EGOTISM IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY

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德国哲学中的自我中心

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PREFACE

This book is one of the many that the present war has brought forth, but it is the fruit of a long gestation. During more than twenty years, while I taught philosophy at Harvard College, I had continual occasion to read and discuss German metaphysics. From the beginning it wore in my eyes a rather questionable shape. Under its obscure and fluctuating tenets I felt something sinister at work, something at once hollow and aggressive. It seemed a forced method of speculation, producing more confusion than it found, and calculated chiefly to enable practical materialists to call themselves idealists and rationalists to remain theologians. At the same time the fear that its secret might be eluding me, seeing that by blood and tradition I was perhaps handicapped in the matter, spurred me to great and prolonged efforts to understand what confronted me so bewilderingly. I wished to be as clear and just about it as I could—more clear and just, indeed, than it ever was about itself.

For the rest, German philosophy was never my chief interest, and I write frankly as an outsider, with no professorial pretensions; merely using my common reason in the presence of claims put forth by others to a logical authority and a spiritual supremacy which they are far from possessing.

A reader indoctrinated in the German schools is, therefore, free not to read further. My object is neither to repeat his familiar arguments in their usual form, nor to refute them; my object is to describe them intelligibly and to judge them from the point of

前言

本书是当前这场战争催生的众多著作之一，但其酝酿过程却历时长久。二十多年间，我在哈佛学院教授哲学，不断有机会阅读和讨论德国形而上学。从一开始，它在我眼中就呈现出颇为可疑的形态。在其晦涩而游移不定的信条之下，我感到某种不祥之物在运作，某种既空洞又咄咄逼人的东西。它似乎是一种强加于人的思辨方法，造成的混乱多于它所澄清的，且主要意在使实践上的唯物主义者得以自称为唯心主义者，使理性主义者得以继续做神学家。与此同时，我担心自己或许未能把握其秘密--鉴于我在血统和传统上于此道或有所欠缺--这恐惧鞭策我付出巨大而持久的努力，去理解那如此令我困惑地呈现在面前的东西。我希望对它能做到尽可能清晰和公正--事实上，比它对自己所能做到的更为清晰和公正。

至于其余部分，德国哲学从来不是我主要的兴趣所在，我坦率地以一个局外人的身份写作，没有任何教授式的自命不凡；只是在他人提出的、声称具有逻辑权威和精神至上地位--而他们远未拥有这种地位--的主张面前，运用我普通的理性。

因此，一个在德国学派中受过灌输的读者尽可以不继续读下去。我的目的既不是以通常的形式重复他所熟悉的论点，也不是反驳它们；我的目的是可理解地描述它们，并从……的角度评判它们。

view of the layman, and in his interests. For those who wish to study German philosophy, the original authors are at hand: all I would give here is the aroma of German philosophy that has reached my nostrils. If the reader has smelt something of the kind, so much the better: we shall then understand each other. The function of history or of criticism is not passively to reproduce its subject-matter. One real world, with one stout corpus of German philosophy, is enough. Reflection and description are things superadded, things which ought to be more winged and more selective than what they play upon. They are echoes of reality in the sphere of art, sketches which may achieve all the truth appropriate to them without belying their creative limitations: for their essence is to be intellectual symbols, at once indicative and original.

门外汉的视角，并符合他的利益。对于那些希望研究德国哲学的人，原著作者近在咫尺：我在此只想给出那已飘入我鼻孔的德国哲学的气息。如果读者也嗅到了类似的气味，那就更好了：我们便能彼此理解。历史或批评的功能并非被动地复制其题材。一个真实的世界，连同德国哲学一个坚实的全集，已经足够了。反思与描述是附加之物，它们应当比其所作用的对象更具羽翼、更具选择性。它们是现实在艺术领域中的回声，是草图，这些草图可以达成与其相称的全部真实，而不必背弃其创造性的局限：因为它们的本质是智性符号，既具指示性，又具原创性。

Egotism—subjectivity in thought and wilfulness in morals—which is the soul of German philosophy, is by no means a gratuitous thing. It is a genuine expression of the pathetic situation in which any animal finds itself upon earth, and any intelligence in the universe. It is an inevitable and initial circumstance in life. But like every material accident, it is a thing to abstract from and to discount as far as possible. The perversity of the Germans, the childishness and sophistry of their position, lies only in glorifying what is an inevitable impediment, and in marking time on an earthly station from which the spirit of man—at least in spirit—is called to fly.

自我中心主义--思想上的主体性与道德上的任性妄为--这是德国哲学的灵魂，绝非无端之事。它是对任何动物在地球上、任何理智在宇宙中所处的那种可悲境况的真实表达。它是生命中一种不可避免的、初始的境况。但如同每一种物质性的偶然，它是一件应当尽可能从中抽离并加以折扣的事情。德国人的乖谬，其立场的幼稚与诡辩，仅仅在于美化那不可避免的障碍，并在地球的驻点上原地踏步--而人的精神，至少在其精神上，是被召唤从那里飞升的。

This glorified and dogged egotism, which a thousand personal and technical evidences had long revealed to me in German philosophy, might now, I should think, be evident to the whole world. Not that the German philosophers are responsible for the

这种被美化了的、顽固的自我中心主义，千百种个人的和技术性的证据早已在德国哲学中向我揭示了它，我现在认为，它或许现在已经为全世界所看清了。并不是说德国哲学家们要为……负责。

war, or for that recrudescence of corporate fanaticism which prepared it from afar. They merely shared and justified prophetically that spirit of uncompromising self-assertion and metaphysical conceit which the German nation is now reducing to action. It is a terrible thing to have a false religion, all the more terrible the deeper its sources are in the human soul. Like many a false religion before it, this which now inspires the Germans has made a double assault upon mankind, one with the secular arm, and another by solemn asseverations and sophistries. This assault, though its incidental methods may be dubious, has been bold and honest enough in principle. It has been like those which all conquerors and all founders of militant religions have made at intervals against liberty or reason. And the issue will doubtless be the same. Liberty may be maimed, but not killed; reason may be bent, but not broken. The dark aggression is to be repelled, if possible, by force of arms; but failing that, it will be nullified in time by the indomitable moral resistance which maturer races, richer in wisdom, can exert successfully against the rude will of the conqueror.

战争，或为那从远处便酝酿了战争的团体狂热的复发。他们不过是预言性地分享并辩护了那种毫不妥协的自我主张与形而上学自负的精神，而德意志民族如今正将其付诸行动。拥有一种虚假的宗教是可怕的事情，其根源在人类灵魂中越深，便越可怕。如同此前许多虚假的宗教一样，如今激励着德国人的这一宗教对人类发起了双重攻击，一是以世俗之臂，一是以庄严的断言和诡辩。这一攻击，尽管其附带的方法可能可疑，在原则上却足够大胆和诚实。它类似于所有征服者和所有好战宗教的创立者间或对自由或理性所发起的那些攻击。而结局无疑也将相同。自由可能被残害，但不会被杀死；理性可能被弯曲，但不会被折断。这黑暗的侵略将被击退，如有可能，以武力击退；但若不能如此，它终将在时间中被那不可征服的道德抵抗所消解--那更为成熟、智慧更为丰富的种族能够成功地以之对抗征服者的粗野意志。

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EGOTISM IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY

CHAPTER I

THE GENERAL CHARACTER OF GERMAN PHILOSOPHY

What I propose in these pages to call German philosophy is not identical with philosophy in Germany. The religion of the Germans is foreign to them; and the philosophy associated with religion before the Reformation, and in Catholic circles since, is a system native to the late Roman Empire. Their irreligion is foreign too; the sceptical and the scientific schools that have been

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德国哲学中的自我中心

第一章

德国哲学的总体特征

我在这些篇章中所要称之为德国哲学的，与德国的哲学并不等同。德国人的宗教对他们来说是外来的；而与宗教相关联的、宗教改革之前的以及此后天主教圈子中的哲学，是一种源于晚期罗马帝国的体系。他们的非宗教也是外来的；在其他国家引人注目的怀疑论学派和科学学派同样也在德国扎下了根。

conspicuous in other countries have taken root in Germany as well. Thus, if we counted the Catholics and the old-fashioned Protestants on the one hand, and the materialists (who call themselves monists) on the other, we should very likely discover that the majority of intelligent Germans held views which German philosophy proper must entirely despise, and that this philosophy seemed as strange to them as to other people.

因此，如果我们一方面把天主教徒和老派新教徒计算在内，另一方面把唯物主义者(他们自称一元论者)计算在内，我们很可能会发现，大多数有才智的德国人所持有的观点，是真正的德国哲学必定完全鄙视的，而这种哲学对他们来说，正如对其他人一样，显得同样陌生。

For an original and profound philosophy has arisen in Germany, as distinct in genius and method from Greek and Catholic philosophy as this is from the Indian systems. The great characteristic of German philosophy is that it is deliberately subjective and limits itself to the articulation of self-consciousness. The whole world appears there, but at a certain remove; it is viewed and accepted merely as an idea framed in consciousness, according to principles fetched from the most personal and subjective parts of the mind, such as duty, will, or the grammar of thought. The direction in which German philosophy is profound is the direction of inwardness. Whatever we may think of its competence in other matters, it probes the self—as unaided introspection may—with extraordinary intentness and sincerity. In inventing the transcendental method, the study of subjective projections and perspectives, it has added a new dimension to human speculation.

因为一种原创而深刻的哲学已在德国兴起，其天才与方法之独特，犹如希腊与天主教哲学之于印度诸体系。德国哲学的显著特征在于它刻意地是主观的，并将自身局限于自我意识的表述。整个世界在那里显现，但隔着一定的距离；它仅仅被看作并在意识中被接受为一个观念，依据的是从心灵最个人化、最主观的部分--如义务、意志或思想的语法--所提取的原则。德国哲学之所以深刻的方向，是内在性的方向。无论我们对其在其他事务上的能力作何感想，它都以非凡的专注与真诚探究自我--如同无援的内省所能做到的那样。在发明先验方法--即对主观投射与视角的研究--的过程中，它为人类的思辨增添了一个新的维度。

The foreign religion and the foreign irreligion of Germany are both incompatible with German philosophy. This philosophy cannot accept any dogmas, for its fundamental conviction is that there are no existing things except imagined ones: God as much as matter is exhausted by the thought of him, and entirely resident in this thought. The notion that knowledge can *discover* anything, or

德国的外来宗教与外来的无宗教都与德国哲学不相容。这种哲学不能接受任何教条，因为它的根本信念是：除了被想象之物以外，不存在任何现存之物：上帝与物质一样，都被关于他的思想所穷尽，并完全寓于这一思想之中。那种认为知识能够发现任何事物的观念，或者说

that anything previously existing can be revealed, is discarded altogether: for there is nothing to discover, and even if there was, the mind could not reach it; it could only reach the idea it might call up from its own depths. This idea might be perhaps justified and necessary by virtue of its subjective roots in the will or in duty, but never justified by its supposed external object, an object with which nobody could ever compare it. German philosophy is no more able to believe in God than in matter, though it must talk continually of both.

任何先前存在的事物都可以被揭示出来，这一观念被完全抛弃了：因为没有什么可发现的，即使有，心灵也无法触及它；心灵只能触及它从自身深处唤起的观念。这个观念也许凭借其在意志或义务中的主观根源而得到辩护并成为必要，但绝不能凭借其假定的外部对象而得到辩护，因为没有人能够将这个对象与之进行比较。德国哲学既不能相信上帝，也不能相信物质，尽管它必须不断地谈论二者。

At the same time this subjectivism is not irreligious. It is mystical, faithful, enthusiastic: it has all the qualities that gave early Protestantism its religious force. It is rebellious to external authority, conscious of inward light and of absolute duties. It is full of faith, if by faith we understand not definite beliefs held on inadequate evidence, but a deep trust in instinct and destiny.

然而，这种主观主义并非不虔诚。它是神秘的、虔诚的、热忱的：它具备了一切赋予早期新教以宗教力量的品质。它反抗外在权威，意识到内在的光明和绝对的责任。它充满信仰--如果我们将信仰理解为不是基于不充分证据的确定信念，而是对本能和命运的深切信赖。

Rather than religious, however, this philosophy is romantic. It accepts passionately the aims suggested to it by sentiment or impulse. It despises prudence and flouts the understanding. In *Faust* and in *Pier Gynt* we have a poetic echo of its fundamental inspiration, freed from theological accommodations or academic cant. It is the adventure of a wild, sensitive, boyish mind, that now plays the fairy prince and now the shabby and vicious egoist; a rebel and an enthusiast, yet often a sensualist to boot by way of experiment; a man eager for experience but blind to its lessons, vague about nature, and blundering about duty, but confident that he can in some way play the magician and bring the world round to serve his will and spiritual necessities.

然而，这种哲学与其说是宗教的，不如说是浪漫主义的。它热情地接受情感或冲动所提示的目标。它蔑视审慎，嘲弄知性。在《浮士德》和《培尔·金特》中，我们看到了对其根本灵感的一种诗意回响，这种灵感摆脱了神学上的迁就或学术上的陈词滥调。这是一个狂野、敏感、稚气心灵的冒险，它时而是童话王子，时而是褴褛而邪恶的利己主义者；一个反叛者和狂热者，却又常常作为实验而兼为感官主义者；一个渴望经验却对其教训视而不见的人，对自然模糊不清，在义务上屡屡犯错，却自信能以某种方式扮演魔术师，让世界转而服务于他的意志和精神需求。

Happiness and despair are alike impossible with such a

幸福与绝望在这样的人身上同样不可能

temperament. Its empiricism is perennial. It cannot lose faith in the vital impulse it expresses; all its fancy, ingenuity, and daring philosophy are embroideries which it makes upon a dark experience.

气质。它的经验主义是常存的。它不能对其所表达的生命冲动失去信心；它所有的想象、机巧和大胆的哲学，都是它在一种幽暗经验之上所作的刺绣。

It cannot take outer facts very seriously; they are but symbols of its own unfathomable impulses. So pensive animals might reason. The just and humble side of German philosophy—if we can lend it virtues to which it is deeply indifferent—is that it accepts the total relativity of the human mind and luxuriates in it, much as we might expect spiders or porpoises to luxuriate in their special sensibility, making no vain effort to peep through the bars of their psychological prison.

它不能认真对待外部事实；它们不过是它自身不可测度的冲动的象征。沉思的动物或许会这样推理。德国哲学公正而谦卑的一面--如果我们能赋予它一些它深感漠然的德性的话--在于它接受人类心智的完全相对性并在其中尽情享受，正如我们可以预期蜘蛛或海豚在它们特殊的感受性中尽情享受一样，不做徒劳的努力去窥视它们心理牢笼的栅栏之外。

This sort of agnosticism in a minor key is conspicuous in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. In a major key it reappears in Nietzsche, when he proclaims a preference for illusion over truth. More mystically expressed it pervades the intervening thinkers. The more profound they are the more content and even delighted they are to consider nothing but their own creations. Their theory of knowledge proclaims that knowledge is impossible. You know only your so-called knowledge, which itself knows nothing; and you are limited to the autobiography of your illusions.

这种小调式的不可知论在《纯粹理性批判》中十分显眼。在大调上，它又在尼采那里重新出现，当时他宣称偏爱幻觉甚于真理。若以更神秘的方式表达，它弥漫于其间的那些思想家。他们越是深刻，就越满足、甚至越欣喜于只考虑自己的创造物。他们的认识论宣称知识是不可能的。你只知道你那所谓的知识，而它本身一无所知；你被限制在你的种种幻觉的自传之中。

The Germans express this limitation of their philosophy by calling it idealism. In several senses it fully deserves this name. It is idealistic psychologically in that it regards mental life as groundless and all-inclusive, and denies that a material world exists, except as an idea necessarily bred in the mind. It is idealistic, too, in that it puts behind experience a background of concepts, and not of matter; a ghostly framework of laws,

德国人通过称其哲学为唯心主义来表达这种局限。在多种意义上，它完全配得上这个名称。它在心理学意义上是唯心主义的，因为它将精神生活视为无根据的、无所不包的，并否认物质世界的存在，除非作为必然在心灵中孕育的观念。它在另一种意义上也是唯心主义的，因为它在经验背后放置的是一个概念的背景，而非物质的背景；一个幽灵般的法则框架，

categories, moral or logical principles to be the stiffening and skeleton of sensible experience, and to lend it some substance and meaning. It is idealistic in morals also, in that it approves of pursuing the direct objects of will, without looking over one's shoulder or reckoning the consequences. These direct objects are ideals, whereas happiness, or any satisfaction based on renunciation and compromise, seems to these spirited philosophers the aim of a degraded, calculating mind. The word idealism, used in this sense, should not mislead us; it indicates sympathy with life and its passions, particularly the learned and political ones; it does not indicate any distaste for material goods or material agencies. The German moral imagination is in its first or dogmatic stage, not in the second or critical one. It is in love with life rather than with wisdom.

范畴、道德或逻辑原则被视为感性经验的支撑与骨架，并赋予它某种实质和意义。它在道德上也是唯心主义的，因为它赞同追求意志的直接对象，而不左顾右盼或计较后果。这些直接对象是理想，而幸福，或任何基于放弃与妥协的满足，在这些意气风发的哲学家看来，似乎是一个堕落的、精于算计的心灵的目标。在这个意义上使用的“唯心主义”一词不应误导我们；它表示对生活及其激情的同情，尤其是对学术激情和政治激情的同情；它并不表示对物质财富或物质手段的任何厌恶。德国的道德想象力处于其第一阶段或独断阶段，而非第二阶段或批判阶段。它爱的是生活，而非智慧。

There is accordingly one sense of the term idealism—the original one—in which this philosophy knows nothing of it, the Platonic and poetic sense in which the ideal is something *better* than the fact. The Platonic idealist is the man by nature so wedded to perfection that he sees in everything not the reality but the faultless ideal which the reality misses and suggests. Hegel, indeed, drew an outline portrait of things, according to what he thought their ideal essence; but it was uglier and more dreary than the things themselves. Platonic idealism requires a gift of impassioned contemplation, an incandescent fancy that leaps from the things of sense to the goals of beauty and desire. It spurns the earth and believes in heaven, a form of religion most odious to the Germans. They think this sort of idealism not only visionary but somewhat impious; for their own religion takes the form of piety and affection towards everything homely, imperfect, unstable, and

因此，唯心主义一词有一种含义--最初的含义--这种哲学对它一无所知，即柏拉图式的和诗意的含义，在这种含义中，理想是比事实更好的东西。柏拉图式的唯心主义者是那种天性如此执着于完美的人，以至于他在一切事物中看到的不是现实，而是现实所错过并暗示的无瑕理想。诚然，黑格尔根据他所认为的事物的理想本质，为事物勾勒了一幅轮廓肖像；但它比事物本身更丑陋、更沉闷。柏拉图式的唯心主义需要一种充满激情的沉思天赋，一种从感官事物跃向美与欲望之目标的炽热想象力。它鄙弃大地而信仰天堂，这是一种最令德国人厌恶的宗教形式。他们认为这种唯心主义不仅空幻，而且有些不虔；因为他们自己的宗教采取的是对一切质朴的、不完美的、不稳定的和

progressive. They yearn to pursue the unattainable and encounter the unforeseen. This romantic craving hangs together with their taste for the picturesque and emphatic in the plastic arts, and for the up-welling evanescent emotions of music. Yet their idealism is a religion of the actual. It rejects nothing in the daily experience of life, and looks to nothing essentially different beyond. It looks only for more of the same thing, believing in perpetual growth, which is an ambiguous notion. Under the fashionable name of progress what these idealists sincerely cherish is the vital joy of transition; and usually the joy of this transition lies much more in shedding their present state than in attaining a better one. For they suffer and wrestle continually, and by a curious and deeply animal instinct, they hug and sanctify this endless struggle all the more when it rends and bewilders them, bravely declaring it to be absolute, infinite, and divine.

进步的。他们渴望追求不可企及之物，遭遇未预见之事。这种浪漫主义的渴求与他们对造型艺术中如画和强调性风格的品味，以及对音乐中涌动的转瞬即逝的情感的品味紧密相连。然而，他们的唯心主义是一种现实宗教。它不拒绝日常生活经验中的任何事物，也不期待本质上不同的彼岸。它只寻求同一事物的更多，相信永恒的生长，而这是一个模棱两可的概念。在进步这一时髦名称下，这些唯心主义者真诚珍视的是过渡的生命喜悦；而通常这种过渡的喜悦更多地在于摆脱当前状态，而非达到更好的状态。因为他们不断受苦和挣扎，并且凭借一种奇特而深具动物性的本能，当这无尽的斗争撕裂和迷惑他们时，他们愈发拥抱和神圣化它，勇敢地宣称它是绝对的、无限的和神圣的。

Such in brief is German philosophy, at least, such it might be said to be if any clear account of it did not necessarily falsify it; but one of its chief characteristics, without which it would melt away, is ambiguity. You cannot maintain that the natural world is the product of the human mind without changing the meaning of the word mind and of the word human. You cannot deny that there is a substance without turning into a substance whatever you substitute for it. You cannot identify yourself with God without at once asserting and denying the existence of God and of yourself. When you speak of such a thing as the consciousness of society you must never decide whether you mean the consciousness individuals have of society or a fabled consciousness which society is to have of itself: the first meaning would spoil your eloquence, and the second would betray your mythology.

简而言之，德国哲学就是这样，至少可以说，如果任何清晰的描述不必然歪曲它的话；但它的主要特征之一，没有它就会消融，那就是模棱两可。你不能主张自然世界是人类心灵的产物，而不改变“心灵”一词和“人类”一词的含义。你不能否认存在实体，而不把你用来替代它的任何东西变成实体。你不能将自己与上帝等同，而不立即断言和否认上帝和你自己的存在。当你谈论诸如社会意识之类的东西时，你绝不能决定你指的是个人对社会的意识，还是社会据说对自身拥有的虚构意识：第一种含义会破坏你的雄辩，第二种会暴露你的神话。

What is involved in all these equivocations is not merely a change of vocabulary, that shifting use of language which time brings with it. No, the persistence of the old meanings alone gives point to the assertions that change them and identify them with their opposites. Everywhere, therefore, in these speculations, you must remain in suspense as to what precisely you are talking about. A vague, muffled, dubious thought must carry you along as on a current. Your scepticism must not derange your common sense; your conduct must not express your radical opinions; a certain afflatus must bear you nobly onward through a perpetual incoherence. You must always be thinking not of what you are thinking of but of yourself or of "something higher" Otherwise you cannot live this philosophy or understand it from within.

所有这些含糊其辞所涉及的不仅仅是词汇的变化，即时间带来的语言使用的转变。不，旧含义的持续存在才赋予了那些改变它们并将其与对立面等同起来的断言以意义。因此，在这些思辨中，你必须始终悬置，不确定你究竟在谈论什么。一个模糊的、低沉的、可疑的思想必须像水流一样载着你前行。你的怀疑主义绝不能扰乱你的常识；你的行为绝不能表达你的激进观点；某种灵感必须高贵地引领你穿越永恒的不连贯。你必须始终思考的不是你正在思考的东西，而是你自己或“某种更高的东西”。否则你无法过这种哲学生活或从内部理解它。

The mere existence of this system, as of any other, proves that a provocation to frame it is sometimes found in experience or language or the puzzles of reflection. Not that there need be any solidity in it on that account. German philosophy is a sort of religion, and like other religions it may be capable of assimilating a great amount of wisdom, while its first foundation is folly. This first folly itself will not lack plausible grounds; there is provocation enough in a single visit to a madhouse for the assertion that the mind can know nothing but the ideas it creates; nevertheless the assertion is false, and such facile scepticism loses sight of the essence of knowledge. The most disparate minds, since they do not regard themselves, may easily regard the same object. Only the maniac stares at his own ideas; he confuses himself in his perceptions; he projects them into the wrong places, and takes surrounding objects to be different from what they are. But perceptions originally have external objects; they express a bodily

这个体系的存在，如同任何其他体系一样，证明了在经验或语言或反思的困惑中有时会发现构建它的诱因。这并不是说因此它就必须有任何坚实性。德国哲学是一种宗教，像其他宗教一样，它可能能够吸收大量智慧，而其最初的基础却是愚蠢的。这最初的愚蠢本身也不会缺乏看似合理的依据；仅仅参观一次疯人院就足以提供断言心灵只能认识它自己创造的观念的诱因；然而这个断言是错误的，这种轻易的怀疑主义忽视了知识的本质。最迥异的心灵，由于它们不关注自身，可以轻易地关注同一个对象。只有疯子凝视自己的观念；他在感知中混淆自己；他把它们投射到错误的地方，并把周围的对象当作与它们实际不同的东西。但感知原本就有外部对象；它们表达一种身体的

reaction, or some inward preparation for such a reaction. They are reports. The porpoise and the spider are not shut up in their self-consciousness; however foreign to us may be the language of their senses, they know the sea and air that we know, and have to meet the same changes and accidents there which we meet—and they even have to meet us, sometimes, to their sorrow. Their knowledge does not end in acquaintance with that sensuous language of theirs, whatever it may be, but flies with the import of that language and salutes the forces which confront them in action, and which also confront us. In focussing these forces through the lenses and veils of sense knowledge arises; and to arrest our attention on those veils and lenses and say they are all we know, belies the facts of the case and is hardly honest. If we could really do that, we should be retracting the first act of intelligence and becoming artificial idiots. Yet this sophistication is the first principle of German philosophy (borrowed, indeed, from non-Germans), and is the thesis supposed to be proved in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*.

反应，或对这类反应的某种内在准备。它们是报告。海豚和蜘蛛并未被封闭在它们的自我意识之中；无论它们感官的语言对我们来说多么陌生，它们认识我们所认识的海和空气，并且不得不在那里面对我们所面对的相同变化和意外--它们甚至有时不得不面对我们，令它们悲伤。它们的知识并不终止于对它们那感官语言的熟悉，无论那语言是什么，而是带着那语言的含义飞翔，并向在行动中与它们相对峙、也与我們相对峙的力量致意。通过感官的透镜和面纱聚焦这些力量，知识便产生了；而将我们的注意力停留在那些面纱和透镜上，说它们就是我们所知的一切，这违背了事实，也几乎不诚实。如果我们真能那样做，我们就应当撤回智力的第一个行动，变成人工的白痴。然而这种诡辩是德国哲学的第一原则(确实借自非德国人)，并且是据称在康德的《纯粹理性批判》中要证明的论点。

CHAPTER II

THE PROTESTANT HERITAGE

The German people, according to Fichte and Hegel, are called by the plan of Providence to occupy the supreme place in the history of the universe.

A little consideration of this belief will perhaps lead us more surely to the heart of German philosophy than would the usual

第二章

新教遗产

根据费希特和黑格尔，德国人民被天意的计划召唤去占据宇宙历史中的最高地位。

对这一信念稍加思考，或许会比通常的……更稳妥地把我们引向德国哲学的核心。

laborious approach to it through what is called the theory of knowledge. This theory of knowledge is a tangle of equivocations; but even if it were correct it would be something technical, and the technical side of a great philosophy, interesting as it may be in itself, hardly ever determines its essential views. These essential views are derived rather from instincts or traditions which the technique of the system is designed to defend; or, at least, they decide how that technique shall be applied and interpreted.

通往它的道路是艰辛的，需经由所谓的认识论。这种认识论是一堆歧义的纠缠；但即便它正确无误，也终究是技术性的东西，而一部伟大哲学的技术层面，尽管本身可能有趣，却几乎从不决定其根本观点。这些根本观点毋宁说源自本能或传统，体系的技巧正是为捍卫它们而设计；或者至少，是它们决定了那种技巧应如何被运用和解释。

The moment we hear Fichte and Hegel mentioning a providential plan of the world, we gather that in their view the history of things is not infinite and endlessly various, but has a closed plot like a drama in which one nation (the very one to which these philosophers belong) has the central place and the chief rôle: and we perceive at once that theirs is a revealed philosophy. It is the heir of Judaism. It could never have been formed by free observation of life and nature, like the philosophy of Greece or of the Renaissance. It is Protestant theology rationalised. The element of religious faith, in the Protestant sense of the word faith, is essential to it. About the witness of tradition, even about the witness of the senses, it may be as sceptical as it likes. It may reduce nature and God to figments of the mind; but throughout its criticism of all matters of fact it will remain deeply persuaded that the questioning and striving spirit within is indefeasible and divine. It will never reduce all things, including the mind, to loose and intractable appearances, as might a free idealism. It will employ its scepticism to turn all things into ideas, in order to chain them the more tightly to the moral interests of the thinker. These moral interests, human and pathetic as they may seem to the outsider, it will exalt immeasurably, pronouncing them to be

一听到费希特和黑格尔提及天意计划，我们便明白，在他们看来，事物的历史并非无限且无尽多样，而是像戏剧一样有一个封闭的情节，其中一个民族(正是这些哲学家所属的民族)占据中心位置和主要角色：我们立刻察觉，他们的哲学是一种启示的哲学。它是犹太教的继承者。它绝不可能像希腊或文艺复兴的哲学那样，通过对生活和自然的自由观察而形成。它是理性化的新教神学。宗教信仰的元素，在新教意义上的“信仰”一词中，对它而言是本质性的。对于传统的见证，甚至对于感官的见证，它可以随心所欲地怀疑。它可以将自然和上帝化约为心灵的虚构；但在对所有事实的批判中，它将始终深信，内心那质疑和奋斗的精神是不可剥夺且神圣的。它绝不会像自由的唯心主义那样，将一切事物--包括心灵--化约为松散而难以驾驭的现象。它将运用其怀疑主义把一切事物转化为观念，以便将它们更紧密地束缚于思想者的道德关切。这些道德关切，尽管在外人看来可能显得人性而可悲，它却会无限地抬高它们，宣称它们是

groundless and immutable; and it will never tolerate the suspicion that all things might not minister to them.

无根据且不可改变的；而且它永远不会容忍这样的猜疑：万物或许并非都服务于它们。

From the same tenet of Fichte and Hegel we may also learn that in the plan of the world, as this revealed philosophy conceives it, the principal figures are not individuals, like the Creator, the Redeemer, and one's own soul, but nations and institutions. It is of the essence of Protestantism and of German philosophy that religion should gradually drop its supernatural personages and comforting private hopes and be absorbed in the duty of living manfully and conscientiously the conventional life of this world.

从费希特和黑格尔的同一原则中，我们还可以得知，在这种启示哲学所构想的世界计划中，主要角色并非个人，如造物主、救赎主和一个人自己的灵魂，而是民族和制度。新教和德国哲学的本质在于，宗教应逐渐抛弃其超自然的人物和慰藉性的私人希望，而专注于有男子气概地、凭良心过此世约定俗成生活的义务。

Not the whole life of the world, however, since gay religions and many other gay things are excluded, or admitted only as childish toys. Positive religion, in fact, disappears, as well as the frivolous sort of worldliness, and there remains only a consecrated worldliness that is deliberate and imposed as a duty.

然而，并非世界的全部生活，因为快乐的宗教和许多其他快乐的事物都被排除在外，或者只作为幼稚的玩物而被接纳。事实上，实证宗教消失了，轻浮的世俗性也消失了，剩下的只有一种经过祝圣的世俗性，它是深思熟虑的，并作为一项义务被强加。

Just as in pantheism God is naturalised into a cosmic force, so in German philosophy the Biblical piety of the earlier Protestants is secularised into social and patriotic zeal.

正如在泛神论中上帝被自然化为一种宇宙力量，在德国哲学中，早期新教徒的圣经虔诚被世俗化为社会和爱国的热忱。

German philosophy has inherited from Protestantism its earnestness and pious intention; also a tendency to retain, for whatever changed views it may put forward, the names of former beliefs. God, freedom, and immortality, for instance, may eventually be transformed into their opposites, since the oracle of faith is internal; but their names may be kept, together with a feeling that what will now bear those names is much more satisfying than what they originally stood for. If it should seem that God came nearest to us, and dwelt within us, in the form of vital energy, if freedom should turn out really to mean

德国哲学从新教继承了它的严肃性和虔诚意图；也继承了一种倾向：无论提出何种改变了的观点，都保留先前信仰的名称。例如，上帝、自由和不朽最终可能被转化为其对立面，因为信仰的神谕是内在的；但它们的名称可能被保留，同时伴随着一种感觉：如今承载这些名称的东西，比它们最初所代表的东西要令人满足得多。如果看起来上帝以生命能量的形式最接近我们、寓居在我们之内，如果自由最终真的意味着

personality, if immortality, in the end, should prove identical with the endlessness of human progress, and if these new thoughts should satisfy and encourage us as the evanescent ideas of God, freedom, and immortality satisfied and encouraged our fathers, why should we not use these consecrated names for our new conceptions, and thus indicate the continuity of religion amid the flux of science? This expedient is not always hypocritical. It was quite candid in men like Spinoza and Emerson, whose attachment to positive religion had insensibly given, way to a half-mystical, half-intellectual satisfaction with the natural world, as their eloquent imagination conceived it. But whether candid or disingenuous, this habit has the advantage of oiling the wheels of progress with a sacred unction. In facilitating change it blurs the consciousness of change, and leads people to associate with their new opinions sentiments which are logically incompatible with them. The attachment of many tender-minded people to German philosophy is due to this circumstance, for German philosophy is not tender.

人格，如果不朽最终被证明与人类进步的无穷无尽同一，如果这些新思想应当满足和鼓舞我们，正如上帝、自由和不朽这些转瞬即逝的观念曾满足和鼓舞我们的父辈，那么我们为何不将这些神圣的名称用于我们的新概念，从而表明宗教在科学流变中的连续性呢?这种权宜之计并不总是虚伪的。在斯宾诺莎和爱默生这样的人身上，它是相当坦诚的，他们对实证宗教的依恋已不知不觉地让位于一种半神秘、半智性的对自然世界的满足，正如他们雄辩的想象力所构想的那样。但无论坦诚与否，这种习惯都有用神圣的涂油润滑进步之轮的好处。在促进变化的同时，它模糊了对变化的意识，并导致人们将逻辑上与他们的新观点不相容的情感与之联系在一起。许多心肠柔软的人对德国哲学的依恋正是由于这种情况，因为德国哲学并不柔软。

The beauty and the torment of Protestantism is that it opens the door so wide to what lies beyond it. This progressive quality it has fully transmitted to all the systems of German philosophy. Not that each of them, like the earlier Protestant sects, does not think itself true and final; but in spite of itself it suggests some next thing. We must expect, therefore, that the more conservative elements in each system should provoke protests in the next generation; and it is hard to say whether such inconstancy is a weakness, or is simply loyalty to the principle of progress. Kant was a puritan; he revered the rule of right as something immutable and holy, perhaps never obeyed in the world. Fichte

新教的美妙与折磨在于，它如此宽泛地敞开了通往彼岸的大门。这种进步品质已完全传递给德国哲学的所有体系。并非每个体系不像早期新教教派那样自认为真实且终极；但尽管如此，它仍暗示着某种后续之物。因此，我们必须预料到，每个体系中较为保守的元素会在下一代引发抗议；很难说这种无常是弱点，还是仅仅忠于进步原则。康德是一位清教徒；他崇敬正当规则，视其为不可变易且神圣之物，或许在世上从未被遵循。费希特

was somewhat freer in his Calvinism; the rule of right was the moving power in all life and nature, though it might have been betrayed by a doomed and self-seeking generation. Hegel was a very free and superior Lutheran; he saw that the divine will was necessarily and continuously realised in this world, though we might not recognise the fact in our petty moral judgments. Schopenhauer, speaking again for this human judgment, revolted against that cruel optimism, and was an indignant atheist; and finally, in Nietzsche, this atheism became exultant; he thought it the part of a man to abet the movement of things, however calamitous, in order to appropriate its wild force and be for a moment the very crest of its wave.

在其加尔文主义中稍显自由；正当规则是一切生命与自然的动力，尽管它可能已被一个注定灭亡且自私自利的世代所背叛。黑格尔是一位非常自由且优越的路德宗信徒；他认识到神圣意志必然且持续地在此世实现，尽管我们可能无法在我们琐碎的道德判断中承认这一事实。叔本华再次为这种人类判断发声，反抗那种残酷的乐观主义，是一位愤慨的无神论者；最终，在尼采那里，这种无神论变得欢欣鼓舞；他认为人的职责是助长事物的运动，无论多么灾难性，以便占有其狂野力量，并在一瞬间成为其波浪的顶峰。

Protestantism was not a reformation by accident, because it happened to find the church corrupt; it is a reformation essentially, in that every individual must reinterpret the Bible and the practices of the church in his own spirit. If he accepted them without renewing them in the light of his personal religious experience, he would never have what Protestantism thinks living religion. German philosophy has inherited this characteristic; it is not a cumulative science that can be transmitted ready made. It is essentially a reform, a revision of traditional knowledge, which each neophyte must make for himself, under pain of rendering only lip-service to transcendental truth, and remaining at heart unregenerate. His chief business is to be converted; he must refute for himself the natural views with which he and all other men have begun life. And still these views—like the temptations of Satan—inevitably form themselves afresh in each generation, and even in the philosopher, between one spell of introspective thought and another, so that he always has to recapitulate his

新教并非偶然的改革，因为它恰好发现教会腐败；它本质上是改革，因为每个人都必须以自己的精神重新解释圣经和教会实践。如果他接受它们而不根据个人宗教经验之光更新它们，他就永远不会拥有新教所认为的活宗教。德国哲学继承了这一特征；它不是一门可以现成传递的累积科学。它本质上是改革，是对传统知识的修订，每个新信徒必须为自己进行，否则只会对先验真理口头敷衍，内心仍不重生。他的主要任务是皈依；他必须为自己反驳他和所有其他人开始生活时持有的自然观点。然而，这些观点--如同撒旦的诱惑--在每一代人中不可避免地重新形成，甚至在哲学家身上，在一次内省思考与另一次之间，因此他总是必须重述他的

saving arguments from the beginning. Each new idealist in each of his books, often in every lecture and every chapter, must run back to refute again the same homely opponents—materialism, naturalism, dualism, or whatever he may call them. Dead as each day he declares these foes to be, he has to fight them again in his own soul on the morrow. Hence his continual preoccupation lest he fall away, or lest the world should forget him. To preserve his freedom and his idealism he must daily conquer them anew. This philosophy is secondary, critical, sophistical; it has a perennial quarrel with inevitable opinions.

从头开始拯救论证。每一本书中的每一个新的唯心主义者，常常在每一讲和每一章中，都必须跑回去再次驳斥同样的家常对手--唯物论、自然主义、二元论，或他可能称呼它们的任何名称。尽管他每天都宣称这些敌人已死，他明天仍不得不在自己的灵魂中再次与它们战斗。因此他不断地 preoccupation，唯恐自己堕落，或唯恐世界忘记他。为了保持他的自由和他的唯心主义，他必须每天重新征服它们。这种哲学是次要的、批判的、诡辩的；它与不可避免的意见有着永久的争吵。

Protestantism, in spite of its personal status, wished to revert to primitive Christianity. In this desire it was guided partly by a conventional faith in the Scriptures, and partly by a deep sympathy with experimental religion. German religion and philosophy are homesick: they wish to be quite primitive once more. And they actually remain primitive in spirit, spontaneous and tentative, even in the midst of the most cumbrous erudition, as a composition of Dürer's, where flesh, fish, and fowl crowd every corner, still remains primitive, puzzled, and oppressed. Such a naïve but overloaded mind is lost in admiration of its own depth and richness; yet, in fact, it is rather helpless and immature; it has not learned to select what suffices, or to be satisfied with what is best.

新教，尽管其个人地位，仍希望回归原始基督教。在这种愿望中，它部分受对圣经的传统信仰指导，部分受对实验宗教的深切同情指导。德国的宗教和哲学是思乡的：它们希望再次完全原始。而它们实际上在精神上保持原始，自发和试探性，即使在最笨重的博学之中，就像丢勒的一幅构图，其中肉、鱼和家禽挤满每个角落，仍然保持原始、困惑和压抑。这样一个天真但超载的心灵迷失在对自身深度和丰富的钦佩中；然而，事实上，它相当无助和不成熟；它还没有学会选择足够的东西，或满足于最好的东西。

Faith for the Germans must be a primitive and groundless assurance, not knowledge credibly transmitted by others whose experience may have been greater than our own. Even philosophy is not conceived as a reasonable adjustment to what may have been discovered to be the constitution of the world; it is in the first instance a criticism, to dissolve that reputed knowledge, and

对德国人来说，信仰必须是一种原初的、无根据的保证，而不是由他人可信地传递的知识--那些人的经验或许比我们自己的更为丰富。甚至哲学也不被设想为对世界可能已被发现的构造所作的一种合理调整；它首先是一种批判，旨在消解那种公认的知识，并且

then, when primitive innocence is happily restored, it is a wager or demand made beyond all evidence, and in contempt of all evidence, in obedience to an innate impulse. Of course, it is usual, as a concession to the weaker brethren, to assume that experience, in the end, will seem to satisfy these demands, and that we shall win our bets and our wars; but the point of principle, borrowed by German philosophy from Protestantism, is that the authority of faith is intrinsic and absolute, while any external corroboration of it is problematical and not essential to the rightness of the assumptions that faith makes. In this we have a fundamental characteristic of the school. Carried (as it seldom is) to its logical conclusion, it leads to the ultra-romantic and ultra-idealistic doctrine that the very notion of truth or fact is a fiction of, the will, invented to satisfy our desire for some fixed point of reference in thought. In this doctrine we may see the culmination of the Protestant rebellion against mediation in religion, against external authority, and against dogma.

