那些坚硬、不可解释的事实的炮击，把我们所剩无几的智慧敲入我们大多数人之中，却也许只是让雪莱茫然和疼痛，而未曾受到教导。当风暴过去，他又开始啁啾他自己的自然音符。如果世界继续限制和困扰他，他就恨这个世界，并渴望自由。由于无法理解现实，他沉醉于在观念中创造一个又一个世界。因为他的本性不仅是预先确定的 and 顽固的，它也是敏感的、激烈的和丰饶的。带着鸟的灵魂，他有着孩童的感官；

the instinct of the butterfly was united in him with the instinct of the brooding fowl and of the pelican. This winged spirit had a heart. It darted swiftly on its appointed course, neither expecting nor understanding opposition; but when it met opposition it did not merely flutter and collapse; it was inwardly outraged, it protested proudly against fate, it cried aloud for liberty and justice.

蝴蝶的本能在他身上与孵卵的母鸡和鹈鹕的本能结合在一起。这个有翅膀的精神有一颗心。它迅速飞奔在指定的路线上，既不期待也不理解反对；但当它遇到反对时，它不只是振翅和崩溃；它在内心感到愤怒，它自豪地抗议命运，它大声呼吁自由和正义。

The consequence was that Shelley, having a nature preformed but at the same time tender, passionate, and moral, was exposed to early and continual suffering. When the world violated the ideal which lay so clear before his eyes, that violation filled him with horror. If to the irrepressible gushing of life from within we add the suffering and horror that continually checked it, we shall have in hand, I think, the chief elements of his genius.

结果是，雪莱具有一种预先形成的天性，但同时温柔、热情和道德，早年就暴露于持续的痛苦之中。当世界违反了他眼前如此清晰的理想时，那种违反使他充满恐惧。如果我们在生命从内部不可抑制地涌出之外，再加上不断检查它的痛苦和恐惧，我想我们就掌握了他才华的主要元素。

Love of the ideal, passionate apprehension of what ought to be, has for its necessary counterpart condemnation of the actual, wherever the actual does not conform to that ideal. The spontaneous soul, the soul of the child, is naturally revolutionary; and when the revolution fails, the soul of the youth becomes naturally pessimistic. All moral life and moral judgment have this deeply romantic character; they venture to assert a private ideal in the face of an intractable and omnipotent world. Some moralists begin by feeling the attraction of untasted and ideal perfection. These, like Plato, excel in elevation, and they are apt to despise rather than to reform the world. Other moralists begin by a revolt against the actual, at some point where they find the actual particularly galling. These excel in sincerity; their purblind conscience is urgent, and they are reformers in intent and sometimes even in action. But the ideals they frame are

对理想的热爱，对应当存在之物的激情领会，其必然的对应物是对现实之物的谴责，只要现实之物不符合那个理想。自发的灵魂，孩子的灵魂，天生是革命的；而当革命失败时，青年的灵魂就自然变得悲观。一切道德生活和道德判断都具有这种深刻的浪漫性格；它们敢于面对一个难以驾驭且全能的世界，断言一个私人的理想。有些道德家从感受未品尝过的、理想的完美的吸引力开始。这些人，像柏拉图一样，擅长于崇高，他们倾向于鄙视世界而不是改革世界。另一些道德家从对现实的反叛开始，在某个他们发现现实特别令人恼火的地方。这些人擅长于真诚；他们半盲的良心是急迫的，他们在意图上，有时甚至在行动上，是改革者。但他们所构想的理想是

fragmentary and shallow, often mere provisional vague watchwords, like liberty, equality, and fraternity; they possess no positive visions or plans for moral life as a whole, like Plato's *Republic*. The Utopian or visionary moralists are often rather dazed by this wicked world; being well-intentioned but impotent, they often take comfort in fancying that the ideal they pine for is already actually embodied on earth, or is about to be embodied on earth in a decade or two, or at least is embodied eternally in a sphere immediately above the earth, to which we shall presently climb, and be happy for ever.

碎片化的和浅薄的，往往只是临时的模糊口号，如自由、平等和博爱；它们不像柏拉图的理想国那样，对作为整体的道德生活拥有任何积极的愿景或计划。乌托邦的或空想的道德家常常被这个邪恶的世界弄得相当茫然；他们善意但无能，常常以幻想他们渴望的理想已经实际体现在地球上，或即将在一二十年内地体现于地球上，或至少永恒地体现在地球正上方的一个领域中为慰藉，我们不久将攀登到那里，并永远幸福。

Lovers of the ideal who thus hastily believe in its reality are called idealists, and Shelley was an idealist in almost every sense of that hard-used word. He early became an idealist after Berkeley's fashion, in that he discredited the existence of matter and embraced a psychological or (as it was called) intellectual system of the universe. In his drama *Hellas* he puts this view with evident approval into the mouth of Ahasuerus:

那些如此仓促地相信理想之实在性的理想爱好者被称为理想主义者，而雪莱在这个被滥用的词的几乎每一种意义上都是一位理想主义者。他早年便依循贝克莱的方式成为一位理想主义者，因为他否弃了物质的存在，并采纳了一种心理的、或(如当时所称)智性的宇宙体系。在他的剧作《希腊》中，他借阿哈苏鲁斯之口表达了这一观点，且显然持赞同态度：

"This whole
Of suns and worlds and men and beasts and flowers,
With all the silent or tempestuous workings
By which they have been, are, or cease to be,
Is but a vision;—all that it inherits
Are motes of a sick eye, bubbles and dreams.
Thought is its cradle and its grave; nor less
The future and the past are idle shadows
Of thought's eternal flight—they have no being:
Nought is but that which feels itself to be."

“这整个
太阳、世界、人类、野兽和花朵，以及它们过去、现在或不再存在的一切沉默或暴风雨般的运作，不过是一个幻象；--它所继承的一切
是病眼的尘埃、气泡和梦。思想是它的摇篮和坟墓；未来和过去同样是思想永恒飞翔的空闲阴影--它们没有存在：除了感觉到自己存在的东西外，什么也没有。”

But Shelley was even more deeply and constantly an idealist after the manner of Plato; for he regarded the good as a magnet

但雪莱更深刻、更持续地是一个柏拉图式的理想主义者；因为他将善视为磁铁

“它甚至像爱一样爱--它深心充满；它渴望它没有的东西，那美丽的。”

(inexplicably not working for the moment) that draws all life and motion after it; and he looked on the types and ideals of things as on eternal realities that subsist, beautiful and untarnished, when the glimmerings that reveal them to our senses have died away. From the infinite potentialities of beauty in the abstract, articulate mind draws certain bright forms—the Platonic ideas—"the gathered rays which are reality," as Shelley called them: and it is the light of these ideals cast on objects of sense that lends to these objects some degree of reality and value, making out of them "lovely apparitions, dim at first, then radiant ... the progeny immortal of painting, sculpture, and rapt poesy."

(莫名其妙暂时不起作用)它吸引着一切生命和运动；他把事物的类型和理想看作永恒的现实，这些现实存在，美丽而无瑕，当向我们感官揭示它们的微光消失之后。从抽象美的无限潜能中，分节的心灵汲取某些明亮的形式--柏拉图式的理念--“被聚集的光线，那就是现实”，如雪莱所称：正是这些理想投射在感官对象上的光，赋予这些对象某种程度的现实和价值，使它们成为“可爱的幻象，起初暗淡，然后光芒四射……绘画、雕塑和狂喜诗歌的不朽后代。”

The only kind of idealism that Shelley had nothing to do with is the kind that prevails in some universities, that Hegelian idealism which teaches that perfect good is a vicious abstraction, and maintains that all the evil that has been, is, and ever shall be is indispensable to make the universe as good as it possibly could be. In this form, idealism is simply contempt for all ideals, and a hearty adoration of things as they are; and as such it appeals mightily to the powers that be, in church and in state; but in that capacity it would have been as hateful to Shelley as the powers that be always were, and as the philosophy was that flattered them. For his moral feeling was based on suffering and horror at what is actual, no less than on love of a visioned good. His conscience was, to a most unusual degree, at once elevated and sincere. It was inspired in equal measure by prophecy and by indignation. He was carried away in turn by enthusiasm for what his ethereal and fertile fancy pictured as possible, and by detestation of the reality forced upon him instead. Hence that extraordinary moral fervour which is the soul of his poetry. His

雪莱与之毫无瓜葛的唯一一种唯心论，是某些大学里盛行的那种唯心论，即黑格尔式的唯心论，它教导说完美的善是一种恶的抽象，并主张一切曾经存在、现在存在、将来也永远存在的恶，都是使宇宙尽可能好所不可或缺的。在这种形式下，唯心论不过是对一切理想的蔑视，以及对事物现状的衷心崇拜；正因如此，它极大地迎合了教会和国家中的当权者；但以这种身份，它本会像当权者一贯那样令雪莱憎恶，也像那奉承当权者的哲学一样令他憎恶。因为他的道德感既建立在对于现实事物的受苦与恐惧之上，也同样建立在对于所憧憬的善的热爱之上。他的良心以一种极不寻常的程度，既高尚又真诚。它同等地受到预言与义愤的激发。他时而为热情所席卷，那是对他那空灵而丰饶的想象所描绘为可能之物的热情；时而又为厌恶所席卷，那是对强加于他的现实的厌恶。因此才有那非凡的道德热忱，那正是他诗歌的灵魂。他的

imagination is no playful undirected kaleidoscope; the images, often so tenuous and metaphysical, that crowd upon him, are all sparks thrown off at white heat, embodiments of a fervent, definite, unswerving inspiration. If we think that the *Cloud* or the *West Wind* or the *Witch of the Atlas* are mere fireworks, poetic dust, a sort of *bataille des fleurs* in which we are pelted by a shower of images—we have not understood the passion that overflows in them, as any long-nursed passion may, in any of us, suddenly overflow in an unwonted profusion of words. This is a point at which Francis Thompson's understanding of Shelley, generally so perfect, seems to me to go astray. The universe, Thompson tells us, was Shelley's box of toys. "He gets between the feet of the horses of the sun. He stands in the lap of patient Nature, and twines her loosened tresses after a hundred wilful fashions, to see how she will look nicest in his song." This last is not, I think, Shelley's motive; it is not the truth about the spring of his genius. He undoubtedly shatters the world to bits, but only to build it nearer to the heart's desire, only to make out of its coloured fragments some more Elysian home for love, or some more dazzling symbol for that infinite beauty which is the need—the profound, aching, imperative need—of the human soul. This recreative impulse of the poet's is not wilful, as Thompson calls it: it is moral. Like the *Sensitive Plant*

想象并非无目的嬉戏的万花筒；那些常常如此纤细而形而上的意象簇拥在他周围，全都是白热状态下迸发的火花，是一种热烈、明确、坚定不移的灵感的化身。如果我们以为《云》或《西风颂》或《阿特拉斯的女巫》不过是烟火、诗意的尘埃，一种我们被意象之雨所击打的「花之战」--那我们就尚未理解其中满溢的激情，正如任何长久孕育的激情，在我们任何人身上，都可能突然以不寻常的词语丰沛溢出。正是在这一点上，弗朗西斯·汤普森对雪莱的知性--通常如此完美--在我看来误入了歧途。汤普森告诉我们，宇宙是雪莱的玩具箱。“他置身于太阳之马的马蹄之间。他站在耐心的自然的膝上，将她松散的鬈发以百种任性的样式缠绕，看她在他的歌中如何显得最美。”这最后一点，我认为，并非雪莱的动机；这不是关于他天才之源泉的真理。他无疑将世界击成碎片，但只是为了将它建造得更接近心之所愿，只是为了用其彩色的碎片为爱造出某个更极乐的家园，或为那无限的美--那是人类灵魂的需要，深切、痛楚、迫切的需要--造出某个更耀眼的象征。诗人这种再创造的冲动并非如汤普森所称的任性：它是道德的。如同《含羞草》

"It loves even like Love,—its deep heart is full;
It desires what it has not, the beautiful."

它像爱一样爱——深情满怀；它渴望所没有的美。

The question for Shelley is not at all what will look nicest in his song; that is the preoccupation of mincing rhymesters, whose well is soon dry. Shelley's abundance has a more generous source; it springs from his passion for picturing what would be best, not in

对雪莱而言，问题根本不在于什么在他的诗歌中看起来最美；那是矫揉造作的押韵诗人的关注所在，他们的灵感之井很快就会干涸。雪莱的丰沛有一个更为慷慨的源泉；它源自他描绘什么将是最好的激情，而非在

the picture, but in the world. Hence, when he feels he has pictured or divined it, he can exclaim:

"The joy, the triumph, the delight, the madness,
The boundless, overflowing, bursting gladness,
The vaporous exultation, not to be confined!
Ha! Ha! the animation of delight,
Which wraps me like an atmosphere of light,
And bears me as a cloud is borne by its own wind!"

To match this gift of bodying forth the ideal Shelley had his vehement sense of wrong; and as he seized upon and recast all images of beauty, to make them more perfectly beautiful, so, to vent his infinite horror of evil, he seized on all the worst images of crime or torture that he could find, and recast them so as to reach the quintessence of distilled badness. His pictures of war, famine, lust, and cruelty are, or seem, forced, although perhaps, as in the *Cenci*, he might urge that he had historical warrant for his descriptions, far better historical warrant, no doubt, than the beauty and happiness actually to be found in the world could give him for his *Skylark*, his *Epipsychidion*, or his *Prometheus*. But to exaggerate good is to vivify, to enhance our sense of moral coherence and beautiful naturalness; it is to render things more graceful, intelligible, and congenial to the spirit which they ought to serve. To aggravate evil, on the contrary, is to darken counsel—already dark enough—and the want of truth to nature in this pessimistic sort of exaggeration is not compensated for by any advantage. The violence and, to my feeling, the wantonness of these invectives—for they are invectives in intention and in effect—may have seemed justified to Shelley by his political purpose. He was thirsting to destroy kings, priests, soldiers, parents, and

“喜悦、胜利、欢欣、疯狂，无边、洋溢、爆发的快乐，那不可限制的蒸汽般的狂喜!哈!哈!喜悦的活力，

对他而言，存在永远不会想到；或者，如果这个想法出
现，它会显得太可怕而不真实。

它如光之氛围将我包裹，
而熊我，如云被其自身的风所承载!

为了与这种将理想具体化的天赋相匹配，雪莱有着对不义的强烈感受；正如他抓住并重塑一切美的形象，使它们更加完美地美，同样，为了发泄他对恶的无限恐惧，他抓住他能找到的一切最恶劣的犯罪或折磨的形象，并重塑它们，以达到蒸馏出的恶之精髓。他对战争、饥荒、淫欲和残酷的描绘是，或似乎是，勉强的，尽管也许，如在《钦契》中，他可以辩称他的描述有历史依据，无疑比世界上实际可找到的美和幸福能给予他的《云雀》、《厄庇普西基迪昂》或《普罗米修斯》更好的历史依据。但夸大善就是赋予生命，增强我们对道德连贯性和美好自然性的感受；就是使事物更加优雅、可理解，并与它们应当服务的精神更加契合。相反，加重恶就是使本已足够黑暗的谋议更加黑暗，而这种悲观式夸大中对自然的真理之缺失，并不能由任何好处来补偿。这些谩骂的暴烈，以及在我看来，的恣意--因为它们在意图和效果上都是谩骂--在雪莱看来也许因其政治目的而被证明是正当的。他渴望摧毁国王、祭司、士兵、父母以及

heads of colleges—to destroy them, I mean, in their official capacity; and the exhibition of their vileness in all its diabolical purity might serve to remove scruples in the half-hearted. We, whom the nineteenth century has left so tender to historical rights and historical beauties, may wonder that a poet, an impassioned lover of the beautiful, could have been such a leveller, and such a vandal in his theoretical destructiveness. But here the legacy of the eighteenth century was speaking in Shelley, as that of the nineteenth is speaking in us: and moreover, in his own person, the very fertility of imagination could be a cause of blindness to the past and its contingent sanctities. Shelley was not left standing aghast, like a Philistine, before the threatened destruction of all traditional order. He had, and knew he had, the seeds of a far lovelier order in his own soul; there he found the plan or memory of a perfect commonwealth of nature ready to rise at once on the ruins of this sad world, and to make regret for it impossible.

学院院长--我的意思是，摧毁他们的官方身份；而将他们那恶魔般纯粹的卑劣展示出来，或许有助于消除半心半意者的顾虑。我们，被十九世纪留下如此温柔地对待历史权利与历史之美的人，也许会奇怪，一个诗人，一个美的热烈爱好者，竟会是这样一个平等主义者，在理论上的破坏性上竟是这样一个破坏文物者。但在这里，是十八世纪的遗产在雪莱身上说话，正如十九世纪的遗产在我们身上说话：而且，在他本人身上，想象的极度丰饶本身就可能成为对过去及其偶然神圣性视而不见的原因。雪莱并未像市侩那样，在一切传统秩序受到威胁的毁灭面前惊骇地站着。他拥有，并且知道自己拥有，一个远为可爱的秩序的种子，就在他自己的灵魂中；在那里他找到了一个完美的自然共和国的蓝图或记忆，它准备立刻在这悲惨世界的废墟上兴起，并使对它的惋惜成为不可能。

So much for what I take to be the double foundation of Shelley's genius, a vivid love of ideal good on the one hand, and on the other, what is complementary to that vivid love, much suffering and horror at the touch of actual evils. On this double foundation he based an opinion which had the greatest influence on his poetry, not merely on the subject-matter of it, but also on the exuberance and urgency of emotion which suffuses it. This opinion was that all that caused suffering and horror in the world could be readily destroyed: it was the belief in perfectibility. An animal that has rigid instincts and an *a priori* mind is probably very imperfectly adapted to the world he comes into: his organs cannot be moulded by experience and use; unless they are fitted by some miraculous pre-established harmony, or by natural

关于我所认为的雪莱天才的双重基础，已经说得够多了：一方面是对于理想之善的生动热爱，另一方面是与那生动热爱相辅相成的、在接触现实之恶时的诸多受苦与恐惧。在这双重基础之上，他建立了一种对他的诗歌影响最大的意见，不仅影响其题材，也影响弥漫其中的情感的丰沛与迫切。这种意见是：世上一切造成受苦与恐惧的东西都可以轻易被摧毁：这就是对可完善性的信念。一个具有 rigid 本能和*a priori*心灵的动物，很可能极不完美地适应于他所进入的世界：他的器官无法被经验和运用所塑造；除非它们由某种奇迹般的预定和谐，或由自然

selection, to things as they are, they will never be reconciled with them, and an eternal war will ensue between what the animal needs, loves, and can understand and what the outer reality offers. So long as such a creature lives—and his life will be difficult and short—events will continually disconcert and puzzle him; everything will seem to him unaccountable, inexplicable, unnatural. He will not be able to conceive the real order and connection of things sympathetically, by assimilating his habits of thought to their habits of evolution. His faculties being innate and unadaptable will not allow him to correct his presumptions and axioms; he will never be able to make nature the standard of naturalness. What contradicts his private impulses will seem to him to contradict reason, beauty, and necessity. In this paradoxical situation he will probably take refuge in the conviction that what he finds to exist is an illusion, or at least not a fair sample of reality. Being so perverse, absurd, and repugnant, the given state of things must be, he will say, only accidental and temporary. He will be sure that his own *a priori* imagination is the mirror of all the eternal proprieties, and that as his mind can move only in one predetermined way, things cannot be prevented from moving in that same way save by some strange violence done to their nature. It would be easy, therefore, to set everything right again: nay, everything must be on the point of righting itself spontaneously. Wrong, of its very essence, must be in unstable equilibrium. The conflict between what such a man feels ought to exist and what he finds actually existing must, he will feel sure, end by a speedy revolution in things, and by the removal of all scandals; that it should end by the speedy removal of his own person, or by such a revolution in his demands as might reconcile

选择，对于事物本来的样子，它们永远不会与之调和，一场永恒的战争将在动物所需要、所爱、所能理解的东西与外部现实所提供的东西之间接踵而至。只要这样一个造物活着--他的生命将是艰难而短暂的--事件就会不断地使他感到不安和困惑；一切在他看来都将是不可解释、不可说明、不自然的。他将无法通过将自己的思维习惯同化于事物进化的习惯，来同情地构想事物的真实秩序和联系。他的官能既然是先天的且不可适应的，就不允许他纠正自己的假定和公理；他将永远无法使自然成为自然性的标准。凡与他的私人冲动相矛盾的东西，在他看来都将与理性、美和必然性相矛盾。在这种悖谬的处境中，他很可能遁入这样一种信念：他所发现存在的东西是一种幻象，或者至少不是实在的公正样本。既如此反常、荒谬和令人反感，事物的既定状态必定--他会说--只是偶然的和暂时的。他将确信他自己的*a priori*想象是一切永恒合宜性的镜子，并且既然他的心灵只能以一种预定的方式运动，那么事物若非其本性遭到某种奇怪的暴力，便不可能被阻止以同样的方式运动。因此，要重新把一切安排妥当将是容易的：不，一切都必定即将自行矫正。错误，就其本质而言，必定处于不稳定的平衡之中。这样一个人所感到应当存在的东西与他所发现实际存在的东西之间的冲突，他将确信，必定以事物的迅速革命而告终，以一切丑闻的消除而告终；至于这种冲突竟会以他本人迅速的消失而告终，或者以他的要求发生某种革命从而得以调和

him to existence, will never occur to him; or, if the thought occurs to him, it will seem too horrible to be true.