那么，当原始纯真幸福地恢复时，这是一个超越所有证据的赌注或要求，并蔑视所有证据，服从一种天生的冲动。当然，通常，作为对较弱兄弟的让步，假设经验最终会似乎满足这些要求，并且我们将赢得我们的赌注和我们的战争；但原则要点，由德国哲学从新教借来，是信仰的权威是内在的和绝对的，而任何外部佐证都是问题性的，并且对信仰所做的假设的正确性不是本质的。在这里我们有了学派的一个基本特征。被带到(如它很少被带到)其逻辑结论，它导致超浪漫主义和超唯心主义学说，即真理或事实的概念本身是意志的虚构，发明来满足我们对思想中某个固定参考点的欲望。在这种学说中，我们可以看到新教反叛宗教中介、反对外部权威和反对教条的顶点。

The Protestant precept to search the Scriptures, and the sense that every man must settle the highest questions for himself, have contributed to the zeal with which science and scholarship have been pursued in Germany. In no other country has so large, so industrious, and (amid its rude polemics) so co-operative a set of professors devoted itself to all sorts of learning. But as the original motive was to save one's soul, an apologetic and scholastic manner has often survived: the issue is prejudged and egotism has appeared even in science. For favourable as Protestantism is to investigation and learning, it is almost incompatible with clearness of thought and fundamental freedom of attitude. If the controlling purpose is not political or religious, it is at least

新教关于搜索圣经的训诫，以及每个人都必须为自己解决最高问题的感觉，促成了在德国追求科学和学术的热情。在任何其他国家，没有如此庞大、如此勤奋，并且(在其粗鲁的论战中)如此合作的一组教授致力于各种学习。但由于原始动机是拯救自己的灵魂，一种辩护和经院的方式经常幸存：问题被预先判断，自我中心主义甚至出现在科学中。因为新教对调查和学习有利，它几乎与思想的清晰和态度的基本自由不相容。如果控制目的不是政治的或宗教的，它至少是

"philosophical," that is to say, arbitrary.

“哲学的”，也就是说，任意的。

We must remember that the greater part of the "facts" on which theories are based are reported or inferred facts—*all* in the historical sciences, since the documents and sources must first be pronounced genuine or spurious by the philosophical critic. Here presumptions and private methods of inference determine what shall be admitted for a fact, to say nothing of the interpretation to be given to it. Hence a piece of Biblical or Homeric criticism, a history of Rome or of Germany often becomes a little system of egotistical philosophy, posited and defended with all the parental zeal and all the increasing conviction with which a prophet defends his supernatural inspirations.

我们必须记住，理论所依据的“事实”的大部分是报告或推断的事实--所有在历史科学中，因为文献和来源必须首先由哲学批评家宣布为真或假。在这里，推定和私人推理方法决定什么应被接受为事实，更不用说给予它的解释。因此，一段圣经或荷马批评，一部罗马或德国历史常常变成一个小型的自我中心哲学体系，以所有父母的热情和所有增加的信念被提出和辩护，就像先知捍卫他的超自然灵感一样。

The distinction between Mary and Martha is not a German distinction: in Germany the rapt idealist is busy about many things, so that his action is apt to be heady and his contemplation perturbed. Only the principle is expected to be spiritual, the illustrations must all be material and mundane. There is no paradox in German idealism turning to material science, commerce, and war for a fresh field of operation. No degeneracy is implied in such an extension of its vocation, especially when the other ideals of the state—pure learning, art, social organisation—are pursued at the same time with an equal ardour. The test of a genuine German idealist is that he should forget and sink his private happiness in whatever service the state may set him to do.

马利亚与马大之间的区别并不是德国式的区别：在德国，狂热的唯心主义者忙于许多事情，以致他的行动容易鲁莽，他的沉思容易受到扰乱。只有原则被期望是精神的，而例证则必须全是物质的、世俗的。德国唯心主义转向物质科学、商业和战争以寻求新的活动领域，这并没有什么悖谬之处。这种对其天职的扩展并不暗示任何退化，尤其是当国家的其他理想--纯粹学问、艺术、社会组织--同时以同等热情被追求时。一个真正的德国唯心主义者的检验标准是：他应当忘记并沉没自己的私人幸福于国家可能指派他做的任何服务之中。

In view of this political fidelity the changing opinions of men are all indifferent to true religion. It is not a question of *correctness* in opinion or conduct, since for the idealist there can be no external

鉴于这种政治上的忠诚，人们意见的变化对真正的宗教而言都是无关紧要的。这不是一个关于意见或行为之正确性的问题，因为对唯心主义者来说，不可能存在任何外在的

standard of truth, existence, or excellence on which such correctness could depend. Ideas are so much real experience and have no further subject-matter. Thought is simply more or less rich, elaborate, or vehement, like a musical composition, and more or less consistent with itself. It is all a question of depth and fulness of experience, obtained by hacking one's way through this visionary and bewitched existence, the secret purpose of which is to serve the self in its development. In this philosophy imagination that is sustained is called knowledge, illusion that is coherent is called truth, and will that is systematic is called virtue.

真理、存在或卓越的标准，这种正确性可能依赖的标准。观念就是如此多的真实经验，并且没有进一步的主题内容。思想仅仅是或多或少丰富、精细或强烈的，就像一首音乐作品，并且或多或少与自身一致。这完全是一个深度和经验 fullness 的问题，通过在这个幻象的和被迷惑的存在中开辟自己的道路而获得，其秘密目的是在发展中服务于自我。在这种哲学中，被维持的想象被称为知识，连贯的幻觉被称为真理，系统的意志被称为美德。

Evidently the only sanction or vindication that such a belief will look for is the determination to reassert it. Religion is here its own heaven, and faith the only proof of its own truth. What is harmonised in the end is not the experience through which people have actually passed but only the echoes of that experience chiming in the mystic ear. Memory too can play the egotist. Subjectivism can rule even within the subject and can make him substitute his idea of himself, in his most self-satisfied moment, for the poor desultory self that he has actually been.

显然，这种信念所寻求的唯一认可或辩护就是重新肯定它的决心。宗教在这里是它自己的天堂，而信仰是它自己真理的唯一证明。最终被调和起来的不是人们实际经历过的经验，而只是那种经验在神秘耳朵中回响的余音。记忆也可以扮演自我中心主义者。主观主义甚至可以在主体内部统治，并可以使他在最自我满足的时刻用他对自己的观念来替代他实际所是的那个可怜的散漫的自我。

The German philosophers have carried on Protestantism beyond itself. They have separated the two ingredients mingled in traditional religions. One of these ingredients—the vital faith or self-trust of the animal will—they have retained. The other—the lessons of experience—they have rejected. To which element the name of religion should still be given, if it is given to either, is a matter of indifference.

德国哲学家们把新教推展到了它自身之外。他们分离了传统宗教中混合的两种成分。其中一种成分--动物意志的 vital faith 或自我信赖--他们保留了下来。另一种成分--经验的教训--他们予以拒斥。至于宗教之名究竟应归于哪一种成分(如果归于其中任何一种的话)，则是无关紧要的事。

The important thing is that, call it religion or irreligion, we should know what we are clinging to.

重要的是，无论称之为宗教还是非宗教，我们都应当知道我们所执着的是什么。

CHAPTER III

TRANSCENDENTALISM

Fichte called Locke the worst of philosophers, but it was ungrateful of him, seeing that his own philosophy was founded on one of Locke's errors. It was Locke who first thought of looking into his own breast to find there the genuine properties of gold and of an apple; and it is clear that nothing but lack of consecutiveness and courage kept him from finding the whole universe in the same generous receptacle. This method of looking for reality in one's own breast, when practised with due consecutiveness and courage by the Germans, became the transcendental method; but it must be admitted that the German breast was no longer that anatomical region which Locke had intended to probe, but a purely metaphysical point of departure, a migratory ego that could be here, there, and everywhere at once, being present at any point from which thought or volition might be taken to radiate. It was no longer so easy to entrap as the soul of Locke, which he asserted travelled with him in his coach from London to Oxford. But the practice of looking for all things within one's own breast, in the subtler sense of searching for them in one's memory and experience, begat in time the whole romantic and subjective school of philosophy.

Leibniz, the first of German philosophers, although an enemy of Locke's sensualism and of his slackness in logic, was even more explicit in assigning a mental seat to all sensible objects. The soul, he said, had no windows and, he might have added, no doors; no

第三章

先验主义

费希特称洛克为最坏的哲学家，但这对他来说是忘恩负义的，因为费希特自己的哲学是建立在洛克的一个错误之上的。正是洛克首先想到审视自己的胸怀，以在那里发现金子和苹果的真正属性；而且很清楚，只有缺乏连贯性和勇气才使他未能在同一个慷慨的容器中发现整个宇宙。这种在自己的胸怀中寻找现实的方法，当被德国人以应有的连贯性和勇气实践时，变成了先验的方法；但必须承认，德国的胸怀不再是洛克打算探查的那个解剖学区域，而是一个纯粹形而上学的出发点，一个可以同时在此处、彼处和处处在场的游移的自我，存在于任何思想或意志可能被认为从中辐射的点上。它不再像洛克的灵魂那样容易被捕获，洛克断言他的灵魂随他乘坐马车从伦敦到牛津。但是，在自己的胸怀中寻找一切事物的实践，在更微妙的意义上即在记忆和经验中寻找它们，及时地孕育了整个浪漫主义的和主观主义的哲学学派。

莱布尼茨，德国哲学家的第一人，虽然反对洛克的感觉论及其逻辑上的松懈，却更为明确地把一切可感对象安置于心灵之中。他说，灵魂没有窗户，而且他本可以补充说，也没有门；没有

light could come to it from without; and it could not exert any transitive force or make any difference beyond its own insulated chamber. It was a *camera obscura*, with a universe painted on its impenetrable walls. The changes which went on in it were like those in a dream, due to the charge of pent-up energies and fecundities within it; for the Creator had wound it up at the creation like a clock, destined to go for ever, striking infinite hours, with ever richer chimes.

光能从外部进入其中；它也不能施加任何及物的力量，或在其自身封闭的密室之外造成任何差异。它是一个暗箱，在其不可穿透的墙壁上绘着一个宇宙。其中发生的变化如同梦中的变化，源于其内部积聚的潜能与丰饶；因为造物主在创世时已将它像钟表一样上紧发条，注定永远走下去，敲响无穷的时辰，钟声愈发丰富。

Here, in miniature, with a clearness and beauty never afterwards equalled, we have the nature and movement of the transcendental self set forth before us: a closed circle of experience, admitting of no relations with anything beyond, but infinite in its own potential developments, and guided by an inner force, according to an innate unconscious plan. All duties, all principles of interpretation, all data, all visioned objects, operated within this single life, diversifying its field of view, and testifying to its secret endowment.

在这里，以缩影的形式，带着后来从未被超越的清晰和美丽，先验自我的本性和运动被展现在我们面前：一个封闭的经验圆圈，不允许与任何超越它的事物发生关系，但在其自身的潜在发展中是无限的，并由一种内在力量按照一种天生的无意识计划所引导。所有的义务、所有的解释原则、所有的材料、所有被看见的对象，都在这个单一的生命内运作，使其视野多样化，并证明其秘密的禀赋。

Nevertheless, the later idealists, ungrateful to Locke for their first principle, were ungrateful also to Leibniz for their ultimate conception, anticipated by him in all its completeness. There were reasons, of course, for this ingratitude. Leibniz, like the transcendentalists, had supposed that the objects of sense, as experience reveals them, were begotten out of the latent nature of the soul; but he had also conceived that there were many souls, as many as atoms in the physical world, and that the images arising in each were signs of the presence and actual condition of its companions. Thus perception, while yielding directly only an idea, as in a dream, was indirectly symbolic of an outer reality, like a dream significant and capable of interpretation. And being an

然而，后来的理想主义者们，对他们的第一原则不感激洛克，对他们的终极概念也不感激莱布尼茨，尽管莱布尼茨已在其完整性上预见了这一概念。当然，这种不感激是有理由的。莱布尼茨如同先验论者一样，认为感官对象，如经验所揭示的，是从灵魂的潜在本性中产生的；但他也认为有许多灵魂，其数量如同物理世界中的原子一样多，并且在每个灵魂中产生的形象是其同伴存在和实际状况的标志。因此，感知虽然直接只产生一个观念，如同在梦中一样，却间接地象征着一个外部现实，就像一个有意义且能够被解释的梦。并且作为一个

undaunted rationalist, Leibniz assumed that the sooth-sayer capable of reading this dream was reason, and that whatever reason conceived to be right and necessary actually must be true in the great outer world.

作为无所畏惧的理性主义者，莱布尼茨假定能够解读这一梦境的预言者就是理性，并且理性所设想为正确和必然的东西，在广大的外部世界中必定实际上是真的。

It was at this point that Kant deviated into his radical subjectification of knowledge. His mind had been more open than that of Leibniz to the influences of English psychology, it had stewed longer in its own juice, and he could not help asking how, if the senses could reveal only ideas of sense, reason was ever able to reveal anything but ideas of reason. Those inferences about the vast world outside, which Leibniz had allowed his spirits to make in their solitary confinement, were reduced by the more scrupulous Kant to scribblings upon their prison walls. These scribblings he officially termed the ideas of pure—that is, of unsupported—reason; but in his private capacity he gently continued to agree with Leibniz and to believe them true.

正是在这一点上，康德偏离到了他对知识的彻底主体化。他的思想比莱布尼茨的思想更开放，更易受英国心理学的影响，它在自己的汁液中炖煮得更久，他不禁要问，如果感官只能揭示感官的观念，理性又如何能揭示除了理性观念之外的任何东西。莱布尼茨允许他的精神在孤独的禁闭中做出的关于广阔外部世界的那些推论，被更为谨慎的康德简化为他们监狱墙壁上的涂鸦。这些涂鸦他正式称为纯粹--即无支持--理性的观念；但在他私人身份下，他温和地继续同意莱布尼茨并相信它们是真的。

There was no anomaly, according to Kant, in this situation. An idea might by chance be the image of a reality, but we could never know that it was. For the proof would have to be supplied by a further idea, and would terminate in that. The hypothesis and the corroboration would alike be mental, since experience was of ideas and could envisage nothing but the vicissitudes of the mind.

按照康德的说法，这种情况并无任何反常之处。一个观念或许偶然是某个实在的映像，但我们永远无法知道它确实如此。因为证明必须由另一个观念来提供，并且将终止于那个观念。假设与确证同样都是心灵的，因为经验是关于观念的，除了心灵的变迁之外无法设想任何东西。

If you had asked Leibniz what determined the order in which perceptions came into any mind, he would doubtless have answered that the Creator did so, or (translating that symbol into its analytic equivalent in his system) that what did so was the innate destiny or predisposition of that mind to develop in

如果你问莱布尼茨，是什么决定了知觉进入任何心灵的次序，他无疑会回答说，是造物主如此决定的，或者(把这一象征翻译为其体系中的分析等价物)是那个心灵与尽可能最好的宇宙相和谐地发展的先天命运或禀性如此决定的。

harmony with the best possible universe. Here is a very remarkable unconscious principle of evolution seated in the spirit and presiding over all its experience. This is precisely what is meant by a transcendental principle.

这里有一个非常值得注意的无意识的进化原则，寓于精神之中并主宰其一切经验。这正是先验原则一词所指的东西。

This principle, unconscious as it is, sometimes betrays its mighty workings to consciousness. Besides the incidental multitude of ideas which it breeds, it makes itself felt in subterranean strains and rumblings, in the sense of movement and of longing. This darker but deeper manifestation of the transcendental clock-work Leibniz called appetition, and under the name of Will it has played a great part in later German systems. To call it Will is, of course, to speak improperly and mythologically, for actual willing requires an idea of what is willed. When we say a man doesn't know what he wants, we mean that he can will nothing, for lack of a clear idea of his interests and situation, although he doubtless wants or lacks many specific things, the absence of which is rendering him unhappy and restless. These instinctive appetitions for objects of which the mind is ignorant may, by a figure of speech, be called unconscious Will; a phrase which would be a contradiction in terms if this word Will (which I write with a capital letter) were not used metaphorically. From this metaphor, when its boldness seems to be dulled by use, we may pass insensibly to giving the name of Will to that whole transcendental potency of the soul which, like the mainspring of a watch, lay coiled up tightly within it from the beginning of time. A man's transcendental Will can then be called the source of everything that ever happens to him—his birth, his character, his whole life, and his death—all that he most detests and most emphatically does not will, like his nightmares, being an expression of the

这一原则，尽管是无意识的，有时会向意识透露其强大的运作。除了它孕育的偶然的众多观念外，它还在潜意识的和隆隆声中，在运动和渴望的感觉中，使自己被感受到。这种先验钟表机制的更黑暗但更深刻的表现，莱布尼茨称之为欲望，而在意志的名义下，它在后来的德国体系中扮演了重要角色。当然，称它为意志是不恰当的，也是神话式的，因为实际的意愿需要有一个关于所意愿之物的观念。当我们说一个人不知道他想要什么时，我们的意思是，由于缺乏对其利益和处境的清晰观念，他无法意愿任何东西，尽管他无疑想要或缺乏许多具体事物，这些事物的缺失使他感到不幸和不安。这些对心灵一无所知的对象的本能欲望，可以通过一种比喻的说法，称为无意识的意志；如果这个意志一词(我用大写字母写)不是被隐喻性地使用，这个短语在术语上将是矛盾的。从这个隐喻中，当它的大胆似乎因使用而变得迟钝时，我们可以不知不觉地过渡到将灵魂的整个先验潜能称为意志，这种潜能就像手表的发条一样，从时间之初就紧紧地盘绕在它里面。一个人的先验意志因此可以被称作发生在他身上的一切事物的源头--他的出生、他的性格、他的一生和他的死亡--所有他最憎恶和最坚决不意愿的东西，就像他的噩梦一样，是那

original pregnancy of his spirit, and its transcendental principle of development.

There is but one thing to add touching a point often left by these philosophers in the most hopeless obscurity. In Leibniz the number of spirits was infinite: in the later systems they are reduced to one. This difference seems greater than it is, for when such terms as Spirit or Will are used metaphorically, standing for unconscious laws of continuity or development, and when the Will or Spirit present in me now may be said to have presided over the destinies of my soul infinite ages before I was born, there seems to be no good reason why the same Spirit or Will should not preside over all the inhabitants of the universe at all times, be they gods or humming-birds. Such a Spirit or Will resembles the notion of Providence, or the law of evolution, or the pre-established harmony of Leibniz far more than it resembles a mind. Those philosophers, intent on proving that the Spirit can be only one, might have proceeded, therefore, by urging that a Spirit was at best a formal and abstract law, covering such disparate facts, that all flesh and fowl, all demons and angels, might just as well be animated by a single Spirit. As it takes all sorts of things to make a world, it might take all sorts of things to express a Spirit.

This cool and consciously verbal way of making all one, however, is not the way of the Germans. No doubt in practice the unity of the Spirit or Will in their systems amounts to nothing more, yet their intention and illusion is rather that whenever two things can be called manifestations of one Spirit in the loosest and most metaphorical sense of this word they are thereby proved to be data in one spirit in the most intimate and psychological sense of the same. So that what really happens to transcendentalists is not

其精神的原初孕育性，及其先验的发展原则。

还有一点需要补充，涉及这些哲学家常常留在最无望的模糊中的一点。在莱布尼茨那里，精神的数量是无限的：在后来的体系中，它们被减少到一个。这个差异似乎比实际更大，因为当诸如精神或意志这样的术语被隐喻性地使用，代表无意识的连续性或发展规律时，并且当现在在我身上的意志或精神可以说在我出生前无限个时代就主持了我灵魂的命运时，似乎没有充分的理由为什么同一个精神或意志不应该在所有时间主持宇宙中的所有居民，无论他们是神还是蜂鸟。这样的精神或意志更像天意的概念，或进化规律，或莱布尼茨的预定和谐，而不是像一个心灵。因此，那些致力于证明精神只能是一个的哲学家们，本可以通过强调精神充其量是一种形式和抽象的规律，涵盖如此不同的事实，以至于所有血肉和飞禽，所有恶魔和天使，都可能同样被一个单一的精神所驱动。正如需要各种各样的东西来构成一个世界，也可能需要各种各样的东西来表达一个精神。

然而，这种冷静且有意识地用语言方式将一切统一起来的方法，并不是德国人的方式。毫无疑问，在实践中，他们体系中精神或意志的统一不过如此，但他们的意图和幻觉更像是，每当两个事物可以在最宽松和最隐喻的意义上被称为一个精神的表现时，它们因此被证明是在最亲密和心理学意义上的同一个精神中的数据。因此，对于先验论者来说，真正发生的事情并不是

that they unite all the transcendental units of Leibniz into one even looser transcendental unit, but that they limit the universe to what in Leibniz was one of an infinite number of parallel careers. Nay, they limit even that one career to the experience present at one point, that of the most intense and comprehensive self-consciousness.

他们把所有莱布尼茨的先验单元结合成一个更为松散的先验单元，但他们把宇宙限制在莱布尼茨那里无限多的平行历程之一中。不仅如此，他们甚至把那一个历程限制在某一时刻所呈现的经验，即最强烈、最包罗万象的自我意识的经验。

The unity they desire and believe in is accordingly an actual and intense unity. All its elements are to be viewed at once, bound and merged together by the simultaneous intuition of all their relations, and this in a single, unchanging, eternal moment of thought, or rather of unutterable feeling. The union is, therefore, real, psychic, mystical, and so close that everything that was to be united there, by a curious irony, remains outside.

因此，他们所渴望并相信的统一是一种实际的、强烈的统一。它的所有要素都要被一次性地观看，由对它们一切关系的同时直觉所束缚并融合在一起，而且这发生在一个单一的、不变的、永恒的思想瞬间，或者毋宁说是不可言说的感受瞬间。因此，这种结合是实在的、心灵的、神秘的，并且如此紧密，以至于按照一种奇特的讽刺，一切本应在那里被结合起来的东西都留在了外面。

What can lead serious thinkers, we may ask, into such pitfalls and shams? In this case, a powerful and not unworthy motive. All transcendentalism takes the point of view of what it calls knowledge; whenever it mentions anything—matter, God, oneself—it means not that thing but the idea of it. By knowledge it understands the image or belief, the fact of cognition. Whatever is thought of exists, or can exist, in this philosophy, only for thought; yet this thought is called not illusion but knowledge, because knowledge is what the thought feels that it is.

我们不妨问一问，究竟是什么东西会把严肃的思想家引入这样的陷阱和骗局呢?在这个例子里，是一个强大而又并非不值得称道的动机。一切先验主义都采取它所谓的知识的观点；每当它提到任何东西--物质、上帝、自我--它所指的都不是那个东西，而是关于那个东西的观念。它把知识理解为影像或信念，理解为认知这一事实。在这套哲学里，凡被想到的东西都只为思想而存在，或能够为思想而存在；然而这种思想并不被称为幻觉，而被称为知识，因为知识正是思想所感觉到的它自身之所是。

Evidently on this principle none of Leibniz's spirits could know any other, nor could any phase of the same spirit know any other phase. The unbridgeable chasm of want of experience would cut off knowledge from everything but its "content," the ideas it has of its objects. Those fabled external objects would be brought back into my ideas, and identified with them; my ideas in turn would

显然，按照这一原则，莱布尼茨的任何精神都不能认识任何其他精神，同一精神的任何阶段也不能认识任何其他阶段。缺乏经验的不可逾越的鸿沟将使知识与其“内容”--即它对对象所拥有的观念--之外的一切隔绝。那些虚构的外部对象将被带回我的观念之中，并与它们等同起来；我的观念反过来又会

be drawn in and identified with the fact that I entertain them and this fact itself would condense into the more intimate and present fact that intensely, vaguely, deeply I feel that I am, or am tending to be, something or other. My Will or Spirit, the rumble of my unconscious appetitions, thus absorbs my ideas, my ideas absorb their objects, and these objects absorb the world, past, present, and future. Earth and heaven, God and my fellowmen are mere expressions of my Will, and if they were anything more, I could not now be alive to their presence. My Will is absolute. With that conclusion transcendentalism is complete.

被吸引进去，并与我怀有这些观念这一事实相等同，而这个事实本身又会凝聚为更内在、更当下的一个事实：我强烈地、模糊地、深切地感觉到我是，或者正趋向于成为，某种东西。于是我的意志或精神，我那无意识欲求的隆隆声，就这样吸收了我的观念，我的观念吸收了它们的对象，而这些对象又吸收了整个世界--过去、现在和未来。天地、上帝和我的同胞都只是我的意志的表达；倘若它们还意味着别的什么，我此刻就不可能对它们的存在有所知觉。我的意志是绝对的。有了这个结论，先验主义便告完成。

Is such transcendentalism impossibly sceptical? Is it absurdly arrogant? Is it wonderfully true?

这样的先验主义是令人无法忍受的怀疑论吗?是荒谬的傲慢吗?还是奇妙地真实?

In so complex a world as this, there is room for a great number of cross-vistas: when all has been surveyed from one point of view and in one set of terms, nothing excludes the same reality from being surveyed from a different centre and expressed in a different notation. To represent a man, sculpture is apparently exhaustive; yet it does not exclude painting, or the utterly disparate description of the man in words; surveys in which there need be no contradiction in the deliverance, though there is the widest diversity and even incommensurability in the methods. Each sort of net drawn through the same sea catches a different sort of fish; and the fishermen may quarrel about what the sea contained, if each regards his draught as exhaustive. Yet the sea contained all their catches, and also the residue, perhaps infinite, that escaped them all.

在这样一个复杂的世界里，容得下许许多多交叉的景致：当一切都已从一个视点、用一套术语勘察完毕，也丝毫不排除同一实在可以从另一个中心被勘察，并用另一套记号来表达。要表现一个人，雕塑显然是穷尽无遗的；然而它并不排除绘画，也不排除用文字对这个人作全然不同的描述；在这些勘察中，所得出的结论之间不必有任何矛盾，尽管方法上有着最广泛的差异，甚至不可通约。每一种网撒过同一片海，捞上来的都是不同种类的鱼；倘若每个渔夫都把自己的捕获视为穷尽无遗，他们就会为海里究竟有什么而争吵起来。然而海里既容纳了他们所有的捕获，也容纳了那逃脱了他们所有人的残余，那残余也许是无限的。

Now one net which every intelligent being casts over things is that of his own apprehension, experience, and interests. He may not

现在，每一个有理智的存在者投射于事物之上的网，就是他自己的领会、经验和利益之网。他可能不会

reflect often on his personal principle of selection and arrangement; he may be so interested in the movements he sees through his glass as never to notice the curious circular frame, perhaps prismatic, which his glass imposes on the landscape. Yet among all the properties of things, the adventitious properties imputed to them in apprehension are worth noting too; indeed, it chastens and transforms our whole life if we have once noted them and taken them to heart. Not that this circumstance implies for a moment what the dizziness of idealists has inferred, that things exist only as perceived or when we perceive them. What follows is rather that, besides the things and in the most interesting contrast to their movement, there is the movement of our minds in observing them. If, for instance, I happen not to know the name of my great-grandfather, and am vexed at my ignorance, I may search the parish records and discover it, together with many circumstances of his life. This does not prove that my interest in genealogy created my great-grandfather, as a consistent egotist would assert; but it does show how my interest was a nucleus for my discoveries and for the terms, such as great-grandfather, in which I express them—for it was no intrinsic property of that worthy man that he was to become my great-grandfather after his death, or that I was to discover him.

常常反思他自己那套选择与安排的个人原则；他可能如此专注于透过镜片看到的运动，以至于从未注意到他的镜片强加于这片风景的那奇特的圆形边框，那也许是棱镜式的边框。然而在事物的所有属性中，那些在领会中被归派给事物的外在属性也是值得注意的； indeed，一旦我们注意到了它们并铭记于心，这便会净化并改变我们的整个生活。这并不是说，这一情形有片刻意味着唯心主义者们在眩晕中所推断出的东西，即事物只作为被感知的而存在，或只在我们感知它们时才存在。由此得出的结论毋宁是：除了事物之外，而且与事物的运动形成最有趣的对照，还有我们的心灵在观察事物时的运动。譬如，倘若我碰巧不知道我曾祖父的名字，并为自己的无知而烦恼，我可以查阅教区记录，把它发现出来，连同他生平中的许多情形。这并不证明我对谱系的兴趣创造出了我的曾祖父，正如一个前后一贯的自我中心主义者会断言的那样；但它确实表明，我的兴趣如何成为我的种种发现以及我用以表达这些发现的那些术语(诸如“曾祖父”)的核心--因为那位可敬的先生死后将成为我的曾祖父，或者我将发现他，这并非他固有的属性。

This vortex which things, as apprehension catches them, seem to form round each whirling spectator, is the fascinating theme of lyric poetry, of psychological novels, and of German philosophy. Dominated as this philosophy is by the transcendental method, it regards views, and the history and logic of views, as more primitive and important than the objects which these views have in common. The genial Professor Paulsen of Berlin (whose pupil I

事物在被领会捕捉时似乎围绕每一个旋转的旁观者所形成的这个漩涡，是抒情诗、心理小说和德国哲学所迷恋的主题。这门哲学受先验方法的支配，它把观点以及观点的历史和逻辑视为比这些观点所共有的事物更为原初和重要。柏林那位和蔼的保尔森教授(我是他的学生

once had the advantage of being) had a phrase that continually recurred in his lectures: *Man kann sagen*, as much as to say, Things will yield the following picture, if one cares to draw it. And he once wrote an article in honour of Kant very pertinently entitled: *Was uns Kant sein kann*; because no veritable disciple of Kant accepts what Kant taught as he taught it, but each rises from the study of the master having irresistibly formed one or more systems of his own. To take what views we will of things, if things will barely suffer us to take them, and then to declare that the things are mere terms in the views we take of them—that is transcendentalism.

曾有幸如此)有一个在他的讲演中不断重现的说法：*Man kann sagen*，意思大致是：只要有人愿意这样描画，事物就会呈现出下面这幅图景。他还曾写过一篇文章纪念康德，题目极为贴切：*Was uns Kant sein kann*；因为康德的真正门徒没有一个会照康德讲授的方式接受康德所教的东西，而是每一个人都在研习大师之后，不可抗拒地形成了自己的一套或几套体系。无论我们对事物采取什么样的看法，只要事物勉强容许我们采取这些看法，然后便宣称事物不过是我们对它们所采取的种种看法中的一些术语--这就是先验主义。

CHAPTER IV

HINTS OF EGOTISM IN GOETHE

All transcendentalists are preoccupied with the self, but not all are egotists. Some regard as a sad disability this limitation of their knowledge to what they have created; they are humble, and almost ashamed to be human, and to possess a mind that must cut them off hopelessly from all reality. On the other hand there are many instinctive egotists who are not transcendentalists, either because their attention has not been called to this system, or because they discredit all speculation, or because they see clearly that the senses and the intellect, far from cutting us off from the real things that surround us, have the function of adjusting our action to them and informing our mind about them. Such an instinctive egotist does not allege that he creates the world by

第四章

歌德思想中的自我中心之迹

所有先验论者都专注于自我，但并非所有人都是自我中心主义者。有些人将这种知识局限于自己所创造之物的状况视为一种可悲的缺陷；他们谦卑，几乎羞于为人，羞于拥有一种必定使他们无可救药地与一切实在隔绝的心灵。另一方面，有许多本能的自我中心主义者并非先验论者，或者是因为他们的注意力未曾被引向这一体系，或者是因为他们不信赖一切思辨，或者是因为他们清楚地看到，感官与知性远非使我们与周围真实事物隔绝，其功能恰恰在于使我们的行动适应这些事物，并让我们的心灵认识它们。这样的本能自我中心主义者并不声称他通过意愿和思维创造了世界，

willing and thinking it, yet he is more interested in his own sensations, fancies, and preferences than in the other things in the world. The attention he bestows on things seems to him to bathe in light their truly interesting side. What he chiefly considers is his own experience—what he cared for first, what second, what he thinks to-day, what he will probably think to-morrow, what friends he has had, and how they have lost their charm, what religions he has believed in, and in general what contributions the universe has made to him and he to the universe. His interest in personality need not be confined to his own; he may have a dramatic imagination, and may assign their appropriate personality to all other people; every situation he hears of or invents may prompt him to conceive the thrilling passions and pungent thoughts of some *alter ego*, in whom latent sides of his own nature may be richly expressed. And impersonal things, too, may fascinate him, when he feels that they stir his genius fruitfully; and he will be the more ready to scatter his favours broadcast in that what concerns him is not any particular truth or person (things which might prove jealous and exclusive), but rather the exercise of his own powers of universal sympathy.

然而他更关心自己的感觉、幻想和偏好，而非世界上的其他事物。在他看来，他施加于事物的注意力似乎照亮了它们真正有趣的一面。他主要考虑的是自己的经验--他首先关心什么，其次关心什么，他今天怎么想，明天可能怎么想，他有过哪些朋友，他们又如何失去了魅力，他信仰过哪些宗教，以及总而言之，宇宙给予了他什么，他又给予了宇宙什么。他对人格的兴趣不必局限于自身；他可能具有戏剧性的想象力，可能为所有其他人分配其恰当的人格；他听说或发明的每一种情境都可能促使他构想某个另一个自我的令人激动的激情和辛辣的思想，在其中他自己本性的潜在方面可能得到丰富的表达。非人格的事物同样可能令他着迷，当他感到它们富有成果地激发他的天才时；而且他会更乐于广泛散布他的青睐，因为与他相关的并非任何特定的真理或人物(这些东西可能被证明是嫉妒而排他的)，而是他自己普遍同情之能力的运用。

Something of this sort seems to appear in Goethe; and although his contact with philosophical egotism was but slight, and some of his wise maxims are incompatible with it, yet his romanticism, his feeling for development in everything, his private life, the nebulous character of his religion, and some of his most important works, like *Faust* and *Wilhelm Meister*, are all so full of the spirit of German philosophy, that it would be a pity not to draw some illustration for our subject from so pleasant a source.

在歌德身上似乎出现了某种类似的东西；尽管他与哲学自我中心主义的接触甚为轻微，他的一些明智格言也与它不相容，然而他的浪漫主义、他对万物中发展过程的感受、他的私生活、他宗教的朦胧性质，以及他一些最重要的作品，如《浮士德》和《威廉·迈斯特》，都充满了德国哲学的精神，若不从如此令人愉悦的源泉中为我们的主题汲取一些例证，那将是可惜的。

There are hints of egotism in Goethe, but in Goethe there are hints

歌德身上有自我中心论的迹象，但歌德身上也有迹象

of everything, and it would be easy to gather an imposing mass of evidence to the effect that he was not like the transcendentalists, but far superior to them. For one thing he was many-sided, not encyclopædic; he went out to greet the variety of things, he did not pack it together. He did not even arrange the phases of his experience (as he did those of Faust) in an order supposed to be a progress, although, as the commentators on *Faust* inform us, not a progress in mere goodness. Hegel might have *understood* all these moral attitudes, and described them in a way not meant to appear satirical; but he would have criticised and demolished them, and declared them obsolete—all but the one at which he happened to stop. Goethe *loved* them all; he hated to outgrow them, and if involuntarily he did so, at least he still honoured the feelings that he had lost. He kept his old age genial and green by that perennial love. In order to hold his head above water and be at peace in his own heart, he did not need to be a Christian, a pagan, or an epicurean; yet he lent himself unreservedly, in imagination, to Christianity, paganism, and sensuality—three things your transcendental egotist can never stomach: each in its way would impugn his self-sufficiency.

关于一切事物，并且很容易收集起大量证据，证明他并不像先验论者那样，而是远胜于他们。首先，他是多方面的，而非百科全书式的；他走出去迎接事物的多样性，他没有将其打包捆扎在一起。他甚至没有按照一种据说是进步的次序来安排自己经验的各个阶段(正如他安排《浮士德》的那些阶段那样)，尽管正如《浮士德》的注释者们告诉我们的，那并非仅仅是善之中的进步。黑格尔或许会理解所有这些道德态度，并以一种并非意在显得讽刺的方式描述它们；但他会批判并摧毁它们，宣布它们过时--除了他碰巧停留其上的那一个。歌德热爱它们全部；他讨厌超越它们，而如果他不由自主地这样做了，至少他仍然尊崇自己已经失去的那些感受。凭借那种经久不衰的爱，他使自己的晚年保持亲切而鲜活。为了保持头脑清醒、内心安宁，他不需要成为基督徒、异教徒或伊壁鸠鲁主义者；然而他在想象中毫无保留地投身于基督教、异教和感官享受--这三样东西是你们先验的自我中心主义者永远无法消受的：每一样都以其自身的方式质疑他的自足。

Nevertheless the sympathies of Goethe were only romantic or æsthetic; they were based on finding in others an interesting variation from himself, an exotic possibility, rather than an identity with himself in thought or in fate. Christianity was an atmosphere necessary to certain figures, that of Gretchen, for instance, who would have been frankly vulgar without it; paganism was a learned masque, in which one could be at once distinguished and emancipated; and sensuality was a sentimental and scientific licence in which the free mind might indulge in due

然而歌德的同情仅仅是浪漫主义的或审美的；它们的基础是在他人身上发现一种对自身的有趣变异，一种异域的可能性，而非在思想或命运上与自身的同一。基督教是某些人物所必需的氛围，例如格蕾琴，若没有它，她便会坦率地显得粗俗；异教是一种博学的假面舞会，在其中人可以同时显得卓越而获得解放；感官享受则是一种感伤而科学的放纵，自由的心灵可以在其中适度地沉溺--

season. The sympathy Goethe felt with things was that of a lordly observer, a traveller, a connoisseur, a philanderer; it was egotistical sympathy.

Nothing, for instance, was more romantic in Goethe than his classicism. His *Iphigenie* and his *Helena* and his whole view of antiquity were full of the pathos of distance. That pompous sweetness, that intense moderation, that moral somnambulism were too intentional; and Goethe felt it himself. In *Faust*, after Helen has evaporated, he makes the hero revisit his native mountains and revert to the thought of Gretchen. It is a wise home-coming, because that craze for classicism which Helen symbolised alienated the mind from real life and led only to hopeless imitations and lackadaisical poses. Gretchen's garden, even the *Walpurgisnacht*, was in truth more classical. This is only another way of saying that in the attempt to be Greek the truly classical was missed even by Goethe, since the truly classical is not foreign to anybody. It is precisely that part of tradition and art which does not alienate us from our own life or from nature, but reveals them in all their depth and nakedness, freed from the fashions and hypocrisies of time and place. The effort to reproduce the peculiarities of antiquity is a proof that we are not its natural heirs, that we do not continue antiquity instinctively. People can mimic only what they have not absorbed. They reconstruct and turn into an archæological masquerade only what strikes them as outlandish. The genuine inheritors of a religion or an art never dream of reviving it; its antique accidents do not interest them, and its eternal substance they possess by nature.

The Germans are not in this position in regard to the ancients. Whether sympathetic like Goethe, or disparaging like Burckhardt,

季节。歌德对事物的同情是一位居高临下的观察者、一位旅行者、一位鉴赏家、一位调情者的同情；它是自我中心的同情。

例如，歌德身上最浪漫主义的莫过于他的古典主义。他的《伊菲革涅亚》和《海伦娜》以及他对古代的整体看法都充满了距离的悲怆。那种浮夸的甜美、那种强烈的节制、那种道德上的梦游都过于刻意；歌德自己也感觉到了这一点。在《浮士德》中，海伦消散之后，他让主人公重访故乡的山峦，重新回到对格蕾琴的思念。这是一次明智的归家，因为海伦所象征的那种对古典主义的狂热使心灵疏离了真实的生活，只导致无望的模仿和矫揉造作的姿态。格蕾琴的花园，甚至瓦尔普吉斯之夜，实际上更为古典。这不过是换一种说法：在试图成为希腊人的过程中，连歌德也错失了真正的古典，因为真正的古典对任何人都不陌生。它恰恰是传统和艺术中那部分不使我们疏离自身生活或自然、而是将其一切深度与赤裸揭示出来的东西，摆脱了时代与地点的风尚和虚伪。努力复制古代的种种特征，恰恰证明我们并非它的天然继承者，我们并非本能地延续古代。人们只能模仿他们尚未吸收的东西。他们只把那些令他们觉得怪异的东西加以重建、变成考古学的化装舞会。一种宗教或一门艺术的真正继承者从不会梦想复兴它；它的古代偶然性引不起他们的兴趣，而其永恒实质他们天生拥有。

德国人在对待古人方面并不处于这种境地。无论是像歌德那样抱有同情，还是像布克哈特那样加以贬低，

or both at once, like Hegel, they have seen in antiquity its local colour, its mannerisms, its documents, and above all its contrasts with the present. It was not so while the traditions of antiquity were still living and authoritative. But the moderns, and especially the Germans, have not a humble mind. They do not go to school with the Greeks unfeignedly, as if Greek wisdom might possibly be true wisdom, a pure expression of experience and reason, valid essentially for us. They prefer to take that wisdom for a phase of sentiment, of course outgrown, but still enabling them to reconstruct learnedly the image of a fascinating past. This is what they call giving vitality to classical studies, turning them into *Kulturgeschichte*. This is a vitality lent by the living to the dead, not one drawn by the young and immature from a perennial fountain. In truth classical studies were vital only so long as they were still authoritative morally and set the standard for letters and life. They became otiose and pedantic when they began to serve merely to recover a dead past in its trivial detail, and to make us grow sentimental over its remoteness, its beauty, and its ruins.

或者像黑格尔那样，同时兼顾两者，他们在古代中看到了它的地方色彩、它的矫揉造作、它的文献，尤其是它与当下的对比。当古代的传统仍然鲜活而具有权威性时，情况并非如此。但现代人，尤其是德国人，并没有谦卑的心态。他们并非真诚地向希腊人学习，仿佛希腊智慧可能就是真正的智慧，是经验和理性的纯粹表达，本质上对我们有效。他们更愿意把那种智慧视为一种情感阶段，当然已经过时，但仍然使他们能够博学地重建一个迷人过去的形象。这就是他们所谓的赋予古典研究以生命力，将其转变为 *Kulturgeschichte*。这是生者借给死者的生命力，而不是年轻和不成熟者从永恒泉源中汲取的。事实上，古典研究只有在道德上仍然具有权威性并为文学和生活设定标准时，才具有生命力。当它们开始仅仅用于恢复一个死去的过去的琐碎细节，并使我们对其遥远、美丽和废墟变得感伤时，它们就变得多余和迂腐了。

How much freer and surer was Goethe's hand when it touched the cord of romanticism! How perfectly he knew the heart of the romantic egotist! The romantic egotist sets no particular limits to the range of his interests and sympathies; his programme, indeed, is to absorb the whole world. He is no wounded and disappointed creature, like Byron, that takes to sulking and naughtiness because things taste bitter in his mouth. He finds good and evil equally digestible. The personal egotism of Byron or of Musset after all was humble; it knew how weak it was in the universe. But absolute egotism in Goethe, as in Emerson, summoned all nature

歌德触及浪漫主义之弦时，他的手是多么自由和自信!他多么完美地了解浪漫主义自我中心主义者的内心!浪漫主义自我中心主义者对他的兴趣和同情的范围不设任何特定界限；事实上，他的纲领就是吸收整个世界。他不是一个像拜伦那样受伤和失望的生物，因为事物在他口中尝起来苦涩就变得闷闷不乐和顽皮。他发现善与恶同样容易消化。毕竟，拜伦或缪塞的个人自我中心主义是谦卑的；它知道自己在宇宙中是多么弱小。但歌德，如同爱默生，绝对的自我中心主义召唤整个自然

to minister to the self: all nature, if not actually compelled to this service by a human creative fiat, could at least be won over to it by the engaging heroism of her favourite child. In his warm pantheistic way Goethe felt the swarming universal life about him; he had no thought of dragooning it all, as sectarians and nationalists would, into vindicating some particular creed or nation. Yet that fertile and impartial universe left each life free and in uncensored competition with every other life. Each creature might feed blamelessly on all the others and become, if it could, the focus and epitome of the world. The development of self was the only duty, if only the self was developed widely and securely enough, with insight, calmness, and godlike irresponsibility.

来服务于自我：整个自然，如果不是实际上被人类的创造性命令强迫从事这种服务，至少可以通过她宠儿那引人入胜的英雄主义而被争取过来。以他温暖泛神论的方式，歌德感受到周围涌动的普遍生命；他从未想过像宗派主义者和民族主义者那样强征这一切来证明某个特定信条或民族。然而，那个丰饶而公正的宇宙让每个生命自由，并与每个其他生命进行无审查的竞争。每个生物都可以无过地以所有其他生物为食，并成为，如果可能的话，世界的焦点和缩影。自我的发展是唯一的责任，只要自我发展得足够广泛和稳固，具有洞察力、平静和神一般的无责任感。

Goethe exhibited this principle in practice more plainly, perhaps, than in theory. His family, his friends, his feelings were so many stepping-stones in his moral career; he expanded as he left them behind. His love-affairs were means to the fuller realisation of himself. Not that his love-affairs were sensual or his infidelities callous; far from it. They often stirred him deeply and unsealed the springs of poetry in his heart; that was precisely their function. Every tender passion opened before him a primrose path into which his inexorable genius led him to wander. If in passing he must tread down some flower, that was a great sorrow to him; but perhaps that very sorrow and his inevitable remorse were the most needful and precious elements in the experience. Every pathetic sweetheart in turn was a sort of Belgium to him; he violated her neutrality with a sigh; his heart bled for her innocent sufferings, and he never said afterwards in self-defence, like the German Chancellor, that she was no better than she should be. But

歌德在实践中展示这一原则，也许比在理论上更清楚。他的家庭、他的朋友、他的感情是他道德生涯中的众多踏脚石；他在把他们抛在身后时扩展了自己。他的恋情是更充分实现自我的手段。并非他的恋情是肉欲的或他的不忠是冷酷的；远非如此。它们常常深深触动他，并打开他心中诗歌的泉源；那正是它们的功能。每一种温柔的激情都在他面前打开一条樱草花小径，他不可抗拒的天才引领他漫步其中。如果在经过时他必须踩倒一些花朵，那对他来说是极大的悲伤；但也许正是那种悲伤和他不可避免的悔恨是经验中最必要和珍贵的元素。每一个可怜的甜心轮流成为他的一种比利时；他叹息着侵犯她的中立；他的心为她无辜的苦难流血，他后来从未像德国总理那样自卫地说她并不比应该的更好。但

he must press on. His beckoning destiny, the claims of his spiritual growth, compelled him to sacrifice her and to sacrifice his own lacerated feelings on the altar of duty to his infinite self. Indeed, so truly supreme was this vocation that universal nature too, he thought, was bound to do herself some violence in his behalf and to grant him an immortal life, that so noble a process of self-expansion might go on for ever.

他必须奋力前行。他那召唤着的命运，他那精神成长的要求，迫使他牺牲她，并把他自己那被撕裂的情感牺牲在对他的无限自我的义务祭坛上。的确，这一使命如此真正地至高无上，以至于他认为，普遍的自然也必定为他而对自己施加某种暴力，并赐予他不朽的生命，以便如此高贵的自我扩展过程能够永远继续下去。

Goethe's perfect insight into the ways of romantic egotism appears also in *Faust*, and not least in the latter parts of it, which are curiously prophetic. If the hero of that poem has a somewhat incoherent character, soft, wayward, emotional, yet at the same time stubborn and indomitable, that circumstance only renders him the fitter vehicle for absolute Will, a metaphysical entity whose business is to be vigorous and endlessly energetic while remaining perfectly plastic. Faust was at first a scholar, fervid and grubbing, but so confused and impatient that he gave up science for magic. Notwithstanding the shams of professional people which offended him, a private and candid science was possible, which might have brought him intellectual satisfaction; and the fact would not have escaped him if he had been a simple lover of truth. But absolute Will cannot be restricted to any single interest, much less to the pursuit of a frigid truth in which it cannot believe; for the Will would not be absolute if it recognised any truth which it had to discover; it can recognise and love only the truth that it makes. Its method of procedure, we are told, consists in first throwing out certain assumptions, such perhaps as that everything must have a cause or that life and progress must be everlasting; and the truth is then whatever conforms to these assumptions. But since evidently these assumptions might be

歌德对浪漫主义自我中心主义方式的完美洞察也出现在《浮士德》中，尤其是在其后半部分，这些部分具有奇特的预言性。如果那首诗的主人公具有某种不连贯的性格，柔软、任性、情绪化，但同时固执和不屈，那种情况只会使他成为绝对意志的更合适载体，一个形而上学实体，其职责是充满活力并无限精力充沛，同时保持完全可塑性。浮士德起初是一个学者，热情而刻苦，但如此困惑和不耐烦，以至于他放弃科学转向魔法。尽管专业人士的虚伪冒犯了他，但一种私人的、坦诚的科学是可能的，它本可以给他智力上的满足；如果他是一个简单的真理爱好者，这个事实不会逃过他。但绝对意志不能被限制在任何单一兴趣上，更不用说追求一种它无法相信的冰冷真理；因为如果意志承认任何它必须发现的真理，它就不会是绝对的；它只能承认和热爱它创造的真理。我们被告知，它的程序方法在于首先抛出某些假设，比如也许一切必须有原因，或者生命和进步必须永恒；然后真理就是符合这些假设的东西。但既然显然这些假设可能

utterly false, it is clear that what interests absolute Will is not truth at all, but only orthodoxy. A delightful illustration of this is given by Faust when, emulating Luther for a moment, he undertakes to translate the first verse of Saint John—that being the Gospel that impresses him most favourably. The point is not prosaically to discover what the Evangelist meant, but rather what he must and shall have meant. *The Word* will never do; *the Sense* would be somewhat better; but *In the beginning was Force* would have even more to recommend it. Suddenly, however, what absolute Will demands flashes upon him, and he writes down contentedly: *In the beginning was the Deed*:

Auf einmal seh' ich Rat
Und schreibe getrost: Im Anfang war die That!

Yet even in this exciting form, the life of thought cannot hold him long. He aches to escape from it; not that his knowledge of the sciences, as well as his magic, will not accompany him through life; he will not lose his acquired art nor his habit of reflection, and in this sense his career is really a progress, in that his experience accumulates; but the living interest is always something new. He turns to miscellaneous adventures, not excluding love; from that he passes to imperial politics, a sad mess, thence to sentimental classicism, rather an unreality, and finally to war, to public works, to trade, to piracy, to colonisation, and to clearing his acquired estates of tiresome old natives, who insist on ringing church bells and are impervious to the new *Kultur*. These public enterprises he finds more satisfying, perhaps only because he dies in the midst of them.

Are these hints of romantic egotism in Goethe mere echoes of his

它完全是虚假的，显而易见，绝对意志所关心的根本不是真理，而仅仅是正统。对此，《浮士德》提供了一个令人愉快的例证：他一时效仿路德，着手翻译《约翰福音》的第一句--因为这部福音书最令他倾心。关键并不在于散文化地发现福音书作者本意为何，而在于他必定且应当意谓什么。道永远不行；意义会稍好一些；但太初有力甚至更值得推荐。然而，突然间，绝对意志所要求的东西在他心中闪现，于是他心满意足地写下：太初有为:

忽然间我有了主意
请放心写下：太初有为!

然而，即便以这种令人兴奋的形式，思想的生活也无法长久地留住他。他渴望逃离它；并非因为他对各门科学的知识以及他的魔法不会伴随他一生；他不会失去已获得的技艺，也不会失去反思的习惯，从这个意义上说，他的生涯确实是一种进步，因为他的经验在积累；但活的兴趣总是某种新的东西。他转向各种各样的冒险，包括爱情；从那里他转向帝国政治，一团可悲的乱麻，再从那里转向感伤的古典主义，颇为不实，最后转向战争、公共工程、贸易、海盗、殖民，以及清理他购得的庄园上那些令人厌烦的旧居民，他们执意敲响教堂的钟声，对新的文化无动于衷。他发现这些公共事业更令人满意，也许只是因为他死于其中。

这些歌德身上浪漫自我主义的迹象，是否仅仅是其

youth and of the ambient philosophy, echoes which he would have rejected if confronted with them in an abstract and doctrinal form, as he rejected the system of Fichte? Would he not have judged Schopenhauer more kindly? Above all, what would he have thought of Nietzsche, his own wild disciple? No doubt he would have wished to buttress and qualify in a thousand ways that faith in absolute Will which they emphasised so exclusively, Schopenhauer in metaphysics and Nietzsche in morals. But the same faith was a deep element in his own genius, as in that of his country, and he would hardly have disowned it.

青春和周围哲学的种种回声--如果以抽象和教条的形式摆在他面前，他本会拒绝这些回声，正如他拒绝了费希特的体系?难道他不会对叔本华作出更善意的评判吗?最重要的是，他会如何看待尼采，他自己狂野的弟子?毫无疑问，他会希望以千百种方式支撑和限定那种对绝对意志的信仰--叔本华在形而上学中、尼采在道德中如此排他地强调的那种信仰。但这种同样的信仰是他自己天才中的一个深层要素，正如在他民族的天才中一样，他几乎不会否认它。

CHAPTER V

SEEDS OF EGOTISM IN KANT

Kant is remarkable among sincere philosophers for the pathetic separation which existed between his personal beliefs and his official discoveries. His personal beliefs were mild and half orthodox and hardly differed from those of Leibniz; but officially he was entangled in the subjective criticism of knowledge, and found that the process of knowing was so complicated and so exquisitely contrived to make knowledge impossible, that while the facts of the universe were there, and we might have, like Leibniz, a shrewd and exact notion of what they were, officially we had no right to call them facts or to allege that we knew them. As there was much in Kant's personal belief which this critical method of his could not sanction, so there were implications and consequences latent in his critical method which he never

第五章

康德哲学中唯我论的萌芽

在真诚的哲学家中，康德之所以引人注目，是因为他的个人信念与他的官方发现之间存在着可悲的分离。他的个人信念温和且半正统，与莱布尼茨的信念几乎没有差别；但在官方上，他陷入了对知识的主观批判之中，并发现认知过程如此复杂、如此精巧地被设计为使知识成为不可能，以至于虽然宇宙的事实就在那里，我们或许可以像莱布尼茨那样对它们是什么拥有一种精明而确切的概念，但在官方上我们无权称它们为事实，也无权声称我们认识它们。正如康德的个人信念中有许多东西是他的这种批判方法所不能认可的，同样，他的批判方法中也潜伏着他从未

absorbed, being an old man when he adopted it. One of these latent implications was egotism.

沉浸其中，因为他采纳它时已是一位老人。这些潜在含义之一便是自我中心主义。

The fact that each spirit was confined to its own perceptions condemned it to an initial subjectivity and agnosticism. What things might exist besides his ideas he could never know. That such things existed was not doubted; Kant never accepted that amazing principle of dogmatic egotism that nothing is able to exist unless I am able to know it. On the contrary he assumed that human perceptions, with the moral postulates which he added to them, were symbols of a real world of forces or spirits existing beyond. This assumption reduced our initial idiotism to a constitutional taint of our animal minds, not unlike original sin, and excluded that romantic pride and self-sufficiency in which a full-fledged transcendentalism always abounds.

每个精神都被局限于自身的感知，这一事实使它注定具有一种初始的主体性和不可知论。除了他的观念之外，还可能存在什么事物，他永远无法知道。这类事物的存在是毋庸置疑的；康德从未接受那条教条式自我中心主义的惊人原则：除非我能够认识某物，否则任何事物都不能存在。相反，他假定人类的感知，连同他加于其上的道德公设，是存在于彼岸的力或精神的真实世界的象征。这一假定将我们初始的愚钝状态降低为我们动物性心智的一种体质性污点，与原始罪并无不同，并排除了那种浪漫主义的骄傲与自足--一个羽翼丰满的先验主义总是充满这些东西。

To this contrite attitude of Kant's agnosticism his personal character and ethics corresponded. A wizened little old bachelor, a sedentary provincial scribe, scrupulous and punctual, a courteous moralist who would have us treat humanity in the person of another as an end and never merely as a means, a pacifist and humanitarian who so revered the moral sense according to Shaftesbury and Adam Smith that, after having abolished earth and heaven, he was entirely comforted by the sublime truth that nevertheless it remained wrong to tell a lie—such a figure has nothing in it of the officious egotist or the superman. Yet his very love of exactitude and his scruples about knowledge, misled by the psychological fallacy that nothing can be an object of knowledge except some idea in the mind, led him in the end to subjectivism; while his rigid conscience, left standing in that unnatural void, led him to attribute absoluteness to what

康德的不可知论这种痛悔的态度，与他的个人品格和伦理学是相称的。一个干瘪瘦小的老单身汉，一个久坐不动的外省文书，一丝不苟、守时守约，一位彬彬有礼的道德主义者--他要求我们把他人身上的人性当作目的，而绝不仅仅当作手段；一位和平主义者和人道主义者，他如此尊崇按照沙夫茨伯里和亚当·斯密而来的道德感，以至于在废除了天地之后，竟完全被这样一个崇高真理所安慰：尽管如此，说谎仍然是错的--这样一个人物身上，丝毫没有那种好管闲事的自我中心主义者或超人的影子。然而，正是他对精确性的热爱和对知识的审慎，被“除了心中的某个观念之外，任何东西都不能成为认识对象”这一心理学谬误所误导，最终把他引向了主观主义；而他那僵硬的良心，被留在那片不自然的虚空之中，则使他将绝对性赋予那

he called the categorical imperative. But this void outside and this absolute oracle within are germs of egotism, and germs of the most virulent species.

他称之为绝对命令。但这外在的虚空与这内在的绝对神谕乃是自我中心主义的胚芽，而且是最具毒性的种类的胚芽。

The categorical imperative, or unmistakable voice of conscience, was originally something external enough—too external, indeed, to impose by itself a moral obligation. The thunders of Sinai and the voice from the whirlwind in Job fetched their authority from the suggestion of power; there spoke an overwhelming physical force of which we were the creatures and the playthings, a voice which far from interpreting our sense of justice, or our deepest hopes, threatened to crush and to flout them. If some of its commandments were moral, others were ritual or even barbarous; the only moral sanction common to them all came from our natural prudence and love of life; our wisdom imposed on us the fear of the Lord. The prophets and the gospel did much to identify this external divine authority with the human conscience; an identification which required a very elaborate theory of sin and punishment and of existence in other worlds, since the actual procedure of nature and history can never be squared with any ideal of right.

绝对命令，或者说良心中那不容错认的声音，最初是相当外在的东西--事实上太外在，以至于单凭自身就能施加一种道德义务。西奈的雷霆和《约伯记》中从旋风中发出的声音，其权威来自对力量的暗示；那里说话的是一种压倒性的物理力量，我们是它的造物和玩物，这声音远非解释我们的正义感或我们最深切的希望，反而威胁要碾碎并嘲弄它们。如果它的某些诫命是道德的，另一些则是仪式性的，甚至是野蛮的；它们共有的唯一道德制裁来自我们天然的审慎和对生命的热爱；我们的智慧把敬畏上帝加在我们身上。先知们和福音书做了很多工作，把这种外在的神圣权威与人的良心等同起来；这种等同需要一套非常精致的关于罪与惩罚以及关于存在于其他世界的理论，因为自然和历史的实际进程永远无法与任何正当的理想相吻合。

In Kant, who in this matter followed Calvin, the independence between the movement of nature, both within and without the soul, and the ideal of right was exaggerated into an opposition. The categorical imperative was always authoritative, but perhaps never obeyed. The divine law was far from being like the absolute Will in Fichte, Hegel, and Schopenhauer, a name for a universal metaphysical force, or even for the flux of material substance. On

在康德那里--他在此事上追随加尔文--自然运动(无论灵魂之内还是之外)与权利理想之间的独立性被夸大为一种对立。绝对命令始终具有权威性，但也许从未被服从。神圣法则远不像费希特、黑格尔和叔本华那里的绝对意志那样，是一个普遍形而上学力量的名称，甚至也不是物质实体之流变的名称。在

the contrary the sublimity of the categorical imperative lay precisely in the fact that, while matter and life moved on in their own unregenerate way, a principle which they *ought* to follow, overarched and condemned them, and constrained them to condemn themselves. Human nature was totally depraved and incapable of the least merit, nor had it any power of itself to become righteous. Its amiable spontaneous virtues, having but a natural motive, were splendid vices. Moral worth began only when the will, transformed at the touch of unmerited grace, surrendered every impulse in overwhelming reverence for the divine law.

相反，绝对命令的崇高性恰恰在于：当物质和生命沿着它们自己那未获重生的方式运行之时，一个它们应当遵循的原则却高悬于它们之上并谴责它们，迫使它们谴责自己。人性是完全败坏的，不能有丝毫功德，也没有任何凭自身变得正直的力量。它那些可爱的自发美德，既然只有自然的动机，便是辉煌的恶习。道德价值只有在意志因不配得的恩典之触摸而转变、怀着对神圣法则的压倒性敬畏而放弃一切冲动之时，才开始。

This Calvinistic doctrine might seem to rebuke all actual inclinations, and far from making the will morally absolute, as egotism would, to raise over against it an alien authority, what *ought* to be willed. Such was, of course, Kant's ostensible intention; but sublime as such a situation was declared to be, he felt rather dissatisfied in its presence. A categorical imperative crying in the wilderness, a duty which nobody need listen to, or suffer for disregarding, seemed rather a forlorn authority. To save the face of absolute right another world seemed to be required, as in orthodox Christianity, in which it might be duly vindicated and obeyed.

这种加尔文主义学说似乎要斥责一切实际的倾向，并且远非像自我中心主义那样使意志在道德上成为绝对的，而是要在它对面竖起一个异己的权威，即应当被意愿的东西。当然，这就是康德表面上的意图；但尽管这样一种处境被宣布为崇高的，他在它面前却颇感不满。一个在旷野中呼喊的绝对命令，一种无人需要听从、或因漠视而受苦的义务，似乎是一种相当孤寂的权威。为了保全绝对正当性的颜面，似乎需要另一个世界，正如正统基督教中那样，在其中它可以得到应有的维护和服从。

Kant's scepticism, by which all knowledge of reality was denied us, played conveniently into the hands of this pious requirement. If the whole natural world, which we can learn something about by experience, is merely an idea in our minds, nothing prevents any sort of real but unknown world from lying about us unawares. What could be more plausible and opportune than that the categorical imperative which the human mind, the builder of this

康德的怀疑论--它否认我们对实在的一切知识-- conveniently 迎合了这种虔诚的要求。如果整个自然世界(我们通过经验可以对它有所了解)仅仅是我们心中的一个观念，那么任何种类的真实而未知的世界潜伏在我们周围而不被察觉，就毫无阻碍。还有什么比这更可信、更合时宜呢：人类心灵--这个可见世界的建造者--所拒斥的绝对命令，竟应在那个另外的实在世界中成为房角石？

visible world, had rejected, should in that other real world be the head stone of the corner?

可见世界，曾拒绝了它，竟应在那个另外的实在世界中成为房角石?

This happy thought, had it stood alone, might have seemed a little fantastic; but it was only a laboured means of re-establishing the theology of Leibniz, in which Kant privately believed, behind the transcendental idealism which he had put forward professorially. The dogmatic system from which he started seemed to him, as it stood, largely indefensible and a little oppressive. To purify it he adopted a fallacious principle of criticism, namely, that our ideas are all we can know, a principle which, if carried out, would undermine that whole system, and every other. He, therefore, hastened to adopt a corrective principle of reconstruction, no less fallacious, namely, that conscience bids us assume certain things to be realities which reason and experience know nothing of. This brought him round to a qualified and ambiguous form of his original dogmas, to the effect that although there was no reason to think that God, heaven, and free-will exist, we ought to act as if they existed, and might call that wilful action of ours faith in their existence.

这个妙想，如果单独成立，也许显得有点异想天开；但它不过是一种费力的手段，用以在康德公开提出的先验唯心主义背后，重建他私下所信奉的莱布尼茨的神学。他出发时所依据的独断体系，在他看来，就其现状而言，大体上是站不住脚的，而且有点压抑。为了净化它，他采纳了一条谬误的批判原则，即我们的观念就是我们所能知道的一切--这条原则如果贯彻到底，就会瓦解那整个体系，以及每一个其他体系。因此，他急忙采纳了一条同样谬误的重建矫正原则，即良心吩咐我们假定某些事物是实在的，而理性和经验对它们一无所知。这使他绕回到了他原有教条的一种有限定而含混的形式，其大意是：尽管没有理由认为上帝、天堂和自由意志存在，我们却应当仿佛它们存在那样行动，并且可以把我们这种任意的行动称为对它们存在的信仰。

Thus in the philosophy of Kant there was a stimulating ambiguity in the issue. He taught rather less than he secretly believed, and his disciples, seizing the principle of his scepticism, but lacking his conservative instincts, believed rather less than he taught them. Doubtless in his private capacity Kant hoped, if he did not believe, that God, free-will, and another life subsisted in fact, as every believer had hitherto supposed; it was only the method of proving their reality that had been illegitimate. For no matter how strong the usual arguments might seem (and they did not seem very strong) they could convey no transcendent assurance; on the

因此，在康德的哲学中，这个问题上存在着一种激发思考的模糊性。他所教导的少于他私下所相信的，而他的门徒们抓住了他怀疑论的原则，却缺乏他保守的本能，所相信的少于他所教导他们的。毫无疑问，康德以私人身份希望--如果不是相信的话--上帝、自由意志和另一种生命事实上确实存在，正如迄今为止每一位信徒所设想的那样；只不过证明它们之实在性的方法一直是不合法的。因为无论通常的论证看起来多么有力(它们看起来并不十分有力)，它们都无法传达任何先验的保证；相反，

contrary, the more proofs you draw for anything from reason and experience, the better you prove that that thing is a mere idea in your mind. It was almost prudent, so to speak, that God, freedom, and immortality, if they had claims to reality, should remain without witness in the sphere of "knowledge," as inadvertently or ironically it was still called; but to circumvent this compulsory lack of evidence God had at least implanted in us a veridical conscience, which if it took itself seriously (as it ought to do, being a conscience) would constrain us to postulate what, though we could never "know" it, happened to be the truth. Such was the way in which the good Kant thought to play hide-and-seek with reality.

你从理性和经验中为任何事物所引出的证据越多，你就越能证明那个事物不过是你心中的一个观念。可以说，这几乎是审慎的：上帝、自由和不朽，如果它们有资格要求实在性，就应当在“知识”的领域中保持没有见证--这个领域仍然被不经意地或讽刺地如此称呼；但为了规避这种强制性的证据缺乏，上帝至少在我们心中植入了一种诚实的良心，这良心如果认真对待自身(它理应如此，因为它是良心)，就会迫使我们设定那些我们虽然永远无法“知道”、却恰好是真理的东西。这就是善良的康德以为可以与实在性玩捉迷藏的方式。

The momentum of his transcendental method, however, led to a very different and quite egotistical conclusion. An adept in transcendentalism can hardly suppose that God, free-will, and heaven, even if he postulates them, need exist at all. Existence, for him, is an altogether inferior category. Even a specific moral law, thundering unalterable maxims, must seem to him a childish notion. What the ego postulates is nothing fixed and already existing, but only such ideal terms as, for the moment, express its attitude. If it is striving to remember, it posits a past; if it is planning, it posits a future; if it is consciously eloquent, it posits an audience. These things do not and cannot exist otherwise than in their capacity of things posited by the ego. All, therefore, that the categorical imperative can mean for the complete transcendentalist is that he should live as if all things were real which are imaginatively requisite for him, if he is to live hard: this intensity of life in him being itself the only reality. At that stage of development at which Kant found himself, God, freedom, and

然而，他的先验方法的动量导致了截然不同且相当自我中心的结论。一位先验主义的行家几乎不可能设想上帝、自由意志和天国--即使他设定了它们--需要实际存在。对他来说，存在是一个完全低级的范畴。甚至一条特定的道德法则，雷鸣般地宣布不可更改的准则，在他看来看来也必定是一个幼稚的观念。自我所设定的不是任何固定的、已经存在的东西，而只是那些暂时表达其态度的理想术语。如果它努力回忆，它就设定一个过去；如果它正在谋划，它就设定一个未来；如果它自觉地雄辩，它就设定一个听众。这些东西不存在，也不能以不同于它们作为自我所设定之物的身份而存在。因此，绝对命令对于完整的先验主义者所能意味的一切就是：他应当如此生活，仿佛一切对于他来说在想象上必需的事物都是真实的，如果他要强烈地生活的话：他身上这种生命的强度本身就是唯一的实在。在康德自己所处的那个发展阶段，上帝、自由和

immortality may have been necessary postulates of practical reason. But to suppose that these imagined objects, therefore, existed apart from the excellent philosopher whose conscience had not yet transcended them, would be not to have profited by his teaching. It would be merely to repeat it. A later and more advanced transcendentalist, instead of God, freedom, and immortality, might just as dutifully posit matter, empire, and the beauty of a warrior's death. His conscience might no longer be an echo of Christianity, but the trumpet-blast of a new heathenism. It is for the ego who posits to judge what it should posit.

不朽或许是实践理性的必要设定。但是，因此就设想这些想象的对象存在于那位卓越的哲学家之外--他的良心尚未超越它们--那就等于没有从他的教导中获益。那只不过是重复他的教导而已。一位更晚近、更先进的先验主义者，可能会同样尽责地设定物质、帝国和战士之死的美，而不是上帝、自由和不朽。他的良心可能不再是基督教的回声，而是新异教精神的号角。应当由设定者--自我--来判断它应当设定什么。

The postulates of practical reason, by which Kant hoped to elude the subjectivity which he attributed to knowledge, are no less subjective than knowledge, and far more private and variable. The senses and the intellect, if they deceive us, seem to deceive us all in much the same way, and the dream they plunge us into in common seems to unite us; but what obscurity, diversity, hostility in the ideals of our hearts! The postulates that were intended to save the Kantian philosophy from egotism are the most egotistical part of it. In the categorical imperative we see something native and inward to the private soul, in some of its moods, quietly claiming to rule the invisible world, to set God on his throne and open eternity to the human spirit. The most subjective of feelings, the feeling of what ought to be, legislates for the universe. Egotism could hardly go further.

实践理性的设定，康德借此希望逃避他归之于知识的主体性，这些设定并不比知识更少主体性，而且远为私人化和多变。感官和知性，如果它们欺骗我们，似乎以大致相同的方式欺骗我们所有人，它们将我们共同投入的梦境似乎将我们联合起来；但是我们心中的理想是多么晦暗、多样、充满敌意!那些旨在将康德哲学从自我中心主义中拯救出来的设定，恰恰是它最自我中心的部分。在绝对命令中，我们看到某种内在于私人灵魂的东西，在它的某些情绪中，悄然声称要统治不可见的世界，将上帝置于其宝座之上，并为人类精神打开永恒。最主观的情感，即关于应当如何的情感，为宇宙立法。自我中心主义几乎不可能走得更远了。

But this is not all. The categorical imperative, not satisfied with proclaiming itself secretly omnipotent, proclaims itself openly ruthless. Kant expressly repudiated as unworthy of a virtuous will any consideration of happiness, or of consequences, either to oneself or to others. He was personally as mild and kindly as the

但这还不是全部。绝对命令不满足于秘密地宣告自己全能，还公开地宣告自己无情。康德明确地斥责任何对幸福或后果的考虑--无论是对自己还是对他人--为不值得一个德性意志。他个人像

Vicar of Wakefield (whose goodness he denied to be moral because it was natural), but his moral doctrine was in principle a perfect frame for fanaticism. Give back, as time was bound to give back, a little flesh to this skeleton of duty, make it the voice not of a remote Mosaic decalogue, but of a rich temperament and a young life, and you will have sanctified beforehand every stubborn passion and every romantic crime. In the guise of an infallible conscience, before which nothing has a right to stand, egotism is launched upon its irresponsible career.

The categorical imperative, as Kant personally conceived it, was that of the conscience of the eighteenth century, which had become humanitarian without ceasing to be Christian, the conscience of the Puritans passing into that of Rousseau. But the categorical principle in morals, like the ego in logic, can easily migrate. If to-day you are right in obeying your private conscience against all considerations of prudence or kindness (though you are prudent and kind by nature, so that this loyalty to a ruthless Duty is a sacrifice for you), to-morrow you may be right in obeying the categorical imperative of your soul in another phase, and to carry out no matter what irresponsible enterprise, though your heart may bleed at the victims you are making. The principle of fanaticism is present in either case; and Kant provides, in his transcendental agnosticism, a means of cutting off all protests from experience or common sense, or a more enlightened self-interest. These protests, he thinks, are not only ignoble, but they come from a deluded mind, since the world they regard is a creature of the imagination, whereas the categorical imperative, revealed to the inner man, is a principle prior to all worlds and, therefore, not to be corrected by any suasion which this particular

韦克菲尔德的牧师(他否认这种善良是道德的，因为它是自然的)，但他的道德学说在原则上是一个完美的狂热主义框架。随着时间必然要归还的，给这具义务的骷髅添上一点血肉，使它成为不是遥远的摩西十诫的声音，而是一种丰富的气质和年轻生命的声音，你就会事先圣化每一种顽固的激情和每一种浪漫主义的罪行。在一种不会错的良心的伪装下，在它面前没有任何东西有权站立，自我中心主义被发射到它不负责任的生涯中。

绝对命令，正如康德个人所构想的那样，是十八世纪良心的绝对命令，这种良心已经成为人道主义的而没有停止成为基督教的，是清教徒的良心过渡到卢梭的良心。但道德中的绝对原则，像逻辑中的自我一样，可以轻易迁移。如果今天你有理由违背一切谨慎或仁慈的考虑而服从你私人的良心(尽管你天性谨慎和仁慈，所以这种对无情的义务的忠诚对你来说是一种牺牲)，明天你可能有理由服从你灵魂在另一个阶段的绝对命令，去执行无论什么不负责任的事业，尽管你的心可能为你正在造成的受害者而流血。狂热主义的原则在两种情况下都存在；而康德在他的先验的不可知论中提供了一种手段，切断来自经验或常识或更开明的自利的一切抗议。他认为，这些抗议不仅不光彩，而且来自一个受蒙蔽的心灵，因为它们所关注的世界是想象的产物，而绝对命令，向内心的人启示的，是一个先于所有世界的原则，因此，不能被任何这种特定的

world, now imagined by us, might try to exercise on our free minds.

Thus it is from Kant, directly or indirectly, that the German egotists draw the conviction which is their most tragic error. Their self-assertion and ambition are ancient follies of the human race; but they think these vulgar passions the creative spirit of the universe. Kant, or that soul within Kant which was still somewhat cramped in its expression, was the prophet and even the founder of the new German religion.

世界，现在被我们想象，可能会试图对我们自由的心灵施加影响。

因此，正是从康德那里，直接或间接地，德国自我中心主义者们汲取了那个信念，而这是他们最悲剧性的错误。他们的自我主张和野心是人类古老的愚蠢；但他们把这些庸俗的激情视为宇宙的创造精神。康德，或者说康德内部那个在表达上仍有些局促的灵魂，是新德国宗教的先知，甚至奠基者。

CHAPTER VI

TRANSCENDENTALISM PERFECTED

Fichte purified the system of Kant of all its inconsistent and humane elements; he set forth the subjective system of knowledge and action in its frankest and most radical form. The ego, in order to live a full and free life, posited or feigned a world of circumstances, in the midst of which it might disport itself; but this imagined theatre was made to suit the play, and though it might seem to oppress the Will with all sorts of hindrances, and even to snuff it out altogether, it was really only a mirage which that Will, being wiser than it knew, had raised in order to enjoy the experience of exerting itself manfully.

It would seem obvious from this that the Will could never be defeated, and that in spite of its name it was identical with destiny or the laws of nature: and those transcendentalists who lean to

第六章

完善先验论

费希特净化了康德的体系，清除了所有不一致和人道的元素；他以最坦率和最激进的形式阐述了知识和行动的主观体系。自我，为了过一种充实和自由的生活，设定或虚构了一个环境世界，在其中它可以自娱自乐；但这个想象出来的剧场是为了适应戏剧而制作的，尽管它似乎会用各种障碍压迫意志，甚至将其完全扼杀，但它实际上只是一个海市蜃楼，那个意志，比它所知道的更明智，为了享受勇敢地施展自身的经验而升起了它。

由此看来似乎显而易见：意志永远不可能被击败，而且尽管有其名称，它与命运或自然法则同一：而那些倾向于

naturalism, or pass into it unawares, like Schelling or Emerson, actually understand the absolute Will in this way. But not so Fichte, nor what I take to be the keener and more heroic romantic school, whose last prophet was Nietzsche. The Germans, in the midst of their fantastic metaphysics, sometimes surprise us by their return to immediate experience: after all, it was in wrestling with the Lord that their philosophy was begotten. As a matter of fact, the will is often defeated—especially if we are stubborn in defining our will; and this tragic fact by no means refutes the Fichtean philosophy, which knows how to deal with it heroically. It conceives that what is inviolable is only what ought to be, the unconscious plan or idea of perfect living which is hidden in the depths of all life: a will not animated in some measure by this idea cannot exist, or at least cannot be noticed or respected by this philosophy. But when, where, how often and how far this divine idea shall be carried out is left unexplained. Actual will may be feeble or wicked in any degree; and in consequence the world that ought to be evoked in its maximum conceivable richness, may dwindle and fade to nothing.

自然主义，或者不知不觉地过渡到它，像谢林或爱默生那样，实际上以这种方式理解绝对的意志。但费希特不是这样，我所认为的更敏锐和更英勇的浪漫主义学派也不是这样，其最后的先知是尼采。德国人，在他们的奇异的形而上学之中，有时以他们回到直接经验而使我们惊讶：毕竟，他们的哲学是在与主摔跤中诞生的。事实上，意志常常被击败--特别是如果我们固执地定义我们的意志；而这个悲剧性的事实绝不反驳费希特哲学，它知道如何英勇地处理它。它设想，不可侵犯的只是应该存在的东西，即隐藏在一切生命深处的完美生活的无意识的计划或理念：一个在某种程度上不被这个理念所激励的意志不能存在，或者至少不能被这个哲学注意到或尊重。但这个神圣的理念何时、何地、多久以及在多大程度上被实现，则未被解释。实际的意志可能在任何程度上是虚弱的或邪恶的；因此，应该以其最大可想象的丰富性被唤起的那个世界，可能萎缩并消退为虚无。

The Will may accordingly be defeated; not, indeed, by imagined external things, but by its own apathy and tergiversation. In this case, according to the logic of this system (which is as beautifully thought out as that of Plotinus), the dissolving world will appear to be overwhelmingly formidable and real. In expiring because we have no longer the warmth to keep it alive, it will seem to be killing us; for the passivity of the ego, says Fichte, is posited as activity in the non-ego. That way of speaking is scholastic; but the thought, if we take the egotistical point of view, is deep and true.

因此，意志可能被击败；确实不是被想象的外部事物，而是被它自己的冷漠和推诿。在这种情况下，按照这个体系的逻辑(它像普罗提诺的体系一样被美妙地思考出来)，消解的世界将显得压倒性地可怕和真实。在因为我们不再有温暖来维持它活着的消亡中，它似乎正在杀死我们；因为自我的被动性，费希特说，被设定为非我中的主动性。那种说法是经院式的；但这个思想，如果我们采取自我中心的观点，是深刻而真实的。

So any actual will may perish by defect and die out; but actual

因此，任何现实的意志都可能因缺陷而消亡并灭绝；但现实的

will may also perish by sublimation. The true object of absolute Will is not things or pleasures or length of life, but willing itself; and the more intense and disinterested this willing is, the better it manifests absolute Will. The heroic act of dashing oneself against overwhelming obstacles may, therefore, be the highest fulfilment of the divine idea. The will dares to perish in order to have dared everything. In its material ruin it remains ideally victorious. If we consider the matter under the form of eternity, we shall see that this heroic and suicidal will has accomplished what it willed; it has not only lived perilously but perished nobly.

意志也可能通过升华而消亡。绝对意志的真正对象不是事物、快乐或寿命，而是意愿本身；而这种意愿越是强烈和无私，它就越是更好地彰显了绝对意志。因此，向压倒性的障碍猛冲过去的英雄行为，可能是神圣理念的最高实现。意志敢于毁灭，以求曾经敢于一切。在其物质的毁灭中，它在理念上仍然胜利。如果我们以永恒的形式来考虑这件事，我们就会看到，这种英雄式的、自杀式的意志已经实现了它所意愿的东西；它不仅危险地生活过，而且高贵地毁灭了。

It is hardly necessary to point out how completely this theory justifies any desperate enterprise to which one happens to be wedded. It justifies, for instance, any wilful handling of history and science. The Will by right lays down the principles on which things must and shall be arranged. If things slip somehow from the traces, so much the grander your "scientific deed" in striving to rein them in. After all, you first summoned them into being only that you might drive them. If they seem to run wild and upset you, like the steeds of Hippolytus, you will, at least, not have missed the glory, while you lived and drove, of assuming the attitude of a master. Call spirits from the vasty deep: if they do not come, what of it? That will only prove the absolute self-sufficiency of your duty to call them.

几乎不必指出，这一理论多么完全地为一己偶然执迷的任何绝望事业提供了正当理由。例如，它为对历史和科学的任何任意处理提供了正当理由。意志有权规定事物必须且应当被安排的原则。如果事物不知怎地挣脱了缰绳，那么你力图将它们勒住的“科学功绩”就更加宏大。毕竟，你最初把它们召唤到存在中，只是为了你可以驱策它们。如果它们似乎野性大发并搅扰了你，像希波吕托斯的骏马那样，那么至少，在你活着并驱策它们的时候，你不会错过采取主人姿态的荣耀。从深渊中召唤精灵吧：如果它们不来，那又怎样?那只会证明你召唤它们的义务具有绝对的自足性。

What tightens this speculative bond between Fichte and the Nietzschean school is that he himself applied his theory of absolute Will to national life. This ego, which was identical with mind in general, he identified also with the German people. If the Germans suffered their national will to be domesticated in the Napoleonic empire, the creative spirit of the universe would be

使费希特与尼采学派之间的这种思辨纽带更为紧密的是，他本人将其绝对意志理论应用于民族生活。这个与一般心灵同一的自我，他也将其与德意志民族同一。如果德国人听任其民族意志被驯化于拿破仑帝国之中，那么宇宙的创造精神就会

extinguished, and God himself, who existed only when incarnate in mankind, would disappear. It was evidently one's duty to prevent this if possible; and Fichte poured out all the vehemence of his nature into the struggle for freedom. The mere struggle, the mere protest in the soul, according to his system, would secure the end desired: self-assertion, not material success, was the goal. A happy equilibrium once established in human life would have been only a temptation, a sort of Napoleonic or Mephistophelian quietus falling on the will to strive.

被熄灭了，而上帝本身--他只存在于化身为人类之中--也会消失。显然，如果可能的话，防止这一点是人的义务；费希特将他本性中的全部激烈倾注到争取自由的斗争之中。按照他的体系，仅仅斗争，仅仅灵魂中的抗议，就会确保所期望的目的：自我主张，而非物质成功，才是目标。一旦在人类生活中建立起一种幸福的平衡，那只会成为一种诱惑，一种落到斗争意志之上的拿破仑式或梅菲斯特式的安息。

I am not sure how far Fichte, in his romantic and puritan tension of soul, would have' relished the present organisation of Germany. He was a man of the people, a radical and an agitator as much as a prophet of nationalism, and the shining armour in which German freedom is now encased might have seemed to him too ponderous. He might have discerned in victory the beginning of corruption.