Such a creature cannot adapt himself to things by education, and consequently he cannot adapt things to himself by industry. His choice lies absolutely between victory and martyrdom. But at the very moment of martyrdom, martyrs, as is well known, usually feel assured of victory. The *a priori* spirit will therefore be always a prophet of victory, so long as it subsists at all. The vision of a better world at hand absorbed the Israelites in exile, St. John the Baptist in the desert, and Christ on the cross. The martyred spirit always says to the world it leaves, "This day thou shall be with me in paradise."

In just this way, Shelley believed in perfectibility. In his latest poems—in *Hellas*, in *Adonais*—he was perhaps a little inclined to remove the scene of perfectibility to a metaphysical region, as the Christian church soon removed it to the other world. Indeed, an earth really made perfect is hardly distinguishable from a posthumous heaven: so profoundly must everything in it be changed, and so angel-like must every one in it become. Shelley's earthly paradise, as described in *Prometheus* and in *Epipsychidion*, is too festival-like too much of a mere culmination, not to be fugitive: it cries aloud to be translated into a changeless and metaphysical heaven, which to Shelley's mind could be nothing but the realm of Platonic ideas, where "life, like a dome of many-coloured glass," no longer "stains the white radiance of eternity." But the age had been an age of revolution and, in spite of disappointments, retained its faith in revolution; and the young Shelley was not satisfied with a paradise removed to the intangible realms of poetry or of religion; he hoped, like the old

对他而言，存在永远不会想到；或者，如果这个想法出现，它会显得太可怕而不真实。

这样一个造物无法通过教育使自己适应事物，因而也无法通过勤劳使事物适应自己。他的选择绝对地介于胜利与殉道之间。但恰恰在殉道的时刻，众所周知，殉道者通常确信胜利。因此，*a priori*精神只要还存在，就将始终是胜利的预言者。一个更美好世界近在眼前的幻象曾使流亡中的以色列人、沙漠中的施洗约翰和十字架上的基督全神贯注。殉道的精神总是对它离弃的世界说：“今日你要同我在乐园里了。”

正是以这种方式，雪莱相信可完善性。在他最后的诗作中--在《希腊》中，在《阿多尼斯》中--他也许有点倾向于把可完善性的场景移到一个形而上学的领域，正如基督教会很快把它移到另一个世界一样。的确，一个真正被造得完美的尘世与一个死后的天堂几乎无法区分：其中一切必定被如此深刻地改变，其中每一个人必定变得如此天使一般。雪莱在《普罗米修斯》和《厄庇普西基迪昂》中所描述的尘世乐园，太像节日庆典，太只是一种纯粹的顶点，不可能不是转瞬即逝的：它大声疾呼着要被翻译成一个不变易的、形而上学的天堂，而在雪莱的心灵中，这个天堂只能是柏拉图理念的领域，在那里，“生命，像一座多色玻璃的穹顶”，不再“染污永恒的白色光辉”。但那个时代一直是一个革命的时代，尽管有种种失望，仍保留着对革命的信仰；年轻的雪莱并不满足于一个被移到诗歌或宗教的不可捉摸领域的乐园；他希望，像古老的

Hebrews, for a paradise on earth. His notion was that eloquence could change the heart of man, and that love, kindled there by the force of reason and of example, would transform society. He believed, Mrs. Shelley tells us, "that mankind had only to will that there should be no evil, and there would be none." And she adds: "That man could be so perfectionised as to be able to expel evil from his own nature, and from the greater part of creation, was the cardinal point of his system." This cosmic extension of the conversion of men reminds one of the cosmic extension of the Fall conceived by St. Augustine; and in the *Prometheus* Shelley has allowed his fancy, half in symbol, half in glorious physical hyperbole, to carry the warm contagion of love into the very bowels of the earth, and even the moon, by reflection, to catch the light of love, and be alive again.

希伯来人那样，希望一个尘世上的乐园。他的想法是，雄辩可以改变人的心，而由理性和榜样的力量在那里点燃的爱将改造社会。雪莱夫人告诉我们，他相信“人类只需意欲没有恶，就不会有恶。”她还补充说：“人可以被完善到能够从自己的本性中、并从造物的更大部分中驱逐恶的程度，这是他体系的核心要点。”这种对人的皈依的宇宙性延伸，使人想起圣奥古斯丁所构想的堕落的宇宙性延伸；而在《普罗米修斯》中，雪莱让他的幻想--一半是象征，一半是壮丽的物理夸张--把爱的温暖传染带入大地的脏腑深处，甚至让月亮通过反射也捕捉到爱的光，重新活过来。

Shelley, we may safely say, did not understand the real constitution of nature. It was hidden from him by a cloud, all woven of shifting rainbows and bright tears. Only his emotional haste made it possible for him to entertain such, opinions as he did entertain; or rather, it was inevitable that the mechanism of nature, as it is in its depths, should remain in his pictures only the shadowiest of backgrounds. His poetry is accordingly a part of the poetry of illusion; the poetry of truth, if we have the courage to hope for such a thing, is reserved for far different and yet unborn poets. But it is only fair to Shelley to remember that the moral being of mankind is as yet in its childhood; all poets play with images not understood; they touch on emotions sharply, at random, as in a dream; they suffer each successive vision, each poignant sentiment, to evaporate into nothing, or to leave behind only a heart vaguely softened and fatigued, a gentle languor, or a

我们可以有把握地说，雪莱并不理解自然的真正构造。它被一朵云遮蔽于他之外，那云全由变幻的彩虹和明亮的泪水织成。只有他的情感上的仓促才使他有可能持有他所持有的那些意见；或者更确切地说，自然的机械论，就其深处而言，在他的图画中只能停留在最模糊的背景上，这是不可避免的。因此，他的诗歌是幻象的诗歌的一部分；真理的诗歌，如果我们有勇气希望这样一种东西，则留待远为不同且尚未出生的诗人们。但公平地说，我们必须记住，人类的道德存在尚处于童年；所有诗人都玩弄着不被理解的意象；他们尖锐地、随意地、如在梦中一般触及情感；他们让每一个接踵而至的幻象、每一种尖锐的情感蒸发为虚无，或者只留下一颗隐约变软而疲惫的心，一种温柔的倦怠，或者一种

tearful hope. Every modern school of poets, once out of fashion, proves itself to have been sadly romantic and sentimental. None has done better than to spangle a confused sensuous pageant with some sparks of truth, or to give it some symbolic relation to moral experience. And this Shelley has done as well as anybody: all other poets also have been poets of illusion. The distinction of Shelley is that his illusions are so wonderfully fine, subtle, and palpitating; that they betray passions and mental habits so singularly generous and pure. And why? Because he did not believe in the necessity of what is vulgar, and did not pay that demoralising respect to it, under the title of fact or of custom, which it exacts from most of us. The past seemed to him no valid precedent, the present no final instance. As he believed in the imminence of an overturn that should make all things new, he was not checked by any divided allegiance, by any sense that he was straying into the vapid or fanciful, when he created what he justly calls "Beautiful idealisms of moral excellence."

含泪的希望。每一个现代诗歌流派，一旦过时，便证明自己曾经是可悲地浪漫而感伤的。没有一个流派做得比用几星真理之光点缀一幅混乱的感性画卷更好，或赋予它与道德经验某种象征性的关联。而雪莱在这方面做得不比任何人差：所有其他诗人也都是幻象的诗人。雪莱的独特之处在于，他的幻象如此美妙地精细、微妙而悸动；它们透露出如此非凡地慷慨而纯净的激情与心智习惯。为什么?因为他不相信庸俗之物的必然性，也没有以事实或习俗之名对它付出那种使人堕落的敬意--而它从我们大多数人那里强索的正是这种敬意。过去在他看来不是有效的先例，现在也不是最终的实例。由于他相信一场将使万物更新的颠覆即将来临，他便不受任何分裂的效忠所阻挠，不受任何觉得自己正误入乏味或空想之境的意识所牵制，当他创造他公正地称之为「道德卓越的美好理想」时。

That is what his poems are fundamentally—the *Skylark*, and the *Witch of the Atlas*, and the *Sensitive Plant* no less than the grander pieces. He infused into his gossamer world the strength of his heroic conscience. He felt that what his imagination pictured was a true symbol of what human experience should and might pass into. Otherwise he would have been aware of playing with idle images; his poetry would have been mere millinery and his politics mere business; he would have been a worldling in art and in morals. The clear fire, the sustained breath, the fervent accent of his poetry are due to his faith in his philosophy. As Mrs. Shelley expressed it, he "had no care for any of his poems that did not emanate from the depths of his mind, and develop some high and

他的诗作根本上就是如此--云雀、阿特拉斯的女巫、含羞草，与那些更宏大的篇章并无二致。他将自己英雄般的良心之力注入那薄纱般的世界。他感到，他的想象所描绘的，是人类经验应当且可能进入的一种真实象征。否则，他就会意识到自己是在玩弄无谓的意象；他的诗就不过是女帽装饰，他的政治就不过是生意；他在艺术与道德上就会是个俗人。他诗中的清澈火焰、持续的气息、炽热的语调，都源于他对自身哲学的信仰。正如雪莱夫人所表述的，他“对任何不是发自他心灵深处、并发展出某种崇高而

abstruse truth." Had his poetry not dealt with what was supreme in his own eyes, and dearest to his heart, it could never have been the exquisite and entrancing poetry that it is. It would not have had an adequate subject-matter, as, in spite of Matthew Arnold, I think it had; for nothing can be empty that contains such a soul. An angel cannot be ineffectual if the standard of efficiency is moral; he is what all other things bring about, when they are effectual. And a void that is alive with the beating of luminous wings, and of a luminous heart, is quite sufficiently peopled. Shelley's mind was angelic not merely in its purity and fervour, but also in its moral authority, in its prophetic strain. What was conscience in his generation was life in him.

深奥的真理的诗篇。」假如他的诗不曾处理在他自己眼中至高无上、在他心中最为珍贵的东西，它就绝不可能成为它现在这样精致而迷人的诗。它就不会有充分的题材--尽管马修·阿诺德有异议，我认为它是有的；因为凡包含这样一个灵魂的东西不可能空洞。天使不可能无效，如果有效的标准是道德的；他正是所有其他事物在有效时所促成的东西。而一个因明亮翅膀的拍动和一颗明亮之心的跳动而充满生气的虚空，已经足够人烟稠密了。雪莱的心灵是天使般的，不仅在其纯净与炽热，也在其道德权威，在其先知般的音调。在他那一代人身上是良心的东西，在他身上就是生命。

The mind of man is not merely a sensorium. His intelligence is not merely an instrument for adaptation. There is a germ within, a nucleus of force and organisation, which can be unfolded, under favourable circumstances, into a perfection inwardly determined. Man's constitution is a fountain from which to draw an infinity of gushing music, not representing anything external, yet not unmeaning on that account, since it represents the capacities and passions latent in him from the beginning. These potentialities, however, are no oracles of truth. Being innate they are arbitrary; being *a priori* they are subjective; but they are good principles for fiction, for poetry, for morals, for religion. They are principles for the true expression of man, but not for the true description of the universe. When they are taken for the latter, fiction becomes deception, poetry illusion, morals fanaticism, and religion bad science. The orgy of delusion into which we are then plunged comes from supposing the *a priori* to be capable of controlling the actual, and the innate to be a standard for the true. That rich and

人的心灵不仅仅是一个感觉中枢。他的智力不仅仅是一种适应工具。内部有一个胚芽，一个力与组织的核心，在有利环境下可以展开为一种内在地被决定的完善。人的构造是一口喷泉，从中可以汲取无穷涌流的音乐，它不表征任何外部事物，但也不因此而无意义，因为它表征的是从一开始就潜藏于他之中的诸能力与激情。然而这些潜能并非真理的神谕。既然是天生的，它们便是任意的；既然是先验的，它们便是主观的；但它们是虚构、诗、道德、宗教的良好原则。它们是真实表达人的原则，但不是真实描述宇宙的原则。当它们被当作后者时，虚构就变成欺骗，诗就变成幻象，道德就变成狂热，宗教就变成坏科学。我们随即陷入的迷妄狂欢，来自把先验的设想为能够控制实际的东西，把天生的设想为真理的标准。那丰富而

definite endowment which might have made the distinction of the poet, then makes the narrowness of the philosopher. So Shelley, with a sort of tyranny of which he does not suspect the possible cruelty, would impose his ideal of love and equality upon all creatures; he would make enthusiasts of clowns and doves of vultures. In him, as in many people, too intense a need of loving excludes the capacity for intelligent sympathy. His feeling cannot accommodate itself to the inequalities of human nature: his good will is a geyser, and will not consent to grow cool, and to water the flat and vulgar reaches of life. Shelley is blind to the excellences of what he despises, as he is blind to the impossibility of realising what he wants. His sympathies are narrow as his politics are visionary, so that there is a certain moral incompetence in his moral intensity. Yet his abstraction from half of life, or from nine-tenths of it, was perhaps necessary if silence and space were to be won in his mind for its own upwelling, ecstatic harmonies. The world we have always with us, but such spirits we have not always. And the spirit has fire enough within to make a second stellar universe.

确定的禀赋，本可以构成诗人的卓越，此时却构成了哲学家的狭隘。于是雪莱以一种他自己并未察觉其可能之残酷的暴政，要把他的爱与平等的理想强加于一切造物；他要把小丑变成狂热者，把秃鹫变成鸽子。在他身上，正如在许多人身上一样，过于强烈的爱的需要排除了明智同情的能力。他的情感无法适应人性的不平等：他的善意是一口间歇泉，不肯冷却下来去浇灌生活中平坦而庸俗的河段。雪莱对他所鄙视之物的优点视而不见，正如他对自己所欲之物实现的不可能视而不见。他的同情是狭隘的，正如他的政治是空想的，因此在他的道德强度中有某种道德上的无能。然而，他从半个人生、或十分之九的人生中抽离出来，也许是必要的，如果要在他的心灵中为其自身涌出的狂喜和谐赢得沉默与空间的话。世界我们总是拥有，但这样的灵魂我们并非总是拥有。而精神内部有足够的火，足以造就第二个星辰宇宙。

An instance of Shelley's moral incompetence in moral intensity is to be found in his view of selfishness and evil. From the point of view of pure spirit, selfishness is quite absurd. As a contemporary of ours has put it: "It is so evident that it is better to secure a greater good for A than a lesser good for B that it is hard to find any still more evident principle by which to prove this. And if A happens to be some one else, and B to be myself, that cannot affect the question." It is very foolish not to love your neighbour as yourself, since his good is no less good than yours. Convince people of this—and who can resist such perfect logic?—and *presto*

雪莱在道德强度上的道德无能，一个实例见于他对自私与恶的看法。从纯粹精神的观点看，自私是相当荒谬的。正如我们的一位同时代人所言：「显然，为A确保更大的善胜过为B确保较小的善，以至于很难找到任何更明显的原则来证明这一点。而如果A碰巧是别人，B是我自己，那也不能影响这个问题。」不爱邻如己是非常愚蠢的，因为他的善并不亚于你的善。让人信服这一点--谁能抗拒如此完美的逻辑?--于是转眼之间

all property in things has disappeared, all jealousy in love, and all rivalry in honour. How happy and secure every one will suddenly be, and how much richer than in our mean, blind, competitive society! The single word love—and we have just seen that love is a logical necessity—offers an easy and final solution to all moral and political problems. Shelley cannot imagine why this solution is not accepted, and why logic does not produce love. He can only wonder and grieve that it does not; and since selfishness and ill-will seem to him quite gratuitous, his ire is aroused; he thinks them unnatural and monstrous. He could not in the least understand evil, even when he did it himself; all villainy seemed to him wanton, all lust frigid, all hatred insane. All was an abomination alike that was not the lovely spirit of love.