我不确定费希特在其浪漫主义和清教徒式的灵魂紧张中，会在多大程度上欣赏德国目前的组织。他是一个人民的人，一个激进分子和鼓动者，同时也是一位民族主义的先知，而如今包裹德国自由的闪亮铠甲在他看来也许过于沉重。他也许会在胜利中察觉到腐败的开端。

Nevertheless we should remember that a perfected idealism has a tendency to change into its opposite and become a materialism for all practical purposes. Absolute Will is not a natural being, not anybody's will or thought; it is a disembodied and unrealised genius which first comes into operation when it begins to surround itself with objects and points of resistance, so as to become aware of its own stress and vocation. What these objects or felt resistances may be is not prejudged; or rather it is prejudged that they shall be most opposite to spirit, and that spirit shall experience its own passivity—one mode of its fated and requisite experience—in the form of an influence which it imputes to dead and material things.

然而我们应当记住，一种完善的唯心主义有一种倾向，会转变成它的对立面，并在一切实际目的上成为一种唯物论。绝对意志不是自然存在物，不是任何人的意志或思想；它是一种无形体、未实现的天才，只有当它开始用对象和阻力点包围自己，以便意识到自身的压力和使命时，它才开始运作。这些对象或感受到的阻力可能是什么，并没有被预先判断；或者更确切地说，被预先判断的是：它们应当与精神最为对立，而精神应当以一种它归咎于死寂物质事物的影响的形式，经验到自身的被动性--这是它命定的、必要的经验的一种模式。

The whole business of spirit may, therefore, well be with matter. Science might be mechanical, art might be cumbrous and material, all the instruments of life might be brutal, life itself might be hard, bitter, and obsessed, and yet the whole might remain a direct manifestation of pure spirit, absolute freedom, and creative duty. This speculative possibility is worth noting: it helps us to understand modern Germany. It is no paradox that idealists should be so much at home among material things. These material things, according to them, are the offspring of their spirit. Why should they not sink fondly into the manipulation of philological details or chemical elements, or over-ingenious commerce and intrigue? Why should they not dote on blood and iron? Why should these fruits of the spirit be uncongenial to it?

因此，精神的全部事务完全可以与物质同在。科学可以是机械的，艺术可以是笨重而物质的，生活的一切工具可以是粗野的，生活本身可以是艰难、苦涩且执迷的，然而整体仍可能保持为纯粹精神、绝对自由与创造性义务的直接显现。这一思辨性的可能性值得注意：它有助于我们理解现代德国。唯心主义者竟如此安于物质事物之中，这并非悖论。按照他们的说法，这些物质事物正是他们精神的产物。他们为何不应深情地沉溺于处理语文学细节或化学元素，或过度精巧的商业与阴谋之中?他们为何不应溺爱血与铁?为何精神的这些果实竟会与精神格格不入?

A theoretical materialist, who looks on the natural world as on a soil that he has risen from and feeds on, may perhaps feel a certain piety towards those obscure abysses of nature that have given him birth; but his delight will be rather in the clear things of the imagination, in the humanities, by which the rude forces of nature are at once expressed and eluded. Not so the transcendentalist. Regarding his mind as the source of everything, he is moved to solemn silence and piety only before himself: on the other hand, what bewitches him, what he loves to fondle, is his progeny, the material environment, the facts, the laws, the blood, and the iron in which he conceives (quite truly, perhaps) that his spirit perfectly and freely expresses itself. To despise the world and withdraw into the realm of mind, as into a subtler and more congenial sphere, is quite contrary to his idealism. Such a retreat might bring him peace, and he wants war. His idealism teaches him that strife and contradiction, as Heraclitus said, are

一个理论唯物主义者，将自然世界视为自己从中升起并赖以滋养的土壤，或许会对那些赋予他生命的自然的幽暗深渊怀有某种虔敬；但他的愉悦毋宁在于想象中清晰的事物，在于人文学科，借此自然的粗野力量既被表达又被规避。先验主义者则不然。他将自己的心灵视为万物的本源，因此唯有在自身面前才被感动至庄严的沉默与虔敬：另一方面，令他着迷、令他乐于抚弄的，是他的产物，物质环境、事实、法则、血与铁--他(或许完全正确地)认为自己的精神在其中完美而自由地表达自身。鄙视世界并退入心灵领域，如同退入一个更精微、更相宜的领域，这与他的唯心主义完全相悖。这样的退隐或许会带给他和平，而他想要的是战争。他的唯心主义教导他，斗争与矛盾，如赫拉克利特所言，是

the parents of all things; and if he stopped striving, if he grew sick of ambition and material goods, he thinks he would be forsaking life, for he hates as he would death what another kind of idealists have called salvation.

We are told that God, when he had made the world, found it very good, and the transcendentalist, when he assumes the Creator's place, follows his example. The hatred and fear of matter is perhaps not a sign of a pure spirit. Even contemplatively, a divine mind may perfectly well fall in love with matter, as the Moon-goddess did with Endymion. Such matter might be imagined only, as if Diana had merely dreamt of her swain; and the fond image might not be less dear on that account. The romantic poet finds his own spirit greeting him in rocks, clouds, and waves; the musician pours out his soul in movement and tumult; why should not the transcendental general, or engineer, or commercial traveller find his purest ideal in trade, crafts, and wars? Grim work, above all, is what absolute Will demands. It needs the stimulus of resistance to become more intensely conscious of Self, which is said to be its ultimate object in imagining a world at all. Acquisition interests it more than possession, because the sense of effort and power is then more acute. The more material the arts that engage it, and the more complicated and worldly its field of action, the more intense will be its exertion, and the greater its joy. This is no idealism for a recluse or a moping poet; it does not feel itself to be something incidental and fugitive in the world, like a bird's note, that it should fear to be drowned in the crash of material instruments or to be forced to a hideous tension and shrillness: shrillness and tension are its native element. It is convinced that it has composed all the movements there are or

万物的父母；如果他停止奋斗，如果他对野心和物质财富感到厌倦，他认为自己就会抛弃生命，因为他憎恨另一种唯心主义者所谓的得救，如同憎恨死亡一样。

我们被告知，上帝在创造世界之后，见它甚好；而先验主义者，当他占据造物主的位置时，便效法此例。对物质的憎恨与恐惧或许并非纯粹精神的标志。即便在沉思层面，一个神圣心灵也完全可以完美地爱上物质，正如月神爱上恩底弥翁那样。这样的物质或许只是被想象出来的，仿佛狄安娜只是梦见了她的情人；而那钟爱的形象并不会因此而不那么珍贵。浪漫主义诗人在岩石、云彩与波浪中遇见自己的精神；音乐家在运动与喧闹中倾泻自己的灵魂；那么，先验的将军、工程师或商旅之人，为何不应在贸易、工艺与战争中发现他最纯粹的理想?尤其是严峻的工作，正是绝对意志所要求的。它需要阻力的刺激，才能更强烈地意识到自我--据说这自我正是它想象一个世界时的终极目标。获取比占有更令它感兴趣，因为此时努力与权力的感觉更为尖锐。参与其中的技艺越物质，其行动领域越复杂、越世俗，它的施展就越强烈，其喜悦也就越大。这并非隐士或郁郁寡欢的诗人的唯心主义；它并不觉得自己是世界中某种偶然而短暂的东西，像鸟的鸣叫那样，以至于害怕被物质器械的轰响所淹没，或被迫陷入可憎的紧张与尖利：尖利与紧张才是它的原生元素。它确信自己谱写了那里存在的一切运动，或

can be in existence, and it feels all the more masterful, the more numerous and thunderous is the orchestra it leads. It is entirely at home in a mechanical environment, which it can prove transcendentally to be perfectly ideal. Its most congenial work is to hack its way through to the execution of its World-Plan. Its most adequate and soul-satisfying expression is a universal battle.

能够存在于世，而且它感到自己越发有主宰力，它所指挥的乐队越是庞大、越是雷鸣般响亮。它在一个机械的环境中完全如鱼得水，它能先验地证明这个环境是完美地观念的。它最惬意的工作是披荆斩棘地执行它的世界计划。它最充分、最能满足灵魂的表达是一场普遍的战争。

CHAPTER VII

FICHTE ON THE MISSION OF GERMANY

When the ancient Jews enlarged their conception of Jehovah so as to recognise in him the only living God to whom all nature and history were subject, they did not cease to regard the universal power as at the same time their special national deity. Here was a latent contradiction. It was ingeniously removed by saying that Jehovah, while not essentially a tribal deity, had chosen Israel for his people by a free act of grace with no previous merit on their part; so that the pride of the Jews was not without humility.

No humility, however, is mingled with the claim which the Germans now make to a similar pre-eminence. "Modern critics," says Max Stirner, "inveigh against religion because it sets up God, the divine, or the moral law over against man, regarding them as external things, whereas the critics transform all these objects into ideas in the human mind. Nevertheless the essential mistake of religion, to assign a mission to man at all, is not avoided by these critics, who continue to insist that man shall be divine, or ideally human, or what not; morality, freedom, humanity, etc., are his

第七章

费希特论德国的使命

当古代犹太人扩展他们对耶和华的观念，以便在他身上承认那位一切自然与历史都隶属于其下的唯一活神时，他们并未停止将这种普遍力量同时视为他们特殊的民族神祇。这里有一个潜在的矛盾。它被巧妙地消除了，其说法是：耶和华虽然本质上并非部落神祇，却通过一次自由的恩典行为选择了以色列作为他的子民，而以色列人此前并无任何功绩；因此，犹太人的骄傲并非没有谦卑。

然而，德国人如今对类似优越地位的宣称中，并未掺杂任何谦卑。“现代批评家，”马克斯·施蒂纳说，“痛斥宗教，因为宗教将上帝、神性或道德法则设立于人对面，把它们视为外在之物，而批评家们却将所有这些对象转化为人类心灵中的观念。然而，宗教的根本错误--即根本赋予人一项使命--并未被这些批评家所避免，他们继续坚持人应当是神圣的，或理想的人性的，或诸如此类；道德、自由、人性等等，都是他的

essence." Now a divinity which is subjective or immanent evidently cannot choose any nation, save by dwelling and manifesting itself more particularly in them. They can be highly favoured only in that they are intrinsically superior, and on that account may be figuratively called vessels of election. Therefore, if the spirit which is in a nation is not one spirit among many in the world (as the primitive Hebrews supposed and as a naturalistic philosophy would maintain), but is the one holy and universal spirit, and if at the same time this spirit dwells in that nation pre-eminently, or even exclusively, humility on the part of this nation would evidently be out of place. Accordingly, the Germans cannot help bearing witness to the divine virtues and prerogatives which they find in themselves, some of which are set forth by Fichte as follows:

本质。”现在，一个主观的或内在的神性显然不能选择任何民族，除非它更特别地寓居并显现在他们之中。他们只能因为自身本质上优越而备受恩宠，并因此可以被比喻性地称为拣选的器皿。因此，如果一个民族中的精神不是世界上众多精神中的一个(如原始希伯来人所以为、自然主义哲学所主张的那样)，而是那唯一神圣和普遍的精神，并且如果同时这种精神卓越地、甚至排他地寓居在那个民族中，那么这个民族的谦卑显然就是不合适的。
Accordingly，德国人不禁要见证他们在自身中发现的神圣美德和特权，其中一些由费希特如下阐述：

The present age stands precisely in the middle of earthly time, between the era in which men were still self-seeking, earthly, and impulsive, and the coming era in which they will live for the sake of pure ideals. The Germans prefigure this better age, and are leading the rest of the world into it. They have created the modern world by uniting the political heritage of classical Europe with the true religion that lingered in Asia, and they have raised the two to a higher unity in their *Kultur*. From them is drawn the best blood of most other nations and the spiritual force that has fashioned them all.

当前时代正处在尘世时间的正中间，介于人们仍然自私自利、世俗和冲动的时代与他们将为了纯粹理想而生活的即将到来的时代之间。德国人预示了这个更好的时代，并正引领世界其余部分进入其中。他们通过将古典欧洲的政治遗产与 lingering 在亚洲的真正宗教联合起来，创造了现代世界，并在他们的*Kultur*中将两者提升到更高的统一。从他们那里汲取了大多数其他民族最好的血液以及塑造了所有这些民族的精神力量。

The Germans have never forsaken their native land nor suffered seriously from immigration. Their language is primitive, and they have never exchanged it for a foreign one. Hence German alone is truly a mother-tongue. Its intellectual terms retain a vital and vivid connection with sensible experience. True poetry and

德国人从未抛弃他们的故土，也从未因移民而遭受严重损失。他们的语言是原始的，他们从未用一门外语来替换它。因此，唯有德语才真正是母语。它的智性术语与感性经验保持着鲜活而生动的联系。真正的诗歌与

philosophy, therefore, exist only in German. Captious persons who judge by mere crude feeling may fancy that German is not very melodious; but these matters cannot be rightly judged without reference to first principles, which in this case would prove that the sweetest language is that which exhausts all possible sounds and combines them in all available ways. Whether German or some other language comes nearest to this *a priori* ideal of euphony must be left for empirical observation to decide.

因此，哲学只存在于德语中。挑剔的人若仅凭粗糙的感觉来判断，可能会以为德语并不十分悦耳；但这些问题若不参照第一原则就无法正确判断，而在这种情况下，第一原则将证明最甜美的语言是那种穷尽所有可能的声音并以所有可用的方式将它们组合起来的语言。究竟是德语还是某种其他语言最接近这种先天的悦耳理想，必须留给经验观察来决定。

The German nature, being pure, deep, earnest, and bold, has instinctively seized upon the true essence of Christianity and discarded with abhorrence all the lies and corruption that obscured it. This essence is the imperative need of turning from the natural to the ideal life. The German knows that his own soul is safe; but this is not enough for him in his unselfishness. His zeal is kindled easily for warmth and light everywhere; and this zeal of his is patient and efficacious, taking hold on real life and transforming it. As he presses on he finds more than he sought, for he has plunged into the quick stream of life which forges ahead of itself and carries him forward with it. The dead heart of other nations may dream of gods in the clouds, or of some perfect type of human life already exemplified in the past and only to be approached or repeated in the future. The spirit of the German is no coinage of earth; it is the living source of all the suns, and rushes to create absolutely new things for ever. The German mind is the self-consciousness of God.

德国人的本性，因其纯洁、深沉、认真和大胆，本能地抓住了基督教的真正本质，并厌恶地抛弃了所有遮蔽它的谎言和腐败。这个本质就是转向理想生活而非自然生活的迫切需求。德国人知道自己的灵魂是安全的；但在他无私的品格中，这对他还不够。他的热情很容易被点燃，去追求各处的温暖和光明；而他的这种热情是耐心而有效的，抓住现实生活并改造它。当他向前推进时，他发现的东西比他寻求的更多，因为他已跳入那奔腾的生命之流，这河流自行向前并带着他一起前进。其他民族的死寂之心可能梦想云中的神祇，或梦想某种已在过去示范、只需在未来接近或重复的完美人类生活典范。德国人的精神不是大地的铸币；它是一切太阳的活源泉，并奔涌着永远创造绝对新的事物。德国心灵是上帝的自我意识。

I do not see that the strain of war or the intoxication of victory could add much to these boasts, uttered by Fichte when, for the moment, he had abandoned all hope of military self-assertion on the part of his country, and relied on education and philosophy

我看不出战争的紧张或胜利的陶醉能给这些豪言壮语增添多少东西，这些话是费希特说的，当时他暂时放弃了对他的国家在军事上自我主张的一切希望，转而依靠教育和哲学

alone to preserve and propagate German righteousness. Even in detail, what he says often seems strangely like what official Germany is now saying. Even the hysterical hatred of England is not absent. In England Fichte did not see the champion of Protestantism, morality, and political liberty, nor the constant foe of Napoleon, but only a universal commercial vampire. His contempt for the Latin races, too, was boundless. In the matter of race, indeed, he entertained a curious idea that there must have been, from all eternity until the beginning of history, a primitive Normal People, a tribe of Adams and Eves; because according to a principle which he adopted from Calvinistic theology, if all men had been originally slaves to nature none could ever have become free. This Normal People were, of course, the ancestors of the Germans. Earth-born savage tribes must have existed also for the Normal People to subdue, since but for some such conquest the primitive equilibrium would never have been broken, Eden and the jungle would never have been merged together, and history, which is a record of novelties, would never have begun. The theory of evolution has rendered the reasons for such a view obsolete; but the idea that the bulk of mankind are mongrels formed by the union of blonde godlike creatures with some sort of anthropoid blacks, recurred later in Gobineau and has had a certain vogue in Germany.

独自保存和传播德国正义。即使在细节上，他所说的也常常奇怪地像官方德国现在所说的。甚至对英格兰的歇斯底里仇恨也不缺席。在英格兰，费希特没有看到新教、道德和政治自由的捍卫者，也不是拿破仑的持续敌人，而只是一个普遍商业吸血鬼。他对拉丁种族的蔑视也是无限的。indeed，在种族问题上，他怀有一个奇怪的观念：从永恒直到历史开端，必定存在过一个原始的正常民族，一个亚当和夏娃的部落；因为根据他从加尔文主义神学采纳的一个原则，如果所有人原本都是自然的奴隶，那么没有人能够变得自由。这个正常民族当然是德国人的祖先。大地所生的野蛮部落也必定存在，以便正常民族征服他们，因为若不是某种这样的征服，原始的平衡就永远不会被打破，伊甸园和丛林就永远不会融合在一起，而历史--新奇之事的记录--就永远不会开始。进化论已使这种观点的理由过时；但人类大众是由金发神样生物与某种类人黑人结合形成的杂种这一观念，后来在戈比诺那里再次出现，并在德国有一定流行。

Fichte, following Calvin and Kant, made a very sharp distinction between the life of nature and that of duty. The ideal must be pursued without the least thought of advantage. Trades, he says, must be practised spontaneously, without any other reward than longer vigils. The young must never hear it mentioned that any one could ever be incited or guided in life by the thought of his

费希特追随加尔文和康德，在自然生活与义务生活之间作出了极其鲜明的区分。理想必须被追求，而丝毫不考虑利益。他说，各行各业必须自发地从事，除了更长的守夜之外没有任何其他报酬。年轻人绝不能听到有人提到，任何人可以在生活中被对自己

own preservation or well-being. Knowledge is no report of existing things or laws which have happened to be discovered. Knowledge is the very life of God, and self-generated. It is "an intellectual activity for its own sake, according to rules for their own sake." In plain English, it is pure imagination. But the method to be imposed on this madness is fixed innately, both for thought and for morals. Only frivolity can interfere with a unanimous idealism.

自我保存或福祉的念头所激励或引导。知识不是对现存事物或偶然被发现之规律的报告。知识是上帝的生命本身，并且是自我生成的。它是“一种为其自身之故、依照为其自身之故的规则的智性活动”。用平白的话说，它就是纯粹的想象。但强加于这种疯狂之上的方法，无论在思想上还是在道德上，都是先天固定的。只有轻浮才能干扰一种一致的唯心主义。

We must not suppose that this prescription of austere and abstract aims implies any aversion on Fichte's part to material progress, compulsory *Kultur*, or military conquest. German idealism, as we have seen, is not Platonic or ascetic, that it should leave the world behind. On the contrary, its mission is to consecrate the world and show that every part of it is an organ of the spirit. This is a form of piety akin to the Hebraic. Even the strictest Calvinists, who taught that the world was totally depraved, were able, in every sense of the phrase, to make a very good thing of it. They reclaimed, they appropriated, they almost enjoyed it. So Fichte gives us prophetic glimpses of an idealistic Germany conquering the world. The state does not aim at self-preservation, still less is it concerned to come to the aid of those members of the human family that lag behind the movement of the day. The dominion of unorganised physical force must be abolished by a force obedient to reason and spirit. True life consists in refashioning human relations after a model innate in the mind. The glorious destiny of Germany is to bring forth and establish the world anew. Natural freedom is a disgraceful thing, a mere medley of sensual and intellectual impulses without any principle of order. It is for the Germans to decide whether a providential progress exists by becoming themselves the providence that shall bring progress

我们切不可设想，这种对严峻而抽象的目标的设定，意味着费希特对物质进步、强制性的文化或军事征服有任何反感。正如我们所见，德国唯心主义并非柏拉图式的或禁欲主义的，以至于应当把世界抛在身后。相反，它的使命是使世界神圣化，并表明世界的每一部分都是精神的器官。这是一种与希伯来式相近的虔诚。即便是最严格的加尔文主义者--他们教导说世界已完全堕落--也能够在各种意义上把世界经营得相当不错。他们开垦它、占有它，几乎享受它。因此，费希特向我们提供了理想主义的德国征服世界的预言性一瞥。国家并不以自我保存为目标，更不关心去援助人类大家庭中那些落后于时代运动的成员。无组织的物质力量的统治必须被一种服从理性与精神的力量所废除。真正的生命在于按照心灵中固有的模型重塑人类关系。德国的光荣命运是催生并重新确立世界。自然自由是可耻的东西，仅仅是感性与理智冲动的混杂，没有任何秩序原则。是否存在着一种天意般的进步，要由德国人自己来决定--办法是使他们自己成为那带来进步的天意

about, or whether on the contrary every higher thought is folly. If they should fail, history would never blame them, for in that case there would be no more history.

究竟是怎么回事，或者相反，一切更高的思想是否都是愚蠢。如果他们失败了，历史永远不会责怪他们，因为在那种情况下就不会再有历史了。

The sole animating principle of history is the tendency towards a universal Christian European monarchy. This tendency is deeper than the plans of men and stronger than their intentions. "That a state, even when on the very point of making war, should solemnly assert its love of peace and its aversion to conquest, is nothing; for in the first place it must needs make this asseveration and so hide its real intention if it would succeed in its design; and the well-known principle *Threaten war that thou mayst have peace* may also be inverted in this way: *Promise peace that thou mayst begin war with advantage*; and in the second place the state may be wholly in earnest in its peaceful assurances, so far as its self-knowledge has gone; but let the favourable opportunity for aggrandisement present itself, and the previous good resolution is forgotten."

历史唯一的推动原则是趋向一种普遍的基督教欧洲君主制的倾向。这种倾向比人们的计划更深，比他们的意图更强。“一个国家，即便在即将开战的时刻，也应庄严地宣称它热爱和平、厌恶征服，这算不了什么；因为首先，它若想使自己的图谋得逞，就必然要作出这种断言，从而掩盖其真实意图；而那条众所周知的原则以战争相威胁，以便你获得和平也可以这样颠倒过来：许诺和平，以便你占尽优势地开战；其次，国家就其自我认识所及而言，也可能完全真诚地作出和平保证；但一旦有利的扩张机会出现，先前的良好决心便被遗忘。”

If the people are disinclined to obey the Idea, the government must constrain them to do so. All the powers of all the citizens must be absorbed in the state. Personal liberty could be turned to no good use when such individuality and variety of training as are good for the state have been provided for by its regulations. Nor must any idleness be tolerated. An ideal education must make men over so that they shall be incapable of willing anything but what that education wills them to will. The state may then rely upon its subjects, "for whoever has a well-grounded will, wills what he wills for all eternity."

如果人民不愿服从理念，政府就必须强制他们服从。全体公民的一切力量都必须被国家所吸收。当国家通过其规章已经提供了对国家有益的个性与多样化的训练时，个人自由便无法被派上什么好用场。也不得容忍任何闲散。一种理想的教育必须把人改造过来，使他们除了那种教育要他们意愿的东西之外，不可能意愿任何别的东西。于是国家便可以信赖它的臣民，“因为凡有充分根据的意志的人，所意愿的就是他永恒地所意愿的东西。”

As to foreign relations, the state, in obedience to its ideal mission,

就对外关系而言，国家遵循其理想使命，

must conquer the surrounding barbarians and raise them to a state of culture. It is this process almost exclusively that has introduced progress into history. "What impels the Macedonian hero ... to seek foreign lands? What chains victory to his footsteps and scatters before him in terror the countless hordes of his enemies? Is this mere fortune? No; it is an Idea.... The civilised must rule and the uncivilised must obey, if Right is to be the law of the world.... Tell me not of the thousands who fell round his path; speak not of his own early death. After the realisation of his Idea, what was there greater for him to do than to die?"

必须征服周围的蛮族，并把他们提升到有文化的状态。几乎唯独是这一过程把进步引入了历史。“是什么驱使那位马其顿英雄……去寻找异邦的土地?是什么把胜利拴在他的脚步上，并使他无数敌人在他面前惊恐四散?这仅仅是运气吗?不；这是一个理念……如果权利要成为世界的法则，文明者就必须统治，未开化者就必须服从……不要对我讲那些倒在他道路周围的成千上万的人；不要提他自己过早的死亡。在他的理念实现之后，还有什么比死去更伟大的事留给他去做呢?”

This enthusiasm for Alexander (which Hegel shared) is not merely retrospective. "At last in one nation of the world the highest, purest morality, such as was never seen before among men, will arise and will be made secure for all future time, and thence will be extended over all other peoples. There will ensue a transformation of the human race from earthly and sensual creatures into pure and noble spirits." "Do you know anything higher than death?... Who has a right to stand in the way of an enterprise begun in the face of this peril?"

这种对亚历山大的热情(黑格尔也怀有这种热情)并不仅仅是回顾性的。“最终，在世界上的某一个民族中，将会兴起一种人类此前从未见过的最崇高、最纯粹的道德，并将为一切未来时代确保下来，并从那里扩展到所有其他民族。随之而来的将是人类从尘世的、感性的造物转变为纯洁而高贵的精神。”“你知道有什么比死亡更高吗?……谁有权利阻挡一项面对这种危险而开创的事业?”

It may seem curious that an uncompromising puritan like Fichte, a prophet sprung from the people, a theoretical republican who quarrelled with his students for forming clubs and fighting duels, a fierce idealist full of contempt for worldlings, should have so perfectly supplied the Junkers and bankers with their philosophy. But the phenomenon is not new. Plato, divine and urbane as he was, supplied the dull Spartans with theirs. Men of idealistic faith are confident that the foundations of things must be divine, and when, upon investigating these foundations, they come upon sinister principles—blind impulse, chance, murderous competition

像费希特这样一位毫不妥协的清教徒，一位从人民中涌现的先知，一位因学生结社和决斗而与他们争吵的理论共和主义者，一位充满对世俗之人蔑视的狂热理想主义者，竟然如此完美地为容克贵族和银行家提供了他们的哲学，这似乎有些奇怪。但这一现象并不新鲜。柏拉图，尽管神圣而文雅，却为迟钝的斯巴达人提供了他们的哲学。怀有理想主义信仰的人确信事物的根基必定是神圣的，而当他们在探究这些根基时，遭遇了邪恶的原则--盲目的冲动、偶然、谋杀性的竞争

—they fanatically erect these very principles into sacred maxims. All strength, they are antecedently convinced, must come from God; therefore if deception, wilfulness, tyranny, and big battalions are the means to power, they must be the chosen instruments of God on earth. In some such way the Catholic Church, too, for fear of impiety, is seen blessing many a form of deceit and oppression. Thus the most ardent speculation may come to sanction the most brutal practice. The primitive passions so sanctioned, because they seem to be safe and potent, are probably too narrowly organised to sustain themselves long; and meantime they miss and trample down the best things that mankind possesses. Nevertheless they are a force like any other, a force not only vehement but contagious, and capable of many victories though of no stable success. Such passions, and the philosophies that glorify them, are sincere, absorbing, and if frankly expressed irrefutable.

--他们便狂热地将这些原则本身树立为神圣的准则。一切力量，他们预先确信，必定来自上帝；因此，如果欺骗、任性妄为、暴政和庞大的军队是获取权力的手段，那么它们必定是上帝在人间的选定工具。以某种类似的方式，天主教会也出于对不敬神的恐惧，被看到祝福着许多形式的欺骗和压迫。因此，最热切的思辨可能最终认可最残暴的实践。那些被如此认可的原初激情，因为看起来安全而有力，可能组织得过于狭隘而难以长久维持自身；与此同时，它们错失并践踏了人类所拥有的最美好的事物。然而，它们是一种与其他任何力量一样的力量，一种不仅猛烈而且具有传染性的力量，能够取得许多胜利，尽管没有稳定的成功。这样的激情，以及将其美化的哲学，是真诚的、引人入胜的，并且如果坦率表达，则是无可辩驳的。

The transcendental theory of a world merely imagined by the ego, and the will that deems itself absolute are certainly desperate delusions; but not more desperate or deluded than many another system that millions have been brought to accept. The thing bears all the marks of a new religion. The fact that the established religions of Germany are still forms of Christianity may obscure the explicit and heathen character of the new faith: it passes for a somewhat faded speculation, or for the creed of a few extremists, when in reality it dominates the judgment and conduct of the nation. No religious tyranny could be more complete. It has its prophets in the great philosophers and historians of the last century; its high priests and pharisees in the government and the professors; its faithful flock in the disciplined mass of the nation; its heretics in the socialists; its dupes in the Catholics and the

那种认为世界仅仅是自我所想象、意志自认为绝对的先验理论，确实是绝望的妄想；但并不比许多其他被千百万人接受的理论更加绝望或更加虚妄。这件事带有一种新宗教的全部特征。德国既有的宗教仍然是基督教的形式，这一事实可能掩盖了新信仰的明确异教性质：它被当作一种有些褪色的思辨，或少数极端分子的信条，而实际上它支配着这个国家的判断和行为。没有任何宗教暴政能比这更彻底。它有上个世纪伟大哲学家和历史学家作为先知；有政府和教授作为高级祭司和法利赛人；有受过训练的民族大众作为虔诚的信众；有社会主义者作为异端；有天主教徒和

liberals, to both of whom the national creed, if they understood it, would be an abomination; it has its martyrs now by the million, and its victims among unbelievers are even more numerous, for its victims, in some degree, are all men.

自由派，对这两者来说，民族信条若被他们理解，都会是可憎之物；它如今有数以百万计的殉道者，而它在不信者中的受害者甚至更多，因为它的受害者，在某种程度上，是所有人。

CHAPTER VIII

THE EGOTISM OF IDEAS

When we are discussing egotism need we speak of Hegel? The tone of this philosopher, especially in his later writings, was full of contempt for everything subjective: the point of view of the individual, his opinions and wishes, were treated as of no account unless they had been brought into line with the providential march of events and ideas in the great world. This realism, pronounced and even acrid as it was, was still idealistic in the sense that the substance of the world was conceived not to be material but conceptual—a law or logic which animated phenomena and was the secret of their movement. The world was like a riddle or confused oracle; and the solution to the puzzle lay in the romantic instability or self-contradiction inherent in every finite form of being, which compelled it to pass into something different. The direction of this movement we might understand sympathetically in virtue of a sort of vital dialectic or dramatic necessity in our own reflection. Hegel was a solemn sophist: he made discourse the key to reality.

第八章

观念的自我中心

当我们讨论自我中心主义时，需要谈到黑格尔吗?这位哲学家的语调，尤其在他后期的著作中，充满了对一切主观事物的蔑视：个体的观点、意见和愿望被视为无足轻重，除非它们已被纳入伟大世界中事件和观念的天意进程。这种现实主义，尽管明确甚至尖刻，在某种意义上仍然是理想主义的，因为世界的实体被设想为不是物质的而是概念的--一种赋予现象以生命并是其运动之秘密的法则或逻辑。世界就像一个谜语或混乱的神谕；而谜题的解答在于每一种有限存在形式所固有的浪漫主义的不稳定性或自相矛盾，这迫使它转变为某种不同的东西。我们可以凭借自身反思中某种生命辩证法或戏剧性必然性，以同情的方式理解这一运动的方向。黑格尔是一位庄重的诡辩家：他将话语作为现实的钥匙。

This technical realism in Hegel was reinforced by his historical imagination, which continually produces an impression of detachment, objectivity, and impersonal intelligence; he often seems to be lost in the events of his story and to be plucking the very heart out of the world. Again, he adored the state, by which in his view the individual should be entirely subjugated, not for the benefit of other individuals (that would be a sort of vicarious selfishness no less barren than private profit), but in the rapt service of common impersonal ends.

黑格尔身上的这种技术性现实主义被他历史性的想象力所强化，这种想象力不断产生一种超然、客观和非个人智识的印象；他常常似乎沉浸于他所讲述的事件之中，从事物的世界中摘取核心。此外，他崇拜国家，在他看来，个体应完全臣服于国家，不是为了其他个体的利益(那将是一种替代性的自私，与私人利益一样贫瘠)，而是为了对共同的非个人目的的狂热服务。

The family was a first natural group in which the individual should be happy to lose himself, the trade-guild was another, and the state was the highest and most comprehensive of all; there was nothing worthy or real in a man except his functions in society.

家庭是第一个自然群体，个人应当乐于在其中迷失自己，行业公会则是另一个，而国家是所有群体中最高、最包罗万象的；一个人身上除了他在社会中的职能之外，没有任何有价值或真实的东西。

Nevertheless this denial of egotism is apparent only. It is a play within the play. On the smaller stage the individual—save for his lapses and stammerings—is nothing but the instrument and vehicle of divine decrees; in fact he is a puppet, and the only reality of him is the space he fills in the total spectacle. But that little stage is framed in by another, often overlooked, but ever present; and on this larger and nearer stage the ego struts alone. It is I that pull the strings, enjoy the drama, supply its plot and moral, and possess the freedom and actuality which my puppets lack. On the little stage the soul of a man is only one of God's ideas, and his whole worth lies in helping out the pantomime; on the big stage, God is simply my idea of God and the purpose of the play is to express my mind. The spectacle in which every individual dances automatically to the divine tune is only my dream.

然而，这种对自我中心主义的否认只是表面上的。这是戏中戏。在较小的舞台上，个人--除了他的失足和结巴之外--不过是神圣法令的工具和载体；事实上他是一个傀儡，他唯一的实在就是他在整体景象中所占据的空间。但那个小舞台被另一个舞台所框定，这个舞台常常被忽视，却始终在场；在这个更大、更近的舞台上，自我独自昂首阔步。是我在拉线，享受戏剧，提供其情节和道德，并拥有我的傀儡所缺乏的自由和现实性。在小舞台上，一个人的灵魂只是上帝诸观念之一，他的全部价值在于帮助完成这场哑剧；在大舞台上，上帝只是我对上帝的观念，而戏剧的目的是表达我的心意。每个人自动随着神圣曲调起舞的景象，只是我的梦。

The philosophy of Hegel is accordingly subjective and all its realism is but a pose and a tone wilfully assumed. That this is the truth of the matter might be inferred, apart from many continual hints and implications, from the fact that the system is transcendental and founded on Kant. Objectivity can, therefore, be only a show, a matter of make-believe, something imputed to things and persons by the mind, whose poetic energies it manifests. Everything must be set down as a creation of mind, simply because it is an object of thought or knowledge.

因此，黑格尔的哲学是主观的，其全部实在论不过是一种姿态和一种刻意假装的语调。这一点是事情的真相，可以从许多持续的暗示和蕴含中推断出来，也可以从以下事实推断：这个体系是先验的，并且建立在康德的基础上。因此，客观性只能是一种表象，一种虚构之事，某种由心灵归诸事物和人的东西，它显现了心灵的诗歌能量。一切都必须被设定为心灵的创造，仅仅因为它是思想或知识的对象。

This underlying subjectivism also explains the singular satisfaction of Hegel, whose glance was comprehensive enough, with so strangely limited a world as he describes to us. He described what he knew best or had heard of most, and felt he had described the universe. This illusion was inevitable, because his principle was that the universe was created by description and resided in it. The mission of Hegel, as he himself conceived it, was not to discover the real world or any part of it: in theory he retracted all belief in a real world and set in its place his conception or knowledge of it —therefore quite adequate to its object. If China was the oldest country he had heard of, the world began with China, and if Prussia was the youngest and he (as he had to be) its latest philosopher, the world ended with Prussia and with himself. This seems a monstrous egotism, but it is not arbitrary; in one sense it was the least pretentious of attitudes, since it was limited to the description of a current view, not of a separate or prior object. The value of a philosophy could lie only in the fullness and fidelity with which it might focus the conceptions of the age in which it arose. Hegel hoped to do this for his own times; he did not covet truth to anything further.

这种潜在的主观主义也解释了黑格尔那种奇特的满足感--他的视野足够全面，却对他向我们描述的一个如此奇怪地受限的世界感到满足。他描述了他最了解或听说最多的事情，并觉得自己已经描述了宇宙。这种幻觉是不可避免的，因为他的原则是宇宙由描述所创造并存在于描述之中。黑格尔的使命，正如他自己所构想的那样，不是去发现真实世界或它的任何部分：在理论上，他撤回了对真实世界的一切信念，并以他对它的概念或知识取而代之--因此这概念或知识与它的对象完全相称。如果中国是他听说过的最古老的国家，那么世界就从中国开始；如果普鲁士是最年轻的国家，而他是(他不得不如此)它最新的哲学家，那么世界就以普鲁士和他自己而告终。这看起来是一种骇人的自我中心主义，但它并非任意的；在某种意义上，这是最不装腔作势的态度，因为它局限于对一种当下观点的描述，而不是对一个分离的或先在的对象的描述。一种哲学的价值只能在于它可能聚焦其产生时代之概念的充实性和忠实性。黑格尔希望为他的时代做到这一点；他并不贪求更进一步地追求真理。

The same attitude explains the servility of his moral philosophy, which is simply an apology for the established order of things and for the prejudices of his time and country. His deepest conviction was that no system of ethics could be more, and if it tried to be more would be less, because it would be merely personal. When, for instance, he condemned harshly the Roman *patria potestas* it was because it offended the individualism of the Protestant and modern conscience; and if in the next breath he condemned even more harshly the sentimentalists who made tender feeling and good intentions the test of virtue, it was because these individual consciences absolved themselves from conformity to the established church and state. To inquire whether in itself or in respect to human economy generally, the morality of Buddha, or Socrates, or Rousseau was the best would have seemed to him absurd: the question could only be what approaches or contributions each of these made to the morality approved by the Lutheran community and by the Prussian ministry of education and public worship. The truth, then as now, was whatever every good German believed. This pious wish of Hegel's to interpret the orthodoxy of his generation was successful, and the modest hopes of his philosophy were fulfilled. Never perhaps was a system so true to its date and so false to its subject.

同样的态度解释了他道德哲学的奴性，这种哲学不过是对既定事物秩序以及对他时代和国家偏见的辩护。他最深的信念是，任何伦理体系都不可能更多，而如果它试图更多，就会更少，因为它将仅仅是个人性的。例如，当他严厉谴责罗马的家父权时，那是因为它冒犯了新教徒和现代良心的个人主义；而如果他在下一口气中更加严厉地谴责那些把温柔情感和善良意图当作美德标准的感伤主义者，那是因为这些个人良心使自己免于遵从既定教会和国家。要探究佛陀、苏格拉底或卢梭的道德本身或就人类经济一般而言是否是最好的，在他看来会是荒谬的：问题只能是这些人物各自对路德教共同体和普鲁士教育与公共崇拜部所认可的道德作出了什么接近或贡献。因此，真理，当时如同现在，就是每一个好德国人所相信的东西。黑格尔这种解释他那一代正统信仰的虔诚愿望是成功的，他哲学的谦逊希望也得到了实现。也许从来没有一个体系如此忠实于它的时代，又如此虚假于它的主题。

The egotism of Hegel appears also in his treatment of mathematical and physical questions. The infinite he called the false infinite, so as to avoid the dilemmas which it placed him in, such as why the evolution of the Idea began six thousand years ago, or less; what more could happen now that in his self-consciousness that evolution was complete; why it should have gone on in this planet only, or if it had gone on elsewhere also,

黑格尔的自我中心主义也表现在他对数学和物理问题的处理上。他把无限称为虚假的无限，以避免它使他陷入的困境，例如为什么观念的演化始于六千年前，或者更短；既然在他的自我意识中这一演化已经完成，现在还能发生什么；为什么它只在这个星球上进行，或者如果它也在别处进行，

why the Idea evolving there might not have been a different Idea. But all such questions are excluded when one understands that this philosophy is only a point of view: the world it describes is a vista not separable from the egotistical perspectives that frame it in. The extent of the world need not be discussed, because that extent is an appearance only; in reality the world has no extent, because it is only my present idea.

为什么在那里演化的观念不可能是一个不同的观念。但只要人们理解这种哲学只是一种观点，所有这类问题就被排除了：它所描述的世界是一幅远景，不能与框定它的自我中心视角相分离。世界的范围无需讨论，因为那个范围只是一种现象；在现实中世界没有范围，因为它只是我当下的观念。

The infinite thus lost its application; but the word was too idealistic to be discarded. Accordingly the title of true infinite was bestowed on the eventual illusion of completeness, on an alleged system of relations out of relation to anything beyond. That nothing existent, unless it was the bad infinite, could be absolute in this manner did not ruffle Hegel, for the existent did not really concern him but only "knowledge," that is, a circle of present and objectless ideas. Knowledge, however limited in fact, always has the completeness in question for the egotist, whose objects are not credited with existing beyond himself. Egotism could hardly receive a more radical expression than this: to declare the ego infinite because it can never find anything that is beyond its range.

无限由此失去了它的应用；但这个词语太唯心主义了，不能被丢弃。因此，真正的无限这一称号被授予了最终关于完整性的幻觉，被授予了一种据称的关系体系，它与任何超越之物都没有关系。没有任何存在物，除非它是坏的无限，能够以这种方式成为绝对的，这并没有使黑格尔感到不安，因为存在物并不真正与他相关，只有“知识”才与他相关，也就是说，一个当下而无对象的观念圆圈。知识，无论事实上多么有限，对自我中心主义者来说总是具有所讨论的那种完整性，因为他的对象不被认为存在于他自身之外。自我中心主义几乎不可能得到比这更彻底的表达：宣称自我是无限的，因为它永远找不到任何超出其范围的东西。

The favourite tenet of Hegel that everything involves its opposite is also a piece of egotism; for it is equivalent to making things conform to words, not words to things; and the ego, particularly in philosophers, is a nebula of words. In defining things, if you insist on defining them, you are constrained to define them by their relation to other things, or even exclusion of them. If, therefore, things are formed by your definitions of them, these relations and exclusions will be the essence of things. The notion of such intrinsic relativity in things is a sophism even in logic,

黑格尔最钟爱的信条--万物皆包含其对立面--同样是一种自我中心主义；因为这等于让事物去符合词语，而非让词语去符合事物；而自我，尤其在哲学家那里，是一团词语的星云。在定义事物时，如果你坚持要定义它们，你就不得不通过它们与其他事物的关系、甚至通过对其他事物的排除来定义它们。因此，如果事物是由你对它们的定义所构成的，那么这些关系和排除就会成为事物的本质。事物具有这种内在相对性的观念，即使在逻辑学中也是一种诡辩，

since elementary terms can never be defined yet may be perfectly well understood and arrested in intuition; but what here concerns us is rather the egotistical motive behind that sophism: namely, that the most verbal and subjective accidents to which the names of things are subject in human discourse should be deputed to be the groundwork of the things and their inmost being.

因为基本术语永远无法被定义，却可以被完美地理解并在直觉中把握；但此处与我们相关的，毋宁是那个诡辩背后的自我中心动机：即，事物的名称在人类话语中所服从的那些最字面的、最主观的偶然情况，竟被委派为事物的基础及其最内在的本质。

Egotistical, too, was Hegel's tireless hatred of what he called the abstract understanding. In his criticisms of this faculty and the opinions it forms there is much keenness and some justice. People often reason in the abstract, floating on words as on bladders: in their knowingness they miss the complexity and volume of real things. But the errors or abuses into which verbal intelligence may fall would never produce that implacable zeal with which Hegel persecutes it. What obsesses him is the fear that, in spite of its frivolity, the understanding may some day understand: that it may correct its inadequacies, trace the real movement of things, and seeing their mechanism lose that *effet d'ensemble*, that dramatic illusion, which he calls reason.

黑格尔对他所谓的抽象知性的不知疲倦的仇恨，同样是自我中心主义的。在他对这一能力及其所形成的意见的批评中，有许多敏锐之处，也有几分公正。人们常常抽象地推理，像浮在词语的气囊上一样漂浮：在他们的知性中，他们错过了真实事物的复杂性和体积。但是，词语知性可能陷入的错误或滥用，绝不会产生黑格尔迫害它时那种不可调和的热情。纠缠他的是这样一种恐惧：尽管知性轻浮，它有朝一日可能会理解：它可能会纠正自己的不足，追踪事物的真实运动，并在看到它们的机制时失去那种整体效果，那种他称之为理性的戏剧性幻觉。

Imagine a landscape-painter condemned to have a naturalist always at his elbow: soon it would not be merely the errors of the naturalist that would irritate him, but the naturalist himself. The artist intent on panoramic effects does not wish to be forced to look through a microscope; in changing his focus he loses his subjective object: not reality but appearance is the reality for him. Hegel, since it was his mission to substitute so-called knowledge for being, had to go further; he had to convince himself, not only that the structure of nature discovered by the understanding was irrelevant to his own conceptual mythology, but that such a structure did not exist. He was not willing to confess (as the

想象一位风景画家被判罚永远有一位博物学家守在他的肘边：很快，令他恼怒的将不仅是博物学家的错误，而是博物学家本人。专注于全景效果的艺术家不希望被迫透过显微镜去看；在改变焦点时，他失去了他的主观对象：对他来说，现实不是实在，而是外观。黑格尔，既然他的使命是以所谓的知识取代存在，就不得不走得更远；他不得不说服自己，不仅知性所发现的自然结构与他自己的概念神话无关，而且这样的结构并不存在。他不愿意承认(正如那位

landscape-painter might) that he *was* an egotist; that it was the subjective that interested him, and that in so great a world the subjective too has its place. No! he must pretend that his egotism was not egotism, but identity with the absolute, and that those who dared to maintain that the world wagged in its own way, apart from the viewing mind, were devils, because they suggested that the viewing mind was not God.

风景画家)他是一个自我中心主义者；令他感兴趣的是主观的东西，而在如此伟大的世界中，主观的东西也有其位置。不!他必须假装他的自我中心主义不是自我中心主义，而是与绝对同一，并且那些胆敢主张世界按其自身方式运行、独立于观看心灵的人都是魔鬼，因为他们暗示观看心灵不是上帝。

It is this latent but colossal egotism that makes plausible the strange use which Hegel sometimes makes of the word substance. His substance is but his grammar of discourse; for he was not looking for substance, in which he could not consistently believe, but only for the ultimate synthetic impression which he might gather from appearances. For the theatre-goer, the function of scenery and actors is that they should please and impress him: but what, in the end, impresses and pleases him? The cumulative burden and force of the play; the enhanced life which it has stimulated in himself. This, for that ruthless egotist, the aesthete, is the *substance* of all things theatrical. Of course, in fact, nothing could be falser, for the author and actors are real people, with lives far outrunning their function in the theatre and truly grounding it. Even the stage machinery has its natural history, and the artisans who made it have theirs, both full of mute inglorious tragedies. These real substances behind his entertainment the spectator, in his æsthetic egotism, laughs at as irrelevant; for him, as for Hamlet, the play's the thing. What is most his own, his imaginative reaction on the spectacle, the terms in which he finds it easiest and most exciting to describe it, he calls the substance of it: a term which betrays the profound impudence of the deliberate egotist; the deepest reality he will recognise is merely specious,

正是这种潜伏却巨大的自我中心主义，使黑格尔有时对“实体”一词的奇怪用法显得可信。他的实体不过是他话语的语法；因为他所寻求的并不是实体--他并不能一贯地相信实体--而只是他可能从现象中获得的最终的综合性印象。对于看戏的人来说，布景和演员的功能在于使他们愉悦并打动他们：但最终打动并愉悦他们的是什么呢?是戏剧累积的重负与力量；是它在自身之中所激发出的增强了的生命。对于那个无情的自我中心主义者、那个审美家来说，这就是一切戏剧性事物的实体。当然，事实上没有什么比这更虚假的了，因为作者和演员都是真实的人，他们的生活远远超出他们在剧院中的功能，并真正为这一功能奠定基础。甚至舞台机械也有其自然史，制造它的工匠也有其自然史，两者都充满了无声的、不光彩的悲剧。观众在其审美的自我中心主义中，把他娱乐背后的这些真实实体当作无关紧要的东西加以嘲笑；对于他，正如对于哈姆雷特一样，戏剧才是关键。他最本己的东西，即他对景观的想象性反应，即他发现最容易、最激动人心地描述它的那些词语，他称之为它的实体：这个术语暴露了蓄意的自我中心主义者那深刻的厚颜无耻；他所愿意承认的最深的实在仅仅是似是而非的，

existing only for the mind that imagines it. What is supposed to rescue the system of Hegel from subjectivism is the most subjective of things—a dialectic which obeys the impulses of a theoretical *parti pris*, and glorifies a fixed idea.

When we have understood all this, those traits of Hegel's which at first sight seem least egotistical—his historical insight and his enthusiasm for organised society—take on a new colour. That historical insight is not really sympathetic; it is imperious, external, contemptuous, feigned. If you are a modern reading the Greeks, especially if you read them in the romantic spirit of Goethe's classicism, and know of them just what Hegel knew, you will think his description wonderfully penetrating, masterly, and complete: but would Æschylus or Plato have thought it so? They would have laughed, or rather they would not have understood that such a description referred to them at all. It is the legend of the Greeks, not the life of the Greeks, that is analysed by him. So his account of mediæval religion represents the Protestant legend, not the Catholic experience. What we know little or nothing about seems to us in Hegel admirably characterised: what we know intimately seems to us painted with the eye of a pedantic, remote, and insolent foreigner. It is but an idea of his own that he is foisting upon us, calling it our soul. He is creating a world in his head which might be admirable, if God had made it.

Every one is subject to such illusions of perspective and to the pathos of distance, now favourable, now unfavourable to what he studies; but Hegel, thinking he had the key to the divine design, fancied himself deeply sympathetic because he saw in everything some fragment of himself. But no part of the world was that; every part had its own inalienable superiority, which to transcend was

只为想象它的心灵而存在。被认为能使黑格尔体系免于主观主义的东西，恰恰是最主观的东西--一种服从理论偏见之冲动的辩证法，它美化一个固定的观念。

当我们理解了这一切之后，黑格尔那些乍看之下最不自我中心主义的特征--他的历史洞见和他对组织化社会的热情--便呈现出一种新的色彩。那种历史洞见并非真正同情的；它是专横的、外在的、轻蔑的、虚假的。如果你是一个阅读希腊人的现代人，尤其是如果你以歌德古典主义那种浪漫主义精神来阅读他们，并且所知道的关于他们的恰好就是黑格尔所知道的东西，你会觉得他的描述奇妙地深刻、精湛而完整：但埃斯库罗斯或柏拉图会这样认为吗?他们会发笑，或者更确切地说，他们根本不会理解这样的描述指的是他们。他所分析的是希腊人的传说，而不是希腊人的生活。同样，他对中世纪宗教的叙述代表的是新教的传说，而不是天主教的体验。我们知之甚少或一无所知的东西，在黑格尔笔下似乎得到了令人钦佩的刻画：我们深切了解的东西，在我们看来却像是用一个迂腐的、疏远的、傲慢的外国人的眼睛描绘出来的。他强加给我们的不过是他自己的一个观念，却称之为我们的灵魂。他在头脑中创造着一个世界，如果上帝创造了它，那或许会是令人钦佩的。

每个人都受制于这种透视的幻象和距离的悲情，时而有利于、时而不利于他所研究的东西；但黑格尔自以为掌握了神圣设计的钥匙，因为他在万物中看到了自身的某个碎片，便幻想自己深具同情。但世界的任何部分都不是那个；每一部分都有其不可剥夺的优越性，超越它便是

to lose for ever. To the omniscient egotist every heart is closed. The past will never give away its secret except to some self-forgetful and humble lover who by nature has a kindred destiny. The egotist who thinks to grasp it, so as to serve it up at his philosophic banquet, or exhibit it in his museum of antiquities, grasps only himself; and in that sense, to his confusion, his egotism turns out true.

永远失去它。对全知的自我中心主义者来说，每一颗心都是关闭的。过去永远不会泄露它的秘密，除非对某个忘我的、谦卑的、天性有着相近命运的爱者。那个以为能把握过去、以便在其哲学宴席上端出它、或在古物博物馆中展出它的自我中心主义者，把握到的只是他自己；在这个意义上，令其困惑的是，他的自我中心主义被证明是真的。

The egotism that appears in this lordly way of treating the past is egotism of the imagination, the same that was expressed in the romantic love of nature, which was really a very subtle, very studious, very obstinate love of self, intent on finding some reference and deference to oneself in everything. But there is also an egotism of passion, which in Hegel appears in his worship of the state. "The passions" is the old and fit name for what the Germans call ideals. The passions are not selfish in the sense in which the German moralists denounce selfishness; they are not contrived by him who harbours them for his ulterior profit. They are ideal, dangerous, often fatal. Even carnal passions are not selfish, if by the self we understand the whole man: they are an obsession to which he sacrifices himself. But the transcendental philosophy with its migratory ego can turn any single passion, or any complex of passions, into a reputed centre of will, into a moral personage. As the passion usurps more and more of the man's nature it becomes a fierce egotist in his place; it becomes fanaticism or even madness.

这种以居高临下的方式对待过去的做法中所表现出的自我中心主义，是想象力的自我中心主义，与浪漫主义自然之爱中所表达的是同一种东西，那实际上是一种非常微妙、非常刻意、非常固执的自爱，执意要在一切事物中寻找到对自己的某种参照与尊崇。但也还有一种激情的自我中心主义，它在黑格尔那里表现为对国家的崇拜。“激情”是德国人所谓的理想的古老而恰当的名称。激情并不是德国道德家所谴责的自私意义上的自私；它们并非由怀有它们的人为其隐秘利益而设计。它们是理想的、危险的、常常是致命的。甚至肉体的激情也不是自私的，如果我们把自我理解为完整的人：它们是一种执念，人为之牺牲自己。但先验哲学及其游移的自我，却能把任何一种单一的激情，或任何一种激情的复合体，变成一个被认定的意志中心，变成一个道德人格。当激情越来越多地侵占人的本性时，它就在他的位置上变成一个凶猛的自我中心主义者；它变成狂热，甚至变成疯狂。

This substitution of a passion for a man, when nobody thought the ego migratory, seemed a disease. What folly, we said to the human soul, to sacrifice your natural life to this partial, transitory, visionary passion! But the German idealist recognises no natural

当没有人认为自我是可迁移的时候，这种用激情替代人的做法看来是一种病。我们曾对人类的灵魂说，牺牲你的自然生命去追求这种局部的、短暂的、幻想的激情，是多么愚蠢!但德国唯心主义者不承认任何自然的

life, no natural individual. His ego can migrate into any political body or any synthetic idea. Therefore, his passions, far from seeming follies to him, seem divine inspirations, calls to sacrifice, fidelities to the ideal.

生命，不承认任何自然的个体。他的自我可以迁移到任何政治体或任何综合观念之中。因此，他的激情远非在他看来显得愚蠢，反而显得是神圣的灵感、牺牲的召唤、对理想的忠诚。

I am far from wishing to say that a German idealist is commonly just to all the passions and raises them in turn to be his highest and absolute will. His passions are generally few and mental. Accidents of training or limitations of temperament keep him respectable; but he is never safe. Dazzle him with a sophism, such, for instance, as that "the more evil the more good," or hypnotise him with a superstition, such as that "organisation is an end in itself," and nothing more is needed to turn him into a romantic criminal.

我远不想说，一个德国唯心主义者通常对所有激情都公正，并依次把它们提升为他最高的、绝对的意志。他的激情通常很少，且是心智上的。训练的偶然或气质的局限使他保持体面；但他从不安稳。用一个诡辩来眩惑他，例如“恶愈多则善愈多”，或者用一种迷信来催眠他，例如“组织本身就是目的”，那就再不需要别的什么来把他变成一个浪漫主义的罪犯了。

Even the absolute requires an enemy to whet its edge upon, and the state, which according to Hegel is morally absolute, requires rival states in order that its separate individuality may not seem to vanish, and with it the occasion for blessed and wholesome wars. Hegel rejects the notion that nations have any duties to one another because, as he asserts, there is no moral authority or tribunal higher than the state, to which its government could be subject. This assertion is evidently false, since in the first place there is God or, if the phrase be preferred, there is the highest good of mankind, hedging in very narrowly the path that states should follow between opposite vices; and in the second place there is the individual, whose natural allegiance to his family, friends, and religion, to truth and to art, is deeper and holier than his allegiance to the state, which for the soul of man is an historical and geographical accident. No doubt at the present stage of civilisation there is more to be gained than lost by co-

甚至绝对也需要一个敌人来磨砺它的锋刃，而按照黑格尔在道德上是绝对的国家，则需要敌对的国家，以便它分离的个体性不至于显得消失，并随之失去进行蒙福而有益的战争的机会。黑格尔拒绝民族彼此之间负有任何义务的观念，因为他断言，没有比国家更高的道德权威或法庭，政府可以服从于它。这一断言显然是错误的，因为首先存在着上帝，或者如果人们更喜欢这种说法，存在着人类的最高善，它非常狭窄地限制着国家在相反恶习之间应走的道路；其次存在着个人，他对家庭、朋友和宗教、对真理和艺术的自然忠诚，比他对国家的忠诚更深刻、更神圣，而国家对于人的灵魂来说不过是一个历史的和地理的偶然。毫无疑问，在文明的现阶段，通过合.....

operating loyally with the governments under which we happen to live, not because any state is divine, but because as yet no less cumbrous machinery is available for carrying on the economy of life with some approach to decency and security. For Hegel, however, the life of the state was the moral substance, and the souls of men but the accidents; and as to the judgment of God he asserted that it was none other than the course of history. This is a characteristic saying, in which he seems to proclaim the moral government of the world, when in truth he is sanctifying a brutal law of success and succession. The best government, of course, succumbs in time like the worst, and sooner; the dark ages followed upon the Roman Empire and lasted twice as long. But Hegel's God was simply the world, or a formula supposed to describe the world. He despised every ideal not destined to be realised on earth, he respected legality more than justice, and extant institutions more than moral ideals; and he wished to flatter a government in whose policy war and even crime were recognised weapons.

忠实地与我们碰巧生活其下的政府合作，不是因为任何国家都是神圣的，而是因为迄今为止还没有不那么笨重的机器可以用来维持生活的经济，使其多少接近体面和安全。然而，对黑格尔来说，国家的生命是道德实体，而人的灵魂只是偶性；至于上帝的审判，他断言那无非是历史的进程。这是一句典型的话，在其中他似乎宣告了世界的道德治理，而实际上他是在将一条关于成功和更替的残酷法则神圣化。当然，最好的政府也会像最坏的政府一样适时屈服，而且更早；黑暗时代紧随罗马帝国之后，持续时间是后者的两倍。但黑格尔的上帝 simply 就是世界，或者是一个被认为描述世界的公式。他鄙视每一个不注定要在地球上实现的理想，他尊重合法性甚于正义，尊重现存制度甚于道德理想；他希望奉承一个其政策中战争甚至犯罪都被承认为武器的政府。

This reign of official passion is not, let me repeat, egotism in the natural man who is subject to it; it is the sacrifice of the natural man and of all men to an abstract obsession, called an ideal. The vice of absoluteness and egotism is transferred to that visionary agent. The man may be docile and gentle enough, but the demon he listens to is ruthless and deaf. It forbids him to ask, "At what price do I pursue this ideal? How much harm must I do to attain this good?" No; this imperative is categorical. The die is cast, the war against human nature and happiness is declared, and an idol that feeds on blood, the Absolute State, is set up in the heart and over the city.

让我重复一遍，这种官方激情的统治并不是受其支配的自然人的自我中心主义；它是对自然人和一切人的牺牲，献给一个被称为理想的抽象执念。绝对性和自我中心的恶习被转移到了那个幻想的动因身上。这个人可能足够温顺和温和，但他所听从的恶魔是无情的、充耳不闻的。它禁止他问：“我以什么代价追求这个理想?为了达到这个善，我必须造成多少伤害?”不；这个命令是绝对命令。骰子已经掷下，对人性和幸福的战争已经宣布，一个以血为食的偶像，即绝对国家，被树立在人心之中和城市之上。

CHAPTER IX

EGOTISM AND SELFISHNESS

In a review of egotism in German philosophy it would hardly be excusable to ignore the one notable writer who has openly adopted egotism in name as well as in fact. The work of Max Stirner on the single separate person and what he may call his own hardly belongs to German philosophy as I have been using the words: it lacks the transcendental point of departure, as well as all breadth of view, metaphysical subtlety, or generous afflatus; it is a bold, frank, and rather tiresome protest against the folly of moral idealism, against the sacrifice of the individual to any ghostly powers such as God, duty, the state, humanity, or society; all of which this redoubtable critic called "spooks" and regarded as fixed ideas and pathological obsessions. This crudity was relieved by a strong mother-wit and a dogged honesty; and it is not impossible that this poor schoolmaster, in his solitary meditations, may have embodied prophetically a rebellion against polite and religious follies which is brewing in the working classes—classes which to-morrow perhaps will absorb all mankind and give for the first time a plebeian tone to philosophy.

Max Stirner called the migratory ego back to its nest. He exorcised that "spook" which had been ascending and descending the ladder of abstractions, lodged now in a single passion, now in a political body, now in a logical term, now in the outspread universe. The

第九章

自我中心主义与自私

在审视德国哲学中的自我中心主义时，忽略那位公开在名义上和事实上都采纳自我中心主义的著名作家几乎是不可原谅的。马克斯·施蒂纳关于单个分离的个人以及他可能称之为自己的东西的著作，几乎不属于我一直使用这个词时所指的德国哲学：它缺乏先验的出发点，也缺乏一切视野的广度、形而上学的微妙或慷慨的灵感；它是对道德唯心主义之愚蠢、对个人被牺牲给任何幽灵般的力量(如上帝、义务、国家、人性或社会)的一次大胆、坦率且相当令人厌倦的抗议；这位令人敬畏的批评家把所有这些称为“幽灵”，并视之为固定观念和病态执念。这种粗糙被一种强烈的母智慧和顽强的诚实所缓解；而且并非不可能的是，这位可怜的校长在他孤独的沉思中，可能已经预言性地体现了一种对文雅和宗教愚蠢的反叛，这种反叛正在工人阶级中酝酿--这些阶级明天或许将吸收全人类，并首次赋予哲学一种平民的基调。

马克斯·施蒂纳把可迁移的自我唤回它的巢穴。他驱除了那个“幽灵”，它一直在抽象之梯上上下下，时而寄居于单一激情，时而寄居于政治体，时而寄居于逻辑术语，时而寄居于展开的宇宙。他坚称，

only true ego, he insisted, was the bodily person, the natural individual who is born and dies. No other organ or seat existed for the mind, or for any of its functions. Personal interests were the only honest interests a man could have, and if he was brow-beaten or indoctrinated into sacrificing them, that moral coercion was a scandal and a wrong. The indomitable individual should shake off those chains, which were only cobwebs, and come into his own.

唯一真实的自我是肉体的人，是出生并死亡的自然个体。心灵或其任何功能都不存在其他器官或位置。个人利益是一个人所能拥有的唯一诚实的利益，如果他受到威吓或被灌输去牺牲它们，那种道德强制就是一种丑闻和一种不义。不屈不挠的个体应当摆脱那些锁链--它们不过是蛛网--并进入自己的所有。

Egotism thus becomes individualism, and threatens to become selfishness. The logic of these positions does not seem to have been clear to Max Stirner. That the individual must *possess* all his wishes and aspirations, even the most self-denying and suicidal, is obvious; he is the seat of those very obsessions and superstitions which Max Stirner deplored. The same thing is true of knowledge: a man can know only what *he* knows and what his faculties make him capable of knowing. This fact is the excuse for transcendentalism, and the element of truth in it. But the fact that volition and knowledge must have their seat in some person prejudges nothing about the scope of their objects. The fallacy of egotism begins with the inference that, therefore, a person can know only his ideas and can live only for his own benefit. On the contrary, what makes knowledge knowledge is that our sensibility may report something which is not merely our feeling; and our moral being arises when our interests likewise begin to range over the world. To deny that a man is capable of generosity because his generosity must be his own, is insufferable quibbling. Even our vanities and follies are disinterested in their way; their egotism is not a calculated selfishness. When a man orders his tomb according to his taste, it is not in the hope of enjoying his residence in it.

自我中心主义于是变成了个人主义，并有沦为利己主义的危险。这些立场的逻辑在马克斯·施蒂纳看来似乎并不清晰。个体必须拥有他所有的愿望和渴求，哪怕是最自我否定和自杀式的，这是显而易见的；他正是马克斯·施蒂纳所痛惜的那些执念和迷信的所在。知识也是如此：一个人只能知道他所知道的东西，以及他的官能使他能够知道的东西。这一事实是先验主义的借口，也是其中真理的成分。但意志和知识必须以某个人为所在这一事实，并不能预先判定其对象的范围。自我中心主义的谬误始于这样的推论：因此，一个人只能知道自己的观念，只能为自己的利益而活。相反，使知识成为知识的，是我们的感性可以报告某种并非仅仅是我们感觉的东西；而我们的道德存在，同样始于我们的兴趣开始遍及世界之时。因为一个人的慷慨必须是他自己的，就否认他能够慷慨，这是令人无法忍受的诡辩。甚至我们的虚荣和愚蠢，也以其方式表现出无私；它们的自我中心主义并非精打细算的利己主义。当一个人按照自己的品味安排自己的坟墓时，他并不指望在其中享受居住之乐。

Max Stirner, while deprecating all subordination of the individual to society, expected people, even after they were emancipated, to form voluntary unions for specific purposes, such as playing games. Did he think that such companionship and co-operation would go without gregarious feelings and ideal interests? Would not a player wish his side to win? Would he not impose a rather painful strain upon himself at times for the sake of that "spook," victory? All the sacrifices that society or religion imposes on a man, when they are legitimate, are based on the same principle.

马克斯·施蒂纳虽然不赞成个人对社会的任何服从，但他期望人们即使在解放之后，也能为特定目的(如玩游戏)组成自愿的联合。他是否认为这种陪伴和合作可以没有群居情感和理想兴趣?一个玩家难道不希望他的一方获胜吗?难道他不会为了那个“幽灵”--胜利--而有时给自己施加相当痛苦的紧张吗?社会或宗教强加于人的一切牺牲，当它们是正当的时候，都基于同样的原则。

The protest of Max Stirner against sham ideals and aims forced upon us by social pressure should not then have extended to ideals congenial to the natural man and founded on his instincts. Since the seat of our enthusiasms must be personal, their appeal should be so too, if they are to inspire us efficaciously; but every art and science shows that they may be utterly impersonal in their object. It was not in proposing ideal aims that the German philosophers were wrong: that was the noble and heroic side of their doctrine, as well as a point in which their psychology was correct. Their error lay in defining these aims arbitrarily and imposing them absolutely, trying to thrust into us ideals like endless strife and absolute will, which perhaps our souls abhor. But if our souls abhor those things, it is because they love something else; and this other thing they love for its own sake, so that the very refusal to sacrifice to those idols is a proof of faith in a true God.

那么，马克斯·施蒂纳对由社会压力强加于我们的虚假理想和目标的抗议，就不应当扩展到那些与自然人和睦相处、建立在其本能之上的理想。既然我们热情的所在必须是个人的，那么这些热情所要感召的对象也应当如此，如果它们要有效地激励我们的话；但每一门艺术和科学都表明，它们的目标可以完全是非个人的。德国哲学家们的错误并不在于提出理想的目标：那是他们学说中高尚而英勇的一面，也是他们的心理学正确的一点。他们的错误在于任意地界定这些目标并绝对地强加于人，试图把诸如无尽争斗和绝对意志之类的理想塞进我们心中，而我们的灵魂也许对此深恶痛绝。但倘若我们的灵魂憎恶那些东西，那是因为它们爱着别的东西；而它们爱这别的东西是因其自身的缘故，所以，正是拒绝向那些偶像献祭，才证明了对一个真神的信仰。

The conclusion of Max Stirner, that because those idols are false, and the worship of them is cruel and superstitious, therefore we

马克斯·施蒂纳的结论是：因为那些偶像都是虚假的，对它们的崇拜是残酷而迷信的，因此我们

must worship nothing and merely enjoy in a piggish way what we may call our own, is a conclusion that misreads human nature. It overlooks the fact that man lives by the imagination, that the imagination—when not chaotic and futile—is exercised in the arts of life, that the objects of these arts are impersonal, and that to achieve these objects brings us a natural happiness.

The Germans are by nature a good stolid people, and it is curious that their moralists, of every school, are so fantastic and bad. The trouble lies perhaps in this, that they are all precipitate. They have not taken the trouble to decipher human nature, which is an *endowment*, something many-sided, unconscious, with a margin of variation, and have started instead with the will, which is only an *attitude*, something casual, conscious, and narrowly absolute. Nor have they learned to respect sufficiently the external conditions under which human nature operates and to which it must conform —God, the material world, the nature and will of other men. Their morality consequently terminates in ideals, casual, conscious, and absolute expressions of the passions, or else expires in a mysticism which renounces all moral judgment. A reasonable morality terminates instead in the arts, by which human ideals and passions are compounded with experience and adapted to the materials they must work in. The immaturity of the German moralists appears in their conception that the good is life, which is what an irrational animal might say: whereas for a rational being the good is only the good part of life, that healthy, stable, wise, kind, and beautiful sort of life which he calls happiness.

必须什么都不崇拜，只以猪一般的方式享受我们可称之为自己的东西--这个结论误读了人性。它忽视了这样一个事实：人靠想象而生活，想象--当它不是混乱而徒劳的时候--运用于生活的技艺之中，这些技艺的对象是非个人的，而实现这些对象给我们带来一种自然的幸福。

德国人天生是一个善良而迟钝的民族，奇怪的是，他们各个学派的道德家却如此荒诞不经、糟糕透顶。问题也许就在这里：他们全都操之过急。他们没有费心去解读人性--人性是一种禀赋，是多面的、无意识的，带有变化的余地--而是从意志出发，意志只是一种态度，是偶然的、有意识的、狭隘地绝对的东西。他们也没有学会充分尊重人性运作所依据、并且必须服从的外部条件--上帝、物质世界、他人的本性和意志。因此，他们的道德最终归结为理想，即激情的偶然的、有意识的、绝对的表达，否则就消解为一种放弃一切道德判断的神秘主义。而一种合理的道德则最终归结为艺术，通过艺术，人类的理想和激情与经验相结合，并适应于它们必须在其间运作的材料。德国道德家的不成熟表现在他们关于善即生命的观念上，这是非理性的动物也可能说的话；而对于一个理性存在者来说，善只是生命中好的部分，即他称之为幸福的那种健康、稳定、明智、善良而美好的生活。

CHAPTER X

THE BREACH WITH CHRISTIANITY

German philosophy has a religious spirit, but its alliance with Christianity has always been equivocal and external. Even in the speculations of Leibniz, concerned as he was about orthodoxy, there was a spirit of independence and absolutism which was rationalistic, not to say heathen. The principle of sufficient reason, for instance, demands that God and nature shall explain their existence and behaviour to us, as timid parents explain their behaviour to their censorious children. By rendering everything necessary, even the acts of God, it takes the place of God and makes him superfluous. Such frigid optimism as this principle involves, besides being fatalistic, is deeply discouraging to that hope of deliverance which is the soul of Christianity: for if this is the best world possible, how poor must be that realm of possible worlds where everything is tainted, and there is no heaven! The theory, too, that each soul contains the seeds of its whole experience and suffices for its own infinite development, destroys the meaning of creation, revelation, miracles, sin, grace, and charity. Thus without intending it, even the obsequious but incredibly intelligent Leibniz undermined all the doctrines of Christianity in the act of thinking them afresh, and insinuated into them a sort of magic heathen individualism.

Kant, Fichte, and Hegel were less punctilious in their theology, but they still intended to be or to seem Christians. They felt that what made the sanctity of traditional religion and its moral force could be recovered in a purer form in their systems. This feeling

第十章

与基督教的决裂

德国哲学有一种宗教精神，但它与基督教的结盟始终是模棱两可的、外在的。即使在莱布尼茨的思辨中--尽管他关心正统--也有一种独立和绝对主义的精神，那是理性主义的，不消说是异教的。例如，充足理由原则要求上帝和自然向我们解释它们的存在和行为，就像胆怯的父母向吹毛求疵的孩子们解释自己的行为一样。通过把一切事物、甚至上帝的行为都变成必然的，它取代了上帝，使上帝成为多余。这一原则所包含的那种冷漠的乐观主义，除了是宿命论的之外，还深深挫伤了那种得救的希望，而那正是基督教的灵魂：因为如果这是可能世界中最好的世界，那么那个一切都被污染、没有天堂的可能世界领域该是多么贫乏啊!同样，那种认为每个灵魂都包含其全部经验的种子、并且足以实现自身无限发展的理论，摧毁了创世、启示、奇迹、罪、恩典和仁爱的意义。因此，甚至那谄媚却无比智慧的莱布尼茨，也在无意之中，在重新思考基督教一切教义的同时瓦解了它们，并向其中悄悄注入了一种魔法般的异教个人主义。

康德、费希特和黑格尔在神学上不那么拘泥，但他们仍然意图成为或显得是基督徒。他们觉得，使传统宗教具有神圣性和道德力量的东西，可以在他们的体系中以更纯粹的形式恢复。这种感受

of theirs was not unwarranted; at least, many religious minds, after the first shock of losing their realistic faith, have seen in transcendentalism a means, and perhaps the only safe means, of still maintaining a sort of Christianity which shall not claim any longer to be a miraculous or exceptional revelation, but only a fair enough poetic symbol for the principles found in all moral life. That he who loses his life shall save it, for instance, is a maxim much prized and much glossed by Hegelians. They lend it a meaning of their own, which might, indeed, be said to be the opposite of what the Gospel meant; for there the believer is urged to discard the very world with which Hegel asks him to identify himself. The idea is that if you surrender your private interests to those of your profession, science, or country, you become thereby a good and important person, and unintentionally a happy one. You will then feel that the world shares your thoughts and renders them perpetual, while you, being absorbed in ideal pursuits, forget your private miseries and mortality.

他们的做法并非没有道理；至少，许多宗教心灵在失去其现实主义信仰的最初打击之后，在先验主义中看到了一种手段，也许是唯一安全的手段，可以仍然维持一种基督教，这种基督教不再声称自己是奇迹般的或例外的启示，而只是对一切道德生活中所发现的那些原则的一个足够美好的诗意象征。例如，“失去生命者将得生命”是一条被黑格尔派学者们极为珍视、反复注解的格言。他们赋予它一种自己的含义，这种含义也许可以说是与福音书原意相反的；因为在福音书里，信徒被敦促舍弃的正是黑格尔要求他与之认同的那个世界。其意思是：如果你把个人利益交给你的职业、科学或国家的利益，你便由此成为一个善良而重要的人，并且不自觉地成为一个幸福的人。那时你会感到世界分享着你的思想并使它们永存，而你自己则沉浸于理想的追求之中，忘却了个人的苦难和必死性。

In this sort of moral psychology there is evidently some truth; but the "law of experience" which it points to is but a loose and ambiguous law, which disguises more facts than it expresses. Honest minds will rebel against the suggestion that when you outgrow a desire you have fulfilled it; and they will detect the furtive irony in bidding you live hard in order not to feel the vanity of living. To drown sorrow in work, and to forget private failures in public interests, is certainly possible, but it is only drugging yourself with hurry and routine, which may not be more advantageous to others than it really is to yourself. Impersonal or "ideal" aims are not necessarily less delusive or "higher" than personal ones; in fact there is far more likelihood that they are

在这种道德心理学中显然有一些真理；但它所指的“经验法则”不过是一条松散而含糊的法则，它掩盖的事实多于它所表达的。诚实的心灵会反抗这样一种暗示：当你超越了某种欲望，你便已经满足了它；他们也会察觉出那种偷偷摸摸的讽刺--吩咐你拼命生活，以免感受到生活的空虚。以工作淹没悲伤，以公共事务忘却个人的失败，这当然是可能的，但那只是用匆忙和例行公事来麻醉自己，这对他人未必比对自己真的更有益处。非个人的或“理想的”目标未必就不那么虚妄，也未必比个人的目标更“高尚”；事实上，它们很可能更是如此

conventional humbug. This pathological hygiene of idealism, which always stops at some uncriticised impulse, thinks it secures health when perhaps it has only increased the dose of illusion.

是传统的骗术。唯心主义的这种病理学卫生学，总是停留在某个未经批判的冲动上，自以为获得了健康，而也许它只是增加了幻象的剂量。

Nevertheless transcendentalism has this important element in common with Christianity and with the other Hebraic religions, that it regards human interests as the core of the universe and God as the God of man, who disposes all things for man's benefit. In its eyes the sphere of providence and moral life is bounded by the history of a part of Europe and Asia for a few thousand years. So long as transcendentalism is taken to imply some such philosophy of history it can compound its differences with liberal Christianity, since they are at one in the cardinal point of their faith, which is the apotheosis of the human spirit.

然而，先验主义与基督教以及其他希伯来宗教有一个重要的共同要素，即它把人类利益视为宇宙的核心，把上帝视为人的上帝，上帝为人的利益安排万物。在先验主义看来，天意与道德生活的领域是由欧亚一部分地区几千年的历史所界定的。只要先验主义被理解为暗示某种这样的历史哲学，它就能与自由基督教调和分歧，因为它们在信仰的根本点上是一致的，即对人的精神的神化。

Yet this human egotism, which comforts so many minds, offends others, in their way no less religious. Of course, those who believe in the infinity of the universe, be they mystics or naturalists, smile at such pettiness and fatuity. But even among transcendentalists, some are repelled; for the dominion which they attribute to their ego is a dominion over appearances only; they do not pretend that the grammar of the human intellect can lay down the law for the world at large. At the same time, in their own house they wish to keep their freedom. That prescribed evolution and that reversible optimism of the absolute transcendentalists are repulsive to them; they resent that such a precise and distasteful career should be imposed on their transcendental individuality, and should swallow it up. It is these rebels that have carried romanticism and German philosophy into its last phase. They have broken at last with Christianity and at the same time with the theological and cosmic transcendentalism that was its treacherous ally, and hoped to be

然而，这种慰藉了许多心灵的人类自我中心主义，却冒犯了另一些在其方式上同样虔诚的人。当然，那些相信宇宙无限的人，无论是神秘主义者还是自然主义者，都对这种渺小与愚妄一笑置之。但即使在先验主义者中间，也有人感到反感；因为他们归于自我的那种支配权，仅仅是对现象的支配权；他们并不声称人类智性的语法能为整个宇宙立法。同时，在他们自己的领域内，他们希望保持自由。那种被规定的进化和绝对先验主义者那种可逆的乐观主义令他们厌恶；他们愤恨这样一种精确而令人不快的事业竟被强加于他们的先验个体性之上，并将其吞没。正是这些反叛者把浪漫主义和德国哲学带入了它的最后阶段。他们最终与基督教决裂，同时也与那曾是它背信弃义的盟友、并希望成为

its heir.

它的继承
者。

The transcendentalism of Schopenhauer, sweeping as it was in its way, retained the modest and agnostic character it had had in Kant: he proclaimed that the world was his idea, but meant only (what is undeniable) that his *idea* of the world was his idea. The egotistical doctrine that the whole universe is but the image of it created by the mind disappeared altogether in his system. The so-called Will which he still placed behind everything was no longer his own will evolving experience out of nothing; it was a fanciful name for whatever force or substance might lie behind experience, animating all its objects, determining their inherent life, and constituting them facts collateral with himself. If his metaphysics remained idealistic, it was on account of his romantic habit of assimilating the life of nature to that of man, as hasty introspection reveals it; so that the universe is described in moral and poetical terms rather than in the terms of science.

叔本华的先验主义，尽管在其方式上颇为激进，却保留了它在康德那里所具有的谦逊与不可知论的特征：他宣称世界是我的表象，但意思只是(这是不可否认的)他关于世界的观念是他自己的观念。那种认为整个宇宙不过是心灵所创造的它的形象的自我中心主义学说，在他的体系中完全消失了。他仍然置于万物背后的所谓意志，不再是他自己的意志从虚无中演化出经验；它只是一个想象性的名称，用来指称可能位于经验背后的任何力量或实体，它赋予经验的一切对象以生命，决定它们固有的生命，并使它们成为与他自身并列的事实。如果说他的形而上学仍然是唯心主义的，那是由于他浪漫主义的习惯，即把自然的生命比附于人的生命，如同仓促的内省所揭示的那样；因此，宇宙是用道德和诗意的词语而非科学的词语来描述的。

The consequences of this change were important. The Will became infinite in what Hegel called the evil sense, that is, in the true one. It was no longer possible to speak of a plan of creation, nor of a dramatic progress in history, with its beginning in Eden and its end in Berlin. Life was seen to radiate, as it really does, from an elementary form into all sorts of disparate and incomparable growths, capable of endless diversity. No limit, no forced co-operation, no stereotyped method was imputed to life. The pocket universe of Hegel opened out to the stars, so hateful to that philosopher. Man lost his importance and at the same time the insufferable burden of his false pretensions. In Schopenhauer frankness returned, and with frankness clearness. Yet he could not quite reconcile man to his actual place in nature. A deep prejudice

这一变化的后果是重要的。意志在黑格尔所谓的坏的意义上，也就是在真正的意义上，变成了无限的。人们不再可能谈论创世的计划，也不再可能谈论历史中戏剧性的进步，其起点在伊甸园，终点在柏林。生命被视为从一种基本形式向各种互不相同、不可比较的生长形态辐射，能够有无穷的多样性，正如它实际上那样。人们不再把任何限制、任何强制的合作、任何固定的方法强加于生命。黑格尔那个袖珍宇宙向星辰敞开，而星辰对那位哲学家是如此可憎。人失去了他的重要性，同时也失去了他那虚假自负的难以承受的重负。在叔本华那里，坦率恢复了，随坦率而来的是清晰。然而他未能完全使人安于其在自然中的实际位置。一种深刻的偏见

still intervened.

仍然进行了干预。

Both Christianity and romanticism had accustomed people to disregard the intrinsic value of things. Things ought to be useful for salvation, or symbols of other greater but unknown things: it was not to be expected that they should be simply good in themselves. This life was to be justified, if justified at all, only as servile work or tedious business may be justified, not as health or artistic expression justify themselves. Unless some external and ulterior end could be achieved by living, it was thought that life would be vanity. Remove now the expectation of a millennium or of a paradise in the sky, and it may seem that all serious value has disappeared from our earthly existence. Yet this feeling is only a temporary after-image of a particular education.