一切事物的财产属性都已消失，爱情中的一切嫉妒、荣誉中的一切竞争也已消失。每个人将顿时变得多么幸福和安全，比之我们这卑劣、盲目、竞争的社会，又将富裕多少!单是爱这个词--我们刚刚看到，爱是一种逻辑的必然--就为一切道德和政治问题提供了一个轻松而最终的解决方案。雪莱无法想象为什么这个方案不被接受，为什么逻辑不产生爱。他只能惊奇和悲伤于它不产生爱；而既然自私和恶意在他看来完全是毫无来由的，他的愤怒便被激起；他认为它们是非自然的、怪异的。他根本无法理解恶，甚至当他自己作恶时也是如此；一切恶行在他看来都是任性的，一切情欲都是冰冷的，一切仇恨都是疯狂的。一切不是可爱的爱之精神的东西，同样都是可憎的。

Now this is a very unintelligent view of evil; and if Shelley had had time to read Spinoza—an author with whom he would have found himself largely in sympathy—he might have learned that nothing is evil in itself, and that what is evil in things is not due to any accident in creation, nor to groundless malice in man. Evil is an inevitable aspect which things put on when they are struggling to preserve themselves in the same habitat, in which there is not room or matter enough for them to prosper equally side by side. Under these circumstances the partial success of any creature—say, the cancer-microbe—is an evil from the point of view of those other creatures—say, men—to whom that success is a defeat. Shelley sometimes half perceived this inevitable tragedy. So he says of the fair lady in the *Sensitive Plant*:

这是一种对恶的极为不明智的看法；倘若雪莱有时间阅读斯宾诺莎--一位他本会发现自己与之大体意气相投的作者--他或许本可以学到：没有什么东西本身是恶的，事物中的恶并非源于创造中的任何偶然，也非源于人心中毫无根据的恶意。恶是事物在挣扎着于同一栖息地中保存自身时所呈现的一种不可避免的方面，在那栖息地中没有足够的空间或物质让它们并排同等繁荣。在这些情形下，任何造物--比如说，癌细胞--的部分成功，从其他那些造物--比如说，人--的角度来看就是一种恶，对后者而言那种成功就是失败。雪莱有时半觉察到这种不可避免的悲剧。因此他这样说到《含羞草》中的那位美丽女士：

"All killing insects and gnawing worms,
And things of obscene and unlovely forms,
She bore in a basket of Indian woof,

“一切杀戮昆虫和啃噬的虫子，以及那些淫秽丑陋
形态的东西，她都用一只印度织物的篮子装着，

Into the rough woods far aloof—
In a basket of grasses and wild flowers full,
The freshest her gentle hands could pull
For the poor banished insects, whose intent,
Although they did ill, was innocent."

Now it is all very well to ask cancer-microbes to be reasonable, and go feed on oak-leaves, if the oak-leaves do not object; oak-leaves might be poison for them, and in any case cancer-microbes cannot listen to reason; they must go on propagating where they are, unless they are quickly and utterly exterminated. And fundamentally men are subject to the same fatality exactly; they cannot listen to reason unless they are reasonable; and it is unreasonable to expect that, being animals, they should be reasonable exclusively. Imagination is indeed at work in them, and makes them capable of sacrificing themselves for any idea that appeals to them, for their children, perhaps, or for their religion. But they are not more capable of sacrificing themselves to what does not interest them than the cancer-microbes are of sacrificing themselves to men.

When Shelley marvels at the perversity of the world, he shows his ignorance of the world. The illusion he suffers from is constitutional, and such as larks and sensitive plants are possibly subject to in their way: what he is marvelling at is really that anything should exist at all not a creature of his own moral disposition. Consequently the more he misunderstands the world and bids it change its nature, the more he expresses his own nature: so that all is not vanity in his illusion, nor night in his blindness. The poet sees most clearly what his ideal is; he suffers no illusion in the expression of his own soul. His political utopias,

远避尘嚣，深入幽莽的林中--

篮子里装满了青草和野花，她那温柔的双手所能采
到的最新鲜的，都是为了那些可怜的被放逐的昆
虫，它们的意图虽然做了恶事，却是无辜的。”

现在，要求癌症微生物讲道理，去吃橡树叶，如果橡树叶不反对的话，这倒也无妨；橡树叶对它们可能是毒药，而且无论如何癌症微生物不可能听从理性；它们必须继续在它们所在的地方繁殖，除非它们被迅速彻底地消灭。而从根本上看，人也完全同样受制于这同一种宿命；除非他们是有理性的，否则他们不可能听从理性；而期望他们作为动物却唯独有理性的，这是不合理的。想象确实在他们身上起作用，使他们能够为任何吸引他们的观念牺牲自己，或许为他们的孩子，或许为他们的宗教。但他们并不比癌症微生物为人牺牲自己更有能力为他们不感兴趣的东西牺牲自己。

当雪莱惊叹于世界的乖戾时，他显示了自己对世界的无知。他所遭受的幻觉是体质性的，云雀和含羞草或许也以它们的方式受制于这种幻觉：他所惊叹的实际上是，竟然存在任何不是他自己道德性情之造物的东西。因此，他越是误解世界并命令它改变其本性，他就越是表达自己的本性：所以他的幻觉中并非全是虚妄，他的盲目中并非全是黑夜。诗人最清楚地看到他的理想是什么；他在表达自己的灵魂时不受任何幻觉的困扰。他的政治乌托邦、

his belief in the power of love, and his cryingly subjective and inconstant way of judging people are one side of the picture; the other is his lyrical power, wealth, and ecstasy. If he had understood universal nature, he would not have so glorified in his own. And his own nature was worth glorifying; it was, I think, the purest, tenderest, richest, most rational nature ever poured forth in verse. I have not read in any language such a full expression of the unadulterated instincts of the mind. The world of Shelley is that which the vital monad within many of us—I will not say within all, for who shall set bounds to the variations of human nature?—the world which the vital monad within many of us, I say, would gladly live in if it could have its way.

他对爱的力量的信念，以及他那刺耳地主观且反复无常的评判人的方式，是这幅画的一面；另一面是他的抒情力量、丰富和狂喜。如果他理解了普遍的自然，他就不会如此荣耀于自己的自然。而他的自然值得荣耀；我认为，它是有史以来倾泻于诗中的最纯净、最温柔、最丰富、最理性的自然。我在任何语言中都没有读到过对心灵纯粹本能的如此充分的表达。雪莱的世界就是那样一个世界--我们许多人内在的生命单子--我不说所有人，因为谁能给人类本性的变异设定界限呢?--我是说，我们许多人内在的生命单子，如果能够随心所欲的话，会乐于生活于其中的世界。

Matthew Arnold said that Shelley was not quite sane; and certainly he was not quite sane, if we place sanity in justness of external perception, adaptation to matter, and docility to the facts; but his lack of sanity was not due to any internal corruption; it was not even an internal eccentricity. He was like a child, like a Platonic soul just fallen from the Empyrean; and the child may be dazed, credulous, and fanciful; but he is not mad. On the contrary, his earnest playfulness, the constant distraction of his attention from observation to daydreams, is the sign of an inward order and fecundity appropriate to his age. If children did not see visions, good men would have nothing to work for. It is the soul of observant persons, like Matthew Arnold, that is apt not to be quite sane and whole inwardly, but somewhat warped by familiarity with the perversities of real things, and forced to misrepresent its true ideal, like a tree bent by too prevalent a wind. Half the fertility of such a soul is lost, and the other half is denaturalised. No doubt, in its sturdy deformity, the practical mind is an

马修·阿诺德曾说雪莱不太理智；倘若我们把理智界定为对外部知觉的公正、对物质的适应以及对事实的顺从，那么他确实不太理智；但他缺乏理智并非源于任何内在的败坏；甚至也不是一种内在的怪僻。他像个孩子，像刚从九天之上坠落的柏拉图式灵魂；孩子可能茫然、轻信、耽于幻想；但他并不疯狂。相反，他那认真的嬉戏、注意力从观察不断转向白日梦的涣散，恰恰表明一种与其年龄相称的内在秩序与丰饶。倘若孩子们不看见幻象，好人们便无事可做。倒是像马修·阿诺德这样善于观察之人的灵魂，往往不太理智、内在不太完整，因熟稔真实事物的乖戾而有些扭曲，被迫歪曲其真正的理想，如同一棵树被过于盛行的风所吹弯。这样一个灵魂的丰饶一半丧失，另一半则被非自然化。毫无疑问，在其坚实的畸形之中，实践的心灵是一个

instructive and not unpleasing object, an excellent, if somewhat pathetic, expression of the climate in which it is condemned to grow, and of its dogged clinging to an ingrate soil; but it is a wretched expression of its innate possibilities. Shelley, on the contrary, is like a palm-tree in the desert or a star in the sky; he is perfect in the midst of the void. His obtuseness to things dynamic —to the material order—leaves his whole mind free to develop things æsthetic after their own kind; his abstraction permits purity, his playfulness makes room for creative freedom, his ethereal quality is only humanity having its way.

富有教益且并非不令人愉悦的对象，是其被迫生长于其中的气候、以及其对贫瘠土壤的顽强依附的一种优秀--尽管有些可悲--的表达；但对其天赋可能性的表达却是糟糕的。相反，雪莱如同沙漠中的棕榈树或天空中的星辰；他在虚空之中是完美的。他对动态事物--对物质秩序--的迟钝，使他整个心灵得以自由地按其自身的方式发展审美事物；他的抽象允许纯洁，他的嬉戏为创造性的自由腾出空间，他的空灵品质不过是人性在顺其自然。

We perhaps do ourselves an injustice when we think that the heart of us is sordid; what is sordid is rather the situation that cramps or stifles the heart. In itself our generative principle is surely no less fertile and generous than the generative principle of crystals or flowers. As it can produce a more complex body, it is capable of producing a more complex mind; and the beauty and life of this mind, like that of the body, is all predetermined in the seed. Circumstances may suffer the organism to develop, or prevent it from doing so; they cannot change its plan without making it ugly and deformed. What Shelley's mind draws from the outside, its fund of images, is like what the germ of the body draws from the outside, its food—a mass of mere materials to transform and reorganise. With these images Shelley constructs a world determined by his native genius, as the seed organises out of its food a predetermined system of nerves and muscles. Shelley's poetry shows us the perfect but naked body of human happiness. What clothes circumstances may compel most of us to add may be a necessary concession to climate, to custom, or to shame; they can hardly add a new vitality or any beauty comparable to that

当我们认为自己的内心是卑劣的，我们或许对自己不公；真正卑劣的毋宁是那束缚或窒息心灵的情境。就其本身而言，我们的生成原则无疑不亚于晶体或花朵的生成原则那样丰饶而慷慨。既然它能产生更复杂的身体，它便能够产生更复杂的心灵；而这心灵的美与生命，如同身体的美与生命，全都在种子中预先注定。环境可以容许有机体发展，或阻止其发展；但若不使其丑陋变形，便不能改变其蓝图。雪莱的心灵从外部汲取的东西，即其意象的储备，如同身体的胚芽从外部汲取的东西，即其食物--一堆纯粹的材料，有待转化与重组。雪莱用这些意象建构一个由其天赋所决定的世界，如同种子从其食物中组织出一个预先注定的神经与肌肉系统。雪莱的诗歌向我们展示了人类幸福的完美而赤裸的身体。环境可能迫使我们大多数人添加的衣物，或许是对气候、习俗或羞耻的必要让步；它们几乎无法增添新的活力，或任何可与那相比拟的美

which they hide.

When the soul, as in Shelley's case, is all goodness, and when the world seems all illegitimacy and obstruction, we need not wonder that *freedom* should be regarded as a panacea. Even if freedom had not been the idol of Shelley's times, he would have made an idol of it for himself. "I never could discern in him," says his friend Hogg, "any more than two principles. The first was a strong, irrepressible love of liberty.... The second was an equally ardent love of toleration ... and ... an intense abhorrence of persecution." We all fancy nowadays that we believe in liberty and abhor persecution; but the liberty we approve of is usually only a variation in social compulsions, to make them less galling to our latest sentiments than the old compulsions would be if we retained them. Liberty of the press and liberty to vote do not greatly help us in living after our own mind, which is, I suppose, the only positive sort of liberty. From the point of view of a poet, there can be little essential freedom so long as he is forbidden to live with the people he likes, and compelled to live with the people he does not like. This, to Shelley, seemed the most galling of tyrannies; and free love was, to his feeling, the essence and test of freedom. Love must be spontaneous to be a spiritual bond in the beginning and it must remain spontaneous if it is to remain spiritual. To be bound by one's past is as great a tyranny to pure spirit as to be bound by the sin of Adam, or by the laws of Artaxerxes; and those of us who do not believe in the possibility of free love ought to declare frankly that we do not, at bottom, believe in the possibility of freedom.

"I never was attached to that great sect
Whose doctrine is that each one should select,

他们所隐藏的。

当灵魂，如雪莱的情形，全是善良，而当世界似乎全是非法与阻碍，我们不必奇怪自由竟被视为万灵药。即便自由不曾是雪莱时代的偶像，他也会为自己把它塑造成偶像。“我从来无法在他身上，”他的朋友霍格说，“辨别出多于两条原则。第一条是对自由的强烈而不可抑制的爱……第二条是同样炽热的对宽容的爱……以及……对迫害的强烈憎恶。”如今我们都幻想自己信仰自由、憎恶迫害；但我们所赞许的自由通常只是社会强制的一种变体，使之对我们最新的情感来说，不如我们若保留旧强制时那般刺痛。出版自由与投票自由并不能大大帮助我们按自己的心意生活，而我想，那才是唯一积极的自由。从诗人的观点看，只要他被禁止与他喜欢的人一起生活，被迫与他不喜欢的人一起生活，便几乎不可能有本质的自由。这对雪莱来说似乎是最刺人的暴政；而自由恋爱，在他的感受中，是自由的本质与试金石。爱必须是自发的，才能在起初成为精神的纽带；它必须保持自发，才能保持精神性。被自己的过去所束缚，对纯粹精神而言，是与被亚当的罪或阿尔塔薛西斯的律法所束缚同样巨大的暴政；而我们当中那些不相信自由恋爱之可能性的人，应当坦率地宣称：我们骨子里并不相信自由的可能性。

「我从未依附于那个伟大的教派
谁的教义是每个人都应选择，

Out of the crowd, a mistress or a friend
And all the rest, though fair and wise, commend
To cold oblivion; though it is the code
Of modern morals, and the beaten road
Which those poor slaves with weary footsteps tread
Who travel to their home among the dead
By the broad highway of the world, and so
With one chained friend, perhaps a jealous foe,
The dreariest and the longest journey go.
True love in this differs from gold and clay,
That to divide is not to take away.
Love is like understanding that grows bright
Gazing on many truths.... Narrow
The heart that loves, the brain that contemplates,
The life that wears, the spirit that creates
One object and one form, and builds thereby
A sepulchre for its eternity!"

The difficulties in reducing this charming theory of love to practice are well exemplified in Shelley's own life. He ran away with his first wife not because she inspired any uncontrollable passion, but because she declared she was a victim of domestic oppression and threw herself upon him for protection. Nevertheless, when he discovered that his best friend was making love to her, in spite of his free-love principles, he was very seriously annoyed. When he presently abandoned her, feeling a spiritual affinity in another direction, she drowned herself in the Serpentine: and his second wife needed all her natural sweetness and all her inherited philosophy to reconcile her to the waves of Platonic enthusiasm for other ladies which periodically swept the

人群中，一位情妇或朋友
而其余的一切，尽管美好而智慧，都交付给冰冷的遗忘；尽管这是现代道德的准则，也是那条被踏平的道路

那些可怜的奴隶拖着疲惫的脚步行走其上，他们沿着世界的宽阔大道前往死者之中的家园，于是带着一个被锁链拴住的同伴，也许是一个嫉妒的仇敌，走上最凄凉、最漫长的旅程。真正的爱在这一点上与黄金和泥土不同：分割并非夺走。

爱犹如理解，在凝视众多真理中变得明亮.....狭隘

爱着的心，沉思的头脑，消磨的生命，创造的精神，一个对象和一个形式，并由此为其永恒建造一座坟墓!”

将这套迷人的爱情理论付诸实践所面临的困难，在雪莱自己的生活中得到了很好的例证。他与第一任妻子私奔，并非因为她激发了什么不可控制的激情，而是因为她宣称自己是家庭压迫的受害者，投向他寻求保护。然而，当他发现他最好的朋友正在向她求爱时，尽管他信奉自由恋爱原则，他还是非常恼火。当他不久后抛弃她，在另一个方向感受到精神上的亲和力时，她投河自尽了：而他的第二任妻子则需要她全部的天生温柔和继承来的哲学，才能使她安然接受那些周期性地席卷而来的、对其他女士的柏拉图式热情的浪潮--

too sensitive heart of her husband. Free love would not, then, secure freedom from complications; it would not remove the present occasion for jealousy, reproaches, tragedies, and the dragging of a lengthening chain. Freedom of spirit cannot be translated into freedom of action; you may amend laws, and customs, and social entanglements, but you will still have them; for this world is a lumbering mechanism and not, like love, a plastic dream. Wisdom is very old and therefore often ironical, and it has long taught that it is well for those who would live in the spirit to keep as clear as possible of the world: and that marriage, especially a free-love marriage, is a snare for poets. Let them endure to love freely, hopelessly, and infinitely, after the manner of Plato and Dante, and even of Goethe, when Goethe really loved: that exquisite sacrifice will improve their verse, and it will not kill them. Let them follow in the traces of Shelley when he wrote in his youth: "I have been most of the night pacing a church-yard. I must now engage in scenes of strong interest.... I expect to gratify some of this insatiable feeling in poetry.... I slept with a loaded pistol and some poison last night, but did not die," Happy man if he had been able to add, "And did not marry!"

她丈夫那颗过于敏感的心。那么，自由恋爱并不能保证免于纠葛；它不会消除当下引发嫉妒、责备、悲剧以及拖着一条越拉越长的锁链的缘由。精神的自由无法转化为行动的自由；你可以修改法律、习俗和社会纠葛，但你仍然会拥有它们；因为这个世界是一台笨重的机械，而不像爱那样是一个可塑的梦。智慧非常古老，因而常常带有讽刺意味，它早已教导说，那些愿意在精神中生活的人最好尽可能远离世界：而婚姻，尤其是自由恋爱的婚姻，对诗人而言是一个陷阱。让他们以柏拉图、但丁乃至歌德的方式--当歌德真正爱的时候--去自由地、无望地、无限地去爱吧：那种精美的牺牲会改善他们的诗，而且不会杀死他们。让他们追随雪莱的足迹，他年轻时曾写道：「我大半夜都在教堂墓地里踱步。我现在必须投身于强烈引人兴趣的场景……我期望在诗歌中满足这种无法满足的情感中的一部分……昨晚我枕着上了膛的手枪和一些毒药入睡，但没有死。」幸福的人啊，要是他能加上一句：「而且没有结婚!」

Last among the elements of Shelley's thought I may perhaps mention his atheism. Shelley called himself an atheist in his youth; his biographers and critics usually say that he was, or that he became, a pantheist. He was an atheist in the sense that he denied the orthodox conception of a deity who is a voluntary creator, a legislator, and a judge; but his aversion to Christianity was not founded on any sympathetic or imaginative knowledge of it; and a man who preferred the *Paradiso* of Dante to almost any other poem, and preferred it to the popular *Inferno* itself, could

在雪莱思想的诸要素中，我或许最后可以提及他的无神论。雪莱年轻时自称无神论者；他的传记作者和批评家通常说他是，或者说他变成了，一个泛神论者。他是在否认正统的上帝观念--即一位自愿的创造者、立法者和审判者--这个意义上说是个无神论者；但他对基督教的厌恶并非建立在任何同情性或想象性的了解之上；而一个宁愿读但丁的《天国篇》而不愿读几乎任何其他诗作、并且宁愿读它而不愿读流行的《地狱篇》本身的人，能够

evidently be attracted by Christian ideas and sentiment the moment they were presented to him as expressions of moral truth rather than as gratuitous dogmas. A pantheist he was in the sense that he felt how fluid and vital this whole world is; but he seems to have had no tendency to conceive any conscious plan or logical necessity connecting the different parts of the whole; so that rather than a pantheist he might be called a panpsychist; especially as he did not subordinate morally the individual to the cosmos. He did not surrender the authority of moral ideals in the face of physical necessity, which is properly the essence of pantheism. He did the exact opposite; so much so that the chief characteristic of his philosophy is its Promethean spirit. He maintained that the basis of moral authority was internal, diffused among all individuals; that it was the natural love of the beautiful and the good wherever it might spring, and however fate might oppose it.

"To suffer ...
To forgive ...
To defy Power ...
To love and bear; to hope, till hope creates
From its own wreck the thing it contemplates;
Neither to change, nor falter, nor repent;
This ... is to be
Good, great and joyous, beautiful and free."

Shelley was also removed from any ordinary atheism by his truly speculative sense for eternity. He was a thorough Platonist All metaphysics perhaps is poetry, but Platonic metaphysics is good poetry, and to this class Shelley's belongs. For instance:

"The pure spirit shall flow

一旦基督教观念和情感作为道德真理的表达而非无端的教义呈现给他，就能被他所吸引。他确实是一个泛神论者，在这个意义上：他感到这整个世界是多么流动而充满生机；但他似乎没有倾向去构想任何有意识的计划或逻辑必然性来连接整体的各个部分；因此与其说他是泛神论者，不如称他为万有精神论者；尤其是因为他并未在道德上将个体置于宇宙之下。他并未在物理必然性面前放弃道德理想的权威，而那恰是泛神论的本质。他做的恰恰相反；以至于他哲学的主要特征是其普罗米修斯精神。他主张道德权威的基础是内在的，散布于所有个体之中；它是对于美和善的自然之爱，无论它从何处萌发，无论命运如何阻挠它。

「受苦……
去原谅……
反抗权力……
去爱并承受；去希望，直到希望从自身的残骸中创造
出它所沉思之物；既不改变，也不动摇，也不悔恨；
这……就是成为

善、伟大而欢乐，美丽而自由。

雪莱也因其真正思辨性的永恒感而远离任何寻常的无神论。他是一个彻底的柏拉图主义者。一切形而上学或许都是诗，但柏拉图式的形而上学是好诗，雪莱的形而上学属于这一类。例如：

「纯粹精神将流溢

Back to the burning fountain whence it came,
A portion of the eternal, which must glow
Through time and change, unquenchably the same.
Peace, peace! he is not dead, he doth not sleep!
He hath awakened from the dream of life.
'Tis we who, lost in stormy visions, keep
With phantoms an unprofitable strife.
"He is made one with Nature. There is heard
His voice in all her music, from the moan
Of thunder, to the song of night's sweet bird.
"He is a portion of the loveliness
Which once he made more lovely.
"The splendours of the firmament of time
May be eclipsed, but are extinguished not:
Like stars to their appointed height they climb,
And death is a low mist which cannot blot
The brightness it may veil. When lofty thought
Lifts a young heart above its mortal lair,
... the dead live there."

回到它来自的燃烧的泉源，永恒的一部分，它必须闪耀

穿越时间和变化，不可熄灭地始终如一。安宁，安宁!他没有死，他没有睡!他已从生命的梦中醒来。是我们，迷失在风暴般的幻象中，与幽灵进行着无益的争斗。

“他与自然合而为一。在她所有的音乐中都能听到他的声音，从雷的呻吟到夜莺甜美的歌声。”“他是那可爱之物的一部分

他曾使之更加可爱。

“时间苍穹的辉煌可能被遮蔽，但不会被熄灭：如同星辰攀向它们指定的高度，而死亡是一层低矮的雾，无法抹去它可能遮掩的光辉。当崇高的思想将一颗年轻的心提升到其必死的巢穴之上……死者在那里活着。”

Atheism or pantheism of this stamp cannot be taxed with being gross or materialistic; the trouble is rather that it is too hazy in its sublimity. The poet has not perceived the natural relation between facts and ideals so clearly or correctly as he has felt the moral relation between them. But his allegiance to the intuition which defies, for the sake of felt excellence, every form of idolatry or cowardice wearing the mask of religion—this allegiance is itself the purest religion; and it is capable of inspiring the sweetest and most absolute poetry. In daring to lay bare the truths of fate, the poet creates for himself the subtlest and most heroic harmonies;

这种类型的无神论或泛神论不能被指责为粗俗或唯物主义的；问题毋宁说在于它的崇高过于朦胧。诗人对事实与理想之间的自然关系的感知，不如他对二者之间道德关系的感受那样清晰或正确。但他对直觉的忠诚--这种直觉为了所感受到的卓越而蔑视一切形式的偶像崇拜或披着宗教面具的怯懦--这种忠诚本身就是最纯粹的宗教；它能够激发最甜美、最绝对的诗。在敢于揭示命运真理的过程中，诗人为自己创造了最精妙、最英勇的和谐；

and he is comforted for the illusions he has lost by being made incapable of desiring them.

We have seen that Shelley, being unteachable, could never put together any just idea of the world: he merely collected images and emotions, and out of them made worlds of his own. His poetry accordingly does not well express history, nor human character, nor the constitution of nature. What he unrolls before us instead is, in a sense, fantastic; it is a series of landscapes, passions, and cataclysms such as never were on earth, and never will be. If you are seriously interested only in what belongs to earth you will not be seriously interested in Shelley. Literature, according to Matthew Arnold, should be criticism of life, and Shelley did not criticise life; so that his poetry had no solidity. But is life, we may ask, the same thing as the circumstances of life on earth? Is the spirit of life, that marks and judges those circumstances, itself nothing? Music is surely no description of the circumstances of life; yet it is relevant to life unmistakably, for it stimulates by means of a torrent of abstract movements and images the formal and emotional possibilities of living which lie in the spirit. By so doing music becomes a part of life, a congruous addition, a parallel life, as it were, to the vulgar one. I see no reason, in the analogies of the natural world, for supposing that the circumstances of human life are the only circumstances in which the spirit of life can disport itself. Even on this planet, there are sea-animals and air-animals, ephemeral beings and self-centred beings, as well as persons who can grow as old as Matthew Arnold, and be as fond as he was of classifying other people. And beyond this planet, and in the interstices of what our limited senses can perceive, there are probably many forms of life

而他因失去的幻象而得到安慰，因为他已变得无法渴望它们。

我们已经看到，雪莱由于不可教诲，永远无法拼合出任何关于世界的正确观念：他只是收集意象和情感，并用它们造出属于自己的世界。因此他的诗既不能很好地表达历史，也不能表达人物性格，也不能表达自然的构造。相反，他展现在我们面前的，在某种意义上，是奇幻的；那是一系列风景、激情和灾变，这样的东西从未在地球上存在过，也永远不会存在。如果你只对属于地球的事物认真感兴趣，你就不会对雪莱认真感兴趣。据马修·阿诺德说，文学应当是对生活的批评，而雪莱没有批评生活；因此他的诗没有坚实性。但我们不妨问一问，生活与在地球上生活的境况是同一回事吗?那标记并评判这些境况的生命精神，本身难道什么都不是吗?音乐当然不是对生活境况的描述；然而它无疑与生活相关，因为它通过一股抽象运动和意象的洪流，激发起存在于精神之中的生活的形式与情感的可能性。通过这样做，音乐成为生活的一部分，一种协调的增添，可以说是一种与庸常生活平行的生活。从自然界的类比中，我看不出有任何理由假定人类生活的境况是生命精神唯一能嬉戏其中的境况。即使在这个星球上，也有海洋动物和空中动物，有朝生暮死的生命和以自我为中心的生命，也有能像马修·阿诺德那样活到老、并像他那样热衷于给他人分类的人。而在这个星球之外，在我们有限感官所能感知的间隙之中，很可能有许多形式的生命

not criticised in any of the books which Matthew Arnold said we should read in order to know the best that has been thought and said in the world. The future, too, even among men, may contain, as Shelley puts it, many "arts, though unimagined, yet to be." The divination of poets cannot, of course, be expected to reveal any of these hidden regions as they actually exist or will exist; but what would be the advantage of revealing them? It could only be what the advantage of criticising human life would be also, to improve subsequent life indirectly by turning it towards attainable goods, and is it not as important a thing to improve life directly and in the present, if one has the gift, by enriching rather than criticising it? Besides, there is need of fixing the ideal by which criticism is to be guided. If you have no image of happiness or beauty or perfect goodness before you, how are you to judge what portions of life are important, and what rendering of them is appropriate?

在马修·阿诺德所说的那些我们应当阅读、以便认识世上所曾思考与言说的最佳之物的书中，这一点并未受到批评。未来，即便在人群之中，也可能如雪莱所言，包含许多“艺术，虽未曾想象，却尚待存在”。当然，不能指望诗人的占卜揭示这些隐藏领域的实际存在或将要存在的样貌；但揭示它们又有什么好处呢?那好处只能与批评人类生活的好处相同，即通过将生活转向可达到的善而间接改善后续的生活；而如果一个人有这种天赋，直接地、在当下改善生活，通过丰富生活而非批评生活，难道不也同样重要吗?此外，还需要确定批评所应遵循的理想。如果你面前没有幸福、美或完美善的形象，你如何判断生活的哪些部分重要，以及何种对它们的呈现是恰当的?

Being a singer inwardly inspired, Shelley could picture the ideal goals of life, the ultimate joys of experience, better than a discursive critic or observer could have done. The circumstances of life are only the bases or instruments of life: the fruition of life is not in retrospect, not in description of the instruments, but in expression of the spirit itself, to which those instruments may prove useful; as music is not a criticism of violins, but a playing upon them. This expression need not resemble its ground. Experience is diversified by colours that are not produced by colours, sounds that are not conditioned by sounds, names that are not symbols for other names, fixed ideal objects that stand for ever-changing material processes. The mind is fundamentally lyrical, inventive, redundant. Its visions are its own offspring, hatched in the warmth of some favourable cosmic gale. The

作为一个内心受灵感启发的歌者，雪莱比一个推论式的批评家或观察者更能描绘生活的理想目标、经验的终极欢乐。生活的境况只是生活的基础或工具：生活的成果不在回顾中，不在对工具的描述中，而在精神本身的表达中，那些工具可能证明对之有用；正如音乐不是对小提琴的批评，而是对小提琴的演奏。这种表达不必与其基础相似。经验被并非由颜色产生的颜色、并非由声音条件决定的声音、并非其他名称之符号的名称、代表永远变化的物质过程的固定理想对象所多样化。心灵根本上是抒情的、创造性的、冗余的。它的幻象是它自己的后代，在某种有利的宇宙之风的温暖中孵化。那

ambient weather may vary, and these visions be scattered; but the ideal world they pictured may some day be revealed again to some other poet similarly inspired; the possibility of restoring it, or something like it, is perpetual. It is precisely because Shelley's sense for things is so fluid, so illusive, that it opens to us emotionally what is a serious scientific probability; namely, that human life is not all life, nor the landscape of earth the only admired landscape in the universe; that the ancients who believed in gods and spirits were nearer the virtual truth (however anthropomorphically they may have expressed themselves) than any philosophy or religion that makes human affairs the centre and aim of the world. Such moral imagination is to be gained by sinking into oneself, rather than by observing remote happenings, because it is at its heart, not at its fingertips, that the human soul touches matter, and is akin to whatever other centres of life may people the infinite.

周围的气候可能变化，这些幻象可能消散；但它们所描绘的理想世界有朝一日可能再次向另一位同样受灵感的诗人揭示；恢复它、或类似之物的可能性是永恒的。正是因为雪莱对事物的感觉如此流动、如此虚幻，它才在情感上向我们敞开了一个严肃的科学可能性；即人类生活并非全部生活，地球的景观也并非宇宙中唯一被赞赏的景观；那些相信神与精灵的古人比任何将人类事务视为世界中心与目标的哲学或宗教更接近虚拟的真理(无论他们表达得多么拟人化)。这种道德想象是通过沉入自身而非观察遥远事件而获得的，因为人类灵魂是在其心脏、而非指尖触及物质，并与可能充满无限的其他生命中心相类似。

For this reason the masters of spontaneity, the prophets, the inspired poets, the saints, the mystics, the musicians are welcome and most appealing companions. In their simplicity and abstraction from the world they come very near the heart. They say little and help much. They do not picture life, but have life, and give it. So we may say, I think, of Shelley's magic universe what he said of Greece; if it

因此，自发性的宗师们、先知们、受启发的诗人们、圣徒们、神秘主义者们、音乐家们是受欢迎且最具吸引力的伴侣。在他们的单纯和与世界的抽离中，他们非常贴近人心。他们说得少而帮助多。他们不描绘生活，而是拥有生活，并给予生活。所以我想，我们可以用雪莱论希腊的话来说他的魔法宇宙；如果它

"Must be
A wreck, yet shall its fragments re-assemble,
And build themselves again impregnably
In a diviner clime,
To Amphionic music, on some cape sublime
Which frowns above the idle foam of time."

" 必须
是一艘残骸，然而它的碎片终将重新聚合，并在一个更神圣的地域中不可攻破地重新建造自身，

伴随着安菲翁的音乐，在某座高耸的海角上，那海角俯瞰着时间闲散的泡沫。”

"Frowns," says Shelley rhetorically, as if he thought that something timeless, something merely ideal, could be formidable, or could threaten existing things with any but an ideal defeat. Tremendous error! Eternal possibilities may indeed beckon; they may attract those who instinctively pursue them as a star may guide those who wish to reach the place over which it happens to shine. But an eternal possibility has no material power. It is only one of an infinity of other things equally possible intrinsically, yet most of them quite unrealisable in this world of blood and mire. The realm of eternal essences rains down no Jovian thunderbolts, but only a ghostly Uranian calm. There is no frown there; rather, a passive and universal welcome to any who may have in them the will and the power to climb. Whether any one has the will depends on his material constitution, and whether he has the power depends on the firm texture of that constitution and on circumstances happening to be favourable to its operation. Otherwise what the rebel or the visionary hails as his ideal will be no picture of his destiny or of that of the world. It will be, and will always remain, merely a picture of his heart. This picture, indestructible in its ideal essence, will mirror also the hearts of those who may share, or may have shared, the nature of the poet who drew it. So purely ideal and so deeply human are the visions of Shelley. So truly does he deserve the epitaph which a clear-sighted friend wrote upon his tomb: *cor cordium*, the heart of hearts.

“皱眉，”雪莱修辞性地说，仿佛他认为某种无时间性的、仅仅理想的东西可以是可畏的，或除了理想的挫败之外还能以任何东西威胁存在的事物。巨大的错误!永恒的可能性确实可能招手；它们可能吸引那些本能地追求它们的人，正如一颗星可能指引那些希望到达它恰好照耀之处的人。但一个永恒的可能性没有物质力量。它只是无限其他同等本质上可能的事物之一，然而其中大多数在这个血与泥的世界中完全无法实现。永恒诸本质的领域不降下朱庇特的雷霆，而只降下幽灵般的乌拉尼亚式宁静。那里没有皱眉；相反，是对任何可能拥有攀登的意志与力量的人的一种被动而普遍的欢迎。是否有人拥有意志取决于他的物质构造，而他是否拥有力量取决于那构造的坚实质地以及恰好有利于其运作的环境。否则，反叛者或幻想家所欢呼的他的理想将不是他的命运或世界命运的图景。它将永远是、且仅仅是他心灵的图景。这幅图景在其理想本质中不可摧毁，也将映照那些可能分享、或可能曾分享绘制它的诗人本性的心灵。雪莱的幻象如此纯粹理想又如此深刻人性。他确实配得上一位明察之友写在他墓上的墓志铭：*cor cordium*，心之心。

VI

THE GENTEEL TRADITION IN AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY

Address delivered before the Philosophical Union of the University of California, August 25, 1911.

Ladies and Gentlemen,—The privilege of addressing you to-day is very welcome to me, not merely for the honour of it, which is great, nor for the pleasures of travel, which are many, when it is California that one is visiting for the first time, but also because there is something I have long wanted to say which this occasion seems particularly favourable for saying. America is still a young country, and this part of it is especially so; and it would have been nothing extraordinary if, in this young country, material preoccupations had altogether absorbed people's minds, and they had been too much engrossed in living to reflect upon life, or to have any philosophy. The opposite, however, is the case. Not only have you already found time to philosophise in California, as your society proves, but the eastern colonists from the very beginning were a sophisticated race. As much as in clearing the land and fighting the Indians they were occupied, as they expressed it, in wrestling with the Lord. The country was new, but the race was tried, chastened, and full of solemn memories. It was an old wine in new bottles; and America did not have to wait for its present universities, with their departments of academic philosophy, in order to possess a living philosophy—to have a distinct vision of the universe and definite convictions about human destiny.

Now this situation is a singular and remarkable one, and has many consequences, not all of which are equally fortunate.