基督教和浪漫主义都使人们习惯于忽视事物的内在价值。事物应当对得救有用，或者是其他更伟大但未知之物的象征：不能指望它们本身就是善的。今生若要被证明为正当，如果终究能被证明为正当的话，也只能像奴仆的工作或乏味的营生可以被证明为正当那样，而不能像健康或艺术表现那样自我证明为正当。除非通过生活能够达到某种外在而终极的目的，人们便认为生活将是虚空的。现在，去掉对千禧年或天上乐园的期待，似乎一切严肃的价值都已从我们尘世的存在中消失了。然而这种感觉只是一种特定教育的暂时的后像。

The romantic poets, through pride, restlessness, and longing for vague impossible things, came to the same conclusion that the church had reached through censoriousness and hope. To be always dissatisfied seemed to that Faust-like age a mark of loftiness. To be dissatisfied is, indeed, a healthy and promising thing, when what troubles us can be set right; but the romantic mind despises such incidental improvements which far from freeing the wild egotistical soul would rather fatten and harness it. It is beneath the romantic pessimist to remember that people, in all ages, sometimes achieve what they have set their hearts on, and that if human will and conduct were better disciplined, this contentment would be more frequent and more massive. On the contrary, he asserts that willing is always and everywhere abortive.

浪漫主义诗人通过骄傲、不安和对模糊不可能之物的渴望，得出了与教会通过苛责和希望所达到的相同结论。对于那个浮士德式的时代来说，永远不满足似乎是崇高的标志。不满足确实是健康和充满希望的，当我们困扰的事情能够被纠正时；但浪漫主义心灵鄙视这些偶然的改进，这些改进远非解放狂野的自我中心灵魂，反而会滋养和束缚它。浪漫主义悲观主义者不屑于记住，所有时代的人们有时会实现他们心中所愿，而且如果人类意志和行为得到更好的训练，这种满足会更加频繁和巨大。相反，他断言意愿总是并且处处都是徒劳的。

How can he persuade himself of something so evidently false? By that mystical misinterpretation of human nature which is perhaps the core of romanticism. He imagines that what is desired is not: this or that—food, children, victory, knowledge, or some other specific goal of a human instinct—but an abstract and perpetual happiness behind all these alternating interests. Of course an abstract and perpetual happiness is impossible, not merely because events are sure to disturb any equilibrium we may think we have established in our lives, but for the far more fundamental reason that we have no abstract and perpetual instinct to satisfy. The desire for self-preservation or power or union with God is no more perpetual or comprehensive than any other: it is commonly when we are in straits that we become aware of such objects, and to achieve them, or imagine we achieve them, will give us only a momentary satisfaction, like any other success. A highest good to be obtained apart from each and every specific interest is more than unattainable; it is unthinkable. The romanticist, chasing wilfully that *ignis fatuus*, naturally finds his life arduous and disappointing. But he might have learned from Plato or any sound moralist, if his genius could allow him to learn anything, that the highest good of man is the sum and harmony of those specific goods upon which his nature is directed. But because the romantic will was unteachable, all will was declared to be foolish.

他如何能说服自己相信如此明显虚假的事情?通过那种对人性的神秘曲解，这也许是浪漫主义的核心。他想象所渴望的不是这个或那个--食物、孩子、胜利、知识或人类本能的某个其他具体目标--而是所有这些交替兴趣背后的抽象和永恒的幸福。当然，抽象和永恒的幸福是不可能的，不仅因为事件必然会扰乱我们可能认为已在生活中建立的任何平衡，而且因为更根本的原因：我们没有抽象和永恒的本能需要满足。对自我保存或权力或与上帝结合的渴望并不比任何其他渴望更永恒或更全面：通常当我们陷入困境时，我们才意识到这些对象，而实现它们，或想象我们实现它们，只会给我们带来短暂的满足，像任何其他成功一样。一种脱离每一个具体兴趣而获得的最高善不仅是不可达到的；它是不可想象的。浪漫主义者故意追逐那个*ignis fatuus*，自然发现他的生活艰辛而令人失望。但他本可以从柏拉图或任何健全的道德家那里学到--如果他的天才允许他学习任何东西的话--人的最高善是那些他的本性所指向的具体善的总和与和谐。但因为浪漫主义的意志不可教，所有意志都被宣布为愚蠢的。

Schopenhauer was led into his pessimism also by the spirit of opposition; his righteous wrath was aroused by the sardonic and inhuman optimism of Hegel, the arguments for which were so cogent, so Calvinistic, and so irrelevant that they would have lost none of their force if they had been proposed in hell. The best possible world and the worst possible world are, indeed, identical

叔本华也是被对抗精神引入他的悲观主义的；他的正义之怒被黑格尔那种讥讽而非人的乐观主义所激起，后者的论证如此有说服力、如此加尔文主义、又如此不相干，以至于即使它们被提出在地狱里，也不会失去任何力量。最好的可能世界和最坏的可能世界，确实，是同一的

for that philosophy. Schopenhauer needed to change nothing in the description of life, as the other idealists conceived it, in order to prove that life was a tragedy; for they were as romantic as himself and as far from feeling the intrinsic value of happiness, and the possibility of real progress. Real progress has little to do with perpetual evolution. It occurs only in certain places and times, when nature or art comes to the assistance of some definite interest already embodied, as the interest in security and mutual confidence, knowledge, or the fine arts is already embodied in mankind. Schopenhauer was not insensible to these achievements; he felt by instinct the infinity and luxuriance of the moral world. It was in part this secret sympathy with nature that alienated him from Christianity and from transcendental metaphysics. But because natural goods cannot be desired or possessed for ever, he thought their value was cancelled, even for those who desired and possessed them. The leaven of romanticism was still at work, forbidding him to recognise a natural order, with which a vital harmony might be established. The ground of life, the Will in all things, was something lurid and tempestuous, itself a psychological chaos. The alternative to theism in the mind of Schopenhauer was not naturalism but anarchy.

对于那种哲学。叔本华不需要改变对生活的描述--如其他唯心主义者所设想的那样--来证明生活是一场悲剧；因为他们和他一样浪漫主义，一样远离感受幸福的内在价值和真正进步的可能性。真正的进步与永恒进化几乎没有关系。它只发生在某些地方和时代，当自然或艺术来协助某个已经体现的具体兴趣时，比如对安全和相互信任、知识或美术的兴趣已经在人类中体现。叔本华对这些成就不无感觉；他本能地感受到道德世界的无限和繁茂。部分正是这种对自然的秘密同情使他疏远了基督教和先验形而上学。但因为自然善不能永远被渴望或拥有，他认为它们的价值被取消了，即使对那些渴望和拥有它们的人也是如此。浪漫主义的酵素仍在起作用，禁止他承认一种自然秩序，一种可以建立生命和谐的自然秩序。生活的根基，万物中的意志，是某种阴森而狂暴的东西，本身就是一个心理混沌。在叔本华心中，有神论的替代品不是自然主义而是无政府状态。

This romantic travesty of life and this conception of metaphysical anarchy were inherited by Nietzsche and regarded by him as the last word of philosophy. But he made the breach with Christianity still wider. The grief of Schopenhauer in the presence of such a world, his desperate and exotic remedy—the denial of the will—and his love of contemplation were all evidences of a mind still half Christian: his pessimism itself was so much homage to the faith he had lost. Such backward glances were not for the

这种对生活的浪漫主义歪曲和这种形而上学无政府状态的概念被尼采继承，并被他视为哲学的最终结论。但他与基督教的决裂更加广泛。叔本华面对这样一个世界的悲伤，他绝望而奇异的补救--否定意志--以及他对沉思的热爱，都是一个仍然半基督教的心灵的证据：他的悲观主义本身就是对他所失去的信仰的致敬。这样的回顾不属于

impetuous Nietzsche, who felt he was a prophet of the future, and really was one. Romantic anarchy delighted him; and he crowned it with a rakish optimism, as with the red cap of Liberty. He was in hearty sympathy with absolute Will; he praised it even for being vain and maleficent, if it was only proud enough to praise itself.

急躁的尼采，他觉得自己是未来的先知，而他也确实是。浪漫主义的无政府状态令他欣喜；他以一种放荡不羁的乐观主义为之加冕，如同戴上自由的红帽。他由衷地同情绝对的意志；他甚至赞美它虚荣而恶毒，只要它骄傲得足以赞美自己。

CHAPTER XI

第十一章

NIETZSCHE AND SCHOPENHAUER

尼采与叔本华

It is hardly fair to a writer like Nietzsche, so poetical, fragmentary, and immature, to judge him as a philosopher; yet he wished to be so judged, and planned a system which was to be an emendation of that of Schopenhauer. The will to live would become the will to dominate; pessimism founded on reflection would become optimism founded on courage; the suspense of the will in contemplation would yield to a more biological account of intelligence and taste; finally in the place of pity and asceticism (Schopenhauer's two principles of morals) Nietzsche would set up the duty of asserting the will at all costs and being cruelly but beautifully strong.

像尼采这样一位如此富有诗意、片段式且不成熟的作家，把他当作哲学家来评判，几乎是不公平的；然而他自己希望被如此评判，并规划了一个体系，旨在修正叔本华的体系。求生的意志将变为求支配的意志；建立在反思之上的悲观主义将变为建立在勇气之上的乐观主义；在沉思中意志的悬置将让位于对智力和品味更为生物学的解释；最后，在同情与禁欲(叔本华的两条道德原则)的位置上，尼采将树立起不惜一切代价肯定意志、并残酷而美丽地坚强的责任。

These points of difference from Schopenhauer cover the whole philosophy of Nietzsche. I will consider them in order, leaving the last for the next chapter.

这些与叔本华的分歧之处涵盖了尼采的全部哲学。我将依次讨论它们，把最后一点留到下一章。

The change from "the will to live" to "the will to be powerful" is only a change of metaphors: both are used merely to indicate the

从“求生的意志”到“求权力的意志”的转变只是一种隐喻的变换：两者都仅仅被用来指示

general movement of nature. The choice of a psychological symbol for this purpose is indifferent scientifically, since the facts in any case remain the same and our knowledge of them is not enlarged; yet it is an interesting indication of the mind of the poet using it, because whatever a man knows and loves best, that he takes his metaphors from. Nietzsche had his reasons for liking to call the universal principle a lust for power. He believed he was the herald of two hundred years of war, he was in love with the vague image of a military aristocracy, and he was not without a certain biological acumen.

自然的普遍运动。为此选择一个心理学象征在科学上是无关紧要的，因为事实无论如何保持不变，我们对它们的认识也并未扩大；然而，这是使用它的诗人内心的一种有趣标志，因为一个人最了解和最爱的东西，正是他取用隐喻的来源。尼采有他的理由喜欢把普遍原则称为权力欲。他相信自己是一场两百年战争的先驱，他迷恋于军事贵族的模糊形象，而且他并非没有某种生物学的敏锐。

An acorn in the ground does not strive to persevere in the state it happens to be in, but expands, absorbs surrounding elements, and transforms them into its own substance, which itself changes its form. Here then is a will to grow, not simply a will to live or to preserve oneself; in fact, as Nietzsche eloquently said, here is a will to perish. It is true that when the oak is full grown it seems to pass to the defensive and no longer manifests the will either to perish or to grow. Even while the will to grow is operating, its scope is not indefinite. It would be grotesque to imagine that the acorn, like the ego of German philosophy, tended to annex the whole earth and the whole sky and to make a single oak of the universe. If we take a broad view, perhaps the ancient myth that nature tends to re-embody certain fixed types, though inaccurate, gives a better picture of the facts than the modern myth that she is striving to change in one predetermined direction. Nevertheless, the fact that Nietzsche's attention was fascinated by the will to grow and to dominate shows that he was in sympathy with young things, that his heart was big with the future, and that his age believed in progress.

一颗埋在土里的橡子并不努力保持在它碰巧所处的状态，而是扩展、吸收周围的元素，并将它们转化为自身的实体，而这实体本身又改变其形式。因此，这里是一种生长的意志，而不仅仅是求生或自保的意志；事实上，正如尼采雄辩地所说，这里是一种毁灭的意志。诚然，当橡树完全长成时，它似乎转入防御，不再表现出毁灭或生长的意志。即使在生长的意志运作之时，其范围也并非无限。如果想象橡子像德国哲学的自我那样，倾向于吞并整个大地和整个天空，把宇宙变成一棵单一的橡树，那将是荒诞可笑的。如果我们采取广阔的视角，也许古代神话--自然倾向于重新体现某些固定的类型--虽然不准确，却比现代神话--自然正朝着某个预先确定的方向努力变化--更好地描绘了事实。然而，尼采的注意力被生长和支配的意志所吸引这一事实表明，他同情年轻的事物，他的心中充满了未来，而且他的时代相信进步。

The change from pessimism to optimism, verbally so complete, did not imply any divergence between Nietzsche and Schopenhauer in their description of the facts; it was all a matter of a little more spirit in the younger thinker and a little more conscience in the elder. Romantic poets and their heroes are well known to oscillate between passionate despair and passionate enterprise. Schopenhauer affected passionate despair, Nietzsche recommended passionate enterprise, each being wedded exclusively to one of those moods which Faust or Byron could feel alternately and reduce to act with all the dashing tumult of anarchy. The value which the world has in the eyes of its inhabitants is necessarily mixed, so that a sweeping optimism or pessimism can be only a theoretic pose, false to the natural sentiment even of those who assume it. Both are impressionistic judgments passed on the world at large, not perhaps without some impertinence.

从悲观主义到乐观主义的转变，在字面上如此彻底，却并不意味着尼采与叔本华在对事实的描述上有任何分歧；这完全只是年轻思想家多一点精神、年长者多一点良心的问题。众所周知，浪漫主义诗人及其主人公在热烈的绝望与热烈的进取之间摇摆。叔本华表现出热烈的绝望，尼采推崇热烈的进取，各自只与浮士德或拜伦能够交替感受、并以无政府状态的全部猛烈喧嚣付诸行动的那些情绪之一结为连理。世界在其居民眼中的价值必然是混杂的，因此，一概而论的乐观主义或悲观主义只能是一种理论姿态，甚至对那些采取这种姿态的人来说，也违背了自然情感。两者都是对世界整体作出的印象式判断，也许并非没有几分冒昧。

Yet it is these poses or attitudes, or, if you like, these impertinences, that give importance to transcendental philosophers; it is their representative and contagious side; their views of things would concern us little, if it was the things themselves that we wished to understand, but our whole study is a study in romanticism. The temper of the age ignored that man is a teachable animal living in a natural world. All that was a vulgar convention; in truth a disembodied Will was directed on any and every ideal at random, and when any of these fantastic objects seemed to be attained nothing was really accomplished, nothing was accumulated or learned. The wish for some other will-o'-the-wisp immediately succeeded, always equally passionate and equally foolish.

然而，正是这些姿态或态度，或者，如果你愿意，这些冒昧，赋予了先验哲学家们重要性；这是他们具有代表性和传染性的一面；如果我们要理解的是事物本身，那么他们对事物的看法对我们来说就无关紧要了，但我们的整个研究是一项对浪漫主义的研究。那个时代的气质忽视了人是一种生活在自然世界中的可教化的动物。所有这一切都是庸俗的惯例；事实上，一个脱离肉体的意志被随意地指向任何和每一个理想，而当这些幻想对象中的任何一个似乎被达成时，实际上什么也没有完成，什么也没有积累或学到。对另一个鬼火的渴望立即接踵而至，总是同样热烈，同样愚蠢。

It is amazing that such a picture of human experience should have met with anything but general derision; but when people read books they compare them with other books, and when they turn to things they forget books altogether. Hence the most palpable falsehoods are held by general consent at certain moments, because they follow logically from what the books of the previous generation had maintained. This absurdity of Schopenhauer's is a plausible variation of idealism; to see how absurd it is you must remember the facts of life, the existence of any degree of civilisation or progress. In these the travail of human nature appears; for human nature is not merely a name for a certain set of passions known to literature; in that sense Schopenhauer fully acknowledged it, and even thought it immutable; it is rather the constitution of an animal capable of training and development. What is more patent than that a man may learn something by experience and may be trained? But if he can be trained he is capable of adaptation and, therefore, of happiness, and the preposterous assertion that all desires are equally arbitrary and equally fruitless is blown to the winds.

令人惊讶的是，这样一幅人类经验的图景竟然没有遭到普遍的嘲笑；然而，当人们读书时，他们是将书与其他书相比较，而当他们转向事物时，他们又完全忘记了书。因此，最明显的谬误在某些时刻会被普遍接受，因为它们是从上一代人的著作所主张的东西中逻辑地推出来的。叔本华的这种荒谬之处是唯心主义的一种貌似合理的变体；要看出它有多么荒谬，你必须记住生活中的事实，记住任何程度的文明或进步的存在。在这些事实中，人性的艰辛劳作显现出来；因为人性不仅仅是对文学所熟知的某套激情的命名；在这个意义上，叔本华完全承认它，甚至认为它是不变的；人性毋宁是一种能够训练和发展的动物的构造。还有什么比一个人可以通过经验学到东西并可以被训练更为明显呢?但如果他可以被训练，他就能够适应，因此就能够幸福，而那个所有欲望都同样任意、同样无果的荒谬断言便被风吹散了。

The belief in a romantic chaos lends itself to pessimism, but it also lends itself to absolute self-assertion. Kant had boasted that he had removed knowledge in order to make room for faith; in other words, he had returned to chaos in order to find freedom. The great egotists, who detested the pressure of a world they had not posited or created, followed gladly in that path; but Schopenhauer was not an egotist. Like Goethe he was probably more selfish personally than those other philosophers whom their very egotism had made zealous and single-minded; but in imagination and feeling he was, like Goethe, genial and humane: the freedom and

对浪漫主义的混沌的信仰有助于悲观主义，但它也有助于绝对性的自我主张。康德曾夸口说他移除了知识以便为信仰腾出空间；换言之，他回到了混沌以便找到自由。那些伟大的自我中心主义者，他们憎恶一个并非由他们设定或创造的世界所带来的压力，欣然走上了那条道路；但叔本华不是一个自我中心主义者。像歌德一样，他个人可能比那些被自我中心主义本身变得热忱而专一的哲学家更为自私；但在想象和情感上，他像歌德一样，是和蔼而人道的：自然的自由与

exuberance of nature impressed him more than his own. Had he been an egotist, as Fichte, Hegel, and Nietzsche were, he might have been an optimist like them. He was rather a happy man, hugely enjoying a great many things, among them food and music; and he taught that music was a direct transcript of the tormented will to live. How simple it would have been for him, if he had been an egotist, to enjoy the spectacle of that tormented will as much as the music which was its faithful image! But no; such æsthetic cruelty, which was Nietzsche's delight, would have revolted Schopenhauer. He thought tragedy beautiful because it detached us from a troubled world and did not think a troubled world good, as those unspeakable optimists did, because it made such a fine tragedy. It is pleasant to find that among all these philosophers one at least was a gentleman.

丰盈给他留下的印象比他自己更为深刻。如果他是一个自我中心主义者，像费希特、黑格尔和尼采那样，他可能会像他们一样是一个乐观主义者。他毋宁是一个快乐的人，极大地享受许多事物，其中包括食物和音乐；而他教导说音乐是那受折磨的求生意志的直接转录。如果他是一个自我中心主义者，像享受那作为其忠实映像的音乐一样享受那受折磨的意志的景象，对他来说会是多么简单!但不；这种审美的残酷，即尼采的乐趣所在，会使叔本华反感。他认为悲剧是美的，因为它使我们脱离一个纷扰的世界，并且不认为一个纷扰的世界是好的，不像那些不可言说的乐观主义者那样，因为它造就了一出精美的悲剧。令人愉快的是，在所有这些哲学家中，至少有一位是绅士。

If Will is the sole substance or force in the universe, it must be present in everything that exists, yet Schopenhauer affirmed that it was absent in æsthetic contemplation; and he looked to an ultimate denial of the Will, which if it was to be an act and not merely a void would evidently be impossible on his principles. The Will might well say to those who attempted to deny it: "They reckon ill who leave me out; when me they fly, I am the wings." In perceiving and correcting this contradiction, Nietzsche certainly improved the technique of the system.

如果意志是宇宙中唯一的实体或力量，它必定存在于一切存在之物中，然而叔本华断言它在审美观照中是不在场的；并且他期待一种对意志的最终否定，如果这要成为一个行动而不仅仅是一个虚空，按照他的原则显然是不可能的。意志完全可以对那些试图否定它的人说：“把我排除在外的人算计错了；当他们逃离我时，我就是那翅膀。”在察觉并纠正这一矛盾时，尼采确实改进了这一体系的技巧。

Yet that contradiction was not substantial; it was verbal merely, and due to the fond use of the term Will for what might more properly be called matter, energy, or movement. Will taken in the metaphorical sense can never be in abeyance, so long as anything is going on; but will taken in its proper sense is in abeyance often; and this is what Schopenhauer saw and meant to say. Actual and

然而那个矛盾并非实质性的；它仅仅是言辞上的，源于对“意志”一词的偏爱使用，而更恰当地说，它或许应被称为物质、能量或运动。在隐喻意义上使用的意志，只要有任何事情在进行，就永远不会处于休止状态；但在其本义上使用的意志却常常处于休止状态；这正是叔本华所看到并想表达的。实际的与

conscious will is a passing phenomenon; it is so little necessary to life that it always disappears when life is at its height. All pure pleasures, including those of seeing and thinking, are without it: they are ingenuous, and terminate in their present object. A philosopher should have learned from Aristotle, if not from his own experience, that at the acme of life we live in the eternal, and that then, as Schopenhauer said, we no longer pry but gaze, and are freed from willing.

有意识的意志是一种转瞬即逝的现象；它对生命如此无关紧要，以至于当生命处于巅峰时它总是消失。所有纯粹的快乐，包括观看和思考的快乐，都没有它：它们是天真无邪的，并且终止于当下的对象之中。一位哲学家本应从亚里士多德那里，若非从自己的经验中，学到：在生命的顶点，我们生活在永恒之中，而那时，正如叔本华所说，我们不再窥探而是凝视，并从意志中解脱出来。

This is not to say that Nietzsche was not very happy and witty in his description of the passions that dominate artists and philosophers, and in urging that the life of the spirit was an impassioned thing. To prove it, he might have quoted Schopenhauer himself, in those moving passages where he describes the ecstasy of thought and the spell of beauty. It is not the dead or the bloodless that have such feelings. Of course, if the operations of the brain, and the whole instinctive life of the soul, were interrupted neither these feelings nor any others would arise. This was at bottom Schopenhauer's conviction. His great intuition, the corner-stone of his philosophy, was precisely the priority of automatism and instinct over the intellect. His only error came from having given to these underlying processes the name of Will, when properly the will is one expression of them only, as the intellect is.

这并不是说尼采在描述支配艺术家和哲学家的激情时，以及在主张精神生活是一种充满激情的事物时，不是非常愉快和机智的。为了证明这一点，他本可以引用叔本华本人，在那些动人的段落中，叔本华描述了思想的狂喜和美的魅力。具有这种感受的不是死人也不是无血的人。当然，如果大脑的运作以及灵魂的整个本能生活被中断，这些感受以及任何其他感受都不会产生。这归根结底是叔本华的信念。他那伟大的直觉，他哲学的基石，恰恰是自动机制和本能对智力的优先性。他唯一的错误在于将这些底层过程命名为意志，而实际上意志只是它们的一种表现，正如智力也是。

Nietzsche, who adopted the same metaphor, was led by it into the very confusion which he criticised in Schopenhauer. Nietzsche had no great technical competence: he saw the inconsistency only when he disliked the result; when the result fell in with his first impressions he repeated the inconsistency. He often condemned other moralists for being enemies to life: he reproached the

尼采采用了同样的隐喻，却被它引向了他所批评的叔本华身上的那种混乱。尼采并无高超的专业能力：他只在他不喜欢结果时才看到不一致；当结果与他的第一印象相符时，他便重复了那种不一致。他常常谴责其他道德家是生命的敌人：他责备

greater part of mankind for loving inglorious ease and resenting the sufferings inseparable from the will to be mighty and to perish. But this churlish attitude of the vulgar would be quite impossible if the heroic will to be powerful were the essence of everybody and even of material things. If I am nothing but the will to grow, how can I ever will to shrink?

But this inconsistency in Nietzsche, like that in Schopenhauer, was an honourable one that came of forgetting a false generalisation in the presence of a clear fact. That the will to be powerful is everywhere was a false generalisation; but it was a clear fact that some people are pious Christians or Epicurean philosophers, who do not care at all about conquering the world. They want to be let alone, and perhaps have a shrewd suspicion that no one lives under such dire compulsions as he who undertakes to tyrannise over others. This slave-morality of theirs might be called Will, though it is rather instinct and habit; but it is certainly not a will to be powerful: it is the opposite of that passion. Thus Nietzsche, by an honest self-contradiction, pointed to people who denied the will to be powerful, in order to abuse them, just as Schopenhauer had pointed to people who denied or suspended the will to live, in order to praise them.

大多数人喜爱不光彩的安逸，并对与求强大和求毁灭的意志不可分离的苦难心怀不满。但是，如果求强大的英雄意志是每个人乃至物质的本质，那么庸众的这种乖戾态度就完全不可能了。如果我仅仅是求生长的意志，我怎么可能意愿萎缩呢？

但尼采身上的这种不一致，如同叔本华身上的那种不一致一样，是一种可敬的不一致，它源于在面对一个清晰的事实时忘记了一个虚假的概括。权力意志无处不在是一个虚假的概括；但有些人虔诚的基督徒或伊壁鸠鲁派哲学家，他们根本不关心征服世界，这是一个清晰的事实。他们希望不被打扰，或许还敏锐地怀疑，没有人像那个着手 tyrannise 他人的人那样生活在如此可怕的强制之下。他们的这种奴隶道德或许可以被称为意志，尽管它更像是本能和习惯；但它肯定不是一种追求权力的意志：它是那种激情的反面。因此，尼采通过一种诚实的自我矛盾，指向那些否认权力意志的人，以便辱骂他们，正如叔本华指向那些否认或悬置生存意志的人，以便赞扬他们。

CHAPTER XII

THE ETHICS OF NIETZSCHE

Nietzsche occasionally spoke disparagingly of morality, as if the word and the thing had got a little on his nerves; and some of his

第十二章

尼采的伦理学

尼采偶尔贬低道德，仿佛这个词和这件事都让他有点神经紧张；而他的一些

best-known phrases might give the impression that he wished to drop the distinction between good and evil and transcend ethics altogether. Such a thought would not have been absurd in itself or even unphilosophical. Many serious thinkers, Spinoza for instance, have believed that everything that happens is equally necessary and equally expressive of the will of God, be it favourable or unfavourable to our special interests and, therefore, called by us good or bad. A too reverent immersion in nature and history convinces them that to think any part of reality better or worse than the rest is impertinent or even impious. It is true that in the end these philosophers usually stultify themselves and declare enthusiastically that whatever is is right. This rapturous feeling can overcome anybody in certain moods, as it sometimes overcame Nietzsche; but in yielding to it, besides contradicting all other moral judgments, these mystics break their difficult resolution never to judge at all.

最著名的短语可能会给人这样的印象：他希望放弃善恶之间的区分并超越伦理学。这样的想法本身并不荒谬，甚至并非不合哲学。许多严肃的思想家，例如斯宾诺莎，相信发生的一切都同样必然，同样表达上帝的意志，无论它对我们的特殊利益有利还是不利，因此被我们称为好或坏。对自然和历史过于虔诚的沉浸使他们确信，认为现实的任何部分比其余部分更好或更坏是傲慢的，甚至是不敬神的。诚然，这些哲学家最终通常会自相矛盾，并热情地宣称凡是存在的就是正确的。这种狂喜的感觉在某些情绪下可以征服任何人，正如它有时征服尼采一样；但在屈服于它时，除了与所有其他道德判断相矛盾外，这些神秘主义者还违背了他们那艰难的决心：根本不作任何判断。

Nietzsche, however, was entirely free from this divine impediment in morals. The courage to cling to what his soul loved—and this courage is the essence of morality—was conspicuous in him. He was a poet, a critic, a lover of form and of distinctions. Few persons have ever given such fierce importance to their personal taste. What he disliked to think of, say democracy, he condemned with the fulminations of a god; what he liked to think of, power, he seriously commanded man and nature to pursue for their single object.

然而，尼采完全摆脱了道德中这种神圣的障碍。坚持他灵魂所爱之物的勇气--而这种勇气是道德的本质--在他身上表现得尤为突出。他是一位诗人、批评家、形式和区分的爱好者。很少有人如此猛烈地重视自己的个人品味。他不喜欢想到的东西，比如民主，他以神的雷霆之怒加以谴责；他喜欢想到的东西，权力，他严肃地命令人和自然以它为唯一目标去追求。

What Nietzsche disparaged, then, under the name of morality was not all morality, for he had an enthusiastic master-morality of his

那么，尼采以道德之名所贬低的并非全部道德，因为他有一种热情洋溢的主人道德，属于他自己的

own to impose. He was thinking only of the Christian virtues and especially of a certain Protestant and Kantian moralism with which perhaps he had been surfeited. This moralism conceived that duty was something absolute and not a method of securing whatever goods of all sorts are attainable by action. The latter is the common and the sound opinion, maintained, for instance, by Aristotle; but Nietzsche, who was not humble enough to learn very much by study, thought he was propounding a revolutionary doctrine when he put goods and evils beyond and above right and wrong: for this is all that his *Jenseits von Gut und Böse* amounts to. Whatever seemed to him admirable, beautiful, eligible, whatever was good in the sense opposed not to *böse* but to *schlecht*, Nietzsche loved with jealous affection. Hence his ire against Christianity, which he thought renounced too much. Hence his hatred of moralism, which in raising duty to the irresponsible throne of the absolute had superstitiously sacrificed half the goods of life. Nietzsche, then, far from transcending ethics, re-established it on its true foundations, which is not to say that the sketchy edifice which he planned to raise on these foundations was in a beautiful style of architecture or could stand at all.

归于自己来强加。他当时想到的只是基督教美德，尤其是一种新教与康德式的道德主义，也许他早已对此饱腻。这种道德主义设想义务是某种绝对的东西，而不是一种确保行动所能获得的各种各样善物的方法。后者是常见的、健全的意见，例如亚里士多德就持此说；但尼采并不谦逊到通过研习而多所学，他以为自己提出了一种革命性的学说，把善与恶置于对与错之上和之外：因为他的《善恶的彼岸》所达到的不过如此。凡在他看来可钦佩、美、可取的东西，凡在并非与böse(恶)相对而是与schlecht(坏)相对的意义上为善的东西，尼采都以嫉妒的钟爱加以爱慕。因此他对基督教怀有怒火，他认为基督教弃绝得太多。因此他憎恨道德主义，因为道德主义把义务抬上绝对的不负责任的宝座，迷信地牺牲了生命的一半善物。于是尼采远非超越了伦理学，而是把它重新建立在它真正的基础上，但这并不是说，他计划在这些基础上建造的那座粗略的建筑物具有优美的建筑风格，或者竟然能够立得住。

The first principle of his ethics was that the good is power. But this word power seems to have had a great range of meanings in his mind. Sometimes it suggests animal strength and size, as in the big blonde beast; sometimes vitality, sometimes fortitude, sometimes contempt for the will of others, sometimes (and this is perhaps the meaning he chiefly intended) dominion over natural forces and over the people, that is to say, wealth and military power. It is characteristic of this whole school that it confuses the laws which are supposed to preside over the movement of things

他的伦理学的第一原则是善即权力。但“权力”这个词在他心中似乎有着广泛的含义。有时它暗示动物性的力量和体型，如在大金发野兽中；有时是生命力，有时是坚毅，有时是对他人意志的蔑视，有时(这也许是他主要意图的含义)是对自然力量和人民的统治，也就是说，财富和军事力量。混淆被认为支配事物运动的规律，是整个学派的特征

with the good results which they may involve; so Nietzsche confuses his biological insight, that all life is the assertion of some sort of power—the power to breathe, for instance—with the admiration he felt for a masterful egotism. But even if we identify life or any kind of existence with the exertion of strength, the kinds of strength exerted will be heterogeneous and not always compatible. The strength of Lucifer does not insure victory in war; it points rather to failure in a world peopled by millions of timid, pious, and democratic persons. Hence we find Nietzsche asking himself plaintively, "Why are the feeble victorious?" The fact rankled in his bosom that in the ancient world martial aristocracies had succumbed before Christianity, and in the modern world before democracy. By strength, then, he could not mean the power to survive, by being as flexible as circumstances may require. He did not refer to the strength of majorities, nor to the strength of vermin. At the same time he did not refer to moral strength, for of moral strength he had no idea.

连同它们可能带来的良好结果；因此尼采把他那生物学上的洞见--一切生命都是对某种力量的肯定，例如呼吸的力量--与他所感受到的对一种专横的自我中心主义的钦佩混为一谈。但即使我们把生命或任何一种存在等同于力量的施展，所施展的力量的种类也将是异质的，并不总是相容的。路西法的力量并不保证战争的胜利；它毋宁指向在一个由千百万胆怯、虔诚和民主的人所居住的世界中的失败。因此我们发现尼采哀怨地问自己：“为什么弱者获胜?”古代世界中尚武的贵族阶层在基督教面前屈服，现代世界中又在民主面前屈服，这一事实在他心中耿耿于怀。那么，他所说的力量不可能指生存的能力，即随环境要求而灵活应变的能力。他既不是指多数的力量，也不是指害虫的力量。同时他也不是指道德的力量，因为他对道德的力量毫无概念。

The arts give power, but only in channels prescribed by their own principles, not by the will of untrained men. To be trained is to be tamed and harnessed, an accession of power detestable to Nietzsche. His Zarathustra had the power of dancing, also of charming serpents and eagles: no wonder that he missed the power, bestowed by goodness, of charming and guiding men; and a Terpsichorean autocrat would be hard to imagine. A man intent on algebra or on painting is not striving to rule anybody; his dominion over painting or algebra is chiefly a matter of concentration and self-forgetfulness. So dominion over the passions changes them from attempts to appropriate anything into sentiments of the mind, colouring a world which is no longer

艺术给予力量，但只在其自身原则所规定的渠道中，而非按照未经训练者的意志。被训练就是被驯服和被套上挽具，这是一种尼采所厌恶的力量的获得。他的查拉图斯特拉有舞蹈的力量，也有迷惑蛇与鹰的力量：难怪他错失了善所赋予的、迷惑和引导人的力量；而一个舞蹈式的专制君主是难以想象的。一个专注于代数或绘画的人并不是在力图统治任何人；他对绘画或代数的支配主要关乎专注与自我遗忘。因此对激情的支配将它们从企图占有任何东西的尝试转变为心灵的感受，为一个不再是

coveted. To attain such autumnal wisdom is, if you like, itself a power of feeling and a kind of strength; but it is not helpful in conquering the earth.

所觊觎的。达到这种秋日般的智慧，如果你愿意，本身就是一种感受的力量和一种强健；但它无助于征服大地。

Nietzsche was personally more philosophical than his philosophy. His talk about power, harshness, and superb immorality was the hobby of a harmless young scholar and constitutional invalid. He did not crave in the least either wealth or empire. What he loved was solitude, nature, music, books. But his imagination, like his judgment, was captious; it could not dwell on reality, but reacted furiously against it. Accordingly, when he speaks of the will to be powerful, power is merely an eloquent word on his lips. It symbolises the escape from mediocrity. What power would be when attained and exercised remains entirely beyond his horizon. What meets us everywhere is the sense of impotence and a passionate rebellion against it.

尼采本人在人格上比他的哲学更具哲学性。他关于力量、严酷和卓越的不道德的谈论，是一个无害的年轻学者和体质上的病人的业余爱好。他丝毫不渴求财富或帝国。他所爱的是孤独、自然、音乐、书籍。但他的想象力，如同他的判断力一样，是挑剔的；它不能停留于现实，而是对现实作出狂怒的反应。因此，当他谈到追求力量的意志时，力量在他口中不过是一个雄辩的词。它象征着对平庸的逃避。力量在被获得和施展时究竟会是什么，则完全在他的视野之外。到处与我们相遇的，是无能感以及对它的激情反抗。

The phrases in which Nietzsche condensed and felt his thought were brilliant, but they were seldom just. We may perhaps see the principle of his ethics better if we forget for a moment the will to be powerful and consider this: that he knew no sort of good except the beautiful, and no sort of beauty except romantic stress. He was a belated prophet of romanticism. He wrote its epitaph, in which he praised it more extravagantly than anybody, when it was alive, had had the courage to do.

尼采用以浓缩和感受其思想的那些短语是精彩的，但很少是公正的。如果我们暂时忘记求强大的意志，转而考虑这一点，或许能更好地看出他伦理学的原则：除了美，他不知道任何善；除了浪漫主义的张力，他不知道任何美。他是一个迟到的浪漫主义先知。他写下了它的墓志铭，在其中他比任何人在它活着时敢于做的那样更加夸张地赞美它。

Consider, for example, what he said about truth. Since men were governed solely by the will to be powerful, the truth for its own sake must be moonshine to them. They would wish to cultivate such ideas, whether true or false, as might be useful to their ambition. Nietzsche (more candid in this than some other

例如，考虑他关于真理所说的话。既然人完全受求强大的意志支配，那么为真理而真理对他们来说必定是虚幻的。他们会希望培养这样的观念，无论真假，只要可能对他们的野心有用。尼采(在这一点上比某些其他

pragmatists) confessed that truth itself did not interest him; it was ugly; the bracing atmosphere of falsehood, passion, and subjective perspectives was the better thing. Sometimes, indeed, a more wistful mood overtook him, and he wondered whether the human mind would be able to endure the light of truth. That was the great question of the future. We may agree that a mind without poetry, fiction, and subjective colouring would not be human, nor a mind at all; and that neither truth nor the knowledge of truth would have any intrinsic value if nobody cared about it for its own sake. But some men do care; and in ignoring this fact Nietzsche expresses the false and pitiful notion that we can be interested in nothing except in ourselves and our own future. I am solitary, says the romantic egotist, and sufficient unto myself. The world is my idea, new every day: what can I have to do with truth?

实用主义者)承认真理本身并不使他感兴趣；它是丑的；虚假、激情和主观视角的令人振奋的氛围才是更好的东西。诚然，有时一种更为怅惘的情绪攫住了他，他思忖人类心灵是否能够承受真理之光。那是未来的重大问题。我们不妨同意，一个没有诗意、虚构和主观色彩的心灵将不是人的心灵，也根本不是心灵；而且，如果没有人为了真理本身而关心它，那么无论真理还是对真理的认识都不会有任何内在价值。但有些人确实关心；而在忽视这一事实时，尼采表达了这样一种虚假而可怜的观念：我们除了对自己和自己的未来感兴趣之外，不可能对任何事物感兴趣。我是孤独的，浪漫主义的自我中心主义者说，而且自足。世界是我的观念，每天都是新的：我与真理能有什么相干?

This impulse to turn one's back on truth, whether in contempt or in despair, has a long history. Lessing had said that he preferred the pursuit of truth to the truth itself; but if we take this seriously (as possibly it was not meant) the pursuit of truth at once changes its character. It can no longer be the pursuit of truth, truth not being wanted, but only the pursuit of some fresh idea. Whether one of these ideas or another comes nearer to the truth would be unimportant and undiscoverable. Any idea will do, so long as it is pregnant with another that may presently take its place; and as presumably error will precipitate new ideas more readily than truth, we might almost find it implied in Lessing's maxim that, as Nietzsche maintained, what is really good is neither truth nor the pursuit of truth (for you might find it, and what would you do then?), but rather a perpetual flux of errors.

这种背弃真理的冲动，无论是出于轻蔑还是出于绝望，都有着悠久的历史。莱辛曾说过，他宁愿追求真理而不愿拥有真理本身；但如果我们认真对待这一点(也许它本就不是认真的)，那么对真理的追求立刻就改变了它的性质。它不再可能是对真理的追求，因为真理并不被需要，而只是对某种新鲜观念的追求。这些观念中的某一个或另一个是否更接近真理，将无关紧要且无法发现。任何观念都行，只要它孕育着另一个可能不久取而代之的观念；而既然错误想必比真理更容易催生新观念，我们几乎可以在莱辛的格言中发现这样的含义：正如尼采所主张的，真正好的既不是真理也不是对真理的追求(因为你可能找到它，而那时你又怎么办呢?)，而毋宁是错误的永恒流变。

This view is also implied in the very prevalent habit of regarding opinions as justified not by their object but by their date. The intellectual ignominy of believing what we believe simply because of the time and place of our birth, escapes many evolutionists. Far from trying to overcome this natural prejudice of position, they raise it into a point of pride. They declare all opinions ever held in the past to be superseded, and are apparently content that their own should be superseded to-morrow, but meantime they cover you with obloquy if you are so backward or so forward as not to agree with them to-day. They accept as inevitable the total dominion of the point of view. Each new date, even in the life of an individual thinker, is expected by them to mark a new phase of doctrine. Indeed, truth is an object which transcendental philosophy cannot envisage: the absolute ego must be satisfied with consistency. How should the truth, actual, natural, or divine, be an expression of the living will that attempts, or in their case despairs, to discover it? Yet that everything, even the truth, is an expression of the living will, is the corner-stone of this philosophy.