VI

美国哲学中的高雅传统

*1911*年*8*月25日在加利福尼亚大学哲学联合会发表的演讲。

女士们、先生们--今天能向你们致辞，我感到非常荣幸，不仅因为这份荣誉之大，也不仅因为旅行的乐趣之多--当一个人第一次访问加利福尼亚时，这种乐趣尤其多--而且因为有些话我早就想说，而此场合似乎特别适合说出来。美国仍然是一个年轻的国家，而这一部分尤其如此；在这个年轻的国家里，如果物质上的专注完全占据了人们的心灵，他们过于忙于生活而无法反思生活，或拥有任何哲学，那也毫不奇怪。然而，情况恰恰相反。不仅你们已经在加利福尼亚找到了时间进行哲学思考，正如你们的协会所证明的，而且东部殖民者从一开始就是一个老练的种族。正如他们自己所说，他们在清理土地和与印第安人作战的同时，也在与主角力。这个国家是新的，但这个种族是经过考验的、受过磨炼的，充满庄严的记忆。这是旧酒装在新瓶里；美国不必等到它现在的大学及其学术哲学系，才拥有一种活的哲学--对宇宙的独特视野和对人类命运的明确信念。

那么，这种境况是独特而引人注目的，并且有许多后果，并非所有后果都同样幸运。

America is a young country with an old mentality: it has enjoyed the advantages of a child carefully brought up and thoroughly indoctrinated; it has been a wise child. But a wise child, an old head on young shoulders, always has a comic and an unpromising side. The wisdom is a little thin and verbal, not aware of its full meaning and grounds; and physical and emotional growth may be stunted by it, or even deranged. Or when the child is too vigorous for that, he will develop a fresh mentality of his own, out of his observations and actual instincts; and this fresh mentality will interfere with the traditional mentality, and tend to reduce it to something perfunctory, conventional, and perhaps secretly despised. A philosophy is not genuine unless it inspires and expresses the life of those who cherish it. I do not think the hereditary philosophy of America has done much to atrophy the natural activities of the inhabitants; the wise child has not missed the joys of youth or of manhood; but what has happened is that the hereditary philosophy has grown stale, and that the academic philosophy afterwards developed has caught the stale odour from it. America is not simply, as I said a moment ago, a young country with an old mentality: it is a country with two mentalities, one a survival of the beliefs and standards of the fathers, the other an expression of the instincts, practice, and discoveries of the younger generations. In all the higher things of the mind—in religion, in literature, in the moral emotions—it is the hereditary spirit that still prevails, so much so that Mr. Bernard Shaw finds that America is a hundred years behind the times. The truth is that one-half of the American mind, that not occupied intensely in practical affairs, has remained, I will not say high-and-dry, but slightly becalmed; it has floated gently in the back-water, while,

美国是一个年轻的国家，却有着古老的心态：它享受了一个被精心抚养并彻底灌输观念的孩子的种种好处；它一直是个聪明的孩子。但一个聪明的孩子，一个少年老成的人，总有一面滑稽而缺乏前途。这种智慧略显单薄和流于言辞，并未意识到其完整的意义与根据；而身体和情感的生长可能因此受阻，甚至紊乱。或者，当孩子过于精力旺盛而不至于如此时，他会从自己的观察和实际本能中发展出一种属于自己的新鲜心态；而这种新鲜心态将干扰传统心态，并倾向于把它贬低为某种敷衍的、因循的、也许暗中被鄙视的东西。一种哲学若不是启发并表达珍视它的人的生活，便不是真正的哲学。我不认为美国世袭的哲学对居民的自然活动造成了多少萎缩；那个聪明的孩子并未错过青春或成年的欢乐；但实际发生的是，世袭的哲学已经变得陈旧，而后来发展起来的学院哲学则从它那里沾染了陈腐的气味。美国并不像我刚才所说的那样，仅仅是一个有着古老心态的年轻国家：它是一个有着两种心态的国家，一种是父辈信仰与标准的遗存，另一种是年轻一代的本能、实践和发现的表达。在心灵的一切较高事物中--在宗教、文学、道德情感中--仍然盛行的是世袭的精神，以至于萧伯纳先生发现美国落后于时代一百年。事实是，美国心灵的一半，即并未紧张地投入实际事务的那一半，一直保持着，我不说搁浅，而是略微停滞的状态；它轻轻漂浮在回水之中，而

alongside, in invention and industry and social organisation, the other half of the mind was leaping down a sort of Niagara Rapids. This division may be found symbolised in American architecture: a neat reproduction of the colonial mansion—with some modern comforts introduced surreptitiously—stands beside the sky-scraper. The American Will inhabits the sky-scraper; the American Intellect inhabits the colonial mansion. The one is the sphere of the American man; the other, at least predominantly, of the American woman. The one is all aggressive enterprise; the other is all genteel tradition.

在旁边，在发明、工业和社会组织方面，心灵的另一半正跃下一道尼亚加拉急流。这种分裂可以在美国建筑中找到象征：一栋整洁的殖民地宅邸复制品--暗中引入了一些现代舒适设施--矗立在摩天大楼旁边。美国意志栖居于摩天大楼；美国智识栖居于殖民地宅邸。前者是美国男人的领域；后者至少 predominantly 是美国女人的领域。前者全是进取的事业；后者全是斯文传统。

Now, with your permission, I should like to analyse more fully how this interesting situation has arisen, how it is qualified, and whither it tends. And in the first place we should remember what, precisely, that philosophy was which the first settlers brought with them into the country. In strictness there was more than one; but we may confine our attention to what I will call Calvinism, since it is on this that the current academic philosophy has been grafted. I do not mean exactly the Calvinism of Calvin, or even of Jonathan Edwards; for in their systems there was much that was not pure philosophy, but rather faith in the externals and history of revelation. Jewish and Christian revelation was interpreted by these men, however, in the spirit of a particular philosophy, which might have arisen under any sky, and been associated with any other religion as well as with Protestant Christianity. In fact, the philosophical principle of Calvinism appears also in the Koran, in Spinoza, and in Cardinal Newman; and persons with no very distinctive Christian belief, like Carlyle or like Professor Royce, may be nevertheless, philosophically, perfect Calvinists. Calvinism, taken in this sense, is an expression of the agonised

现在，若您允许，我想更充分地分析这一有趣的局面是如何产生的，它如何被限定，以及它趋向何方。首先我们应当记住，最初的定居者带入这个国家的哲学究竟是什么。严格说来不止一种；但我们可以把注意力集中于我将称之为加尔文主义的东西，因为当前的学院哲学正是嫁接在其上的。我指的并不完全是加尔文的加尔文主义，甚至也不是乔纳森·爱德华兹的；因为在他们体系中，有许多并非纯粹哲学，而是对启示的外在性和历史的信仰。然而，犹太教和基督教的启示被这些人以一种特定哲学的精神加以解释，这种哲学本可在任何天空下产生，并与任何其他宗教以及新教基督教相关联。事实上，加尔文主义的哲学原则也出现在《古兰经》中，在斯宾诺莎中，在纽曼枢机主教中；而没有十分独特的基督教信仰的人，如卡莱尔或罗伊斯教授，在哲学上仍可能是完美的加尔文主义者。在这个意义上理解的加尔文主义，是一种痛苦

conscience. It is a view of the world which an agonised conscience readily embraces, if it takes itself seriously, as, being agonised, of course it must. Calvinism, essentially, asserts three things: that sin exists, that sin is punished, and that it is beautiful that sin should exist to be punished. The heart of the Calvinist is therefore divided between tragic concern at his own miserable condition, and tragic exultation about the universe at large. He oscillates between a profound abasement and a paradoxical elation of the spirit. To be a Calvinist philosophically is to feel a fierce pleasure in the existence of misery, especially of one's own, in that this misery seems to manifest the fact that the Absolute is irresponsible or infinite or holy. Human nature, it feels, is totally depraved: to have the instincts and motives that we necessarily have is a great scandal, and we must suffer for it; but that scandal is requisite, since otherwise the serious importance of being as we ought to be would not have been vindicated.

良心。这是一种世界观，一颗饱受煎熬的良心只要认真对待自己--而既然饱受煎熬，它当然必定会认真对待自己--便会欣然拥抱这种世界观。加尔文主义本质上断言三件事：罪存在，罪受惩罚，而罪存在以受惩罚是美的。因此，加尔文主义者的心分裂于对自己悲惨境况的悲剧性关切与对宇宙整体的悲剧性欢欣之间。他在精神的一种深沉的卑屈与一种悖论的昂扬之间摇摆。在哲学上做一个加尔文主义者，就是要在苦难的存在中--尤其是自身苦难的存在中--感受到一种强烈的快感，因为这苦难似乎彰显了这样一个事实：绝对者是不负责任的，或无限的，或神圣的。它觉得，人性是完全败坏的：拥有我们必然拥有的本能与动机是一大丑闻，我们必须为此受苦；但这丑闻是必需的，因为否则，我们应当如何存在这一严肃的重要性便不会得到辩护。

To those of us who have not an agonised conscience this system may seem fantastic and even unintelligible; yet it is logically and intently thought out from its emotional premises. It can take permanent possession of a deep mind here and there, and under certain conditions it can become epidemic. Imagine, for instance, a small nation with an intense vitality, but on the verge of ruin, ecstatic and distressful, having a strict and minute code of laws, that paints life in sharp and violent chiaroscuro, all pure righteousness and black abominations, and exaggerating the consequences of both perhaps to infinity. Such a people were the Jews after the exile, and again the early Protestants. If such a people is philosophical at all, it will not improbably be Calvinistic. Even in the early American communities many of these conditions

对于我们当中那些没有饱受煎熬的良心的人来说，这一体系也许显得荒诞，甚至不可理解；然而它是从其情感前提中逻辑地、专注地推演出来的。它能够在此处或彼处永久地占据一颗深邃的心灵，并且在某些条件下能够成为流行病。试想，例如，一个充满强烈生命力却濒临毁灭的小民族，狂喜而又痛苦，拥有一套严格而细密的法律，将人生描绘成尖锐而暴烈的明暗对照，全是纯粹的正义与漆黑的憎恶，并且也许把两者的后果都夸大到无限。这样的民族就是流亡后的犹太人，又是早期的新教徒。如果这样一个民族终究是哲学的，它不无可能便是加尔文主义的。即便在早期的美国社群中，这些条件也有许多

were fulfilled. The nation was small and isolated; it lived under pressure and constant trial; it was acquainted with but a small range of goods and evils. Vigilance over conduct and an absolute demand for personal integrity were not merely traditional things, but things that practical sages, like Franklin and Washington, recommended to their countrymen, because they were virtues that justified themselves visibly by their fruits. But soon these happy results themselves helped to relax the pressure of external circumstances, and indirectly the pressure of the agonised conscience within. The nation became numerous; it ceased to be either ecstatic or distressful; the high social morality which on the whole it preserved took another colour; people remained honest and helpful out of good sense and good will rather than out of scrupulous adherence to any fixed principles. They retained their instinct for order, and often created order with surprising quickness; but the sanctity of law, to be obeyed for its own sake, began to escape them; it seemed too unpractical a notion, and not quite serious. In fact, the second and native-born American mentality began to take shape. The sense of sin totally evaporated. Nature, in the words of Emerson, was all beauty and commodity; and while operating on it laboriously, and drawing quick returns, the American began to drink in inspiration from it æsthetically. At the same time, in so broad a continent, he had elbow-room. His neighbours helped more than they hindered him; he wished their number to increase. Good will became the great American virtue; and a passion arose for counting heads, and square miles, and cubic feet, and minutes saved—as if there had been anything to save them for. How strange to the American now that saying of Jonathan Edwards, that men are naturally God's enemies! Yet that

得到了满足。这个民族小而孤立；它生活在压力与不断的考验之下；它所熟悉的善与恶的范围都很小。对行为的警觉和对个人正直的绝对要求不仅仅是传统的东西，而且是像富兰克林和华盛顿这样的实践智者推荐给同胞的东西，因为它们是凭其果实便显而易见地证明自身正当性的美德。但很快，这些幸福的结果本身就有助于放松外部环境的压力，并间接地放松内心饱受煎熬的良心的压力。这个民族变得众多；它不再狂喜，也不再痛苦；它总体上所保持的高尚社会道德换了另一种色彩；人们保持诚实和乐于助人，是出于健全的判断和善意，而不是出于对任何固定原则的一丝不苟的恪守。他们保留了对秩序的本能，并且常常以惊人的速度创造秩序；但法律因其自身之故便应被遵守这一神圣性，开始从他们那里溜走；它显得太不切实际，也不十分严肃。事实上，第二代土生土长的美国人心灵开始成形。罪感完全蒸发了。用爱默生的话说，自然全是美和商品；而在对自然辛勤劳作、获取快速回报的同时，美国人开始以审美的态度从中汲取灵感。与此同时，在如此广阔的大陆上，他有充裕的活动余地。他的邻人帮助他多于妨碍他；他希望他们的人数增加。善意成为伟大的美国美德；并且兴起了一种激情，要清点人头、平方英里、立方英尺和节省下来的分钟--仿佛有什么东西需要为它们而节省似的。乔纳森·爱德华兹的那句话--人天生是上帝的敌人--如今对美国人来说是多么奇怪!然而那

is an axiom to any intelligent Calvinist, though the words he uses may be different. If you told the modern American that he is totally depraved, he would think you were joking, as he himself usually is. He is convinced that he always has been, and always will be, victorious and blameless.

对任何有智识的加尔文主义者而言，这是一条公理，尽管他所用的措辞可能有所不同。如果你告诉现代美国人他完全堕落，他会以为你在开玩笑，正如他自己通常也在开玩笑一样。他确信自己一直并将永远胜利而无瑕。

Calvinism thus lost its basis in American life. Some emotional natures, indeed, reverted in their religious revivals or private searchings of heart to the sources of the tradition; for any of the radical points of view in philosophy may cease to be prevalent, but none can cease to be possible. Other natures, more sensitive to the moral and literary influences of the world, preferred to abandon parts of their philosophy, hoping thus to reduce the distance which should separate the remainder from real life.

加尔文主义就这样在美国生活中失去了它的基础。诚然，一些情感丰富的天性，在宗教复兴或私下的内心省察中，回到了传统的源头；因为哲学中任何激进的观点都可能不再流行，但没有一种会不再可能。另一些对世界的道德与文学影响更为敏感的天性，则宁愿放弃他们哲学的一部分，希望以此缩小应当分隔其余部分与现实生活的距离。

Meantime, if anybody arose with a special sensibility or a technical genius, he was in great straits; not being fed sufficiently by the world, he was driven in upon his own resources. The three American writers whose personal endowment was perhaps the finest—Poe, Hawthorne, and Emerson—had all a certain starved and abstract quality. They could not retail the genteel tradition; they were too keen, too perceptive, and too independent for that. But life offered them little digestible material, nor were they naturally voracious. They were fastidious, and under the circumstances they were starved. Emerson, to be sure, fed on books. There was a great catholicity in his reading; and he showed a fine tact in his comments, and in his way of appropriating what he read. But he read transcendentally, not historically, to learn what he himself felt, not what others might have felt before him. And to feed on books, for a philosopher or a poet, is still to starve. Books can help him to acquire form, or to avoid pitfalls; they

与此同时，如果有人带着特殊的情感或技术天赋出现，他便陷入极大的困境；由于没有得到世界充分的滋养，他被迫退回到自己的资源之中。三位个人禀赋也许最为优异的美国作家--坡、霍桑和爱默生--都带有某种饥饿而抽象的品质。他们无法零售斯文传统；他们太敏锐、太有洞察力、也太独立，不至于此。但生活提供给他们的可消化材料很少，他们也不是天生贪食的。他们挑剔，而在这种情况下，他们挨饿了。诚然，爱默生以书为食。他的阅读有一种伟大的广博性；他在评论中、在他挪用所读之物的方式中，表现出一种精妙的得体。但他是先验地而非历史地阅读，是为了了解他自己所感受到的，而不是他之前别人可能感受到的。而对于一个哲学家或诗人来说，以书为食仍然意味着挨饿。书能帮助他获得形式，或避开陷阱；它们

cannot supply him with substance, if he is to have any. Therefore the genius of Poe and Hawthorne, and even of Emerson, was employed on a sort of inner play, or digestion of vacancy. It was a refined labour, but it was in danger of being morbid, or tinkling, or self-indulgent. It was a play of intra-mental rhymes. Their mind was like an old music-box, full of tender echoes and quaint fancies. These fancies expressed their personal genius sincerely, as dreams may; but they were arbitrary fancies in comparison with what a real observer would have said in the premises. Their manner, in a word, was subjective. In their own persons they escaped the mediocrity of the genteel tradition, but they supplied nothing to supplant it in other minds.

无法为他提供实质内容，如果他要拥有任何实质的话。因此，坡和霍桑，甚至爱默生的天才，都用在了一种内在的戏耍，或是对空虚的消化上。这是一种精致的劳作，但它有变得病态、叮当作响或自我放纵的危险。这是一种心灵内部的韵律游戏。他们的心灵就像一只古老的音乐盒，充满了温柔的回声和古怪的幻想。这些幻想真诚地表达了他们个人的天才，如同梦境所能做到的那样；但与一个真正的观察者在同样前提下会说出的话相比，它们不过是任意的幻想。一言以蔽之，他们的方式是主观的。在他们自己身上，他们逃脱了斯文传统的平庸，但他们没有为其他心灵提供任何东西来取代它。

The churches, likewise, although they modified their spirit, had no philosophy to offer save a new emphasis on parts of what Calvinism contained. The theology of Calvin, we must remember, had much in it besides philosophical Calvinism. A Christian tenderness, and a hope of grace for the individual, came to mitigate its sardonic optimism; and it was these evangelical elements that the Calvinistic churches now emphasised, seldom and with blushes referring to hell-fire or infant damnation. Yet philosophic Calvinism, with a theory of life that would perfectly justify hell-fire and infant damnation if they happened to exist, still dominates the traditional metaphysics. It is an ingredient, and the decisive ingredient, in what calls itself idealism. But in order to see just what part Calvinism plays in current idealism, it will be necessary to distinguish the other chief element in that complex system, namely, transcendentalism.

教会同样如此，尽管它们修改了自己的精神，却除了重新强调加尔文主义所包含的部分内容之外，拿不出任何哲学。我们必须记住，加尔文的神学中除了哲学性的加尔文主义之外，还有许多别的东西。一种基督教的温情，以及对个体蒙恩的希望，缓和了其讥诮的乐观主义；正是这些福音派元素，加尔文主义教会如今加以强调，鲜少且羞怯地提及地狱之火或婴儿永罚。然而，哲学性的加尔文主义，带着一种若地狱之火和婴儿永罚恰好存在便能完美为之辩护的人生理论，仍然支配着传统的形而上学。它是自称唯心论的东西中的一个成分，而且是决定性的成分。但为了看清加尔文主义在当前唯心论中扮演的确切角色，有必要区分那个复杂体系中的另一个主要元素，即超验主义。

Transcendentalism is the philosophy which the romantic era produced in Germany, and independently, I believe, in America

超验主义是浪漫主义时代在德国产生的哲学，并且我相信，在美国也独立地产生了。

also. Transcendentalism proper, like romanticism, is not any particular set of dogmas about what things exist; it is not a system of the universe regarded as a fact, or as a collection of facts. It is a method, a point of view, from which any world, no matter what it might contain, could be approached by a self-conscious observer. Transcendentalism is systematic subjectivism. It studies the perspectives of knowledge as they radiate from the self; it is a plan of those avenues of inference by which our ideas of things must be reached, if they are to afford any systematic or distant vistas. In other words, transcendentalism is the critical logic of science. Knowledge, it says, has a station, as in a watch-tower; it is always seated here and now, in the self of the moment. The past and the future, things inferred and things conceived, lie around it, painted as upon a panorama. They cannot be lighted up save by some centrifugal ray of attention and present interest, by some active operation of the mind.