这种观点也隐含在一个非常普遍的習慣中，即认为意见的正当性不在于其对象，而在于其年代。仅仅因为我们出生时间和地点而相信我们所相信的东西，这种智识上的耻辱，许多进化论者并未察觉。他们远未试图克服这种基于位置的自然偏见，反而将其提升为一种骄傲的资本。他们宣称过去所持有的一切意见都已被取代，并且显然满足于他们自己的意见明天也被取代，但与此同时，如果你因为太落后或太超前而不同意他们今天的意见，他们就会对你大肆诋毁。他们接受观点之完全统治为不可避免。每一个新的日期，甚至在个体思想家的生命中，都被他们期望标志着学说的新阶段。事实上，真理是先验哲学无法设想的对象：绝对自我必须满足于一致性。真理，无论是实际的、自然的还是神圣的，如何能成为试图发现它的活生生意志的表达--在他们的情况下则是绝望地试图发现它的意志的表达呢?然而，一切事物，甚至真理，都是活生生意志的表达，这是这一哲学的基石。

Consider further the spirit in which Nietzsche condemned Christianity and the Christian virtues. Many people have denounced Christianity on the ground that it was false or tyrannical, while perhaps admitting that it was comforting or had a good moral influence. Nietzsche denounced it—and in unmeasured terms—on the ground that (while, of course, as true as any other vital lie) it was mean, depressing, slavish, and plebeian. How beastly was the precept of love! Actually to love all these grotesque bipeds was degrading. A lover of the beautiful must wish almost all his neighbours out of the way. Compassion, too, was a lamentable way of assimilating oneself to evil. That

进一步思考尼采谴责基督教和基督教美德的精神。许多人谴责基督教，理由是它虚假或暴虐，同时或许承认它令人慰藉或具有良好道德影响。尼采谴责它--并且是用毫不节制的措辞--理由是(当然，它和任何其他至关重要的谎言一样真实)它卑劣、令人沮丧、奴性且庸俗。爱的训诫是多么可恶!实际上爱所有这些怪诞的两足动物是有辱人格的。美的爱好者必定希望几乎所有的邻人都让开。同情也是一种可悲的将自己与恶同化的方式。那

contagious misery spoiled one's joy, freedom, and courage. Disease should not be nursed but cauterised; the world must be made clean.

传染性的苦难破坏了人的快乐、自由和勇气。疾病不应被照料，而应被烧灼；世界必须被弄干净。

Now there is a sort of love of mankind, a jealous love of what man might be, in this much decried maxim of unmercifulness. Nietzsche rebelled at the thought of endless wretchedness, pervasive mediocrity, crying children, domestic drudges, and pompous fools for ever. *Die Erde war zu lange schon ein Irrenhaus!* His heart was tender enough, but his imagination was impatient. When he praised cruelty, it was on the ground that art was cruel, that it made beauty out of suffering. Suffering, therefore, was good, and so was crime, which made life keener. Only crime, he said, raises a man high enough for the lightning to strike him. In the hope of sparing some obscure person a few groans or tears, would you deprive the romantic hero of so sublime a death?

现在，在这条备受诟病的无情准则中，存在着一种对人类之爱，一种对人之可能所是的嫉妒之爱。尼采反叛于无尽悲惨、普遍平庸、哭闹孩童、家庭苦役和永远自命不凡的傻瓜的念头。大地早已太久是一座疯人院了!他的心足够温柔，但他的想象力不耐烦。当他赞美残酷时，理由是艺术是残酷的，它从苦难中制造美。因此，苦难是好的，罪行也是好的，它使生命更敏锐。他说，只有罪行才能把人提升到足够高，让闪电击中他。为了希望让某个无名之人少几声呻吟或几滴眼泪，你就要剥夺浪漫主义英雄如此崇高的死亡吗?

Christians, too, might say they had their heroes, their saints; but what sort of eminence was that? It was produced by stifling half the passions. A sister of charity could not be an Arminius; devotion to such remedial offices spoilt the glory of life. Holiness was immoral; it was a half-suicide. *All* experience, the ideal of Faust, was what a spirited man must desire. All experience would involve, I suppose, passing through all the sensations of a murderer, a maniac, and a toad; even through those of a saint or a sister of charity. But the romantic mind despises results; it is satisfied with poses.

基督徒也可以说他们有他们的英雄、他们的圣徒；但那是什么样的卓越呢?它是通过窒息一半激情而产生的。一位慈善修女不可能成为阿米尼乌斯；献身于这种补救性职务破坏了生命的荣耀。圣洁是不道德的；它是一种半自杀。一切经验，浮士德的理想，才是一个有精神的人必定渴望的。一切经验，我想，将涉及经历杀人犯、疯子和蟾蜍的所有感觉；甚至经历圣徒或慈善修女的感觉。但浪漫主义心灵鄙视结果；它满足于姿态。

Consider, too, the romantic demand for a violent chiaroscuro, a demand which blossoms into a whole system of ethics. Good and evil, we are told, enhance one another, like light and shade in a

也考虑一下浪漫主义对强烈明暗对比的要求，这一要求绽放为一整套伦理学体系。我们被告知，善与恶相互增强，如同

picture; without evil there can be no good, so to diminish the one is to undermine the other, and the greatest and most heroic man is he who not only does most good but also most harm. In his love of mischief, in his tenderness for the adventurer who boldly inflicts injury and suffering on others and on himself, in order to cut a more thrilling and stupendous figure in his own eyes, Nietzsche gave this pernicious doctrine its frankest expression; but unfortunately it was not wholly his own. In its essence it belongs to Hegel, and under various sophistical disguises it has been adopted by all his academic followers in England and America. The arguments used to defend it are old sophisms borrowed from the Stoics, who had turned the physical doctrine of Heraclitus, that everything is a mixture of contraries, into an argument for resignation to inevitable evils and detachment from tainted goods. The Stoics, who were neither romantic nor worldly, used these sophisms in an attempt to extirpate the passions, not to justify them. They were sufficiently refuted by the excellent Plutarch where he observes that according to this logic it was requisite and necessary that Thersites should be bald in order that Achilles might have leonine hair. The absurdity is, indeed, ludicrous, if we are thinking of real things and of the goods and evils of experience; but egotists never think of that; what they always think of is the picture of those realities in their imagination. For the observer, effects of contrast do alter the values of the elements considered; and, indeed, the elements themselves, if one is very unsympathetic, may not have at all in contemplation the quality they have in experience: whence æsthetic cruelty. The respect which Hegel and Nietzsche have for those sophisms becomes intelligible when we remember what imperturbable egotists they

图景；没有恶就不可能有善，因此减少其一就是削弱其二，而最伟大最英雄的人不仅是行善最多的人，也是为害最多的人。尼采对恶作剧的热爱，对大胆给他人和自己造成伤害和苦难的冒险者的温情--为了在自己眼中呈现出更惊心动魄、更惊人的形象--使这一有害学说得到了最坦率的表达；但不幸的是，它并不完全是他自己的。本质上它属于黑格尔，并且在各种诡辩伪装下被他在英国和美国的所有学院追随者所采纳。用来捍卫它的论据是从斯多葛派借来的古老诡辩，斯多葛派把赫拉克利特的物理学说--一切事物都是对立面的混合--变成了顺从不可避免的恶和超脱于受污染之善的论据。斯多葛派既非浪漫主义也非世俗，他们使用这些诡辩试图根除激情，而非为之辩护。普鲁塔克在观察到按照这种逻辑，忒耳西忒斯必须秃头以便阿喀琉斯有狮子般的头发时，已经充分驳斥了他们。如果我们思考的是真实事物以及经验中的善与恶，这种荒谬确实可笑；但自我中心主义者从不考虑那个；他们总是考虑的是那些实在在他们想象中的图景。对于观察者来说，对比的效果确实会改变所考虑元素的价值；而且，事实上，如果一个人非常缺乏同情心，元素本身在观照中可能根本不具有它们在经验中的性质：由此产生审美的残酷。当我们记得黑格尔和尼采是多么不动声色的自我中心主义者时，他们对那些诡辩的尊重就变得可以理解了

were.

This egotism in morals is partly mystical. There is a luxurious joy in healing the smart of evil in one's mind, without needing to remove or diminish the evil in the world. The smart may be healed by nursing the conviction that evil after all is good, no matter how much of it there is or how much of it we do. In part, however, this egotism is romantic; it does not ask to be persuaded that evil, in the end, is good. It feels that evil is good in the present; it is so intense a thing to feel and so exciting a thing to do. Here we have what Nietzsche wished to bring about, a reversal of all values. To do evil is the true virtue, and to be good is the most hopeless vice. Milk is for babes; your strong man should be soaked in blood and in alcohol. We should live perilously; and as material life is the power to digest poisons, so true excellence is the power to commit all manner of crimes, and to survive.

That there is no God is proved by Nietzsche pragmatically, on the ground that belief in the existence of God would have made him uncomfortable. Not at all for the reason that might first occur to us: to imagine himself a lost soul has always been a point of pride with the romantic genius. The reason was that if there had been any gods he would have found it intolerable not to be a god himself. Poor Nietzsche! The laurels of the Almighty would not let him sleep.

It is hard to know if we should be more deceived in taking these sallies seriously or in not taking them so. On the one hand it all seems the swagger of an immature, half-playful mind, like a child that tells you he will cut your head off. The dreamy impulse, in its

是。

这种道德上的自我中心主义部分是神秘主义的。在心灵中治愈邪恶的创伤，而无需消除或减少世上的邪恶，这其中有一种奢华的快乐。这种创伤可以通过培育这样一种信念来治愈：邪恶终究是善的，无论它有多少，无论我们做了多少。然而，这种自我中心主义部分是浪漫主义的；它并不要求被说服相信邪恶最终是善的。它觉得邪恶在当下就是善的；感受它是一件如此强烈的事情，做它是一件如此令人兴奋的事情。在此我们看到了尼采所希望带来的东西，一切价值的颠倒。作恶是真正的美德，为善是最无可救药的恶习。牛奶是给婴儿的；你的强者应当浸透鲜血和酒精。我们应当危险地生活；正如物质生命是消化毒物的能力，真正的卓越也是如此，即犯下各种罪行并存活下来的能力。

没有上帝，这一点尼采是以实用主义方式证明的，理由是相信上帝的存在会使他不舒服。完全不是出于我们首先可能想到的理由：把自己想象成一个失落的灵魂，对浪漫主义天才来说一直是一种骄傲。理由是，如果有任何神存在，他会觉得不能容忍自己不是神。可怜的尼采!全能者的桂冠不让他入睡。

很难知道我们是在认真对待这些俏皮话时更受骗，还是在不认真对待它们时更受骗。一方面，这一切似乎是一个不成熟的、半开玩笑的头脑的虚张声势，就像一个孩子告诉你他要砍掉你的头。那种梦幻般的冲动，在其

inception, is sincere enough, but there is no vestige of any understanding of what it proposes, of its conditions, or of its results. On the other hand these explosions are symptomatic; there stirs behind them unmistakably an elemental force. That an attitude is foolish, incoherent, disastrous, proves nothing against the depth of the instinct that inspires it. Who could be more intensely unintelligent than Luther or Rousseau? Yet the world followed them, not to turn back. The molecular forces of society, so to speak, had already undermined the systems which these men denounced. If the systems have survived it is only because the reformers, in their intellectual helplessness, could supply nothing to take their place. So Nietzsche, in his genial imbecility, betrays the shifting of great subterranean forces. What he said may be nothing, but the fact that he said it is all-important. Out of such wild intuitions, because the heart of the child was in them, the man of the future may have to build his philosophy. We should forgive Nietzsche his boyish blasphemies. He hated with clearness, if he did not know what to love.

开端，是足够真诚的，但对于它所提出的东西、它的条件或它的结果，却没有一丝一毫理解的痕迹。另一方面，这些爆发是症候性的；在它们背后，不可错认地涌动着一种原始的力量。一种态度愚蠢、不连贯、灾难性，并不能证明激发它的本能缺乏深度。谁还能比路德或卢梭更加强烈地不智呢?然而世界追随了他们，并非为了回头。可以说，社会的分子力量早已侵蚀了这些人所谴责的体系。如果这些体系幸存下来，那只是因为改革者在智识上的无能，无法提供任何东西来取代它们的位置。因此，尼采以其天真的愚钝，泄露了巨大地下力量的转移。他所说的也许无关紧要，但他说出它这一事实却至关重要。从这样狂野的直觉中，因为孩童的心灵在其中，未来的人也许不得不建立他的哲学。我们应当原谅尼采孩子气的亵渎。他恨得清晰，即使他不知道该爱什么。

CHAPTER XIII

THE SUPERMAN

In his views on matters of fact Nietzsche, as becomes the naïve egotist, was quite irresponsible. If he said the course of history repeated itself in cycles, it was because the idea pleased him; it seemed a symbol of self-approval on the world's part. If he hailed the advent of a race of men superior to ourselves and of stronger

第十三章

超人

尼采在事实问题上的观点，正如一个天真的自我中心主义者所应有的那样，是极不负责任的。如果他说历史进程以循环的方式重复自身，那是因为这个想法令他满意；它似乎是世界方面自我认可的一种象征。如果他欢呼一个比我们更优越、纤维更强健的人种的出现，那是因为人类生活本来的样子，尤其是他自己的生活，令他厌恶。他敏感，因此苛责。他环顾四周，凝视自己，回想起他曾一度崇拜的伟大人物瓦格纳令人失望的脆弱与浮夸。他的乐观主义暂时让位于他的真诚。他宁愿废除这样一个世界也不愿宽恕它，于是他逃到海边某个孤寂的山坡上，对自己说人是一种有待被超越的造物。

fibre, it was because human life as it is, and especially his own life, repelled him. He was sensitive and, therefore, censorious. He gazed about him, he gazed at himself, he remembered the disappointing frailties and pomposity of the great man, Wagner, whom he had once idolised. His optimism for the moment yielded to his sincerity. He would sooner abolish than condone such a world, and he fled to some solitary hillside by the sea, saying to himself that man was a creature to be superseded.

尼采的超人之所以更加虚幻，是因为他不仅必须与当下的普通人相矛盾，还必须与过去的优越者、半超人的存在相矛盾。超越人性并非什么新的抱负；这始终是印度和基督教宗教戒律以及斯多葛哲学的努力。但这种精神上的优越，如同艺术家和诗人的优越一样，来自抽象；一种对生命的优越，在

Dissatisfaction with the actual is what usually leads people to frame ideals at all, or at least to hold them fast; but such a negative motive leaves the ideal vague and without consistency. If we could suddenly have our will, we should very likely find the result trivial or horrible. So the superman of Nietzsche might prove, if by magic he could be realised. To frame solid ideals, which would, in fact, be better than actual things, is not granted to the merely irritable poet; it is granted only to the master-workman, to the modeller of some given substance to some given use—things which define his aspiration, and separate what is relevant and glorious in his dreams from that large part of them which is merely ignorant and peevish. It was not for Nietzsche to be an artist in morals and to institute anything coherent, even in idea.

对现实的不满通常是人们构建理想的起因，或者至少是坚守理想的起因；但这种否定的动机使理想变得模糊而缺乏一致性。如果我们能突然实现自己的意愿，我们很可能会发现结果是琐碎或可怕的。因此，尼采的超人如果被魔法实现，可能会证明如此。构建坚实的理想--这些理想事实上比现实事物更好--并不是仅仅易怒的诗人所能做到的；它只被授予大师级的工匠，授予将某种给定材料塑造为某种给定用途的人--这些事物界定他的抱负，并将他梦中相关而光荣的部分与其中仅仅无知和暴躁的大部分区分开来。尼采不适合做一个道德上的艺术家，也不适合在理念中建立任何连贯的东西。

The superman of Nietzsche is rendered the more chimerical by the fact that he must contradict not only the common man of the present but also the superior men, the half-superhuman men, of the past. To transcend humanity is no new ambition; that has always been the effort of Indian and Christian religious discipline and of Stoic philosophy. But this spiritual superiority, like that of artists and poets, has come of abstraction; a superiority to life, in

尼采的超人之所以更加虚幻，是因为他不仅必须与当下的普通人相矛盾，还必须与过去的优越者、半超人的存在相矛盾。超越人性并非什么新的抱负；这始终是印度和基督教宗教戒律以及斯多葛哲学的努力。但这种精神上的优越，如同艺术家和诗人的优越一样，来自抽象；一种对生命的优越，在

that these minds were engrossed in the picture or lesson of life rather than in living; and if they powerfully affected the world, as they sometimes did, it was by bringing down into it something supermundane, the arresting touch of an ulterior wisdom. Nietzsche, on the contrary, even more than most modern philosophers, loved mere life with the pathetic intensity of the wounded beast; his superman must not rise above our common condition by his purely spiritual resources, or by laying up his treasure in any sort of heaven. He must be not a superior man but a kind of physiological superman, a griffin in soul, if not in body, who instead of labouring hands and religious faith should have eagle's wings and the claws of a lion. His powers should be superior to ours by resembling those of fiercer and wilder animals. The things that make a man tame—Nietzsche was a retired professor living in a boarding-house—must be changed into their opposites. But man has been tamed by agriculture, material arts, children, experience; therefore these things are to be far from the superman. If he must resemble somebody, it will be rather the *condottieri* of the renaissance or the princes and courtiers of the seventeenth century; Cæsar Borgia is the supreme instance. He must have a splendid presence and address, gallantry, contempt for convention, loyalty to no country, no woman, and no idea, but always a buoyant and lordly assertion of instinct and of self. In the helter-skelter of his irritable genius, Nietzsche jumbled together the ferocity of solitary beasts, the indifference and *hauteur* of patricians, and the antics of revellers, and out of that mixture he hoped to evoke the rulers of the coming age.

这些心灵专注于生活的图景或教训，而非生活本身；如果他们有力地影响了世界，正如他们有时所做的那样，那是通过将某种超世俗的东西带入世界，一种终极智慧的引人注目的触碰。相反，尼采甚至比大多数现代哲学家更甚，以受伤野兽那种可怜的强度热爱纯粹的生命；他的超人绝不能凭借纯粹的精神资源，或通过将宝藏存放在任何形式的天堂中，而超越我们共同的条件。他必须不是一个优越的人，而是一种生理上的超人，一个灵魂上的狮鹫，如果不是身体上的，他代替劳作的手和宗教信仰，应该拥有鹰的翅膀和狮子的爪子。他的力量应该通过类似于更凶猛和更野性的动物而优于我们的力量。使人类变得温顺的东西--尼采是一个住在寄宿公寓里的退休教授--必须被改变为它们的对立面。但人类已被农业、物质技艺、孩子、经验所驯服；因此这些东西要远离超人。如果他必须像某个人，那将是文艺复兴时期的*condottieri*或十七世纪的君主和朝臣；切萨雷·博尔贾是最高典范。他必须拥有辉煌的仪表和谈吐、英勇、对习俗的蔑视、不忠于任何国家、任何女人和任何理念，但始终是本能和自我的一种昂扬而高贵的断言。在他易怒天才的忙乱中，尼采将独居野兽的凶猛、贵族的冷漠和*hauteur*以及狂欢者的滑稽混在一起，从这种混合物中他希望能唤起未来时代的统治者。

How could so fantastic an ideal impose on a keen satirist like

像这样荒诞的理想，怎能骗过像

Nietzsche and a sincere lover of excellence? Because true human excellence seemed to him hostile to life, and he felt—this was his strong and sane side, his lien on the future—that life must be accepted as it is or may become, and false beliefs, hollow demands, and hypocritical, forced virtues must be abandoned. This new wisdom was that which Goethe, too, had felt and practised; and of all masters of life Goethe was the one whom Nietzsche could best understand. But a master of life, without being in the least hostile to life, since he fulfils it, nevertheless uses life for ends which transcend it. Even Goethe, omnivorous and bland as he was, transcended life in depicting and judging and blessing it. The saints and the true philosophers have naturally emphasised more this renunciation of egotism: they have seen all things in the light of eternity—that is, as they are in truth—and have consequently felt a reasonable contempt for mere living and mere dying; and in that precisely lies moral greatness. Here Nietzsche could not follow; rationality chilled him; he craved vehemence.

尼采和一个真诚的卓越爱好者?因为真正的人类卓越在他看来似乎敌视生命，而他感到--这是他有力和健全的一面，是他对未来的依托--生命必须被接受为它现在的样子或可能变成的样子，虚假的信念、空洞的要求和虚伪的、强制的美德必须被抛弃。这种新的智慧也是歌德所感受到并实践的；在所有生活的大师中，歌德是尼采最能理解的一位。但生活的大师，丝毫不敌视生命，因为他实现了生命，然而却将生命用于超越它的目的。甚至歌德，尽管他无所不包而温和，也在描绘、判断和祝福生命中超越了生命。圣徒和真正的哲学家自然更强调这种对自我中心主义的弃绝：他们以永恒之光看待一切事物--即，如它们真实的样子--因此对纯粹的生和纯粹的死感到一种合理的蔑视；而道德伟大恰恰在于此。在此尼采无法跟随；理性使他感到寒冷；他渴望激烈。

How life can be fulfilled and made beautiful by reason was never better shown than by the Greeks, both by precept and example. Nietzsche in his youth was a professor of Greek literature: one would have expected his superman to be a sort of Greek hero. Something of the Dorian harshness in beauty, something of the Pindaric high-born and silent victor may have been fused into Nietzsche's ideal; certainly Bacchic freedom and ardour were to enter in. But on the whole it is remarkable how little he learned from the Greeks, no modesty or reverence, no joy in order and in loveliness, no sense for friendship, none for the sanctity of places and institutions. He repeated the paradoxes of some of their

生命如何能通过理性得到实现并变得美丽，从未有比希腊人更好的展示，无论是通过训诫还是榜样。尼采年轻时是希腊文学的教授：人们会期望他的超人是一种希腊英雄。多利亚式的严酷之美，品达式的高贵而沉默的胜利者，也许已被融入尼采的理想；当然，酒神的自由和热情也要进入其中。但总体而言，令人注目的是他从希腊人那里学到的如此之少，没有谦逊或敬畏，没有对秩序和美的喜悦，没有对友谊的感受，没有对场所和制度之神圣性的感受。他重复了他们某些人的悖论

sophists, without remembering how their wise men had refuted them. For example, he gave a new name and a new prominence to the distinction between what he called the Dionysiac and the Apollonian elements in Greek genius. He saw how false was that whitewashed notion of the Greek mind which young ladies derived from sketching a plaster cast of the Apollo Belvidere.[1] He saw that a demonic force, as the generation of Goethe called it, underlay everything; what he did not see was that this demonic force was under control, which is the secret of the whole matter. The point had been thoroughly elucidated by Plato, in the contrast he drew between inspiration and art. But Plato was rather ironical about inspiration, and had a high opinion of art; and Nietzsche, with, his contrary instinct, rushes away without understanding the mind of the master or the truth of the situation. He thinks he alone has discovered the divinity of Dionysus and of the Muses, which Plato took as a matter of course but would not venerate superstitiously. Inspiration, like will, is a force without which reason can do nothing. Inspiration must be presupposed; but in itself it can do nothing good unless it is in harmony with reason, or is brought into harmony with it. This two-edged wisdom that makes impulse the stuff of life and reason its criterion, is, of course, lost on Nietzsche, and with it the whole marvel of Greek genius. There is nothing exceptional in being alive and impulsive; any savage can run wild and be frenzied and enact histrionic passions: the virtue of the Greeks lay in the exquisite firmness with which they banked their fires without extinguishing them, so that their life remained human (indeed, remained infra-human, like that of Nietzsche's superman) and yet became beautiful: they were severe and fond of maxims, on a basis of universal tolerance;

智者派，却不记得他们的智者是如何驳倒这些人的。例如，他给希腊天才中他所谓的酒神因素与日神因素之间的区分赋予了一个新名称和新的突出地位。他看出，年轻女士们从描摹阿波罗·贝尔维德雷石膏像中得来的那种粉饰性的希腊心灵观念是多么虚假。[1]他看出，一种恶魔般的力量--歌德那一代人如此称呼它--是一切的基础；他没有看出的是，这种恶魔般的力量受到了控制，而这正是整个事情的关键。柏拉图在灵感与艺术之间所作的对比中已经彻底阐明了这一点。但柏拉图对灵感颇为讽刺，而对艺术评价很高；尼采则带着相反的本能，冲了出去，却不理解这位大师的思想或处境的真相。他以为自己独自发现了狄俄尼索斯和缪斯的神性，而柏拉图视之为理所当然，却不愿迷信地崇敬。灵感，如同意志，是一种力量，没有它理性便无所作为。灵感必须被预设；但灵感本身若不与理性和谐，或未被带入与理性的和谐之中，便不能做出任何善事。这种双刃的智慧--使冲动成为生命的质料，使理性成为其标准--当然被尼采所错失，随之而失的还有希腊天才的全部奇迹。活着并有冲动并没有什么特别；任何野蛮人都能撒野发狂，演出戏剧性的激情：希腊人的德性在于那种精致的坚定，他们筑堤拦住自己的火却不将其熄灭，使他们的生活保持为人(实际上，保持为低于人的，像尼采的超人的生活那样)，却又变得美丽：他们在普遍宽容的基础上是严峻的，并且喜爱格言；

they governed themselves rationally, with a careful freedom, while well aware that nature and their own bosoms were full of gods, all of whom must be reverenced.

他们理性地治理自己，带着一种审慎的自由，同时清楚地意识到自然和他们自己的胸怀充满了神祇，所有这些神祇都必须受到敬奉。

After all, this defect in appreciation is inseparable from the transcendental pose. The ancients, like everything else, never seem to the egotist a reality co-ordinate with himself, from which he might still have something to learn. They are only so much "content" for his self-consciousness, so much matter for his thought to transcend. They can contain nothing for him but the part of his outgrown self which he deigns to identify with them. His mind must always envelop them and be the larger thing. No wonder that in this school learning is wasted for the purposes of moral education. Whoever has seen the learned egotist flies at his approach. History in his hands is a demonstration of his philosophy. Science is a quarry of proofs for his hobbies. If we do not agree with him we are not merely mistaken (every philosopher tells us that), but we are false to ourselves and ignorant of our ideal significance. His ego gives us our place in the world. He informs us of what we mean, whatever we may say; and he raises our opinions, as he might his food, to a higher unity in his own person. He is priest in every temple. He approaches a picture-gallery or a foreign religion in a dictatorial spirit, with his *a priori* categories ready on his lips; pedantry and vanity speak in his every gesture, and the lesson of nothing can reach his heart.

毕竟，这种鉴赏上的缺陷与先验的姿态是不可分离的。古人，像其他一切事物一样，在自我中心主义者看来从来不是与他自身并列的现实，不是他仍可从中有所学习的东西。他们只是他的自我意识的一堆“内容”，只是他的思想要去超越的一堆材料。他们对他所能包含的，无非是他那已成长超越的自我中他屈尊与之认同的那一部分。他的心灵必须始终包裹他们，并且是更大的东西。难怪在这个学派中，学问对于道德教育的目的而言是浪费的。凡是见过博学的自我中心主义者的人，一见其走近便逃之夭夭。历史在他手中是他哲学的演示。科学是他癖好的证据采石场。如果我们不同意他，我们就不只是弄错了(每位哲学家都这样告诉我们)，而且我们对自己不真诚，并且对我们理想的意蕴一无所知。他的自我赋予我们在世界中的位置。他告知我们我们意味着什么，无论我们可能说什么；并且他把我们的意见--如同他可能对待自己的食物那样--提升到他自身人格中更高的统一。他在每座神庙中都是祭司。他带着独断的精神走近画廊或异国宗教，先天范畴已备于唇边；迂腐与虚荣在他的一举一动中说话，而任何教训都无法抵达他的内心。

No, neither the philosophy inherited by Nietzsche nor his wayward imagination was fit to suggest to him a nobler race of men. On the contrary, they shut him off from comprehension of the best men that have existed. Like the utopias or ideals of many other satirists and minor philosophers, the superman is not a

不，无论是尼采所继承的哲学，还是他那任性的想象，都不足以向他提示一个更高贵的人种。相反，它们使他无法理解曾经存在过的最优秀的人。如同许多其他讽刺作家和次要哲学家的乌托邦或理想一样，超人并不是一个

possibility, it is only a protest. Our society is outworn, but hard to renew; the emancipated individual needs to master himself. In what spirit or to what end he will do so, we do not know, and Nietzsche cannot tell us. He is the jester, to whom all incoherences are forgiven, because all indiscretions are allowed. His mind is undisciplined, and his tongue outrageous, but he is at bottom the friend of our conscience, and full of shrewd wit and tender wisps of intuition. Behind his "gay wisdom" and trivial rhymes lies a great anguish. His intellect is lost in a chaos. His heart denies itself the relief of tears and can vent itself only in forced laughter and mock hopes that gladden nobody, least of all himself.

[1] I was about to say: How false was the notion of Winkelmann about the grandeur and repose of the Greek spirit. But Winkelmann, if his sense for the chained monsters in the Greek soul was inadequate, was at least in real sympathy with what had inspired Greek sculpture, love and knowledge of the human body in the life, made gentle by discipline and kept strong by training. For that reason Winkelmann seems hardly a German: his learning was deficient and his heart was humble. He did not patronise the ancients, he believed in them.

可能性，它只是一种抗议。我们的社会已破旧不堪，却难以更新；被解放的个体需要掌控自己。他将以何种精神、为了何种目的这样做，我们不知道，尼采也无法告诉我们。他是那个小丑，一切语无伦次都被原谅，因为一切失检都被允许。他的心智未受训练，他的舌头肆无忌惮，但他骨子里是我们良心的朋友，充满精明的机智和温柔的直觉丝缕。在他的“快乐的智慧”和琐碎韵语背后，隐藏着巨大的痛苦。他的智性迷失在混沌之中。他的心拒绝眼泪的慰藉，只能发泄于强作的笑声和虚假的希望，这些希望不能使任何人欢喜，尤其不能使他自己欢喜。

[1]我正要说：温克尔曼关于希腊精神的宏伟与宁静的观念是多么虚假。但温克尔曼，如果他对希腊灵魂中被锁链束缚的怪物的感受力不足，至少真正同情于曾启发希腊雕塑的东西，即对生活中人体的爱与知识，这人体因训练而变得温和，因锻炼而保持强壮。因此之故，温克尔曼几乎不像一个德国人：他的学识有欠缺，他的心是谦卑的。他不以居高临下的态度对待古人，他相信他们。

CHAPTER XIV

HEATHENISM

Schopenhauer somewhere observes that the word heathen, no longer in reputable use elsewhere, had found a last asylum in Oxford, the paradise of dead philosophies. Even Oxford, I believe,

第十四章

异教精神

叔本华在某处观察到，异教这个词在其他地方已不再有体面的用法，却在牛津--死去的哲学的乐园--找到了最后的避难所。我相信，即便是牛津，

has now abandoned it; yet it is a good word. It conveys, as no other word can, the sense of vast multitudes tossing in darkness, harassed by demons of their own choice. No doubt it implies also a certain sanctimony in the superior person who uses it, as if he at least were not chattering in the general Babel. What justified Jews, Christians, and Moslems (as Mohammed in particular insisted) in feeling this superiority was the possession of a Book, a chart of life, as it were, in which the most important features of history and morals were mapped out for the guidance of teachable men. The heathen, on the contrary, were abandoned to their own devices, and even prided themselves on following only their spontaneous will, their habit, presumption, or caprice.

如今已弃用了它；然而这是一个好词。它传达出一种感觉，即广大的人群在黑暗中翻滚，被他们自己选择的恶魔所折磨，这是任何别的词都无法传达的。毫无疑问，它也暗示使用这个词的上等人身上某种自命神圣，仿佛至少他没有在普遍的巴别塔中喋喋不休。使犹太人、基督徒和穆斯林(尤其是穆罕默德所坚持的)有理由感到这种优越的，是拥有一部书，可以说是一幅生活的图表，其中历史和道德的最重要特征被绘制出来，以指导可教之人。相反，异教徒则被弃于他们自己的设计，甚至以只遵循他们自发的意志、他们的习惯、僭妄或任性而自傲。

Most unprejudiced people would now agree that the value of those sacred histories and rules of life did not depend on their alleged miraculous origin, but rather on that solidity and perspicacity in their authors which enabled them to perceive the laws of sweet and profitable conduct in this world. It was not religion merely that was concerned, at least not that outlying, private, and almost negligible sphere to which we often apply this name; it was the whole fund of experience mankind had gathered by living; it was wisdom. Now, to record these lessons of experience, the Greeks and Romans also had their Books; their history, poetry, science, and civil law. So that while the theologically heathen may be those who have no Bible, the morally and essentially heathen are those who possess no authoritative wisdom, or reject the authority of what wisdom they have; the untaught or unteachable who disdain not only revelation but what revelation stood for among early peoples, namely, funded experience.

大多数不带偏见的人如今都会同意，那些神圣的历史和人生准则的价值并不取决于据称的超自然起源，而在于其作者的那种坚实与明察，使他们能够洞察这个世界上甜美而有益的行为法则。这不仅仅关乎宗教，至少不仅仅关乎我们常常冠以宗教之名的那个边缘的、私人的、几乎可以忽略的领域；它关乎人类通过生活所积累的全部经验；它就是智慧。如今，为了记录这些经验教训，希腊人和罗马人也有他们的书；他们的历史、诗歌、科学和民法。因此，虽然神学意义上的异教徒可能是那些没有圣经的人，但道德上和本质上的异教徒则是那些不拥有任何权威智慧的人，或者拒绝他们所拥有的智慧之权威的人；那些未受教导或不可教导的人，他们不仅蔑视启示，而且蔑视启示在早期民族中所代表的东西，即积累的经验。

In this sense the Greeks were the least heathen of men. They were singularly docile to political experiment, to law, to methodical art, to the proved limitations and resources of mortal life. This life they found closely hedged about by sky, earth, and sea, by war, madness, and conscience with their in-dwelling deities, by oracles and local genii with their accustomed cults, by a pervasive fate, and the jealousy of invisible gods. Yet they saw that these divine forces were constant, and that they exercised their pressure and bounty with so much method that a prudent art and religion could be built up in their midst. All this was simply a poetic prologue to science and the arts; it largely passed into them, and would have passed into them altogether if the naturalistic genius of Greece had not been crossed in Socrates by a premature discouragement, and diverted into other channels.

在这个意义上，希腊人是最不异教的人。他们异常顺从于政治实验、法律、有条理的艺术、凡俗生活已被证实的局限和资源。他们发现这种生活被天空、大地和海洋紧密包围，被战争、疯狂和良心及其内在的神灵所包围，被神谕和当地守护神及其惯常崇拜所包围，被一种无处不在的命运和不可见诸神的嫉妒所包围。然而他们看到这些神圣力量是恒常的，它们以如此多的条理施加压力和恩惠，以至于可以在它们中间建立起审慎的艺术和宗教。所有这一切不过是科学和艺术的诗意序幕；它在很大程度上融入了它们，并且本会完全融入它们，如果不是希腊的自然主义天才在苏格拉底身上被过早的沮丧所阻挠，并被引入其他渠道的话。

Early Hebraism itself had hardly been so wise. It had regarded its tribal and moral interests as absolute, and the Creator as the champion and omnipotent agent of Israel. But this arrogance and inexperience were heathen. Soon the ascendency of Israel over nature and history was proclaimed to be conditional on their fidelity to the Law; and as the spirit of the nation under chastisement became more and more penitential, it was absorbed increasingly in the praise of wisdom. Salvation was to come only by repentance, by being born again with a will wholly transformed and broken; so that the later Jewish religion went almost as far as Platonism or Christianity in the direction opposite to heathenism.

早期希伯来教本身几乎不曾如此明智。它将其部落和道德利益视为绝对的，将造物主视为以色列的捍卫者和全能的代理人。但这种傲慢和无经验是异教精神。不久，以色列对自然和历史的支配被宣布为以他们对律法的忠诚为条件；随着受惩罚的民族精神变得越来越悔罪，它越来越专注于对智慧的赞美。拯救只能通过悔改、通过带着完全转变和破碎的意志重生而来；因此后来的犹太教在反对异教精神的方向上几乎走得和柏拉图主义或基督教一样远。

This movement in the direction of an orthodox wisdom was regarded as a progress in those latter days of antiquity when it occurred, and it continued to be so regarded in Christendom until

这种朝向正统智慧的运动，在它发生的古代晚期那些日子里被视为一种进步，并且在基督教世界中继续被视为如此，直到

the rise of romanticism. The most radical reformers simply urged that the current orthodoxy, religious or scientific, was itself imperfectly orthodox, being corrupt, overloaded, too vague, or too narrow. As every actual orthodoxy is avowedly incomplete and partly ambiguous, a sympathetic reform of it is always in order. Yet very often the reformers are deceived. What really offends them may not be what is false in the received orthodoxy, but what though true is uncongenial to them. In that case heathenism, under the guise of a search for a purer wisdom, is working in their souls against wisdom of any sort. Such is the suspicion that Catholics would throw on Protestantism, naturalists on idealism, and conservatives generally on all revolutions.

浪漫主义的兴起。最激进的改革者只是主张，当前的正统--无论是宗教的还是科学的--本身就不完全正统，因为它腐败、超载、过于模糊或过于狭隘。由于每一种实际的正统都公开承认自己是不完整的且部分含糊不清，对它的同情性改革总是合乎时宜的。然而改革者常常被欺骗。真正冒犯他们的可能不是公认正统中的虚假之处，而是那些虽然真实却与他们格格不入的东西。在这种情况下，异教精神以寻求更纯粹智慧为伪装，在他们的灵魂中对抗任何种类的智慧。这就是天主教徒会加于新教的怀疑，自然主义者加于唯心主义的怀疑，以及保守派普遍加于一切革命的怀疑。

But if ever heathenism needed to pose as constructive reform, it is now quite willing and able to throw off the mask. Desire for any orthodox wisdom at all may be repudiated; it may be set down to low vitality and failure of nerve. In various directions at once we see to-day an intense hatred and disbelief gathering head against the very notion of a cosmos to be discovered, or a stable human nature to be respected. Nature, we are told, is an artificial symbol employed by life; truth is a temporary convention; art is an expression of personality; war is better than peace, effort than achievement, and feeling than intelligence; change is deeper than form; will is above morality. Expressions of this kind are sometimes wanton and only half thought out; but they go very deep in the subjective direction. Behind them all is a sincere revulsion against the difficult and confused undertakings of reason; against science, institutions, and moral compulsions. They mark an honest retreat into immediate experience and animal faith. Man used to be called a rational animal, but his rationality

但如果说异教精神曾经需要伪装成建设性改革，那么现在它完全愿意并且能够摘下面具。对任何正统智慧的渴望都可能被否定；它可以被归因于生命力低下和意志衰竭。今天我们在各个方向同时看到一种强烈的仇恨和不信任正在积聚，针对的是发现一个宇宙或尊重一种稳定人性的观念本身。我们被告知，自然是有生命者使用的一种人为符号；真理是一种暂时的约定；艺术是个性的表达；战争优于和平，努力优于成就，情感优于理智；变化比形式更深刻；意志高于道德。这类表达有时是任性的、只经过一半思考的；但它们在主观方向上走得非常深。在它们背后全都是一种真诚的反感，反对理性那些困难而混乱的事业；反对科学、制度和道德强制。它们标志着一种诚实的退却，退入直接经验和动物信仰。人过去被称为理性的动物，但他的理性

is something eventual and ideal, whereas his animality is actual and profound. Heathenism, if we consider life at large, is the primal and universal religion.

It has never been my good fortune to see wild beasts in the jungle, but I have sometimes watched a wild bull in the ring, and I can imagine no more striking, simple, and heroic example of animal faith; especially when the bull is what is technically called noble, that is, when he follows the lure again and again with eternal singleness of thought, eternal courage, and no suspicion of a hidden agency that is mocking him. What the red rag is to this brave creature, their passions, inclinations, and chance notions are to the heathen. What they will they will; and they would deem it weakness and disloyalty to ask whether it is worth willing or whether it is attainable. The bull, magnificently sniffing the air, surveys the arena with the cool contempt and disbelief of the idealist, as if he said: "You seem, you are a seeming; I do not quarrel with you, I do not fear you. I am real, you are nothing." Then suddenly, when his eye is caught by some bright cloak displayed before him, his whole soul changes. His will awakes and he seems to say: "You are my destiny; I want you, I hate you, you shall be mine, you shall not stand in my path. I will gore you. I will disprove you. I will pass beyond you. I shall be, you shall not have been." Later, when sorely wounded and near his end, he grows blind to all these excitements. He smells the moist earth, and turns to the dungeon where an hour ago he was at peace. He remembers the herd, the pasture beyond, and he dreams: "I shall not die, for I love life. I shall be young again, young always, for I love youth. All this outcry is nought to me, this strange suffering is nought. I will go to the fields again, to graze, to roam, to love."

是某种终极的、理想的东西，而他的动物性则是实际的、深刻的。异教精神，如果我们从整体上考虑生命，是最原初的、普遍的宗教。

我从未有幸在丛林中见到野兽，但有时我曾在斗牛场上观看一头野牛，我想象不出比这更引人注目、更单纯、更英勇的动物信念的例证了；尤其是当这头公牛属于技术上所谓的高贵品种时，也就是说，当它带着永恒的专一思想、永恒的勇气，毫不怀疑有一个隐藏的力量在嘲弄它，一次又一次地追逐那诱饵的时候。红布对于这勇敢的生物，正如激情、倾向和偶然的念头对于异教徒一样。他们想要什么就要什么；他们会认为，追问是否值得去要或是否能够达到，是软弱和不忠。那头公牛威风凛凛地嗅着空气，带着唯心主义者那种冷静的轻蔑和不信任审视着斗牛场，仿佛在说：“你似乎是，你只是似乎；我不与你争吵，我不怕你。我是真实的，你什么也不是。”然后突然间，当它的眼睛被展示在它面前的某件鲜艳斗篷吸引住时，它的整个灵魂都变了。它的意志觉醒了，它似乎说：“你是我的命运；我要你，我恨你，你将属于我，你不得挡我的路。我要用角刺穿你。我要否定你。我要超越你。我将存在，你将不曾存在。”后来，当它身受重伤、临近末日时，它对所有这些刺激都变得视而不见了。它嗅着湿润的泥土，转向一小时前它还安然无恙待着的那个地牢。它想起了牛群、远处的牧场，它梦想着：“我不会死，因为我热爱生命。我将重新年轻，永远年轻，因为我热爱青春。所有这些叫喊对我算不了什么，这奇怪的痛苦算不了什么。我要回到田野去，去吃草，去漫游，去爱。”

So exactly, with not one least concession to the unsuspected reality, the heathen soul stands bravely before a painted world, covets some bauble, and defies death. Heathenism is the religion of will, the faith which life has in itself because it is life, and in its aims because it is pursuing them.