也是如此。真正的超验主义，如同浪漫主义，不是关于存在何物的任何特定教义集合；它不是将宇宙视为一个事实或事实之集合的体系。它是一种方法，一种观点，从这种观点出发，任何世界，无论它可能包含什么，都可以被一个自我意识的观察者所接近。超验主义是系统的主观主义。它研究知识的前景，因为这些前景从自我辐射而出；它是那些推论途径的规划，通过它们我们关于事物的观念必须被达到，如果它们要提供任何系统的或遥远的视野的话。换言之，超验主义是科学的批判逻辑。它说，知识有一个位置，如同在瞭望塔中；它总是坐落于此时此地，在当下的自我之中。过去和未来，被推论的事物和被构想的事物，围绕它展开，如同画在全景图上。它们不能被照亮，除非通过某种注意力和当下兴趣的离心射线，通过心灵的某种主动运作。

This is hardly the occasion for developing or explaining this delicate insight; suffice it to say, lest you should think later that I disparage transcendentalism, that as a method I regard it as correct and, when once suggested, unforgettable. I regard it as the chief contribution made in modern times to speculation. But it is a method only, an attitude we may always assume if we like and that will always be legitimate. It is no answer, and involves no particular answer, to the question: What exists; in what order is what exists produced; what is to exist in the future? This question must be answered by observing the object, and tracing humbly the movement of the object. It cannot be answered at all by harping on the fact that this object, if discovered, must be discovered by somebody, and by somebody who has an interest in discovering it.

这里几乎不是展开或解释这一精微洞见的场合；只需说--以免你日后认为我贬低超验主义--作为方法，我认为它是正确的，而且一旦被提出，就令人难忘。我认为它是现代对思辨所作的主要贡献。但它只是一种方法，一种我们如果愿意就可以始终采取且始终合法的态度。它不是对以下问题的回答，也不涉及任何特定回答：存在什么；存在之物以什么秩序被产生；未来将存在什么？这个问题必须通过观察对象、谦卑地追踪对象的运动来回答。它完全不能通过反复强调以下事实来回答：这个对象，如果被发现，必须由某人发现，且由某个对发现它有利益的人发现。

Yet the Germans who first gained the full transcendental insight were romantic people; they were more or less frankly poets; they were colossal egotists, and wished to make not only their own knowledge but the whole universe centre about themselves. And full as they were of their romantic isolation and romantic liberty, it occurred to them to imagine that all reality might be a transcendental self and a romantic dreamer like themselves; nay, that it might be just their own transcendental self and their own romantic dreams extended indefinitely. Transcendental logic, the method of discovery for the mind, was to become also the method of evolution in nature and history. Transcendental method, so abused, produced transcendental myth. A conscientious critique of knowledge was turned into a sham system of nature. We must therefore distinguish sharply the transcendental grammar of the intellect, which is significant and potentially correct, from the various transcendental systems of the universe, which are chimeras.

In both its parts, however, transcendentalism had much to recommend it to American philosophers, for the transcendental method appealed to the individualistic and revolutionary temper of their youth, while transcendental myths enabled them to find a new status for their inherited theology, and to give what parts of it they cared to preserve some semblance of philosophical backing. This last was the use to which the transcendental method was put by Kant himself, who first brought it into vogue, before the terrible weapon had got out of hand, and become the instrument of pure romanticism. Kant came, he himself said, to remove knowledge in order to make room for faith, which in his case meant faith in Calvinism. In other words, he applied the

然而，首先获得完整超验洞见的德国人是浪漫的人；他们或多或少坦率地是诗人；他们是巨大的自我中心者，希望不仅使自己的知识而且使整个宇宙都以自己为中心。他们充满了浪漫的孤立和浪漫的自由，于是他们想到想象一切现实或许都是一个超验的自我和一个像他们自己一样的浪漫梦想者；不，它或许就是他们自己的超验自我和他们自己的浪漫梦想无限延伸。超验逻辑，心灵发现的方法，也将成为自然和历史中进化的方法。超验方法如此被滥用，产生了超验神话。一种对知识的认真批判被变成了一个虚假的自然体系。因此，我们必须 sharply 区分智性的超验语法--它是有意义的且潜在地正确的--与各种超验的宇宙体系--它们是嵌合体。

然而，超验主义在其两个方面都颇值得美国哲学家青睐，因为超验方法迎合了他们青年时代那种个人主义和革命性的气质，而超验神话则使他们能够为继承下来的神学找到新的地位，并为他们愿意保留的那部分神学披上一层哲学支持的外衣。这后一点正是康德本人运用超验方法的目的，他首先使这种方法风行一时，那时这可怕的武器尚未失控，尚未成为纯粹浪漫主义的工具。康德自己说，他来是为了废除知识以便为信仰腾出地盘，在他那里这意味着对加尔文主义的信仰。换言之，他将

transcendental method to matters of fact, reducing them thereby to human ideas, in order to give to the Calvinistic postulates of conscience a metaphysical validity. For Kant had a genteel tradition of his own, which he wished to remove to a place of safety, feeling that the empirical world had become too hot for it; and this place of safety was the region of transcendental myth. I need hardly say how perfectly this expedient suited the needs of philosophers in America, and it is no accident if the influence of Kant soon became dominant here. To embrace this philosophy was regarded as a sign of profound metaphysical insight, although the most mediocre minds found no difficulty in embracing it. In truth it was a sign of having been brought up in the genteel tradition, of feeling it weak, and of wishing to save it.

超验方法应用于事实问题，从而将其化约为人的观念，以便赋予良心的加尔文主义公设一种形而上学的有效性。因为康德有他自己的斯文传统，他希望将其转移到一个安全之处，觉得经验世界对它来说已变得过于炽热；而这个安全之处便是超验神话的领域。我几乎不必说，这一权宜之计何等完美地契合了美国哲学家的需要，康德的影响不久便在此地占据主导地位，这绝非偶然。拥抱这一哲学被视为具有深刻形而上学洞见的标志，尽管最平庸的头脑也能毫不费力地拥抱它。实际上，这是一个人在斯文传统中成长、感到它虚弱、并希望拯救它的标志。

But the transcendental method, in its way, was also sympathetic to the American mind. It embodied, in a radical form, the spirit of Protestantism as distinguished from its inherited doctrines; it was autonomous, undismayed, calmly revolutionary; it felt that Will was deeper than Intellect; it focussed everything here and now, and asked all things to show their credentials at the bar of the young self, and to prove their value for this latest born moment. These things are truly American; they would be characteristic of any young society with a keen and discursive intelligence, and they are strikingly exemplified in the thought and in the person of Emerson. They constitute what he called self-trust. Self-trust, like other transcendental attitudes, may be expressed in metaphysical fables. The romantic spirit may imagine itself to be an absolute force, evoking and moulding the plastic world to express its varying moods. But for a pioneer who is actually a world-builder this metaphysical illusion has a partial warrant in historical fact;

但超验方法就其自身方式而言，也契合美国人的心灵。它以激进的形式体现了新教的精神，有别于其继承的教义；它是自主的、无所畏惧的、冷静革命的；它感到意志比理智更为深沉；它将一切聚焦于此时此地，要求万物在年轻的自我面前出示凭证，证明它们对最新诞生的时刻具有价值。这些东西是真正美国的；它们会是任何具有敏锐而散漫智力的年轻社会的特征，而在爱默生的思想和人格中得到了显著的体现。它们构成了他所称的自信。自信，如同其他超验态度一样，可以用形而上学寓言来表达。浪漫精神可以想象自己是一种绝对的力量，召唤并塑造可塑的世界以表达其变化不定的情绪。但对于一个实际上是世界建造者的先驱来说，这种形而上学幻觉在历史事实中有部分的依据；

far more warrant than it could boast of in the fixed and articulated society of Europe, among the moonstruck rebels and sulking poets of the romantic era. Emerson was a shrewd Yankee, by instinct on the winning side; he was a cheery, child-like soul, impervious to the evidence of evil, as of everything that it did not suit his transcendental individuality to appreciate or to notice. More, perhaps, than anybody that has ever lived, he practised the transcendental method in all its purity. He had no system. He opened his eyes on the world every morning with a fresh sincerity, marking how things seemed to him then, or what they suggested to his spontaneous fancy. This fancy, for being spontaneous, was not always novel; it was guided by the habits and training of his mind, which were those of a preacher. Yet he never insisted on his notions so as to turn them into settled dogmas; he felt in his bones that they were myths. Sometimes, indeed, the bad example of other transcendentalists, less true than he to their method, or the pressing questions of unintelligent people, or the instinct we all have to think our ideas final, led him to the very verge of system-making; but he stopped short. Had he made a system out of his notion of compensation, or the over-soul, or spiritual laws, the result would have been as thin and forced as it is in other transcendental systems. But he coveted truth; and he returned to experience, to history, to poetry, to the natural science of his day, for new starting-points and hints toward fresh transcendental musings.

远比他能在欧洲固定而分化的社会中、在浪漫时代那些迷狂的叛逆者和愠怒的诗人中间所夸耀的依据要多得多。爱默生是一个精明的北方佬，本能地站在胜利的一方；他是一个欢快、孩子般的灵魂，对恶的证据无动于衷，正如对他那超验个性不适于欣赏或注意的一切无动于衷一样。也许比任何曾经活过的人更多地，他以全部的纯粹性实践了超验方法。他没有体系。他每天早晨以新鲜的真诚睁开眼睛看世界，记下事物当时在他看来如何，或它们向他自发的想象暗示了什么。这种想象，因其自发，并不总是新颖的；它受他心灵的习惯和训练所引导，而这些是传教士的习惯和训练。然而他从不坚持自己的观念以致将其变成固定的教义；他骨子里感到它们是神话。有时，确实，其他超验主义者(不如他那样忠于其方法)的坏榜样，或缺乏才智之人的紧迫问题，或我们所有人都有的将自己的观念视为终极的本能，将他引到体系建构的边缘；但他止步了。倘若他从其补偿观念、超灵或精神法则中造出一个体系，其结果会像其他超验体系一样单薄而勉强。但他渴求真理；他回到经验、历史、诗歌、他那个时代的自然科学，以寻求新的出发点和朝向新鲜超验沉思的提示。

To covet truth is a very distinguished passion. Every philosopher says he is pursuing the truth, but this is seldom the case. As Mr. Bertrand Russell has observed, one reason why philosophers often fail to reach the truth is that often they do not desire to reach it.

渴求真理是一种极为卓越的激情。每位哲学家都声称自己在追求真理，但事实鲜少如此。正如伯特兰·罗素先生所观察到的，哲学家常常未能抵达真理的一个原因，是他们常常并不渴望抵达它。

Those who are genuinely concerned in discovering what happens to be true are rather the men of science, the naturalists, the historians; and ordinarily they discover it, according to their lights. The truths they find are never complete, and are not always important; but they are integral parts of the truth, facts and circumstances that help to fill in the picture, and that no later interpretation can invalidate or afford to contradict. But professional philosophers are usually only apologists: that is, they are absorbed in defending some vested illusion or some eloquent idea. Like lawyers or detectives, they study the case for which they are retained, to see how much evidence or semblance of evidence they can gather for the defence, and how much prejudice they can raise against the witnesses for the prosecution; for they know they are defending prisoners suspected by the world, and perhaps by their own good sense, of falsification. They do not covet truth, but victory and the dispelling of their own doubts. What they defend is some system, that is, some view about the totality of things, of which men are actually ignorant. No system would have ever been framed if people had been simply interested in knowing what is true, whatever it may be. What produces systems is the interest in maintaining against all comers that some favourite or inherited idea of ours is sufficient and right. A system may contain an account of many things which, in detail, are true enough; but as a system, covering infinite possibilities that neither our experience nor our logic can prejudge, it must be a work of imagination and a piece of human soliloquy. It may be expressive of human experience, it may be poetical; but how should anyone who really coveted truth suppose that it was true?

Emerson had no system; and his coveting truth had another

那些真正关心发现何者为真的人，毋宁是科学家、自然主义者、历史学家；而通常他们按照自己的识见发现了它。他们发现的真理从不完整，也并不总是重要；但它们是真理的组成部分，是有助于填充图景的事实和情况，后来的解释既不能使之失效，也担不起与之矛盾。但职业哲学家通常只是辩护者：也就是说，他们全神贯注于捍卫某种既得的幻觉或某种雄辩的观念。像律师或侦探一样，他们研究自己受聘的案件，看看能为辩护搜集多少证据或证据的表象，能对控方证人激起多少偏见；因为他们知道自己是在为被世人、或许也被他们自己的健全理智怀疑犯有伪造罪的囚犯辩护。他们不渴求真理，而渴求胜利和消除自己的疑虑。他们所捍卫的是某种体系，即关于事物整体的某种观点，而对此人们实际上是无知的。如果人们只是单纯地关心知道什么是真的，无论它是什么，那么任何体系都不会被构建出来。产生体系的是这样一种兴趣：面对所有来者坚持我们某种偏爱的或继承的观念是充分而正确的。一个体系可能包含对许多事物的说明，这些说明在细节上足够真实；但作为一个体系，涵盖着我们的经验和逻辑都无法预判的无限可能性，它必定是想象的作品和一段人类的独白。它可能表达人类经验，它可能是诗意的；但一个真正渴求真理的人怎么会设想它是真的呢？

爱默生没有体系；而他对真理的渴求还有另一

exceptional consequence: he was detached, unworldly, contemplative. When he came out of the conventicle or the reform meeting, or out of the rapturous close atmosphere of the lecture-room, he heard Nature whispering to him: "Why so hot, little sir?" No doubt the spirit or energy of the world is what is acting in us, as the sea is what rises in every little wave; but it passes through us, and cry out as we may, it will move on. Our privilege is to have perceived it as it moves. Our dignity is not in what we do, but in what we understand. The whole world is doing things. We are turning in that vortex; yet within us is silent observation, the speculative eye before which all passes, which bridges the distances and compares the combatants. On this side of his genius Emerson broke away from all conditions of age or country and represented nothing except intelligence itself.

非凡的后果：他超然物外、不谙世事、耽于沉思。当他走出 conventicle 或改革集会，或走出演讲厅那令人陶醉的封闭氛围时，他听见自然向他低语：“为何如此热切，小先生?”毫无疑问，世界的精神或能量正是在我们身上起作用的东西，正如大海正是在每一朵小浪中涌起的东西；但它穿过我们，无论我们怎样呼喊，它都会继续前行。我们的特权在于当它运动时感知到了它。我们的尊严不在于我们做了什么，而在于我们理解了什么。整个世界都在做事。我们在那漩涡中旋转；然而在我们之内有静默的观察，那思辨的眼睛，一切都在它面前经过，它跨越距离并比较着争斗者。在其天才的这一面，爱默生摆脱了一切年龄或国家的条件，除了理智本身之外不代表任何东西。

There was another element in Emerson, curiously combined with transcendentalism, namely, his love and respect for Nature. Nature, for the transcendentalist, is precious because it is his own work, a mirror in which he looks at himself and says (like a poet relishing his own verses), "What a genius I am! Who would have thought there was such stuff in me?" And the philosophical egotist finds in his doctrine a ready explanation of whatever beauty and commodity nature actually has. No wonder, he says to himself, that nature is sympathetic, since I made it. And such a view, one-sided and even fatuous as it may be, undoubtedly sharpens the vision of a poet and a moralist to all that is inspiriting and symbolic in the natural world. Emerson was particularly ingenious and clear-sighted in feeling the spiritual uses of fellowship with the elements. This is something in which all Teutonic poetry is rich and which forms, I think, the most genuine and spontaneous

爱默生身上还有另一种元素，与超验主义奇妙地结合在一起，即他对自然的热爱与敬重。对于超验主义者而言，自然是珍贵的，因为它是他自己的作品，是一面镜子，他在其中照见自己并说道(像一个品味自己诗作的诗人):“我是何等天才!谁会想到我里面有这样的东西?”而这位哲学上的自我中心者在其学说中找到了一种现成的解释，可以说明自然实际具有的任何美与效用。他对自己说，难怪自然富有同情心，因为是我创造了它。这样一种观点，尽管片面甚至愚妄，无疑会锐化诗人和道德家对自然世界中一切鼓舞人心和象征性之物的洞察力。爱默生在感受与诸元素相交的精神用途方面尤为机巧而明察。这是所有条顿诗歌都丰富具备的东西，我认为它构成了最真诚、最自发的

part of modern taste, and especially of American taste. Just as some people are naturally enthralled and refreshed by music, so others are by landscape. Music and landscape make up the spiritual resources of those who cannot or dare not express their unfulfilled ideals in words. Serious poetry, profound religion (Calvinism, for instance), are the joys of an unhappiness that confesses itself; but when a genteel tradition forbids people to confess that they are unhappy, serious poetry and profound religion are closed to them by that; and since human life, in its depths, cannot then express itself openly, imagination is driven for comfort into abstract arts, where human circumstances are lost sight of, and human problems dissolve in a purer medium. The pressure of care is thus relieved, without its quietus being found in intelligence. To understand oneself is the classic form of consolation; to elude oneself is the romantic. In the presence of music or landscape human experience eludes itself; and thus romanticism is the bond between transcendental and naturalistic sentiment. The winds and clouds come to minister to the solitary ego. Have there been, we may ask, any successful efforts to escape from the genteel tradition, and to express something worth expressing behind its back? This might well not have occurred as yet; but America is so precocious, it has been trained by the genteel tradition to be so wise for its years, that some indications of a truly native philosophy and poetry are already to be found. I might mention the humorists, of whom you here in California have had your share. The humorists, however, only half escape the genteel tradition; their humour would lose its savour if they had wholly escaped it. They point to what contradicts it in the facts; but not in order to abandon the genteel tradition, for they

现代趣味的一部分，尤其是美国趣味的一部分。正如有些人天生被音乐所迷住并为之振作，另一些人则被风景所迷住并为之振作。音乐和风景构成了那些不能或不敢用言语表达其未竟理想之人的精神资源。严肃的诗歌、深刻的宗教(例如加尔文主义)，是一个坦白自身不幸者的欢乐；但当斯文传统禁止人们坦白自己不幸时，严肃的诗歌和深刻的宗教便因此对他们关闭了；而由于人类生活在其深处无法公开表达自身，想象便被驱向抽象艺术以求慰藉，在那里人类境况被置若罔闻，人类问题在一种更纯粹的媒介中消融。忧虑的压力由此得到缓解，而其平息却并非在理智中找到。理解自己是慰藉的古典形式；逃避自己是浪漫的形式。在音乐或风景面前，人类经验逃避了自身；因此浪漫主义是超验情感与自然主义情感之间的纽带。风和云前来服侍那孤独的自我。我们不妨问，是否已有任何成功的努力，试图逃离斯文传统，并在其背后表达某种值得表达的东西?这很可能尚未发生；但美国如此早熟，它已被斯文传统训练得如此少年老成，以至于一种真正本土的哲学和诗歌的某些迹象已经可以找到。我可以提一提幽默作家，你们在加利福尼亚这里也有自己的一份。然而，幽默作家只逃离了斯文传统的一半；如果他们完全逃离了它，他们的幽默便会失去其风味。他们指出事实中与它相矛盾的东西；但不是为了抛弃斯文传统，因为他们

have nothing solid to put in its place. When they point out how ill many facts fit into it, they do not clearly conceive that this militates against the standard, but think it a funny perversity in the facts. Of course, did they earnestly respect the genteel tradition, such an incongruity would seem to them sad, rather than ludicrous. Perhaps the prevalence of humour in America, in and out of season, may be taken as one more evidence that the genteel tradition is present pervasively, but everywhere weak. Similarly in Italy, during the Renaissance, the Catholic tradition could not be banished from the intellect, since there was nothing articulate to take its place; yet its hold on the heart was singularly relaxed. The consequence was that humorists could regale themselves with the foibles of monks and of cardinals, with the credulity of fools, and the bogus miracles of the saints; not intending to deny the theory of the church, but caring for it so little at heart that they could find it infinitely amusing that it should be contradicted in men's lives and that no harm should come of it. So when Mark Twain says, "I was born of poor but dishonest parents," the humour depends on the parody of the genteel Anglo-Saxon convention that it is disreputable to be poor; but to hint at the hollowness of it would not be amusing if it did not remain at bottom one's habitual conviction.

The one American writer who has left the genteel tradition entirely behind is perhaps Walt Whitman. For this reason educated Americans find him rather an unpalatable person, who they sincerely protest ought not to be taken for a representative of their culture; and he certainly should not, because their culture is so genteel and traditional. But the foreigner may sometimes think otherwise, since he is looking for what may have arisen in

没有坚实的东西可以取而代之。当他们指出许多事实多么难以契合于它时，他们并未清楚地设想这会不利于那标准，而是认为这是事实中一种有趣的乖僻。当然，如果他们真诚地尊重斯文传统，这样一种不协调在他们看来会是可悲的，而非可笑的。也许美国幽默的盛行，无论合时与否，都可以被当作又一个证据，证明斯文传统无处不在，却处处薄弱。同样，在意大利，文艺复兴时期，天主教传统无法从理智中被驱逐，因为没有任何清晰成形的东西可以取代它；然而它对心灵的掌控却奇异地松弛了。其后果是，幽默作家可以用修士和枢机主教的弱点、愚人的轻信以及圣徒的伪奇迹来款待自己；他们并不打算否认教会的理论，但在心里如此不在乎它，以至于他们觉得它在人们的生活中被违背却毫无损害，这无限有趣。所以当马克·吐温说“我出身贫寒但父母不诚实”时，幽默取决于对斯文盎格鲁-撒克逊惯例的戏仿，即贫穷是可耻的；但暗示其空洞若不在根本上仍是自己习惯性的信念，便不会有趣。

或许唯一完全将斯文传统抛在身后的美国作家是惠特曼。由于这个原因，受过教育的美国人觉得他相当令人难以接受，他们真诚地断言他不应被视为他们文化的代表；他当然不应如此，因为他们的文化是如此斯文而传统。但外国人有时可能不这么看，因为他在寻找可能已经出现于

America to express, not the polite and conventional American mind, but the spirit and the inarticulate principles that animate the community, on which its own genteel mentality seems to sit rather lightly. When the foreigner opens the pages of Walt Whitman, he thinks that he has come at last upon something representative and original. In Walt Whitman democracy is carried into psychology and morals. The various sights, moods, and emotions are given each one vote; they are declared to be all free and equal, and the innumerable commonplace moments of life are suffered to speak like the others. Those moments formerly reputed great are not excluded, but they are made to march in the ranks with their companions—plain foot-soldiers and servants of the hour. Nor does the refusal to discriminate stop there; we must carry our principle further down, to the animals, to inanimate nature, to the cosmos as a whole. Whitman became a pantheist; but his pantheism, unlike that of the Stoics and of Spinoza, was unintellectual, lazy, and self-indulgent; for he simply felt jovially that everything real was good enough, and that he was good enough himself. In him Bohemia rebelled against the genteel tradition; but the reconstruction that alone can justify revolution did not ensue. His attitude, in principle, was utterly disintegrating; his poetic genius fell back to the lowest level, perhaps, to which it is possible for poetic genius to fall. He reduced his imagination to a passive sensorium for the registering of impressions. No element of construction remained in it, and therefore no element of penetration. But his scope was wide; and his lazy, desultory apprehension was poetical. His work, for the very reason that it is so rudimentary, contains a beginning, or rather many beginnings, that might possibly grow into a noble moral imagination, a

美国去表达，不是那彬彬有礼、循规蹈矩的美国心灵，而是那激励着共同体的精神与未成文的原则，而共同体自身的斯文心态似乎颇轻地栖居于其上。当外国人翻开沃尔特·惠特曼的书页时，他以为自己终于遇到了某种有代表性且原创的东西。在沃尔特·惠特曼那里，民主被带入心理学和道德。各种各样的景象、情绪和情感各得一票；它们被宣布为全部自由而平等，生活中无数平凡的时刻被容许像其他时刻一样发言。那些从前被认为伟大的时刻并未被排除，但它们被安排与同伴们一同行进--普通步兵和一时之仆。拒绝区分并未止步于此；我们必须把我们的原则进一步向下推行，推到动物、推到无生命的自然、推到作为整体的宇宙。惠特曼成了泛神论者；但他的泛神论，不像斯多葛派和斯宾诺莎的泛神论，是非理智的、懒散的、自我放纵的；因为他只是快活地觉得一切真实的东西都足够好，而他自己也足够好。在他身上，波希米亚反叛了斯文传统；但唯有它能证明革命正当的重建并未随之而来。他的态度，在原则上，完全是瓦解性的；他的诗才退落到了也许诗才所能退落的最低水平。他把自己的想象降为一种被动的感觉中枢，用以登记印象。其中不再留有任何建构的元素，因此也没有任何穿透的元素。但他的范围是广阔的；而他懒散、散漫的领会是富有诗意的。他的作品，正因其如此初级，包含着一个开端，或者毋宁说许多开端，它们或许可能长成一种高尚的道德想象，一种

worthy filling for the human mind. An American in the nineteenth century who completely disregarded the genteel tradition could hardly have done more.

But there is another distinguished man, lately lost to this country, who has given some rude shocks to this tradition and who, as much as Whitman, may be regarded as representing the genuine, the long silent American mind—I mean William James. He and his brother Henry were as tightly swaddled in the genteel tradition as any infant geniuses could be, for they were born before 1850, and in a Swedenborgian household. Yet they burst those bands almost entirely. The ways in which the two brothers freed themselves, however, are interestingly different. Mr. Henry James has done it by adopting the point of view of the outer world, and by turning the genteel American tradition, as he turns everything else, into a subject-matter for analysis. For him it is a curious habit of mind, intimately comprehended, to be compared with other habits of mind, also well known to him. Thus he has overcome the genteel tradition in the classic way, by understanding it. With William James too this infusion of worldly insight and European sympathies was a potent influence, especially in his earlier days; but the chief source of his liberty was another. It was his personal spontaneity, similar to that of Emerson, and his personal vitality, similar to that of nobody else. Convictions and ideas came to him, so to speak, from the subsoil. He had a prophetic sympathy with the dawning sentiments of the age, with the moods of the dumb majority. His scattered words caught fire in many parts of the world. His way of thinking and feeling represented the true America, and represented in a measure the whole ultra-modern, radical world. Thus he eluded the genteel tradition in the

值得填充人类心灵的东西。一个完全无视斯文传统的十九世纪美国人几乎不可能做得更多。

但是，还有另一位杰出人物，最近离开了这个国家，他给这一传统带来了一些粗暴的冲击，而且，与惠特曼一样，可以被视为代表了真正的、长期沉默的美国心灵--我指的是威廉·詹姆斯。他和他的兄弟亨利像任何婴儿天才一样，被紧紧地裹在斯文传统之中，因为他们出生在1850年之前，而且在一个斯威登堡式的家庭里。然而，他们几乎完全挣脱了那些束缚。不过，这两兄弟解放自己的方式却有趣地不同。亨利·詹姆斯先生是通过采取外部世界的观点，并把美国斯文传统--如同他对待其他一切事物一样--变成分析的主题材料来做到这一点的。对他而言，这是一种奇特的思维习惯，被深切地理解，并与其他同样为他所熟知的思维习惯相比较。因此，他以经典的方式克服了斯文传统，即通过知性来理解它。对威廉·詹姆斯来说，这种世俗洞察力和欧洲同情心的注入也是一种强大的影响，尤其是在他早年；但他自由的主要来源却是另一个。那是他个人的自发性，类似于爱默生的自发性，以及他个人的生命力，类似于其他任何人的生命力。可以说，信念和思想从底层土壤来到他那里。他对时代初现的情感、对沉默大多数的情绪有着先知般的同情。他零散的话语在世界许多地方点燃了火焰。他的思维和感受方式代表了真正的美国，并在一定程度上代表了整个超现代的、激进的世界。因此，他以

romantic way, by continuing it into its opposite. The romantic mind, glorified in Hegel's dialectic (which is not dialectic at all, but a sort of tragi-comic history of experience), is always rendering its thoughts unrecognisable through the infusion of new insights, and through the insensible transformation of the moral feeling that accompanies them, till at last it has completely reversed its old judgments under cover of expanding them. Thus the genteel tradition was led a merry dance when it fell again into the hands of a genuine and vigorous romanticist like William James. He restored their revolutionary force to its neutralised elements, by picking them out afresh, and emphasising them separately, according to his personal predilections.

浪漫的方式避开了斯文传统，通过将其延续到它的对立面。浪漫的心灵，在黑格尔的辩证法(这根本不是辩证法，而是一种悲喜剧式的经验历史)中被美化，总是通过注入新的洞察力，以及通过伴随它们的道德情感的不易察觉的转变，使自己的思想变得不可辨认，直到最后，它在扩展旧判断的掩护下完全颠倒了它们。因此，当斯文传统再次落入像威廉·詹姆斯这样一位真正的、充满活力的浪漫主义者手中时，它被搞得团团转。他通过重新挑选那些被中和的元素，并根据他个人的偏好分别强调它们，恢复了它们的革命力量。

For one thing, William James kept his mind and heart wide open to all that might seem, to polite minds, odd, personal, or visionary in religion and philosophy. He gave a sincerely respectful hearing to sentimentalists, mystics, spiritualists, wizards, cranks, quacks, and impostors—for it is hard to draw the line, and James was not willing to draw it prematurely. He thought, with his usual modesty, that any of these might have something to teach him. The lame, the halt, the blind, and those speaking with tongues could come to him with the certainty of finding sympathy; and if they were not healed, at least they were comforted, that a famous professor should take them so seriously; and they began to feel that after all to have only one leg, or one hand, or one eye, or to have three, might be in itself no less beauteous than to have just two, like the stolid majority. Thus William James became the friend and helper of those groping, nervous, half-educated, spiritually disinherited, passionately hungry individuals of which America is full. He became, at the same time, their spokesman and

一方面，威廉·詹姆斯让他的心灵和心胸对所有在文雅人士看来在宗教和哲学中显得古怪、个人化或幻想的东西保持开放。他真诚而尊重地倾听感伤主义者、神秘主义者、唯灵论者、巫师、怪人、江湖骗子和冒名顶替者--因为很难划清界限，而詹姆斯不愿过早地划清。他以一贯的谦逊认为，这些人中的任何一个都可能有什么可以教给他的。跛子、瘸子、盲人以及说方言的人可以来找他，确信能找到同情；即使他们没有痊愈，至少也得到了安慰，因为一位著名的教授竟如此认真地对待他们；他们开始觉得，毕竟只有一条腿、一只手、一只眼睛，或者有三条腿、三只手、三只眼睛，本身可能并不比像迟钝的大多数那样只有两条腿、两只手、两只眼睛更不美丽。因此，威廉·詹姆斯成为了那些在美国比比皆是的摸索着、紧张不安、半受教育、精神上被剥夺继承权、充满激情地饥饿的个人的朋友和帮助者。他同时成为了他们的代言人和

representative before the learned world; and he made it a chief part of his vocation to recast what the learned world has to offer, so that as far as possible it might serve the needs and interests of these people.

在学术世界面前的代表；并且他将重塑学术世界所提供的东西作为自己天职的主要部分，以便它尽可能服务于这些人的需求与利益。

Yet the normal practical masculine American, too, had a friend in William James. There is a feeling abroad now, to which biology and Darwinism lend some colour, that theory is simply an instrument for practice, and intelligence merely a help toward material survival. Bears, it is said, have fur and claws, but poor naked man is condemned to be intelligent, or he will perish. This feeling William James embodied in that theory of thought and of truth which he called pragmatism. Intelligence, he thought, is no miraculous, idle faculty, by which we mirror passively any or everything that happens to be true, reduplicating the real world to no purpose. Intelligence has its roots and its issue in the context of events; it is one kind of practical adjustment, an experimental act, a form of vital tension. It does not essentially serve to picture other parts of reality, but to connect them. This view was not worked out by William James in its psychological and historical details; unfortunately he developed it chiefly in controversy against its opposite, which he called intellectualism, and which he hated with all the hatred of which his kind heart was capable. Intellectualism, as he conceived it, was pure pedantry; it impoverished and verbalised everything, and tied up nature in red tape. Ideas and rules that may have been occasionally useful it put in the place of the full-blooded irrational movement of life which had called them into being; and these abstractions, so soon obsolete, it strove to fix and to worship for ever. Thus all creeds and theories and all formal precepts sink in the estimation of the

然而，正常的、务实的、男性化的美国人也在威廉·詹姆斯那里有一位朋友。现在有一种普遍的感受，生物学和达尔文主义为之提供了一些色彩，即理论不过是实践的工具，而知性仅仅是物质生存的辅助。据说，熊有皮毛和爪子，但可怜的赤裸人类被判定为必须拥有知性，否则就会灭亡。威廉·詹姆斯将这种感受体现在他称之为实用主义的那种关于思想和真理的理论中。他认为，知性不是一种神奇的、闲置的能力，用来被动地映照任何或一切恰好为真的事物，毫无目的地复制现实世界。知性在事件的脉络中有其根源和结果；它是一种实践调整，一种实验行为，一种生命张力的形式。它本质上不是用来描绘现实的其他部分，而是用来连接它们。这一观点并未被威廉·詹姆斯在其心理学和历史细节上充分展开；不幸的是，他主要是在与对立面的论战中发展这一观点的，他称之为理智主义，并以他善良心灵所能容纳的全部仇恨来憎恨它。他所构想的理智主义是纯粹的迂腐；它使一切贫乏化和言辞化，并用繁文缛节束缚自然。它把可能偶尔有用的观念和规则置于曾召唤它们产生的充满血性的非理性生命运动的位置上；而这些如此迅速过时的抽象物，它却力图固定并永远崇拜。因此，一切信条、理论和一切形式戒律在

pragmatist to a local and temporary grammar of action; a grammar that must be changed slowly by time, and may be changed quickly by genius. To know things as a whole, or as they are eternally, if there is anything eternal in them, is not only beyond our powers, but would prove worthless, and perhaps even fatal to our lives. Ideas are not mirrors, they are weapons; their function is to prepare us to meet events, as future experience may unroll them. Those ideas that disappoint us are false ideas; those to which events are true are true themselves.

实用主义者将心灵视为一种局部而临时的行动语法；这种语法必须由时间缓慢改变，也可能由天才迅速改变。把事物作为一个整体来认识，或认识它们永恒的样子--如果它们之中有任何永恒之物的话--不仅超出我们的能力，而且会被证明毫无价值，甚至可能对我们的生命致命。观念不是镜子，而是武器；它们的功能是让我们准备好迎接事件，正如未来经验可能展开的那样。那些令我们失望的观念是虚假的观念；那些事件与之相符的观念本身就是真实的。

This may seem a very utilitarian view of the mind; and I confess I think it a partial one, since the logical force of beliefs and ideas, their truth or falsehood as assertions, has been overlooked altogether, or confused with the vital force of the material processes which these ideas express. It is an external view only, which marks the place and conditions of the mind in nature, but neglects its specific essence; as if a jewel were defined as a round hole in a ring. Nevertheless, the more materialistic the pragmatist's theory of the mind is, the more vitalistic his theory of nature will have to become. If the intellect is a device produced in organic bodies to expedite their processes, these organic bodies must have interests and a chosen direction in their life; otherwise their life could not be expedited, nor could anything be useful to it. In other words—and this is a third point at which the philosophy of William James has played havoc with the genteel tradition, while ostensibly defending it—nature must be conceived anthropomorphically and in psychological terms. Its purposes are not to be static harmonies, self-unfolding destinies, the logic of spirit, the spirit of logic, or any other formal method and abstract law; its purposes are to be concrete endeavours, finite efforts of

这似乎是一种非常功利主义的心灵观；我承认我认为它是片面的，因为信念和观念的逻辑力量，即它们作为断言的真或假，被完全忽视了，或者与这些观念所表达的物质过程的生命力相混淆。这仅仅是一种外在的观点，它标明了心灵在自然中的位置和条件，却忽略了它的特定本质；就好像把宝石定义为戒指上的一个圆孔。然而，实用主义者的心灵理论越是唯物主义，他的自然理论就越必须变得生机论化。如果理智是有机体内产生的一种装置，用以加速其过程，那么这些有机体在其生命中必定有利益和选定的方向；否则它们的生命就无法被加速，任何事物也不可能对它有用了。换言之--这是威廉·詹姆斯的哲学表面上捍卫斯文传统、实际上却将其彻底颠覆的第三点--自然必须被拟人化地、以心理学的术语来构想。它的目的不是静态的和谐、自我展开的命运、精神的逻辑、逻辑的精神，或任何其他形式方法和抽象规律；它的目的是具体的努力，是有限的力量付出--

souls living in an environment which they transform and by which they, too, are affected. A spirit, the divine spirit as much as the human, as this new animism conceives it, is a romantic adventurer. Its future is undetermined. Its scope, its duration, and the quality of its life are all contingent. This spirit grows; it buds and sends forth feelers, sounding the depths around for such other centres of force or life as may exist there. It has a vital momentum, but no predetermined goal. It uses its past as a stepping-stone, or rather as a diving-board, but has an absolutely fresh will at each moment to plunge this way or that into the unknown. The universe is an experiment; it is unfinished. It has no ultimate or total nature, because it has no end. It embodies no formula or statable law; any formula is at best a poor abstraction, describing what, in some region and for some time, may be the most striking characteristic of existence; the law is a description *a posteriori* of the habit things have chosen to acquire, and which they may possibly throw off altogether. What a day may bring forth is uncertain; uncertain even to God. Omniscience is impossible; time is real; what had been omniscience hitherto might discover something more to-day. "There shall be news," William James was fond of saying with rapture, quoting from the unpublished poem of an obscure friend, "there shall be news in heaven!" There is almost certainly, he thought, a God now; there may be several gods, who might exist together, or one after the other. We might, by our conspiring sympathies, help to make a new one. Much in us is doubtless immortal; we survive death for some time in a recognisable form; but what our career and transformations may be in the sequel we cannot tell, although we may help to determine them by our daily choices. Observation

灵魂生活在一种环境中，它们改变这一环境，同时也受其影响。一种精神，无论是神圣的精神还是人的精神，按照这种新的万物有灵论的理解，都是一位浪漫的冒险家。它的未来是不确定的。它的范围、它的绵延、它的生命品质都是偶然的。这种精神生长着；它发芽并伸出触须，探测周围深处，寻找可能存在于那里的其他力量或生命的中心。它有一种生命的动量，但没有预定的目标。它把过去当作垫脚石，或者更确切地说，当作跳板，但每一刻都有一种全新的意志，要这样或那样地跃入未知。宇宙是一场实验；它是未完成的。它没有终极的或总体的本性，因为它没有终点。它不体现任何公式或可陈述的规律；任何公式充其量只是一种贫乏的抽象，描述着在某个区域和某个时间可能是存在最显著特征的东西；规律是对事物选择养成的习惯的后天描述，而这些习惯它们完全可能彻底抛弃。一天会带来什么是不确定的；甚至对上帝来说也是不确定的。全知是不可能的；时间是真实的；迄今为止可能是全知的东西，今天也许会发现更多。“将会有新闻，”威廉·詹姆斯喜欢欣喜若狂地说，引用一位默默无闻的朋友的未发表诗作，“天堂里将会有新闻!”他几乎确信，现在有一位上帝；也许有几位神，他们可能同时存在，或一个接一个地存在。我们也许能通过我们同心协力的同情，帮助创造一位新的神。我们身上无疑有许多东西是不朽的；我们以可辨认的形式在死后存活一段时间；但我们在后续中的历程和转变会是什么，我们无法知晓，尽管我们可以通过日常的选择帮助决定它们。观察--

must be continual if our ideas are to remain true. Eternal vigilance is the price of knowledge; perpetual hazard, perpetual experiment keep quick the edge of life.