正是如此，异教灵魂没有对一个未曾被察觉的实在做出哪怕最微小的让步，却勇敢地站在一个被描绘出来的世界面前，觊觎着某件小玩意，并蔑视死亡。异教精神是意志的宗教，是生命因其是生命而对自己所怀的信仰，以及对其目标--因为它正在追求它们--所怀的信仰。

In their tentative, many-sided, indomitable way, the Germans have been groping for four hundred years towards a restoration of their primitive heathenism. Germany under the long tutelage of Rome had been like a spirited and poetic child brought up by very old and very worldly foster-parents. For many years the elfin creature may drink in their gossip and their maxims with simple wonder; but at last he will begin to be restive under them, ask himself ominous questions, protest, suffer, and finally break into open rebellion. Naturally he will not find at first theories and precepts of his own to take the place of his whole education; he will do what he can with his traditions, revising, interpreting, and patching them with new ideas; and only if he has great earnestness and speculative power will he ever reach an unalloyed expression of his oppressed soul.

德国人以他们那种试探性的、多方面的、不屈不挠的方式，四百年来一直在摸索着恢复他们原始的异教精神。在罗马的长期监护下的德国，就像一个充满生气和诗意的孩子，由非常年老、非常世故的养父母抚养长大。许多年里，这个精灵般的孩子可能会怀着单纯的惊奇吸收他们的闲谈和格言；但最终他会开始对他们感到不耐烦，问自己一些不祥的问题，抗议、受苦，最后爆发为公开的反叛。自然，他起初不会找到自己的理论和训诫来取代他的全部教育；他会尽其所能地对待他的传统，修订、解释，并用新观念来修补它们；只有当他具有极大的真诚和思辨能力时，他才会达到对他受压抑的灵魂的一种纯粹的表达。

Now in Germany speculative power and earnestness existed in a high degree, not, of course, in most people, but in the best and most representative; and it was this *élite* that made the Reformation, and carried it on into historical criticism and transcendental philosophy, until in the nineteenth century, in Schopenhauer, Wagner, and Nietzsche, the last remnants of Christian education were discarded and the spontaneous heathen morality of the race reasserted itself in its purity. That this assertion was not consistent, that it was thrown into the language and images of some alien system, is not to be wondered at; but the

如今在德国，思辨能力和真诚存在于很高的程度上，当然不是在大多数人身上，而是在最优秀和最有代表性的人身上；正是这个精英造就了宗教改革，并将其推进为历史批判和先验哲学，直到十九世纪，在叔本华、瓦格纳和尼采那里，基督教教育的最后残余被抛弃，这个种族自发的异教道德以其纯粹性重新确立了自身。这种确立并不一致，它被投入某个外来体系的语言和形象之中，这并不奇怪；但是

Christianity of Parsifal, like the Buddhism of the denial of the will, is a pure piece of romanticism, an exotic setting for those vacillations and sinkings which absolute Will may very well be subject to in its absolute chaos.

《帕西法尔》中的基督教，如同否定意志的佛教一样，是纯粹的浪漫主义，是为绝对意志在其绝对混沌中很可能经历的那些动摇与沉沦所设置的一个异域背景。

The rebellion of the heathen soul is unmistakable in the Reformation, but it is not recognised in this simple form, because those who feel that it was justified do not dream that it was heathen, and those who see that it was heathen will not admit that it was justified. Externally, of course, it was an effort to recover the original essence of Christianity; but why should a free and absolute being care for that original essence when he has discovered it, unless his own mind demanded that very thing? And if his mind demanded it, what need has he to read that demand into an ancient revelation which, as a matter of fact, turned on quite other matters? It was simply the inertia of established prejudice that made people use tradition to correct tradition; until the whole substance of tradition, worn away by that internal friction, should be dissolved, and impulse and native genius should assert themselves unimpeded.

异教灵魂的反叛在宗教改革中是确凿无疑的，但它并没有以这种简单的形式被认识到，因为那些觉得它是正当的人做梦也想不到它是异教的，而那些看出它是异教的人又不愿承认它是正当的。从外表上看，当然，这是一次恢复基督教原初本质的努力；但是，一个自由而绝对的存在，当他发现了那个原初本质时，为什么要关心它呢，除非他自己的心灵恰恰要求那个东西?而如果他的心灵要求它，他又何必把这种要求读进一个古代的启示之中，而那个启示实际上涉及的是完全另外的事情呢?只不过是既定偏见的惰性使人们用传统来纠正传统；直到传统的全部实质被那种内部摩擦磨损殆尽，冲动和天赋精神得以不受阻碍地确立自身。

Judaism and Christianity, like Greek philosophy, were singly inspired by the pursuit of happiness, in whatever form it might be really attainable: now on earth if possible, or in the millennium, or in some abstracted and inward life, like that of the Stoics, or in the last resort, in a different life altogether beyond the grave. But heathenism ignores happiness, despises it, or thinks it impossible. The regimen and philosophy of Germany are inspired by this contempt for happiness, for one's own happiness as well as for other people's. Happiness seems to the German moralists something unheroic, an abdication before external things, a

犹太教和基督教，像希腊哲学一样，都单独地受到追求幸福的启发，无论这种幸福以什么形式才真正可以达到：如果可能的话，就在今世，或者在千禧年，或者在某种抽象的、内在的生活中，像斯多葛派那样，或者作为最后的手段，在坟墓之外的另一种完全不同的生活中。但异教精神忽视幸福，蔑视它，或者认为它是不可能的。德国的养生之道和哲学受到这种对幸福的蔑视的启发，既包括对自己幸福的蔑视，也包括对他人幸福的蔑视。在德国道德家看来，幸福似乎是某种不英勇的东西，是在外部事物面前的一种退位，一种

victory of the senses over the will. They think the pursuit of happiness low, materialistic, and selfish. They wish everybody to sacrifice or rather to forget happiness, and to do "deeds."

感官对意志的胜利。他们认为追求幸福是低级的、物质主义的和自私的。他们希望每个人都牺牲--或者更确切地说，忘记--幸福，去做出“事迹”。

It is in the nature of things that those who are incapable of happiness should have no idea of it. Happiness is not for wild animals, who can only oscillate between apathy and passion. To be happy, even to conceive happiness, you must be reasonable or (if Nietzsche prefers the word) you must be tamed. You must have taken the measure of your powers, tasted the fruits of your passions and learned your place in the world and what things in it can really serve you. To be happy you must be wise. This happiness is sometimes found instinctively, and then the rudest fanatic can hardly fail to see how lovely it is; but sometimes it comes of having learned something by experience (which empirical people never do) and involves some chastening and renunciation; but it is not less sweet for having this touch of holiness about it, and the spirit of it is healthy and beneficent. The nature of happiness, therefore, dawns upon philosophers when their wisdom begins to report the lessons of experience: an *a priori* philosophy can have no inkling of it.

事物的本性在于：那些无法获得幸福的人，对幸福也毫无概念。幸福不属于野兽，它们只能在麻木与激情之间摇摆。要获得幸福，哪怕只是构想幸福，你也必须是理性的，或者(如果尼采偏爱这个词的话)你必须是被驯化的。你必须衡量过自己的力量，品尝过激情的果实，认清自己在世界中的位置，以及世间何物能真正为你所用。要获得幸福，你必须明智。这种幸福有时是本能地找到的，于是最粗野的狂热者也不难看出它是多么可爱；但有时它来自经验的教训(经验主义者从来做不到这一点)，并包含某种惩戒与弃绝；然而，正因为带有这一丝神圣的意味，它才丝毫不减其甜美，其精神是健康而有益的。因此，当哲学家的智慧开始报告经验的教训时，幸福的本性便在他们心中初现曙光：一门先天的哲学对此是毫无概念的。

Happiness is the union of vitality with art, and in so far as vitality is a spiritual thing and not mere restlessness and vehemence, art increases vitality. It obviates friction, waste, and despair. Without art, vitality is painful and big with monsters. It is hurried easily into folly and crime; it ignores the external forces and interests which it touches. German philosophy does this theoretically, by dethroning the natural world and calling it an idea created by the ego for its own purposes; and it does this practically also by obeying the categorical imperative—no longer the fabled

幸福是活力与艺术的结合，而就活力是一种精神性的东西、而非单纯的躁动与激烈而言，艺术增进了活力。它消除了摩擦、浪费与绝望。没有艺术，活力便是痛苦的，且孕育着怪物。它容易被匆匆推入愚蠢与罪恶；它无视它所触及的外在力量与利益。德国哲学在理论上这样做，是通过废黜自然世界、称其为自我为其自身目的所创造的一个观念；它在实践上也这样做，是通过服从绝对命令--不再是传说中的

imperatives of Sinai or of Königsberg, but the inward and vital imperative which the bull obeys, when trusting absolutely in his own strength, rage, and courage, he follows a little red rag and his destiny this way and that way.

西奈山或柯尼斯堡的绝对命令，而是公牛所服从的那种内在而 vital 的绝对命令--当公牛绝对信任自己的力量、愤怒和勇气时，它便跟着一块小红布，跟着自己的命运，这边那边地跑。

CHAPTER XV

GERMAN GENIUS

It is customary to judge religions and philosophies by their truth, which is seldom their strong point; yet the application of that unsympathetic criterion is not unjust, since they aspire to be true, maintain that they are so, and forbid any opposed view, no matter how obvious and inevitable, to be called true in their stead. But when religions and philosophies are dead, or when we are so removed from them by time or training that the question of their truth is not a living question for us, they do not on that account lose all their interest; then, in fact, for the first time they manifest their virtues to the unbeliever. He sees that they are expressions of human genius; that however false to their subject-matter they may be, like the conventions of art they are true to the eye and to the spirit that fashioned them. And as nothing in the world, not even the truth, is so interesting as human genius, these incredible or obsolete religions and philosophies become delightful to us. The sting is gone out of their errors, which no longer threaten to delude us, and they have acquired a beauty invisible to the eye of their authors, because of the very refraction which the truth suffered in that vital medium.

第十五章

德国天才

人们习惯于以真伪来评判宗教与哲学，而真伪很少是它们的长处；然而，应用这一缺乏同情的标准并非不公正，因为它们自称追求真理，坚称自己为真，并禁止任何对立的观点--无论多么明显和不可避免--被称为真以取代它们。但是，当宗教与哲学已经死亡，或者当我们因时间或教养而与它们相距如此之远，以致其真伪问题对我们而言已不再是一个活生生的问题时，它们并不因此就失去了全部趣味；事实上，正是在那时，它们才第一次向不信者展现出自己的美德。他看到它们是人类天才的表达；无论它们与其题材多么不符，就像艺术的惯例一样，它们对于塑造它们的眼睛和精神而言是真实的。而且，世上没有什么东西--甚至真理本身--比人类天才更有趣，因此这些不可思议或过时的宗教与哲学对我们来说变得令人愉悦。它们错误中的毒刺已经拔去，不再威胁要欺骗我们，而且由于真理在这一生命媒介中所遭受的折射，它们获得了一种其作者之眼所看不见的美。

German philosophy is a work of genius. To be heathen is easy; to have an absolute will and a belief in chaos—or rather a blind battle with chance—is probably the lot of most animals; but to be condemned to be learned, industrious, moral, and Christian, and yet, through that veil of unavoidable phenomena and conventions, to pierce to absolute will and freedom, and to set them forth persuasively as the true reality, in spite of all the ordered appearances which do not cease to confront and to occupy us—that is a work of genius. It is a wonderful achievement, to have recovered atavistically the depths of the primitive soul, in the midst of its later sophistication. In this philosophy the ancestral ego, the soul perplexed and incredulous at being born into this world, returns to haunt us in broad day-light and to persuade us with its ghostly eloquence that not that ego but this world is the ghost.

德国哲学是一件天才的作品。做一个异教徒是容易的；拥有一个绝对的意志和对混沌的信仰--或者更确切地说，与偶然进行一场盲目的战斗--大概是大多数动物的命运；但是，被判定为博学、勤勉、有道德且是基督徒，却又能透过那不可避免的现象与惯例的帷幕，穿透到绝对的意志与自由，并尽管有种种不断面对我们、占据我们的有序表象，仍将它们有说服力地阐述为真正的实在--这是一件天才的作品。这是一项了不起的成就：在其后来的老练圆滑之中，以返祖的方式恢复了原始灵魂的深处。在这种哲学中，那个祖先的自我，那个对降生于此世感到困惑和怀疑的灵魂，在光天化日之下回来纠缠我们，并用它幽灵般的雄辩说服我们：不是那个自我，而是这个世界才是幽灵。

The egotism which in German philosophy is justified by a theory in German genius is a form of experience. It turns everything it touches into a part of its own life, personal, spontaneous, sincere, original. It is young and self-sufficient; yet as a continual change of view is incompatible with art and learning, we see in Germany, even more than elsewhere, a division of labour between genius and tradition; nowhere are the types of the young rebel and the tireless pedant so common and so extreme.

在德国哲学中由理论所辩护、在德意志天才中存在的自我中心主义，是一种经验的形式。它把它所触及的一切都变成自己生命的一部分，个人的、自发的、真诚的、原创的。它年轻而自足；然而，由于观点的不断变化与艺术和学问不相容，我们在德国--甚至比在其他地方更甚--看到天才与传统之间的分工；年轻反叛者与不知疲倦的学究这两种典型，在任何地方都不如在这里常见和极端。

The notion that something that moves and lives, as genius does, can at the same time be absolute has some interesting implications. Such a genius and all its works must be unstable. As it has no external sources and no external objects, as its own past can exercise no control over it (for that would be the most lifeless of tyrannies), it is a sort of shooting star, with no guarantees for

那种认为像天才一样运动和活着的东西同时可以是绝对的观点，具有一些有趣的意涵。这样的天才及其一切作品必定是不稳定的。由于它没有外部来源和外部对象，由于它自己的过去不能对它施加任何控制(因为那将是最无生命的暴政)，它是一种流星，没有任何保证

the future. This, for the complete egotist, has no terrors. A tragic end and a multitude of enemies may seem good to the absolute hero and necessary to his perfect heroism. In the same way, to be without a subject-matter or an audience may seem good to the absolute poet, who sings to himself as he goes, exclusively for the benefit of that glorious and fleeting moment. Genius could not be purer than that: although perhaps it might be hard to prove that it was genius.

未来。对于完全的自我中心主义者来说，这并不可怕。一个悲剧性的结局和众多的敌人，在绝对的英雄看来或许是好的，并且对他的完美英雄气概来说是必要的。同样，没有题材或听众，在绝对的诗人看来或许也是好的，他边走边唱，完全是为了那光荣而短暂的一刻。天才不可能比这更纯粹了：尽管要证明那是天才，或许很难。

A kindred implication, which perhaps might be less welcome to the egotist himself, is that an absolute genius is formless, and that the absolute freedom with which it thinks it takes on now this form and now that, is not really freedom at all, but subjection to unknown and perhaps ironical forces. Absolute Will, of which a perfectly free genius is an expression, cannot say specifically what it craves, for essentially it should crave everything indiscriminately. In practice, however, it must seem to aim at this or that precise result. These specific aims are suggested to it by circumstances, foisted upon it in its replete innocence; for it is all expectation, all vague heartiness and zeal for it knows not what. The logic it proclaims at any time and calls eternal is but the fashionable rhetoric of that hour. Absolute Will is a great dupe on whom fortune forces card after card. Like Faust it is helpless before the most vulgar temptations. Why should it not fulfil itself now by the pursuit of magic, now by the seduction of a young girl, now by an archæological pose, now by a piratical or an engineering enterprise? True, there are limits to its gullibility; there are suggestions from which it recoils. The German ego, after swallowing Christianity whole, will in Luther stick at Indulgences. Faust sometimes turns on Mephistopheles, as the worm will turn:

一个类似的含义--也许对自我中心主义者本人来说不那么受欢迎--是：绝对的天才没有形式，而它自以为时而采取这种形式、时而采取那种形式的绝对自由，根本不是自由，而是对未知的、也许是反讽的力量的服从。绝对意志--一个完全自由的天才即是其表现--无法具体说出它渴求什么，因为本质上它应当不加区分地渴求一切。然而在实践中，它必定显得在追求这个或那个确切的结果。这些具体目标是由环境暗示给它的，是在其满溢的纯真中被强加于它的；因为它全是期待，全是模糊的热忱和对自己也不知为何物的热望。它在任何时候宣称并称之为永恒的逻各斯，不过是那个时代的时髦修辞。绝对意志是一个大冤大头，命运把一张又一张牌强塞给它。像《浮士德》一样，它在最粗俗的诱惑面前束手无策。它为何不此刻通过追求魔法、此刻通过诱骗一个年轻姑娘、此刻通过一种考古学的姿态、此刻通过一项海盗式或工程式的事业来实现自身呢?诚然，它的轻信是有限度的；有些暗示是它要退缩的。德国自我在把基督教整个吞下之后，在路德那里却会在赎罪券上卡住。《浮士德》有时会转向梅菲斯特，正如虫子也会转身：

he says that he covets all experience, but in that he does himself a great injustice; there are experiences he scorns. After all this ego is not really absolute; it is specifically and pathetically human and directed upon a few natural ends. That is what saves it; for a mind can have no distinction and a soul no honour if its only maxim is to live on. It may take up with enthusiasm whatever it takes up, but it will take up anything; and it may do mightily whatever it does, but it will not do it long.

他说他渴求一切经验，但在这点上他大大冤枉了自己；有些经验是他所鄙视的。毕竟这个自我并非真正绝对的；它是具体的、可悲地属人的，并指向少数几个自然目的。这正是拯救它之处；因为一个心灵若其唯一准则只是活下去，便不可能有卓越，一个灵魂也不可能有荣誉。它无论从事什么都会满怀热情地从事，但它什么都会从事；它无论做什么都可能做得声势浩大，但它不会做得长久。

Consider, in this respect, the pathetic history of the German people. It conquered the Roman empire and it became Roman, or wished to become so. It had had a mythology and a morality of its own (very like in principle to those it has since rediscovered), yet it accepted Christianity with the docility of a child. It began to feel, after some centuries, how alien to its genius this religion was, but it could find relief only in a fresh draught from the same foreign sources, or others more remote. To cease to be Roman it tried to become Hebraic and Greek. In studying these models, however, it came upon a new scent. What passed for revelation or for classical perfection was of human national growth, stratified like the rocks, and not divine or authoritative at all. If you only made hypotheses enough, you could prove how it all arose according to necessary laws, logical, psychological, historical, economical, and æsthetical. Above all, you could prove how nobody had understood anything properly before, and how the key to it all was in your single hand.

在这方面，想一想德国人民那令人悲悯的历史吧。它征服了罗马帝国，它变成了罗马人，或者说希望变成罗马人。它本来有自己的神话和道德(在原则上与它后来重新发现的那套极为相似)，然而它却以孩童般的顺从接受了基督教。过了几个世纪，它开始感到这个宗教与它的天才多么格格不入，但它只能从同一批外来源头、或更遥远的其他源头中再饮一口来求得解脱。为了不再做罗马人，它试图变成希伯来人和希腊人。然而在研究这些典范时，它嗅到了新的气味。那些被当作启示或古典完美的东西，其实是民族的人为生长，像岩石一样层层堆积，根本不是神圣的或权威的。只要你假设得足够多，你就能证明这一切是如何按照必然规律--逻辑的、心理的、历史的、经济的和美学的--兴起的。最重要的是，你能证明此前没有人正确理解过任何事物，而这一切的钥匙就握在你一人手中。

Yet the triumphs of theory alone soon seemed unsatisfying. Wine, science, and song once seemed to make Germany happy, but if a prince imposed military discipline, might not that be an even better thing? For a time wistfulness, longing, and the feeling of

然而，仅仅理论的胜利很快就显得不能令人满足。美酒、科学和歌唱曾一度使德国幸福，但如果一位君主强加军事纪律，那难道不是更好的事情吗?有一段时间，渴望、憧憬，以及那种

Titanic loneliness and of a world to be evoked and snuffed out like a dream, seemed to fill the cup of intense living, and the greatest and happiest of Germans could cry—

Nur wer die Sehnsucht kennt
weiss, was ich leide,
allein und abgetrennt
von aller Freude.

But presently true intensity of life appeared to lie rather in being a victorious general, or an ironmaster, or a commercial traveller, or a reveller in the Friedrich-strasse, or a spy and conspirator anywhere in the world.

All these turbid and nondescript ambitions are in a sense artificial; the Germans accept them now as a thousand years ago they accepted Christianity, because such things are suddenly thrust upon them. By nature they are simple, honest, kindly, easily pleased. There is no latent irony or disbelief in their souls. The pleasures of sense, plain and copious, they enjoy hugely, long labour does not exasperate them, science fills them with satisfaction, music entrances them. There ought to be no happier or more innocent nation in this world. Unfortunately their very goodness and simplicity render them helpless; they are what they are dragooned to be. There is no social or intellectual disease to which, in spots, they do not succumb, as to an epidemic: their philosophy itself is an example of this. They have the defects of the newly prosperous; they are far too proud of their possessions, esteeming them for being theirs, without knowing whether they are good of their kind. Culture is a thing seldom mentioned by those who have it. The real strength of the Germans lies not in

泰坦式的孤独感，以及一个像梦一样被唤起又被掐灭的世界的感受，似乎充满了强烈生活的酒杯，而最伟大、最幸福的德国人会喊道--

唯有懂得渴望的人
知道我所受的苦，
单独且分离
一切欢乐。

但不久，真正的强烈生活似乎更在于做一个胜利的将军，或一个铁厂主，或一个商业旅行者，或在弗里德里希大街上狂欢的人，或世界任何地方的间谍和阴谋家。

所有这些浑浊而难以名状的野心在某种意义上都是人为的；德国人如今接受它们，正如一千年前他们接受基督教一样，因为这类东西是突然强加给他们的。就其天性而言，他们单纯、诚实、友善、易于满足。他们的灵魂中没有潜藏的反讽或不信。感官的快乐，朴素而丰盛，他们尽情享受；长久的劳作不会使他们恼怒；科学使他们心满意足；音乐使他们入迷。这个世界上本不该有比他们更幸福或更纯真的民族了。不幸的是，正是他们的善良和单纯使他们束手无策；他们是被驱赶成什么样就是什么样。没有哪种社会的或智识的疾病是他们(在某些地方)不会像染上流行病一样屈服的：他们的哲学本身就是一例。他们有着暴发户的缺陷；他们对自己的所有物过于骄傲，因其属于自己而珍视它们，却不知道它们本身是否优良。有文化的人很少提及文化。德国人的真正力量不在于

those external achievements of which at this moment they make so much—for they may outgrow this new materialism of theirs—it lies rather in what they have always prized, their *Gemüth* and their music.

那些外在的成就--此刻他们如此重视这些成就--因为他们可能会超越他们这种新的唯物论--它更在于他们一直珍视的东西，他们的*Gemüth*和他们的音乐。

Perhaps these two things have a common root. Emotion is inarticulate, yet there is a mighty movement in it, and a great complexity of transitions and shades. This intrinsic movement of the feelings is ordinarily little noticed because people are too wide awake, or too imaginative. Everything is a fact or a picture to them, and their emotions seem to them little but obvious qualities of things. They roundly call *things* beautiful, painful, holy, or ridiculous; they do not speak of their *Gemüth*, although, of course, it is by virtue of their emotions that they pass such judgments. But when the occasions of our emotions, the objects that call them forth, are not so instantly focussed, when we know better what we feel than why we feel it, then we seem to have a richer and more massive sensibility. Our feelings absorb our attention because they remain a thing apart: they seem to us wonderfully deep because we do not ground them in things external.

也许这两样东西有一个共同的根源。情感是难以言表的，然而其中却有一种强大的运动，以及大量复杂的过渡与色调变化。情感的这种内在运动通常很少被人注意到，因为人们过于清醒，或者过于富有想象力。对他们来说，一切都不过是一个事实或一幅图画，而他们的情感在他们看来不过是事物显而易见的性质罢了。他们直截了当地把事物称为美的、痛苦的、神圣的或可笑的；他们不谈自己的Gemüth(心灵)，尽管当然正是凭借他们的情感他们才做出这样的判断。但是，当我们情感的场合、唤起情感的对象不那么即刻聚焦时，当我们更清楚自己感受到什么而非为什么感受到它时，那时我们似乎拥有一种更丰富、更厚重的感受力。我们的情感吸收了我们的注意力，因为它始终是一个独立的东西：它在我们看来奇妙地深邃，因为我们并不把它奠基于外物之上。

Now music is a means of giving form to our inner feelings without attaching them to events or objects in the world. Music is articulate, but articulate in a language which avoids, or at least veils the articulation of the world we live in; it is, therefore, the chosen art of a mind to whom the world is still foreign. If this seems in one way an incapacity, it is also a privilege. Not to be at home in the world, to prize it chiefly for echoes which it may have in the soul, to have a soul that can give forth echoes, or that can generate internal dramas of sound out of its own resources—may this not be a more enviable endowment than that of a mind

音乐是一种赋予我们内心情感以形式的手段，而不将这些情感附着于世界上的事件或对象。音乐是清晰表达的，但它所用的语言回避、或至少遮掩了我们所居住的世界的清晰表达；因此，它是那些世界对其仍然陌生的心灵所选择的艺术。如果这在某方面看来是一种无能，它也是一种特权。不在世界中感到自在，主要因其可能在灵魂中产生的回声而珍视世界，拥有一个能够发出回声、或能够从自身资源中生成内在声音戏剧的灵魂--这难道不比那样一种心灵更令人羡慕的禀赋吗?

all surface, a sensitive plate only able to photograph this not too beautiful earth? In any case, for better or for worse, inward sensibility, unabsorbed in worldly affairs, exists in some people; a life, as it were, still in the womb and not yet in contact with the air. But let these inspired musicians, masters in their own infinite realms, beware of the touch of matter. Let them not compose a system of the universe out of their *Gemüth,* as they might a symphony. Let them not raise their baton in the face of the stars or of the nations, and think to lead them like an orchestra.

全是表面，一块只能拍摄这个不太美丽的地球的感光板?无论如何，好也罢坏也罢，未被世事吸收的内在敏感性存在于某些人身上；这是一种可以说仍在子宫中、尚未与空气接触的生命。但让这些受启发的音乐家们，这些在自己无限领域中的大师们，警惕物质的触碰。让他们不要从自己的*Gemüth*中构建一个宇宙体系，就像他们可能创作一部交响曲那样。让他们不要在星辰或民族面前举起指挥棒，以为可以像指挥管弦乐队一样领导它们。

CHAPTER XVI

EGOTISM IN PRACTICE

第十六章

实践中的自我中心

Theories in their own ethereal essence can have no influence on events. But the men who conceive and adopt a theory form, in doing so, certain habits of discrimination and of reaction to things. In fact, they have conceived and adopted their theory because their habits of apprehension and action suggested it to them, or could be brought to suggest it: the explicit theory is a symbol and omen of their practical attitude, of their way, as the phrase has it, of grasping the situation.

理论在其自身的空灵本质中不可能对事件产生影响。但是，构想并采纳一种理论的人，在这样做时形成了某些辨别事物和对事物作出反应的习性。事实上，他们之所以构想并采纳他们的理论，是因为他们的理解和行动习性向他们提示了它，或者能够被引导去提示它：明确的理论是他们实践态度的象征和预兆，是他们把握局势的方式--如俗话所说。

All philosophies have the common property of being speculative, and, therefore, their immediate influence on those who hold them is in many ways alike, however opposed the theories may be to one another: they all make people theoretical. In this sense any philosophy, if warmly embraced, has a moralising force, because, even if it belittles morality, it absorbs the mind in intellectual

所有哲学都具有思辨这一共同属性，因此，它们对持有者的直接影响在许多方面是相似的，无论这些理论彼此多么对立：它们都使人变得理论化。在这个意义上，任何哲学，如果被热烈地拥抱，都具有一种道德化的力量，因为即使它贬低道德，它也 absorbing the mind in intellectual

contemplation, accustoms it to wide and reasoned comparisons, and makes the sorry escapades of human nature from convention seem even more ignominious than its ruling prejudices.

沉思，使其习惯于广泛而有条理的比较，并使人性偏离习俗的可悲越轨行为显得比其主导偏见更加可鄙。

The particular theory of egotism arises from an exorbitant interest in ourselves, in the medium of thought and action rather than in its objects. It is not necessarily incorrect, because the self is actual and indispensable; but the insistence on it is a little abnormal, because the self, like consciousness, ought to be diaphanous. Egotism in philosophy is, therefore, a pretty sure symptom of excessive pedantry and inordinate self-assertion.

自我中心主义的特定理论源于对我们自身--对思想和行动的媒介而非其对象--的过度兴趣。它不一定是错误的，因为自我是实际的且不可或缺的；但对它的强调有点不正常，因为自我，像意识一样，应该是透明的。因此，哲学中的自我中心主义是过度迂腐和过分自我主张的一个相当可靠的症状。

In the lofty theory of egotism life is represented as a sort of game of patience, in which the rules, the cards, the table, and the empty time on our hands, all are mere images created by the fancy, as in a dream. The *sense* of being occupied, though one really has nothing to do, will then be the secret of the whole affair, and the sole good to be attained by living. Of course this fantastic theory is put forward only on great occasions, when an extreme profundity is in place; but like other esoteric doctrines it expresses very well the spirit in which those people live habitually who would appeal to it in the last resort. Obviously such an egotist should in consistency be a man of principle. He would feel it to be derogatory to his dignity, and contrary to his settled purpose, to cheat at the game he has instituted. That luck should sometimes go against him is pre-ordained by himself; otherwise the game would have no zest, and to be interested, to be pressed, even to be annoyed seems the highest good to him in his great tedium. He will, therefore, be assiduous, patient, and law-abiding; and the idea of ever abandoning his chosen game for anything less forced and less arbitrary will seem to him disloyalty to himself, and a

在自我中心主义的高超理论中，生活被表现为一种耐心的游戏，其中规则、纸牌、桌子以及我们手上空闲的时间，全都只是幻想所创造的纯粹意象，如同在梦中。被占用的感觉，尽管实际上无事可做，将成为整个事情的秘密，也是生活所能获得的唯一善。当然，这种幻想的理论只在重大场合提出，当需要一种极端的深刻性时；但像其他秘传学说一样，它很好地表达了那些在最后关头会求助于它的人习惯性生活的精神。显然，这样一个自我中心主义者若保持一致，就应当是一个有原则的人。他会觉得在他所设立的游戏中有作弊行为是有损尊严的，也违背他既定的目的。运气有时对他不利，这是他自己预先规定的；否则游戏就没有趣味，而感兴趣、被逼迫、甚至被惹恼，在他极大的无聊中似乎是对他最高的善。因此，他将勤勉、耐心、守法；而放弃他所选择的游戏、转而追求任何不那么勉强和任意的事情的念头，在他看来将是对自己的不忠，以及一种

great wickedness.

大恶。

Indeed, nothing beside his own purpose will have any value in his eyes, or even any existence. He will therefore inevitably act without consideration for others, without courtesy, without understanding. When he chooses to observe anything external—and he is studious—his very attentions will be an insult; for he will assume that his idea of that external thing is the reality of it, and that other people can have only such rights and only such a character as he is willing to assign to them. It follows from his egotistical principles that in judging others he should be officious and rude, learned and mistaken.

事实上，除了他自己的目的之外，任何事物在他眼中都没有价值，甚至没有存在。因此，他将不可避免地行事不顾他人，不讲礼貌，不予理解。当他选择观察任何外部事物时--而他好学--他的关注本身就将是一种侮辱；因为他将假定他对外部事物的观念就是该事物的现实，而其他人只能拥有他愿意赋予他们的权利和性格。从他的自我中心主义原则可以推出，在评判他人时，他应当是多管闲事而粗鲁的，博学而错误的。

What the egotist calls his will and his ideals are, taken together, simply his passions; but the passions of the egotist are turned into a system and go unrebuked. A man who lowers his precepts to the level of his will may the more easily raise his practice to the level of his precepts. He endows his life with a certain coherence, momentum, and integrity, just because he has suppressed all vain aspiration and all useless shame. He does not call himself a sinner; he would be at a loss for a reason to think himself one; for really his standard of virtue expresses nothing but his prevalent will. Is it not intelligible that such a morality should be more efficacious, more unifying, heavier, and more convinced than one which begins by condemning our natural passions and the habitual course of human life?

自我中心主义者所称的他的意志和理想，合在一起，不过是他的激情；但自我中心主义者的激情被转化为一个体系，且不受斥责。一个将自己的戒律降低到意志水平的人，可能更容易将自己的实践提升到戒律的水平。他赋予自己的生活某种连贯性、动力和完整性，正是因为他压制了所有徒劳的渴望和所有无用的羞耻。他不称自己为罪人；他会找不到理由认为自己是的；因为实际上他的美德标准只表达了他 prevailing 的意志。这样一种道德比一种以谴责我们自然激情和人类生活惯常进程为开端的道德更有效、更统一、更沉重、更确信，这难道不可理解吗？

In fact, egotism in practice is a solemn and arduous business; there is nothing malicious about it and nothing gay. There is rather a stolid surprise that such honest sentiments and so much enterprise should not meet everywhere with applause. If other

事实上，实践中的自我中心主义是一件严肃而艰巨的事情；它没有任何恶意，也没有任何欢快。倒是有一种迟钝的惊讶：如此诚实的感情和如此多的进取心竟然不能到处受到喝彩。如果其他人

people are put thereby at a disadvantage, why should they not learn their lesson and adopt in their turn the methods of the superman? If they are touched by the vanity and the charm of existence and neglect the intense pursuit of their absolute will, why do they complain if they are jostled and beaten? Only he deserves life and freedom, said Goethe, who is forced daily to win them afresh.

因此处于不利地位，他们为什么不吸取教训，转而采用超人的方法呢?如果他们被存在的虚荣和魅力所触动，而忽视对其绝对意志的强烈追求，那么当他们被推挤和击败时，为什么要抱怨呢?歌德说，只有每天被迫重新赢得生活和自由的人，才配享有它们。

If the egotist suffers passion to speak in his philosophy, it is perhaps because he has so little passion. Men of frank passions quickly see the folly of them; but the passions of the egotist are muffled, dull, like the miserly passions of old men; they are diffused into sensuality and sentiment, or hardened into maxims. Egotistical lovers can hold hands for hours and chastely kiss each other for years; such tokens of affection help to keep them in love and at the same time are a sop to more troublesome impulses. Sentimentality and gush mark the absence of passion: the blood has been diluted to lymph. Hence the egotist can the more easily mistake his passions for duties, and his cupidities for ideals. His devotion to these ideals is pure and enthusiastic; but in serving them he fattens steadily, as punctual at his work as at his meals, as dutifully moved by the approved music as by the official patriotism, vicious when it seems manly to be vicious, brutal when it seems politic to be brutal; he feels he is impeccable, and he must die in his sins. Nothing can ruffle the autonomous conscience of this kind of idealist, whose nature may be gross, but whose life is busy and conventional, and who loudly congratulates himself daily on all he knows and does.

如果自我中心主义者任凭激情在他的哲学中发言，那也许是因为他的激情太少。怀有坦率激情的人很快就会看出激情的愚蠢；但自我中心主义者的激情是沉闷的、压抑的，就像老人的吝啬激情一样；它们弥散为肉欲和感伤，或者硬化成格言。自我中心主义的恋人可以牵手数小时，纯洁地亲吻彼此数年；这些爱的表示有助于让他们保持相爱，同时也是对更麻烦的冲动的安抚。感伤和滥情标志着激情的缺失：血液已被稀释成淋巴。因此，自我中心主义者更容易把他的激情误认为义务，把他的贪欲误认为理想。他对这些理想的忠诚是纯粹而热忱的；但在侍奉这些理想时，他稳步地养肥自己，工作准时如同进餐准时，被认可的音樂感动得尽职尽责如同被官方爱国主义感动一样，当恶行显得有男子气概时就行恶，当残暴显得合于策略时就残暴；他觉得自己无可指摘，而他必定死于自己的罪中。没有什么能扰乱这类理想主义者的自主良心，他的天性也许粗俗，但他的生活忙碌而循规蹈矩，他每天大声地为自己所知所做的一切自我庆贺。

Turn the circumstances about as you like, the egotist finds only one ultimate reason for everything. It is not a reason; it is absolute

随你怎么颠倒环境，自我中心主义者对一切只找到一个终极理由。它不是理由；它是绝对的

will. Suppose we asked the ego, in the Fichtean system, why it posited a material world to be its implacable enemy and rebellious toy, and why without necessity it raised this infinity of trouble for itself and for the unhappy world which it created by its fiat. It could only reply: "Because such is the categorical imperative within me; because so I will, so I must, and so my absolute duty and its logic require. If the consequences are tragic—and in the end I know they must be tragic—that only proves the sublime unselfishness of my egotism, the purity of my sacred folly, the ideality of my groundless will. All reasons, all justifications which might appeal to me must be posterior to my will; my will itself can have no justification and no reason."

意志。假设我们在费希特体系中问自我，为什么它设定一个物质世界作为自己不可调和的敌人和叛逆的玩物，为什么它在没有必然性的情况下为自己、也为它凭自己的命令所创造的不幸世界招来这无限多的麻烦。它只能回答：“因为我心中有这样的绝对命令；因为我要如此，所以我必须如此，我的绝对义务及其逻辑要求如此。如果后果是悲剧性的--而我知道最终必定是悲剧性的--那只能证明我的自我中心主义的崇高无私，我的神圣愚行的纯洁，我的无根据意志的理想性。一切可能对我有说服力的理由、一切辩护，都必须后于我的意志；我的意志本身不可能有任何辩护，也没有任何理由。”

Let us admire the sincerity of this searching confession. Virtue itself, if it relied on self-consciousness for its philosophy, could not justify itself on other grounds. If the difference between virtue and vice is hereby obliterated, that only proves that the difference is not founded on self-consciousness but on the circumstances and powers under which we live. What self-consciousness can disclose is not the basis of anything. All will is the expression of some animal I body, frail and mortal, but teachable and rich in resource. The environment in which this will finds itself controls and rewards its various movements, and establishes within it the difference between virtue and vice, wisdom and folly.

让我们钦佩这一探询性自白的真诚。德性本身，如果它依靠自我意识来建立其哲学，就不能以其他根据为自己辩护。如果德性与恶行之间的区别由此被抹去，那只能证明这一区别并非建立在自我意识之上，而是建立在我们生活于其下的环境和力量之上。自我意识所能揭示的，不是任何事物的基础。一切意志都是某个动物身体的表现，这身体脆弱而必死，但可教且富于资源。这一意志所发现自身于其中的环境控制和奖赏它的各种运动，并在它之中确立德性与恶行、智慧与愚蠢之间的区别。

The whole transcendental philosophy, if made ultimate, is false, and nothing but a private perspective. The will is absolute neither in the individual nor in humanity. Nature is not a product of the mind, but on the contrary there is an external world, ages prior to any idea of it, which the mind recognises and feeds upon. There is a steady human nature within us, which our moods and passions

整个先验哲学，如果被当作终极的，就是错误的，只不过是一种私人的视角。意志既不在个体中也不在人类中是绝对的。自然不是心灵的产物，相反，有一个外部世界，在任何关于它的观念之前就已存在许多时代，心灵认识它并以它为食。我们内心中有一种稳定的人性，我们的情绪和激情

may wrong but cannot annul. There is no categorical imperative but only the operation of instincts and interests more or less subject to discipline and mutual adjustment. Our whole life is a compromise, an incipient loose harmony between the passions of the soul and the forces of nature, forces which likewise generate and protect the souls of other creatures, endowing them with powers of expression and self-assertion comparable with our own, and with aims no less sweet and worthy in their own eyes; so that the quick and honest mind cannot but practise courtesy in the universe, exercising its will without vehemence or forced assurance, judging with serenity, and in everything discarding the word absolute as the most false and the most odious of words. As Montaigne observes, "He who sets before him, as in a picture, this vast image of our mother Nature in her entire majesty; who reads in her aspect such universal and continual variety; who discerns himself therein, and not himself only but a whole kingdom, to be but a most delicate dot—he alone esteems things according to the just measure of their greatness."

可能犯错，但不能废除。没有绝对命令，只有或多或少服从于纪律和相互调整的本能和利益的作用。我们的整个生活是一种妥协，是灵魂的激情与自然的力量之间一种初生的松散和谐，这些力量同样产生并保护其他生物的灵魂，赋予它们与我们自己的表达能力 and 自我主张能力相当的能力，以及在其自己眼中同样甜美而值得的目的；因此，敏捷而诚实的心灵不得不在宇宙中践行礼貌，行使自己的意志而不猛烈、不强求确信，宁静地判断，并在一切事物中把“绝对的”一词当作最虚假、最可憎的词而抛弃。正如蒙田所言：“谁若把我们的母亲自然在其全部威严中的这一巨大形象像一幅画一样置于自己面前；谁若在她的面貌中读到如此普遍而持续的变化；谁若在其中辨认出自己，并且不仅自己，而且整个王国，都不过是一个极其精致的点--唯有他按照事物之伟大的公正尺度来评价事物。”

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