This is, so far as I know, a new philosophical vista; it is a conception never before presented, although implied, perhaps, in various quarters, as in Norse and even Greek mythology. It is a vision radically empirical and radically romantic; and as William James himself used to say, the visions and not the arguments of a philosopher are the interesting and influential things about him. William James, rather too generously, attributed this vision to M. Bergson, and regarded him in consequence as a philosopher of the first rank, whose thought was to be one of the turning-points in history. M. Bergson had killed intellectualism. It was his book on creative evolution, said James with humorous emphasis, that had come at last to "*écraser l'infâme*." We may suspect, notwithstanding, that intellectualism, infamous and crushed, will survive the blow; and if the author of the Book of Ecclesiastes were now alive, and heard that there shall be news in heaven, he would doubtless say that there may possibly be news there, but that under the sun there is nothing new—not even radical empiricism or radical romanticism, which from the beginning of the world has been the philosophy of those who as yet had had little experience; for to the blinking little child it is not merely something in the world that is new daily, but everything is new all day. I am not concerned with the rights and wrongs of that controversy; my point is only that William James, in this genial evolutionary view of the world, has given a rude shock to the genteel tradition. What! The world a gradual improvisation? Creation unpremeditated? God a sort of young poet or struggling

如果我们的观念要保持真实，就必须持续不断。永恒的警惕是知识的代价；永不停息的危险、永不停息的实验使生命的锋芒保持锐利。

据我所知，这是一种新的哲学远景；这是一个从未被提出过的构想，尽管也许在各方各面都有所暗示，如在北欧甚至希腊神话中。这是一种彻底经验主义和彻底浪漫主义的视野；正如威廉·詹姆斯本人常说的，一位哲学家中令人感兴趣和有影响力的是他的视野，而不是他的论证。威廉·詹姆斯相当过于慷慨地把这一视野归功于柏格森先生，并因此把他视为第一流的哲学家，认为他的思想将成为历史上的转折点之一。柏格森先生杀死了理智主义。詹姆斯以幽默的强调说，正是他那本关于创造进化的书终于"*écraser l'infâme*"。然而，我们不妨怀疑，被斥为声名狼藉并被粉碎的理智主义，将会在打击之后幸存下来；而如果《传道书》的作者如今还活着，听说天堂里将会有新闻，他无疑会说，那里也许可能有新闻，但在太阳之下没有新事物--甚至没有彻底经验主义或彻底浪漫主义，因为从世界之初起，这就是那些迄今经验甚少的人的哲学；因为对于眨着眼睛的小孩来说，不仅世界上每天有某种新东西，而且一整天一切都是新的。我关心的不是那场争论的是非对错；我的要点仅仅是，威廉·詹姆斯在这种亲切的进化论世界观中，给了斯文传统一个粗暴的冲击。什么!世界是一场渐进的即兴创作?创造是未经预谋的?上帝是某种年轻的诗人或挣扎中的--

artist? William James is an advocate of theism; pragmatism adds one to the evidences of religion; that is excellent. But is not the cool abstract piety of the genteel getting more than it asks for? This empirical naturalistic God is too crude and positive a force; he will work miracles, he will answer prayers, he may inhabit distinct places, and have distinct conditions under which alone he can operate; he is a neighbouring being, whom we can act upon, and rely upon for specific aids, as upon a personal friend, or a physician, or an insurance company. How disconcerting! Is not this new theology a little like superstition? And yet how interesting, how exciting, if it should happen to be true! I am far from wishing to suggest that such a view seems to me more probable than conventional idealism or than Christian orthodoxy. All three are in the region of dramatic system-making and myth to which probabilities are irrelevant. If one man says the moon is sister to the sun, and another that she is his daughter, the question is not which notion is more probable, but whether either of them is at all expressive. The so-called evidences are devised afterwards, when faith and imagination have prejudged the issue. The force of William James's new theology, or romantic cosmology, lies only in this: that it has broken the spell of the genteel tradition, and enticed faith in a new direction, which on second thoughts may prove no less alluring than the old. The important fact is not that the new fancy might possibly be true—who shall know that?—but that it has entered the heart of a leading American to conceive and to cherish it. The genteel tradition cannot be dislodged by these insurrections; there are circles to which it is still congenial, and where it will be preserved. But it has been challenged and (what is perhaps more

艺术家?威廉·詹姆斯是有神论的倡导者；实用主义为宗教的证据增添了一条；这很好。但是，斯文传统那种冷静抽象的虔诚，难道不是得到了超出它所要求的东西吗?这个经验主义的自然主义上帝是一种过于粗糙和肯定的力量；他会创造奇迹，他会应允祈祷，他可能栖居于特定的地点，并具有唯有在其中他才能运作的特定条件；他是一位邻近的存在者，我们可以对他施加影响，并依赖他获得具体的帮助，就像依赖一位私人朋友、一位医生或一家保险公司一样。多么令人不安!这种新神学难道不是有点像迷信吗?然而，如果它碰巧是真的，那又是多么有趣、多么令人兴奋啊!我远不想暗示，这种观点在我看来比传统唯心论或基督教正统更可能为真。三者都处于戏剧性体系构建和神话的领域，概率对之无关紧要。如果一个人说月亮是太阳的姐妹，另一个人说她是他的女儿，问题不在于哪个观念更可能，而在于两者中是否有任何一个具有表达力。所谓的证据是事后设计出来的，当信仰和想象已经预先判断了问题的时候。威廉·詹姆斯的新神学，或浪漫宇宙论的力量，仅仅在于这一点：它打破了斯文传统的魔咒，并把信仰引向一个新的方向，这个方向经过再思之后，可能证明不亚于旧方向那样诱人。重要的事实不是这种新幻想可能碰巧为真--谁又能知道呢?--而是它已经进入了一位领先的美国人的心中，被他构想并珍视。斯文传统无法被这些叛乱所驱逐；还有一些圈子与它仍然投合，它将在那里被保存下来。但它已经受到了挑战，而且(也许更为

insidious) it has been discovered. No one need be browbeaten any longer into accepting it. No one need be afraid, for instance, that his fate is sealed because some young prig may call him a dualist; the pint would call the quart a dualist, if you tried to pour the quart into him. We need not be afraid of being less profound, for being direct and sincere. The intellectual world may be traversed in many directions; the whole has not been surveyed; there is a great career in it open to talent. That is a sort of knell, that tolls the passing of the genteel tradition. Something else is now in the field; something else can appeal to the imagination, and be a thousand times more idealistic than academic idealism, which is often simply a way of white-washing and adoring things as they are. The illegitimate monopoly which the genteel tradition had established over what ought to be assumed and what ought to be hoped for has been broken down by the first-born of the family, by the genius of the race. Henceforth there can hardly be the same peace and the same pleasure in hugging the old proprieties. Hegel will be to the next generation what Sir William Hamilton was to the last. Nothing will have been disproved, but everything will have been abandoned. An honest man has spoken, and the cant of the genteel tradition has become harder for young lips to repeat.

阴险的)它已被发现。再没有人需要被恐吓着去接受它了。再没有人需要害怕，比方说，因为某个年轻的学究也许会称他为二元论者，他的命运就被注定了；如果你试图把一夸脱倒进一品脱的容器里，一品脱的容器会称一夸脱为二元论者。我们不必害怕因为直接和真诚而变得不那么深刻。知识世界可以从许多方向被穿越；整体尚未被勘测；其中有一项伟大的事业向有才能的人敞开。那是一种丧钟，敲响了斯文传统的逝去。别的东西现在已进入战场；别的东西能够诉诸想象，并且比学院唯心论--后者往往不过是一种粉饰和崇拜事物现状的方式--要理想主义一千倍。斯文传统对什么应当被假定、什么应当被希望所建立的不合法的垄断，已被这个家族的长子、被这个种族的天才所打破。从此以后，拥抱旧有礼仪时几乎不可能再有同样的安宁和同样的愉悦。黑格尔对于下一代将如同威廉·汉密尔顿爵士对于上一代。没有什么将被驳倒，但一切都将被抛弃。一个诚实的人已经发言，斯文传统的伪善言辞对于年轻的嘴唇来说已变得更难重复。

With this I have finished such a sketch as I am here able to offer you of the genteel tradition in American philosophy. The subject is complex, and calls for many an excursus and qualifying footnote; yet I think the main outlines are clear enough. The chief fountains of this tradition were Calvinism and transcendentalism. Both were living fountains; but to keep them alive they required, one an agonised conscience, and the other a radical subjective criticism of knowledge. When these rare metaphysical

至此，我已完成了我能在此向诸位提供的关于美国哲学中斯文传统的这样一幅素描。这个主题是复杂的，需要许多附论和限定性的脚注；然而我认为主要轮廓已足够清晰。这一传统的主要源泉是加尔文主义和超验主义。两者都是活的源泉；但为了保持它们的活力，一个需要痛苦的良心，另一个需要对知识的彻底的主观批评。当这些罕见的形而上学

preoccupations disappeared—and the American atmosphere is not favourable to either of them—the two systems ceased to be inwardly understood; they subsisted as sacred mysteries only; and the combination of the two in some transcendental system of the universe (a contradiction in principle) was doubly artificial. Besides, it could hardly be held with a single mind. Natural science, history, the beliefs implied in labour and invention, could not be disregarded altogether; so that the transcendental philosopher was condemned to a double allegiance, and to not letting his left hand know the bluff that his right hand was making. Nevertheless, the difficulty in bringing practical inarticulate convictions to expression is very great, and the genteel tradition has subsisted in the academic mind for want of anything equally academic to take its place.

关切消失之后--而美国的气氛对两者都不利--这两个体系就不再被内在地理解了；它们仅作为神圣的奥秘而存续；而两者在某种超验的宇宙体系中的结合(原则上的矛盾)则是双重人为的。此外，它几乎无法以单一的心灵来持守。自然科学、历史、劳动和发明中所隐含的信念，不能被完全置之不顾；因此超验哲学家被判以双重效忠，并且不能让他的左手知道他的右手在虚张声势。然而，把实际的、未言明的信念带到表达中来，其困难是非常大的，而斯文传统之所以在学院心灵中存续，是因为缺乏任何同样学院化的东西来取代它的位置。

The academic mind, however, has had its flanks turned. On the one side came the revolt of the Bohemian temperament, with its poetry of crude naturalism; on the other side came an impassioned empiricism, welcoming popular religious witnesses to the unseen, reducing science to an instrument of success in action, and declaring the universe to be wild and young, and not to be harnessed by the logic of any school.

然而，学院式的心灵已被包抄。一侧是波希米亚气质的反叛，带着它那粗犷自然主义的诗篇；另一侧是一种充满激情的经验主义，它欢迎大众宗教对不可见之物的见证，将科学贬为行动中获取成功的工具，并宣称宇宙是狂野而年轻的，不能被任何学派的逻辑所驾驭。

This revolution, I should think, might well find an echo among you, who live in a thriving society, and in the presence of a virgin and prodigious world. When you transform nature to your uses, when you experiment with her forces, and reduce them to industrial agents, you cannot feel that nature was made by you or for you, for then these adjustments would have been pre-established. Much less can you feel it when she destroys your labour of years in a momentary spasm. You must feel, rather, that

我认为，这场革命很可能会在你们中间找到回响，你们生活在一个繁荣的社会中，面对着一个原始而奇异的世界。当你们把自然转化为你们的用途，当你们实验她的力量并将它们还原为工业的动因时，你们不能觉得自然是你们或为你们而造的，因为那样的话这些调整就会是预先确立的。当她在一阵短暂的痉挛中摧毁你们多年的劳动时，你们更不可能这样觉得。你们必定感到，不如说，

you are an offshoot of her life; one brave little force among her immense forces. When you escape, as you love to do, to your forests and your sierras, I am sure again that you do not feel you made them, or that they were made for you. They have grown, as you have grown, only more massively and more slowly. In their non-human beauty and peace they stir the sub-human depths and the superhuman possibilities of your own spirit. It is no transcendental logic that they teach; and they give no sign of any deliberate morality seated in the world. It is rather the vanity and superficiality of all logic, the needlessness of argument, the relativity of morals, the strength of time, the fertility of matter, the variety, the unspeakable variety, of possible life. Everything is measurable and conditioned, indefinitely repeated, yet, in repetition, twisted somewhat from its old form. Everywhere is beauty and nowhere permanence, everywhere an incipient harmony, nowhere an intention, nor a responsibility, nor a plan. It is the irresistible suasion of this daily spectacle, it is the daily discipline of contact with things, so different from the verbal discipline of the schools, that will, I trust, inspire the philosophy of your children. A Californian whom I had recently the pleasure of meeting observed that, if the philosophers had lived among your mountains their systems would have been different from what they are. Certainly, I should say, very different from what those systems are which the European genteel tradition has handed down since Socrates; for these systems are egotistical; directly or indirectly they are anthropocentric, and inspired by the conceited notion that man, or human reason, or the human distinction between good and evil, is the centre and pivot of the universe. That is what the mountains and the woods should make

你们是她生命的一个分支；是她巨大力量中的一个勇敢的小力量。当你们逃到你们的森林和你们的山峦中去--正如你们喜爱做的那样--我确信你们并不觉得是你们造了它们，或者它们是为你们而造的。它们生长着，正如你们生长着一样，只是更为巨大、更为缓慢。在它们那非人的美与安宁中，它们激起了你们自己精神中那低于人的深处和那超乎人的可能性。它们所教导的不是任何超验逻辑；它们也不给出任何迹象表明世界中坐镇着某种深思熟虑的道德。不如说，是一切逻辑的虚妄与肤浅，是论证的不必要，是道德的相对性，是时间的力量，是物质的丰饶，是可能生活的多样、不可言说的多样。一切都是可度量和有条件的，无限地重复着，然而在重复中又多少偏离了其旧有的形式。处处是美，无处是永恒，处处是初生的和谐，无处是意图、责任或计划。正是这日常景象的不可抗拒的劝服，正是与事物接触的日常训练--它与学府中言辞的训练如此不同--我相信，将启发你们孩子们的哲学。我最近有幸遇见的一位加利福尼亚人观察到，如果哲学家们曾生活在你们的群山之中，他们的体系就会与现在不同。当然，我要说，会与欧洲斯文传统自苏格拉底以来所传下的那些体系非常不同；因为这些体系是自我中心的；它们直接或间接地是人类中心论的，并且受到那种自负观念的启发：人，或人类理性，或人类对善恶的区分，是宇宙的中心和枢轴。这正是群山和森林应当使

you at last ashamed to assert. From what, indeed, does the society of nature liberate you, that you find it so sweet? It is hardly (is it?) that you wish to forget your past, or your friends, or that you have any secret contempt for your present ambitions. You respect these, you respect them perhaps too much; you are not suffered by the genteel tradition to criticise or to reform them at all radically. No; it is the yoke of this genteel tradition itself that these primeval solitudes lift from your shoulders. They suspend your forced sense of your own importance not merely as individuals, but even as men. They allow you, in one happy moment, at once to play and to worship, to take yourselves simply, humbly, for what you are, and to salute the wild, indifferent, non-censorious infinity of nature. You are admonished that what you can do avails little materially, and in the end nothing. At the same time, through wonder and pleasure, you are taught speculation. You learn what you are really fitted to do, and where lie your natural dignity and joy, namely, in representing many things, without being them, and in letting your imagination, through sympathy, celebrate and echo their life. Because the peculiarity of man is that his machinery for reaction on external things has involved an imaginative transcript of these things, which is preserved and suspended in his fancy; and the interest and beauty of this inward landscape, rather than any fortunes that may await his body in the outer world, constitute his proper happiness. By their mind, its scope, quality, and temper, we estimate men, for by the mind only do we exist as men, and are more than so many storage-batteries for material energy. Let us therefore be frankly human. Let us be content to live in the mind.

你终于羞于断言。究竟从什么之中，自然的社会将你解放出来，使你觉其如此甜美?这几乎不是(不是吗?)你希望忘却自己的过去、自己的朋友，或你对当前抱负怀有某种隐秘的蔑视。你尊重这些，你也许过于尊重它们；斯文传统不容你从根本上批判或改革它们。不；正是这斯文传统之轭，被这些原始孤寂从你肩上卸下。它们悬置了你对自己重要性的强制感受，不仅作为个体，甚至作为人。它们允许你，在一个幸福的时刻，同时游戏与崇拜，单纯地、谦卑地看待你自己之所是，并向自然的狂野、冷漠、不加评判的无限致敬。你被告诫：你所能做的在物质上微不足道，最终一无所有。同时，通过惊奇与愉悦，你被教导思辨。你了解到你真正适合做什么，你的自然尊严与欢乐何在， namely，在于表征许多事物而不成为它们，在于让你的想象通过同情去庆祝并回响它们的生命。因为人的独特之处在于，他对外部事物作出反应的机制包含了对这些事物的想象性转录，这转录被保存并悬置于他的幻想之中；而这内在风景的趣味与美，而非任何可能在外在世界等待他身体的命运，构成了他真正的幸福。我们依据他们的心灵、其范围、品质与性情来评价人，因为唯有通过心灵，我们才作为人存在，才不仅仅是物质能量的若干蓄电池。因此，让我们坦率地做人。让我们满足于生活在心灵之中。

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